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RILEM TC ISR Summer 2015 Activity Report

With aging infrastructures, instances of Alkali Silica Reaction (ASR) and Delayed Ettringite Formation (DEF), broadly covered under the term Internal Swelling Reaction (ISR), are increasingly being detected. They have been observed in bridges, dams, and most recently in nuclear power plants. Concrete swelling may result in bridge partial failure, dams with structural cracks and misaligned turbine shafts, and locked slice gates. For nuclear reactors micro-cracks may cause increased gas permeability which will jeopardize the containment integrity and may decrease the residual structural resistance under accidental loading. This TC, which limits its activity to structures with known expansive concrete, seeks to address two complementary but fundamental questions: a) What is the kinetics of the reaction and b) How would it affect the integrity of the structure (serviceability and strength) and thus establish a science based prognostic to the structure owner.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites - An Update - 16057

An updated preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure and conditions relevant to transportation of SNF and GTCC waste, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to shipping transportation casks containing SNF and GTCC waste, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Every site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to add to the information presented in the evaluation. (authors)

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The Case of Nuclear Propulsion

Fission technology can enable rapid, affordable access to any point in the solar system. If fission propulsion systems are to be developed to their full potential; however, near-term customers must be identified and initial fission systems successfully developed, launched, and utilized. Successful utilization will simultaneously develop the infrastructure and experience necessary for developing even higher power and performance systems. To be successful, development programs must devise strategies for rapidly converting paper reactor concepts into actual flight hardware. One approach to accomplishing this is to design highly testable systems, and to structure the program to contain frequent, significant hardware milestones. This paper discusses ongoing efforts in Russia and the United States aimed at enabling near-term utilization of space fission systems.

Koroteev, Anatoly S.↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure and conditions relevant to transportation of SNF and GTCC waste, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to shipping transportation casks containing SNF and GTCC waste, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Every site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to add to the information presented in the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Paucity Problem: Where Have All the Space Reactor Experiments Gone?

The Handbooks of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) and the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) together contain a plethora of documented and evaluated experiments essential in the validation of nuclear data, neutronics codes, and modeling of various nuclear systems. Unfortunately, only a minute selection of handbook data (twelve evaluations) are of actual experimental facilities and mockups designed specifically for space nuclear research. There is a paucity problem, such that the multitude of space nuclear experimental activities performed in the past several decades have yet to be recovered and made available in such detail that the international community could benefit from these valuable historical research efforts. Those experiments represent extensive investments in infrastructure, expertise, and cost, as well as constitute significantly valuable resources of data supporting past, present, and future research activities. The ICSBEP and IRPhEP were established to identify and verify comprehensive sets of benchmark data; evaluate the data, including quantification of biases and uncertainties; compile the data and calculations in a standardized format; and formally document the effort into a single source of verified benchmark data. See full abstract in attached document.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Simulations of Failure via Three-Dimensional Cracking in Fuel Cladding for Advanced Nuclear Fuels

Enhancing performance of fuel cladding and duct alloys is a key means of increasing fuel burnup. This project will address the failure of fuel cladding via three-dimensional cracking models. Researchers will develop a simulation code for the failure of the fuel cladding and validate the code through experiments. The objective is to develop an algorithm to determine the failure of fuel cladding in the form of three-dimensional cracking due to prolonged exposure under varying conditions of pressure, temperature, chemical environment, and irradiation. This project encompasses the following tasks: 1. Simulate 3D crack initiation and growth under instantaneous and/or fatigue loads using a new variant of the material point method (MPM); 2. Simulate debonding of the materials in the crack path using cohesive elements, considering normal and shear traction separation laws; 3. Determine the crack propagation path, considering damage of the materials incorporated in the cohesive elements to allow the energy release rate to be minimized; 4. Simulate the three-dimensional fatigue crack growth as a function of loading histories; 5. Verify the simulation code by comparing results to theoretical and numerical studies available in the literature; 6. Conduct experiments to observe the crack path and surface profile in unused fuel cladding and validate against simulation results; and 7. Expand the adaptive mesh refinement infrastructure parallel processing environment to allow adaptive mesh refinement at the 3D crack fronts and adaptive mesh merging in the wake of cracks. Fuel cladding is made of materials such as stainless steels and ferritic steels with added alloying elements, which increase stability and durability under irradiation. As fuel cladding is subjected to water, chemicals, fission gas, pressure, high temperatures, and irradiation while in service, understanding performance is essential. In the fast fuel used in advanced burner reactors, simulations of the nuclear fuels are critical to understand the burnup, and thus the fuel efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) Monthly Report March 2015

Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) Formerly: Advanced Test Reactor National Scientific User Facility (ATR NSUF) Monthly Report February 2015 Highlights; Jim Cole attended the OECD NEA Expert Group on Innovative Structural Materials meeting in Paris, France; Jim Lane and Doug Copsey of Writers Ink visited PNNL to prepare an article for the NSUF annual report; Brenden Heidrich briefed the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee-Facilities Subcommittee on the Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database project and provided them with custom reports for their upcoming visits to Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and University of California-Berkeley Principal Investigator Mehdi Balooch visited PNNL to observe measurements and help finalize plans for completing the desired suite of analyses. His visit was coordinated to coincide with the visit of Jim Lane and Doug Copsey.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

New initiatives in materials security

NRC Mission: To license and regulate the Nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. Scope of Responsibility: NRC's regulatory mission covers three main areas: - Reactors: commercial reactors for generating electric power and non-power reactors used for research, testing, and training; - Materials: uses of nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and facilities that produce nuclear fuel; - Waste: transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and waste, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities from service. A Changing Environment: - National security is dominant concern; - Obtain appropriate balance between safety and Security initiatives and Operational activities; - Multiple layers of systems, infrastructures for various licensees. Effective Communication: Not easy; Sound bites galore; Nuclear 'phobia'; Acceptability of risk; Balance of cost and benefits; Responsibility of the regulator, licensees and radiation protection professionals. Prioritized Licensee Groups: - High priority: Panoramic irradiators; manufacturers/distributors; - Medium priority: medical and research facilities, radiography, well-logging, broad-scope licenses, self-shielded irradiators, open-field irradiators, and other licensees; - Low priority: Portable gauges. Increased Security Measures: Security Zone; Control Access; Monitor, Detect, Assess, and Respond; Transportation Security; Additional control to secure portable and mobile devices; Liaison with Local Law Enforcement Agencies; Background Investigations and Fingerprinting; License Verification; Document Retention; Information Protection; Orders/Legally binding requirements to more than 3000 licensees. Orders Issued: Large Panoramic Irradiators Security Measures (60 Orders issued 6/03, Inspections done); Manufacturing and Distribution Licensees Security Measures (61 Orders issued 1/04, Inspections done); Transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (167 Orders Issued 07/05, Inspections done); Orders for Increased Control Measures for other types of sources by categories of licenses (1,098 NRC Orders and 1782 binding State requirements issued by 12/05, Implemented 06/06, Inspections done by NRC and States). Security Inspection Results: All first year Increased Control inspections completed; NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-16 issued May 2007; Since IN 2007-16 was issued, {approx}50% of the NRC inspections performed resulted in violations; Licensees misinterpreted or incompletely implemented requirements; Common theme: failure to properly document actions or programs when implementing the Increased Controls. Energy Policy Act of 2005: Established Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force: cooperative effort with 14 Federal agencies, 2 State organizations; Comprehensive analysis of the security of radiation sources in the U.S.; Directed NRC to contract with National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on radiation source use and replacement; Report to the President and Congress issued 8/06 and every 4 years thereafter. Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force: Need higher priority on international transport security; Evaluate feasibility of using new and existing technologies to detect and discourage theft during transport; Conduct a feasibility study on the possible phase out of CsCl in highly dispersible forms; Further evaluate potential alternative technologies; Expedite completion of fingerprint requirements in Act. National Source Tracking System: Joint NRC/DOE 2003 report on Radiological Dispersal Devices recommended development of a national source tracking system; IAEA Code of Conduct recommended establishment of a national registry; U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 placed requirements for NRC to issue regulations establishing a mandatory tracking system. New Fingerprinting Requirements: Orders were issued to NRC Increased Control licensees on Dec 5, 2007; Licensees have 60 days to notify the NRC if they are unable to comply or if compliance is unnecessary; Licensees have 90 days to fingerprint and approve a Trustworthiness and Reliability Official; Licensees will have 180 days to implement program; 34 Agreement Stated Increased Control Licensees will receive similar requirements within 180 days. 2007 GAO Investigation: Formed Bogus Company and Obtained NRC License; Altered NRC License; Two Suppliers Agreed to Sell Material; Parallel Attempt to Obtain Agreement State; License Aborted When Notified of Site Visit. Short-Term Actions Taken: Terminated the NRC License; Stopped issuance of new NRC licenses until Interim Guidance was issued; Mandatory pre-Licensing visits or meetings for new applicants; Performed consequence assessment; Coordinated with Federal and State Partners; Retrospective exam ensure licensees are legitimate. Action Plan: Independent, 120-day external review Issued 2/11/08 for comment; National Source Tracking System - Jan 2009; Web-Based Licensing; General Licenses and Outreach; Pre-Licensing and Materials Working Groups; Agreement State Partnership; Comprehensive Internal Assessment. Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS 2008-02): Issued February 1, 2008; Latest developments in materials security; Highlights Energy Policy Act 2005, GAO report and National Academy pending Feb 2008 report; New efforts with DHS, DOE/NNSA and manufacturers on additional security enhancements for Cs-137 irradiators; Low-cost, easily implemented physical security improvements. Enhanced State, Federal and International Partnerships: Federal, State and local interface; DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 'Securing the Cities' Initiative; DHS Protective Action Guides for RDDs and INDs; DOE/NNSA's Securing the Sources Initiative; International nuclear security outreach activities. (authors)

