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At least 307 records · Page 17

Utilizing Physics-Informed Synthetic Data to Train a Digital Twin for Predicting Reactor Operations

Understanding techniques to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime is crucial in reducing the creation of nuclear weaponry on the basis of advancements in the nuclear energy industry. Prior to construction of a nuclear power plant, it is necessary to understand the proliferation potential of the plant’s reactor. Digital twins serve as a unique solution to recognizing reactor behavior indicative of nuclear proliferation. The following research conducted serves as a validation to training a digital twin on synthetic data fabricated via means of reactor physics simulations based on parameters of Idaho State University’s AGN-201 reactor. The synthetic data is utilized to train a long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network model. The accuracy of the predicted data is measured against real operational data to verify the reliability of the synthetic data creation methods and if these methods should be used in the future to inform inspectors of a reactor’s proliferation capabilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

An Assessment of Machine Learning Applied to Ultrasonic Nondestructive Evaluation

In the United States, the nuclear industry performs inservice inspection (ISI) through nondestructive examination (NDE) methods in accordance with guidelines specified in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components. Ultrasonic nondestructive testing and evaluation (NDT&E) is one of the more commonly used techniques for inspecting Class 1 structural components in nuclear power systems. As the number of qualified NDE inspectors declines, the nuclear industry is looking to take advantage of advances in automation to enhance inspection capabilities. Advances in computational power, cloud-based computing, and machine learning algorithms make automated data analysis possible. Machine learning (ML) has shown huge potential in automated data analyses for ultrasonic NDE in the context of weld inspections.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Advanced Diagnosis and Accelerated Testing of Balance of System Components for Utility Scale PV Installations: October 1, 2022-September 30, 2024

A study of the durability of PV Balance of System components was performed. Specifically, wire cable jackets and cable connectors were examined within the direct current (DC) PV Power Transmission Chain (PTC). Degraded and failed samples have been obtained from utility PV installations to provide feedback on the degradation modes and the related damage-enabling considerations in today's PV systems. An industry interface group (including system owners, system inspectors, component manufacturers, and test labs) was used to help identify and obtain field-failed samples, for feedback (including samples and experimental design), and to facilitate the subsequent dissemination of the results of this study. Samples were empirically studied using accelerated stress testing with steady-state conditions (cable jackets) in addition to combined-accelerated stress testing (cable jackets, connectors and uncapped connectors). Steady-state accelerated testing has been performed using at least one applied stressor (e.g. UV light) to aid understanding of jacket durability relative to its application. Component- and material-focused failure analysis was conducted to develop an understanding and advise the PV industry. In-depth characterization will be applied selectively to field- and artificially aged-samples, to gain scientific understanding of the structural, chemical, electrical, mechanical, and thermal properties enabling degradation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Análisis de Tareas del Auditor Energético [Energy Auditor Job Task Analysis (Spanish Translation)]

El Laboratorio Nacional de Energía Renovable (NREL), bajo el contrato con el Programa de Asistencia para la Climatización (WAP) del Departamento de Energía de EE.UU. (DOE), desarrolla y mantiene los recursos en el marco del proyecto Directrices para Profesionales de la Energía Doméstica (GHEP). El objetivo del proyecto GHEP es aumentar la calidad del trabajo de remodelación energética residencial realizado por WAP y otros programas de remodelación residencial en Estados Unidos. Para cumplir el objetivo de “Establecer certificaciones nacionales de la mano de obra y normas de formación”, el DOE encargó al NREL el desarrollo de recursos GHEP, incluido un conjunto de certificaciones avanzadas, basadas en aptitud, para el personal de los profesionales de la energía doméstica (HEP). Desde 2010, el NREL ha reclutado voluntarios expertos en la materia de WAP y de la industria del mantenimiento del hogar para que formen parte de comités que desarrollen y actualicen programas de certificación y sus análisis de tareas (JTA) necesarios como base de programas de certificación y formación estandarizados. Las certificaciones HEP apoyan al WAP y al sector del mantenimiento de viviendas residenciales en general mediante el proceso de acreditación y el desarrollo de JTA definidos para auditores energéticos (EA) e inspectores de control de calidad (QCI). Este informe es un resumen de las actualizaciones más recientes (2022) del JTA del EA. [The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) to develop and maintain the resources under the Guidelines for Home Energy Professionals (GHEP) project. The purpose of the GHEP project is to increase the quality of work conducted for residential energy retrofits in the United States through the WAP network and other residential retrofit programs. This is the Spanish translation of NREL/TP-7A40-85300.]

