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Final technical report

A new series of MW-class, RF loads were developed that can dissipate power levels exceeding 1.5 MW at frequencies from 28 GHz to 180 GHz. The new loads are designed to reflect less than 0.25% of the input power and operate continuously (CW). Stainless-steel and anodized aluminum versions were developed. The stainless steel version is designed to meet requirements for nuclear facilities, such as ITER, while the aluminum version is capable of power levels exceeding 2 MW CW. The aluminum version is also lighter and less expensive. This report describes the design activities during the program and the performance characteristics of the loads.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Trace Elemental Analysis of Bulk Thorium Using an Automated Separation–Inductively Coupled Plasma Optical Emission Spectroscopy Methodology

Presented here is a novel automated method for determining the trace element composition of bulk thorium by inductively coupled plasma–optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES). ICP-OES is a universal approach for measuring the trace elemental impurities present in actinide-rich materials; however, due to the emission rich spectrum of the actinide, a separation from the trace elements is warranted for spectrochemical analysis. Here, AG MP-1 ion exchange resin was utilized for retention of the Th matrix, while allowing the trace element impurities to be separated prior to subsequent analysis using ICP-OES. After demonstrating the separation on traditional gravity-driven columns, the methodology was transitioned to an automated platform for comparison. This automated platform utilizes syringe-driven sample and solvent flow and can collect the trace element and thorium fractions in separate locations. Finally, while reducing the sample size (500 µL, 1.5 mg of Th), maintaining the overall separation efficiency (recoveries >95%), and illustrating the sample throughput ability (n = 10+), this automated methodology could be readily adopted to nuclear facilities in which the determination of trace elemental impurities in Th samples is warranted.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

UAS Live Incursion Drills Survey

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS/drones) are rapidly evolving and are considered an emerging threat by nuclear facilities throughout the world. Due to the wide range of UAS capabilities, members of the workforce and security/response force personnel need to be prepared for a variety of drone incursion situations. Tabletop exercises are helpful, but actual live exercises are often needed to evaluate the quick chain of events that might ensue during a real drone fly-in and the essential kinds of information that will help identify the type of drone and pilot. Even with drone detection equipment, the type of UAS used for incursion drills can have a major impact on detection altitude and finding the UAS in the sky. Using a variety of UAS, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) would like to offer partners the capability of adding actual UAS into workforce and response exercises to improve overall UAS awareness as well as the procedures that capture critical steps in dealing with intruding drones.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Integration of Wireless Sensor Networks and Battery-free RFID for Advanced Reactors

To address an important need for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) to significantly reduce the amount of the required cables for sensor data communications, this Phase I SBIR effort successfully developed and demonstrated a novel low-cost proof-of-concept prototype of a secure wireless sensor network backbone communications system. This system combines commercially available low power, low cost XBEE wireless communications network and passive (battery-free) Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems to report individual sensor data and their location through the containment wall for rapid response to anomalies in nuclear facilities. This WIreless Sensing and Locating (WISLO) system network architecture allows non-intrusive wireless collection of sensor data with the sensor’s accurate location information from inside of the instrumentation or containment area with minimal need for power sources. The multi-node sensor data in the containment area is wirelessly transmitted to outside through the metal reinforced concrete walls without the need for any batteries. The WISLO system could be readily used in current reactor fleet and future advanced reactors, as well as in small modular reactors (SMR). The WISLO system is the first dual frequency battery-free trough the wall communications backbone system developed specifically for use in nuclear power plants. It not only can modernize the sensor monitoring practices in the existing reactor fleet, but also offers a secure, low-cost solution to advanced reactors and SMRs by removing cables and issues related to them such as cable integrity, reporting delays, and installation and maintenance costs. The intent is to improve process safety, reliability, efficiency, and cost effectiveness to the monitoring and maintenance process in current and future plants. As we address the next productization and manufacturing capabilities in the next phase, this system will serve the needs of many commercial and government applications in remote monitoring of sensor data that demand battery-free transmission of sensor data such as Internet-of-Things (IOT).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

5G Communications in Nuclear: Potential Use Cases and Security Considerations

As fifth-generation (5G) communications continues to revolutionize the future of wireless technology, there is growing demand to utilize its benefits for critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants (NPPs). In regard to achieving full automation and control in the operation of existing and future nuclear reactors, the unique capabilities of 5G can bring several potential advantages over other wireless technologies. However, a deep investigation is needed for the availability and security of 5G communications under various NPP operational scenarios. This article examines how 5G security capabilities can be architecturally deployed in nuclear applications so as to replace existing communication infrastructures. We discuss the current use of all wireless technologies in NPPs with their key features. Consequently, we investigated several NPP use cases in which 5G offers potential advantages but entails specific security considerations. The present article covers the characteristics of 5G communications, general challenges to its application in nuclear, and the security gaps that need to be addressed. We also highlight certain 5G security-by-design features that can help addressing current stringent NPP requirements. In addition, we discuss some future research direction that can facilitate the implementation of 5G in a nuclear facility. The findings presented herein can help foster 5G deployment in NPPs, thus enabling secured data transmission, cost savings, and increased operational efficiency with enhanced reliability.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Reactor physics benchmark experiments at the JSI TRIGA MARK II reactor - Current status and future outlook