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Overview of the US Nuclear Science User Facilities

Specialized and often unique and expensive instrumentation, adapted for use on radioactive materials, is essential to conduct research in the area of nuclear energy. Much of this equipment is located in facilities dedicated for such work that have been built and maintained over many decades. The Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) was established in 2007 under the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) in order to bring these capabilities together with those innovative ideas from researchers at universities, national laboratories, small business, and industry that might not have regular access to reactors, hot cells, transportation casks, radiologically qualified instrumentation, and associated expertise. Early descriptions of the originally named Advanced Test Reactor National Scientific User Facility have been given. Through a competitively reviewed proposal process, the NSUF offers access to these capabilities and expertise at no cost to the user to promote research that will address the mission of DOE-NE. As a national organization comprised of a number of partner facilities across the US and located at National Laboratory, university, and industry sites, the NSUF supports materials science studies directed at irradiation effects in nuclear fuels and materials as well as in-pile and post irradiation examination (PIE) instrumentation development. The NSUF has created a Nuclear Fuels and Materials Library (NFML) of previously irradiated materials that users may access for their studies. Expanding the library for future applications of advanced technologies and novel concepts is an important objective of the NSUF. The NSUF has established and maintains the Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database (NEID) as a tool for both DOE-NE and the nuclear energy research community. The extensive catalogue of capabilities is intended to aid DOE-NE, NSUF, and researchers more effectively and efficiently utilize the available capabilities. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Management of the decommissioning of the Thetis reactor

The Thetis research reactor on the site of the Nuclear Sciences Institute of the Ghent University has been in operation from 1967 until December 2003. This light-water moderated graphite-reflected low-enriched uranium pool-type reactor has been used for various purposes e.g. the production of radioisotopes and activation analyses. During the first years its core power was 15 kW. In the early '70, a core enlargement allowed for operation at typically 150 kW, while the maximum was allowed to be 250 kW In September 2007, Ghent University entrusted to SCK-CEN the management of the back-end of the spent fuel and the decommissioning of the reactor. In 2010, the spent fuel was removed from the reactor and transported to Belgoprocess for cementation in 400 l drums and interim storage awaiting final disposal. This activity allows tackling the decommissioning of the reactor. The objective is to complete its decommissioning by the end of 2014. In the framework of the decommissioning of the Thetis reactor, SCK-CEN set-up the final decommissioning plan and the decommissioning licensing file. These documents include among others a radiological inventory of the reactor. The graphite moderator blocks, the control and the safety pates, the liner of the pool were modeled to assess the activation products (isotopic vector and intensity). At the end of the unloading of the reactor in 2010 a brief mapping of the equipment's and internals of the reactor pool was performed. In 2012, we realized a more detailed mapping. These results confirmed those performed earlier and allowed to confirm the assumptions made in the final decommissioning plan. We set-up the terms of reference for the first decommissioning phase of the reactor namely the dismantling of the reactor i.e. reactor pool, circuits and rabbit system, equipment's and ventilation ducts. The removal of asbestos is also included into this phase. We conducted the selection process and the awarding of this decommissioning job. We gained the decommissioning license in May 2012. We also prepared the software tool allowing managing the decommissioning project by updating the inventory and recording the progress, the characterization measurements and the material and waste production. This software allows also to trace all the material streams and to report to the Authorities. This software is a simplified release of the ones developed by SCK-CEN in the framework of other decommissioning projects like BR3 and Belgonucleaire. The dismantling of the reactor i.e. reactor pool, circuits and rabbit system, will be performed in 2013. In 2014, it is planned to map all the surfaces of the infrastructure to highlight residual contamination of floor, walls and ceiling. The contaminated surfaces will be decontaminated and controlled. The objective is to reach the free release of the reactor building and laboratories by the end of 2014. (authors)