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Cryptographic Obfuscation Sensor System Guarding Restricted Data (CrOSSGRD): Prototype Detailed Design Document

A prototype has been developed at Sandia National Laboratories to collect nominally sensitive data from a mock treaty accountable item, record that information as non-sensitive encrypted outputs, and allow inspectors to subsequently evaluate that information at a time and location of their choice without any risk of the host party’s data being inadvertently (or maliciously) revealed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

2023 Annual Explosives Inventory Completion

The 2023 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) annual explosives inventory was executed from May 18, 2023 to September 27, 2023 and was verified for accuracy effective September 28, 2023 following the LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan. This year’s annual inventory includes changes incorporated based on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report DOE-OIG-20-50, The Department of Energy’s Storage and Disposition of Explosives Material at Selected Sites, dated July of 2020. Based on the associated recommendations, explosives at DOE and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) sites are considered "sensitive personal property" and applicable inventories must comply with 41 CFR 109, Personal Property Management. This regulation adds additional stipulations which require the annual inventory to include accountability of the total site inventory. In addition, the inventory must be performed by personnel other than the property owner, or alternatively must include independent verification. The development of the inventory plan was agreed to by the LLNL Explosives Safety Committee in conjunction with the LLNL Property and Business Division Leader. The LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan was reviewed and approved by the DOE Explosives Safety Committee Chair on May 17, 2023 and by the NNSA Property Management Office on May 25, 2023.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Pose Estimation for the Inspecta Project

In this addendum report we take the lessons learned from our initial generic object pose estimation research described in (Smartt, et al., 2025) and apply it to metal cup seals, which are attached to items after an international nuclear safeguards inspection (i.e., metal cup seals may be attached to containers of spent nuclear fuel after an inspector has measured and verified the material). We have also refined our software pipeline and training techniques since the final Inspecta report and will describe that process here. The objective of this task is to allow a robot to acquire images of the engraved seal characters to confirm that the correct seal is attached to the correct container. However, the seal may be attached in any orientation and therefore the robot manipulator arm with a camera needs to align with the normal face of the seal.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

In-Field Alpha Spectrometer Development FY2022 Mid-Year Report

In response to needs identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has developed an In-Field Alpha Spectrometer (IFAS) to allow IAEA safeguards inspectors to collect samples of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) at processing facilities, to perform field assessments to verify uranium enrichment. For sample collection, the IFAS method uses Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) samplers, developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), which contain thin zeolite coatings that trap UF6 gas and convert it to the safer, more stable form uranyl fluoride (as a dihydrate, UO 2 F 2 ·2H 2 O). For alpha spectrometry, the IFAS instrument employs a large area silicon semiconductor transducer to detect and record alpha particle energy-deposition events. Over the course of this project INL, PNNL, Oak Ridge National Laboratory worked to optimize the SUDA sample design for alpha spectrometry, to optimize processes for manufacturing, loading, and shipping SUDA samples, and to allow the measurement of loaded SUDA samples. In fiscal year (FY) 2022 INL has bene investigating the reproducibility and measurement precision of IFAS measurements and the associated determination of uranium enrichment.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Special Report on "Allegations of Conflict of Interest Regarding Licensing of PROTECT by Argonne National Laboratory"