Full text of publication follows. With the development of new high-fidelity computational methods, improvement of nuclear data, and multiphysics modelling, there is an increased need for benchmark experiments to experimentally validate the models, methods and input data. Many of the nuclear facilities designed to perform reactor physics benchmark experiments have been shut down. Therefore, research reactors offer a great opportunity for benchmark experiments, if they are well designed and performed with great care and accuracy. In this presentation we provide an overview of the past and ongoing activities related to benchmark experiments at the Jozef Stefan Institute TRIGA Mark II research reactor. The following experiments have been performed: criticality with fresh fuel, {sup 197}Au(n,γ) and {sup 27}Al(n,α) reaction rates in irradiation channels, absolute and relative {sup 197}Au(n,γ), {sup 235}U(n,f) and {sup 238}U(n,f) reaction rates in the core, burnup, kinetic parameters, control rod worth, isothermal reactivity coefficient, self-shielding, slow and fast (pulse) transients, nuclear heating, delayed and prompt gamma ray production, temperature profiles for multi-physics. Since the existing fleet of research reactors is ageing very rapidly and new experiments are needed, new research reactors should be designed and built to meet the needs of future advanced reactors, education and training, and other technologies in the coming years. We will review planned activities at the JSI TRIGA reactors and plans for the new research reactor in Slovenia. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

MINOS Infrasound Analysis Synopsis

This report was written as a guide to working with infrasound data collected as part of the Multi-Informatics for Nuclear Operations Scenarios (MINOS)project, an NA-22 funded venture. The main purpose of overall MINOS project is the combination of multiple, disparate data modalities to characterize the operations at a nuclear facility, specifically instrumenting and studying the High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) locate at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN. HFIR is an 85 MW research reactor and is used primarily for production of medical radioisotopes, material irradiation experiments, neutron activation, and neutron scattering. Targets for the reactor are constructed, processed, and dissolved at REDC. REDC also hosts other glove-box and hot-cell type activities.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Materials and Fuels Complex Operations Management Improvement Strategy for FY2022

The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) has experienced substantial growth in terms of staff, research, and production in recent years. MFC operational performance has effectively kept pace with this growth. However, to capture the continuous improvement actions needed to improve effectiveness and increase the efficiency of our management systems, a broad operations management strategy is necessary. The MFC Operations Management Improvement (OMI) Strategy is complementary to the MFC Five-Year Mission and Investment Strategies and the MFC Management Plan. The OMI strategy is structured to address the management systems outlined in the Nuclear Facility Management Standard Operations Model. Selected management systems are evaluated independently in chapters that describe the prior 5 years of performance improvement, a description of improvement actions for the MFC staff that directly perform within or contribute to the management system, process improvements, and any needed equipment improvements. Chapter selection is based on a management system’s need for improvement. In some cases, management systems may be combined in a single chapter. Additional chapters are added to address subject areas not formally described in the standard operations model.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Gas diffusion through variably-water-saturated zeolitic tuff: Implications for transport following a subsurface nuclear event

Noble gas transport through geologic media has important applications in the characterization of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). Without accurate transport models, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between xenon signatures originating from civilian nuclear facilities and UNEs. Understanding xenon transport time through the earth is a key parameter for interpreting measured xenon isotopic ratios. One of the most challenging aspects of modeling gas transport time is accounting for the effect of variable water saturation of geological media. In this study, we utilize bench-scale laboratory experiments to characterize the diffusion of krypton, xenon, and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) through intact zeolitic tuff under different saturations. Here, we demonstrate that the water in rock cores with low partial saturation dramatically affects xenon transport time compared to that of krypton and SF6 by blocking sites in zeolitic tuff that preferentially adsorb xenon. This leads to breakthrough trends that are strongly influenced by the degree of the rock saturation. Xenon is especially susceptible to this phenomenon, a finding that is crucial to incorporate in subsurface gas transport models used for nuclear event identification. We also find that the breakthrough of SF6 diverges significantly from that of noble gases within our system. When developing field scale models, it is important to understand how the behavior of xenon deviates from chemical tracers used in the field, such as SF6 (Carrigan et al., 1996). These new insights demonstrate the critical need to consider the interplay between rock saturation and fission product sorption during transport modeling, and the importance of evaluating specific interactions between geomedia and gases of interest, which may differ from geomedia interactions with chemical tracers.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Application of the ANSI/ANS-8.3-2022 Minimum Accident to Tube Vault Storage

In support of planned site activities, the existing basis for criticality safety in nuclear facilities is being revisited. One such technical basis is the demonstration of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) coverage in tube vaults at Y-12 National Security Complex. The configuration of the vaults places significant shielding between the source and the detector stations and is dissimilar to drum storage or other processes. This paper describes tube vault storage at Y-12, describes the basis for the application of the 2022 minimum accident for system design (MASD) to the analysis, and presents how the accident is implemented in the analysis.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Improved Nondestructive Isotopic Analysis with Practical Microcalorimeter Gamma Spectrometers