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Use of Multi-Attribute Utility Analyses to Assess Transportation Routes from ISFSIs - 20535

With two consolidated interim storage facilities for used nuclear fuel (UNF) having applied for storage licenses, there is the potential need to transport UNF in the U.S. from shutdown reactor sites to complete the site cleanup and from operating reactor sites who may be running out of storage options (e.g., spent fuel pools are nearly full and dry storage facilities are reaching licensed capacity). At some of the shutdown reactor sites, only the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) exists and often there remains a degraded transportation infrastructure for performing shipments from these sites. At other sites (e.g., operating reactor plants), the existing transportation infrastructure on the site is unchanged and sufficient for moving UNF, but the environment around the route may have changed (e.g., what was once a rural setting has transformed into a more urban setting) and/or local stakeholders want their input taken into consideration in UNF transportation activities. So, although preliminary evaluations have been performed to identify viable modes of transport from these sites using rail, barge, and/or heavy haul truck, if multiple options exist for moving the UNF from the site (e.g., multiple truck routes or a truck and a barge route both exist) then an evaluation that takes input from multiple stakeholders should be considered to identified the preference (e.g., ranking) of routes from a site. Orano has supported the development of several studies examining the viable routes for removing UNF from some of these sites and has utilized a multi-attribute utility analysis (MUA) to establish a ranking of routes and associated modes to move the UNF from the ISFSIs to a Class I rail carrier. The ultimate result from the MUA is a list(s) of the most to the least favored/preferred routes from the site. This paper provides an overview of the MUA methodology and provides an example of its application to a site with a shutdown reactor. (authors)

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A Look at the U.S. Energy System – A Strategic Impact Model (2050 SIM)

The United States (U.S.) energy infrastructure is among the most reliable, accessible, and economical in the world. On the other hand, it is also excessively reliant on foreign energy sources, experiences high volatility in energy prices, does not always practice good stewardship of finite indigenous energy resources, and emits significant quantities of greenhouse gases. The U.S. Department of Energy is conducting research and development on advanced nuclear reactor concepts and technologies, including High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technologies, directed at helping the United States meet its current and future energy challenges. This paper discusses the systematic approach used to develop the 2050 Strategic Impact Model (2050 SIM), which allows the user to analyze and depict the benefits of various energy sources in meeting the energy demand. It also provides an overall systems understanding of the tradeoffs between building and using HTGRs versus other existing technologies for providing energy (heat and electricity) to various energy-use sectors in the United States. This paper also provides the assumptions used in the model, the rational for the methodology, and the references for the source documentation and source data used in developing 2050 SIM.

2050↗

Energy Integration for 2050 - A Strategic Impact Model (2050 SIM), Version 1.0

The United States (U.S.) energy infrastructure is among the most reliable, accessible, and economic in the world. On the other hand, it is also excessively reliant on foreign energy sources, experiences high volatility in energy prices, does not always practice good stewardship of finite indigenous energy resources, and emits significant quantities of greenhouse gas. The U.S. Department of Energy is conducting research and development on advanced nuclear reactor concepts and technologies, including High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technologies, directed at helping the United States meet its current and future energy challenges. This report discusses the Draft Strategic Impact Model (SIM), an initial version of which was created during the later part of FY-2010. SIM was developed to analyze and depict the benefits of various energy sources in meeting the energy demand and to provide an overall system understanding of the tradeoffs between building and using HTGRs versus other existing technologies for providing energy (heat and electricity) to various energy-use sectors in the United States. This report also provides the assumptions used in the model, the rationale for the methodology, and the references for the source documentation and source data used in developing the SIM.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Energy Integration for 2050 - A Strategic Impact Model (2050 SIM), Version 2.0

The United States (U.S.) energy infrastructure is among the most reliable, accessible, and economic in the world. On the other hand, it is also excessively reliant on foreign energy sources, experiences high volatility in energy prices, does not always practice good stewardship of finite indigenous energy resources, and emits significant quantities of greenhouse gas. The U.S. Department of Energy is conducting research and development on advanced nuclear reactor concepts and technologies, including High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) technologies, directed at helping the United States meet its current and future energy challenges. This report discusses the Draft Strategic Impact Model (SIM), an initial version of which was created during the later part of FY-2010. SIM was developed to analyze and depict the benefits of various energy sources in meeting the energy demand and to provide an overall system understanding of the tradeoffs between building and using HTGRs versus other existing technologies for providing energy (heat and electricity) to various energy-use sectors in the United States. This report also provides the assumptions used in the model, the rationale for the methodology, and the references for the source documentation and source data used in developing the SIM.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Development of a Cloud-based Application to Enable a Scalable Risk-informed Predictive Maintenance Strategy at Nuclear Power Plants

Light-water reactor operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are prohibitively high, thus contributing to the premature decommissioning of nuclear power plants (NPPs). This is partly due to how the equipment is monitored. In recent years, cloud computing has emerged as a dominant technology by virtue of its low costs, computing and storage adaptability, and ability to host applications over numerous types of virtual infrastructures. Cloud computing can be a cost-effective alternative to onsite storage and diagnostics. This paper conducts a techno-economic assessment of a provisional cloud deployment architecture for a NPP predictive monitoring (PdM) system. The cloud-based monitoring system would enable maintenance and diagnostics (M&D) analysts and other authorized plant users to remotely monitor equipment functionality so as to enable PdM practices and early detection of faults. The Microsoft Azure cloud platform is included in the proposed cloud architecture to provide data processing and storage, sensor device networking, and database management; however, this analysis could be extended to other cloud computing service providers as well. For the techno-economic assessment, technical feasibility is measured in terms of network performance metrics such as response time, latency, and throughput, whereas economic feasibility is measured in terms of operational costs and capital expenditures. Finally, this report covers certain regulatory and security aspects that may concern licensees looking to implement cloud computing. The report focuses on the integration of sensor database storage, the application of cloud resources to PdM, and the identification of technological and economic hurdles associated with moving to a cloud-computing-based architecture.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Reconstruction of 3D Concrete Microstructures Combining High-Resolution Characterization and Convolutional Neural Network for Image Segmentation

After water, concrete is the second most used material in the world. Concrete’s forming adaptability and low-cost constituents make it a predominant material used in the construction of civil infrastructures in nuclear power plants such as concrete biological shields, containment buildings, turbine buildings, fuel handling and storage buildings, underground piping for cooling, cooling towers, and so on. Depending on environmental and operating conditions, these passive structures are subject to time-dependent phenomena that can either enhance (e.g., continued hydration) or degrade concrete’s structural performance. Unlike components such as the reactor pressure vessel and the primary circuit, concrete composition varies regionally because it is manufactured using local aggregates and cement. Hence, concrete performance metrics over time cannot be derived confidently using empirical relations. Alternatively, the specific characteristics of the local concrete constituents and their assemblage in concrete must be considered.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of a Technology Roadmap for Online Monitoring of Nuclear Power Plants