Advances in both instrumentation and data analysis software are now enabling the first ultra-high-resolution microcalorimeter gamma spectrometers designed for implementation in nuclear facilities and analytical laboratories. With approximately ten times better energy resolution than high-purity germanium detectors, these instruments can overcome important uncertainty limits. Microcalorimeter gamma spectroscopy is intended to provide nondestructive isotopic analysis capabilities with sufficient precision and accuracy to reduce the need for sampling, chemical separations, and mass spectrometry to meet safeguards and security goals. Key milestones were the development of the SOFIA instrument (Spectrometer Optimized for Facility Integrated Applications) and the SAPPY software (Spectral Analysis Program in PYthon). SOFIA is a compact instrument that combines advances in large multiplexed transition-edge sensor arrays with optimized cryogenic performance to overcome many practical limitations of previous systems. With a 256-pixel multiplexed detector array capable of 5,000 counts per second, measurement time can be comparable to high-purity germanium detectors. SAPPY was developed to determine isotopic ratios in data from SOFIA and other microcalorimeter instruments with an approach similar to the widely-used FRAM software. SAPPY provides a flexible framework with rigorous uncertainty analysis for both microcalorimeter and high purity germanium (HPGe) data, allowing direct comparison. Here, we present current results from the SOFIA instrument, preliminary isotopic analysis using SAPPY, and describe how the technology is being used to explore uncertainty limits of nondestructive isotopic characterization, inform safeguards models, and extract improved nuclear data including gamma-ray branching ratios.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

STAND Quickstart Guide

STAND is a flexible web application designed to identify and examine potentially feasible sites where advanced nuclear facilities might be welcomed by host communities. STAND allows the user to explore and provide insight on socioeconomic, proximity, and safety data, generate county reports, review regulatory data, and complete a comparative analysis across multiple sites by following several paths, either individually or sequentially based on the user’s needs and where they are in the deployment process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Building Interfaces with Echo Using R

The following report details the functionality that was developed to directly query the MongoDB and read in echo records from within R, and the ability to create a cinema database directly from echo records. Both of these efforts used the data collected under the MINOS project for development. The nuclear facility under consideration is the High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and co-located Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN. HFIR is an 85 MW research reactor and is used primarily for production of a medical radioisotopes, material irradiation experiments, neutron activation, and neutron scattering. Targets for the reactor are fabricated and processed and dissolved at REDC, in addition to other glove-box and hot-cell type activities. An overhead view of the facility is provided. The rest of the report is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how to query the MongoDB and load in echo records from within R, with background information on the database type, MongoDB, and the file format of echo records, hdf5, as well as lessons learned during the development phase. Section 3 details the functionality and usage of creating a cinema database directly from echo records within R. A series of appendixes display all the R code (Section 5), some example scripts where the code is used (Section 6), and useful links for further exploration (Section 7).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developments to the Distributed Holdup Monitoring System in Fiscal Year 2025

Permanently installed holdup monitoring would provide a myriad of benefits to nuclear facilities, ranging among decreased facility burden, increased safety bases, and increased accuracy of relevant material controls and accountancy metrics. However, the cost per detection system must be affordable to provide reliable coverage. For this project, the target unit price per system has been $\$$1,000. Recent work has focused on pushing costs lower through developing a plastic scintillator and silicon photomultiplier (SiPM)–based front end, which are components that are not commercially available in conjunction with each other. Other work has included further system development and use of a low-cost SiPM. Finally, a limited deployment at a processing facility was achieved. Results from this deployment and the development process are discussed in detail.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Design Considerations for the Field Use of International Nuclear Safeguards Technology

The process of developing and deploying safeguards technology should be carried out in such a way that it supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) international safeguards verification mission, while also being efficient in terms of both cost and time. This process, however, may be hindered by a general lack of nuclear facility operating experience among the scientists or engineers designing safeguards technology, or the inability to interact with the IAEA inspector end user. As a result, equipment designers may have difficulty understanding inspector needs and the limitations of using safeguards technology in the field, often leading to inefficiencies (in the form of increased cost and time spent) in the safeguards technology design process. Here, to mitigate this knowledge gap, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has developed design considerations that should be incorporated into safeguards technologies, focusing on non-destructive assay equipment. Timelines for integration of these considerations into the design process are also discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Machine learning at the edge to improve in-field safeguards inspections

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are near-ubiquitous in day-to-day life; from cars with automated driver-assistance, recommender systems, generative content platforms, and large language chatbots. Implementing AI as a tool for international safeguards could significantly decrease the burden on safeguards inspectors and nuclear facility operators. The use of AI would allow inspectors to complete their in-field activities quicker, while identifying patterns and anomalies and freeing inspectors to focus on the uniquely human component of inspections. Sandia National Laboratories has spent the past two and a half years developing on-device machine learning to develop both a digital and robotic assistant. This combined platform, which we term inspecta, has numerous on-device machine learning capabilities that have been demonstrated at the laboratory scale. Here this work describes early successes implementing AI/ML capabilities to reduce the burden of tedious inspector tasks such as seal examination, information recall, note taking, and more.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