The nuclear power industry has recently recognized the potential cost saving that can be achieved from migrating the current manual and labor dependent surveillance and preventive maintenance activities to data-driven online monitoring methods. Since then, several efforts have been launched with various degrees of momentum to tackle specific surveillance or preventive maintenance activities. The light water reactor sustainability program (LWRS) program has anticipated this need and launched an effort that aimed to develop a technology roadmap for the nuclear power industry. Because the roadmap has to be focused towards the user or application’s value, and because nuclear power plants have different process efficiencies and deficiencies, the technology roadmap has to be plant independent. Achieving this objective required optimizing the extent of details described by a technology roadmap. The approach followed is for the roadmap to describe the sequence of activities needed to automate a process or equipment activity, but not describe the sequence of processes or equipment to target. For example, the steps required to migrate the inspection of a pump are plant independent. However, defining that the migration of feed water pumps inspections to online monitoring should be performed before inspections of feed water valves is dependent on multiple plant factors such as the plant requirements, labor work capacity, and process or equipment conditions. The technology roadmap was broken down into six elements, four of which have a sequential path of advancement, while the other two are supporting elements to the sequential elements. The sequential part of the roadmap analyzes data collection, analytics, visualization, and management. For these elements of the technology roadmap, the migration of an activity is defined in three states. The base state is defined as the most primitive, manual, and labor dependent process used by some nuclear power plants. The modern state is defined as the state that can be achieved if the activities are augmented or replaced by current technologies that are commercially available or are soon to be available. The state of the art is defined as using technologies of the future, i.e. concept and technologies that are being researched. The data collection part of the technology roadmap defines three states of every process performed in a nuclear power plant. However, the data analytics part is described based on equipment, because automating an activity performed on one equipment required considering multiple data sources. The visualization and data management elements are process or equipment independent. Visualization describes the means to use human factor science and technologies advancement in presenting the data collected and the data analytics results. The data management targets storage, communication, and computational power need, in addition to data integration and sharing. Since storage, communication, and computational power technologies and path for deployment are known to any information technology organization, this effort targeted the cost of data management. This has a direct impact on the feasibility of the automation effort. The supporting elements analyzes the value of automating the activity and the change challenges to tackle. For the support elements, the roadmap targeted describing activities that need to be performed as part of the roadmap development. The value element of the roadmap describes how to analyze the cost saving and the associated risk. The change management identifies multiple factors to consider such as regulation, cybersecurity, resource availability, supporting infrastructure availability, feasibility (power, fitness, environment tolerance, facilities), and cultural change.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assessing Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Consequences of Damage to Critical Infrastructure

Since the publication of 'Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure,' there has been a keen understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and shared responsibility required to protect the nation's most critical assets that are essential to our way of life. The original 5 sectors defined in 1997 have grown to 18 Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR), which are discussed in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its supporting sector-specific plans. The NIPP provides the structure for a national program dedicated to enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provides in-depth, multi-disciplinary assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence across all 18 sectors at scales ranging from specific facilities to infrastructures spanning multi-state regions, such as the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) sector. Like many of the CIKR sectors, the ONG sector is comprised of production, processing, distribution, and storage of highly valuable and potentially dangerous commodities. Furthermore, there are significant interdependencies with other sectors, including transportation, communication, finance, and government. Understanding the potentially devastating consequences and collateral damage resulting from a terrorist attack or natural event is an important element of LLNL's infrastructure security programs. Our work began in the energy sector in the late 1990s and quickly expanded other critical infrastructure sectors. We have performed over 600 physical assessments with a particular emphasis on those sectors that utilize, store, or ship potentially hazardous materials and for whom cyber security is important. The success of our approach is based on building awareness of vulnerabilities and risks and working directly with industry partners to collectively advance infrastructure protection. This approach consists of three phases: The Pre-Assessment Phase brings together infrastructure owners and operators to identify critical assets and help the team create a structured information request. During this phase, we gain information about the critical assets from those who are most familiar with operations and interdependencies, making the time we spend on the ground conducting the assessment much more productive and enabling the team to make actionable recommendations. The Assessment Phase analyzes 10 areas: Threat environment, cyber architecture, cyber penetration, physical security, physical penetration, operations security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, consequence analysis, and risk characterization. Each of these individual tasks uses direct and indirect data collection, site inspections, and structured and facilitated workshops to gather data. Because of the importance of understanding the cyber threat, LLNL has built both fixed and mobile cyber penetration, wireless penetration and supporting tools that can be tailored to fit customer needs. The Post-Assessment Phase brings vulnerability and risk assessments to the customer in a format that facilitates implementation of mitigation options. Often the assessment findings and recommendations are briefed and discussed with several levels of management and, if appropriate, across jurisdictional boundaries. The end result is enhanced awareness and informed protective measures. Over the last 15 years, we have continued to refine our methodology and capture lessons learned and best practices. The resulting risk and decision framework thus takes into consideration real-world constraints, including regulatory, operational, and economic realities. In addition to 'on the ground' assessments focused on mitigating vulnerabilities, we have integrated our computational and atmospheric dispersion capability with easy-to-use geo-referenced visualization tools to support emergency planning and response operations. LLNL is home to the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). NARAC/IMAAC has capabilities to respond to toxic industrial chemical spills, nuclear-power plant accidents, fires, chemical/biological agents, radiological/nuclear devices (RDDs, INDs), and other airborne hazards. Our web-based systems provide hazards assessments of critical infrastructure for defensive planning and can provide infrastructure operators and emergency responders with a baseline for planning and exercises. LLNL's infrastructure security web mapping services facilitate dissemination of technical information for all phases of disaster management. Examples of some of these products are shown in the Figure 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