In February 2009, the Office of Inspector General received a letter from Congressman Mark Steven Kirk of Illinois, which included constituent allegations that an exclusive technology licensing agreement by Argonne National Laboratory was tainted by inadequate competition, conflicts of interest, and other improprieties. The technology in question was for the Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism, commonly referred to as PROTECT. Because of the importance of the Department of Energy's technology transfer program, especially as implementation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act matures, we reviewed selected aspects of the licensing process for PROTECT to determine whether the allegations had merit. In summary, under the facts developed during our review, it was understandable that interested parties concluded that there was a conflict of interest in this matter and that Argonne may have provided the successful licensee with an unfair advantage. In part, this was consistent with aspects of the complaint from Congressman Kirk's constituent.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 percent of existing corrective action milestones had missed estimated remediation dates, with many exceeding planned completion dates by at least one year. As a consequence, the risk of compromise to the Department's information and systems remained higher than necessary. To assist the continuing efforts to improve, we made several recommendations designed to help the Department's managers to strengthen the unclassified cyber security program and, thereby, protect its computer resources from unauthorized modification, loss, or disclosure of information. Due to security considerations, information on specific vulnerabilities and locations has been omitted from this report. Management officials at the sites evaluated were provided with detailed information regarding identified vulnerabilities, and, in many instances, initiated corrective actions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Audit Report on "The Department's Management of the ENERGY STAR Program"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) authorized about $300 million in consumer rebate incentives for purchases of products rated under the 'ENERGY STAR' Program. ENERGY STAR, a voluntary labeling program established in 1992, provides consumers with energy efficiency data for a range of products so that they can make informed purchase judgments. The overall goal of the program is to encourage consumers to choose energy efficient products, advancing the nationwide goal of reducing energy consumption. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) managed the ENERGY STAR Program on a stand-alone basis until 1996 when it joined forces with the Department of Energy (Department). A Memorandum of Cooperation expanded the ENERGY STAR product categories, giving the Department responsibility for overseeing eight product categories such as windows, dishwashers, clothes washers, and refrigerators, while EPA retained responsibility for electronic product categories and heating, ventilating, and cooling equipment. Each agency is responsible for setting product efficiency specifications for those items under its control and for ensuring the proper use of the ENERGY STAR label in the marketplace. In August 2007, the EPA Office of Inspector General issued an audit report identifying significant control weaknesses in EPA's management of ENERGY STAR. The Department, concerned by the findings at EPA and eager to improve its own program, developed an approach to verify adherence to product specifications, ensure proper use of the ENERGY STAR label in the marketplace, and improve the establishment of product specifications. As evidenced by the commitment of $300 million in Recovery Act funds, the ENERGY STAR Program plays an important role in the U.S. efforts to reduce energy consumption. We initiated this audit to determine whether the Department had implemented the actions it announced in 2007 to strengthen the Program. The Department had not implemented planned improvements in the ENERGY STAR Program. Our audit revealed that officials had not: (1) Developed a formal quality assurance program to help ensure that product specifications were adhered to; (2) Effectively monitored the use of the ENERGY STAR label to ensure that only qualifying products were labeled as compliant; and (3) Formalized procedures for establishing and revising product specifications and for documenting decisions regarding those specifications. In our judgment, the delay in the Department's planned improvements in its management of the ENERGY STAR Program could reduce consumer confidence in the integrity of the ENERGY STAR label. Such loss of credibility could reduce energy savings, increase consumer risk, and diminish the value of the recent infusion of $300 million for ENERGY STAR rebates under the Recovery Act.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Audit Report on "The Office of Science's Management of Information Technology Resources"

The Department of Energy's Office of Science (Science) and its facility contractors are aggressive users of information technology (IT) to support fundamental research in areas such as energy, environmental remediation and computational sciences. Of its $4 billion Fiscal Year 2008 budget, Science spent about $287 million to manage its IT program. This included cyber security activities, acquisition of hardware and software, and support service costs used to maintain the operating environments necessary to support the missions of the program. Prior Office of Inspector General reports have identified various issues with Science's management of its IT programs and resources. For instance, our report on Facility Contractor Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Hardware (DOE/IG-0768, June 2007) noted that the Science sites reviewed spent more than necessary when acquiring IT hardware. In another example, our review of The Department's Efforts to Implement Common Information Technology Services at Headquarters (DOE/IG-0763, March 2007) disclosed that Science's reluctance to adopt the Department of Energy Common Operating Environment (DOE-COE) at Headquarters contributed to the Department's inability to fully realize potential cost savings through consolidation and economies of scale. In light of the magnitude of the Office of Science IT program and previously identified program weaknesses, we initiated this audit to determine whether Science adequately managed its IT resources. Science had taken a number of actions to improve its cyber security posture and align its program to Federal requirements. Yet, our review disclosed that it had not taken some basic steps to enhance security and reduce costs. In particular, we found that: (1) For their non-scientific computing environments, all seven of the field sites reviewed (two Federal, five contractor) had implemented security configurations that were less stringent than those included in the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. This configuration was designed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and its use was mandated by the Office of Management and Budget; (2) Although we previously highlighted weaknesses and recommended corrective actions, Science still had not fully established or enforced IT hardware standards for acquiring hardware such as desktop and laptop computers or related peripherals, contributing to significant unnecessary expenditures; and (3) While we have noted in a series of past reports that significant savings could be realized from aggregating demand for IT services and products across the enterprise, Science had not implemented a common infrastructure for users at its Federal sites and continued to maintain an IT environment independent of the Department's Common IT Operating Environment. The weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to a lack of adequate policies and procedures for ensuring effective cyber security and hardware acquisition practices. In addition, Science had not effectively monitored the performance of its field sites to ensure that previously reported internal control weaknesses were addressed and had not implemented an appropriate mechanism to track its IT-related costs. Without improvements, Science may be unable to realize the benefits of improved security over its information systems, reduce costs associated with hardware acquisition, and lower IT support costs through consolidation of services. In particular, we determined that Science could potentially realize savings of more than $3.3 million over the next three years by better controlling hardware costs and implementing standards for certain equipment. Furthermore, Science could continue to pay for duplicative IT support services and fail to take advantage of opportunities to lower costs and apply potential savings to mission-related work. During the course of our audit work, we learned from Science officials that they had initiated the process of revising the Program Cyber Security Plan to better clarify its policy for implementing Federal cyber security requirements. In addition, we noted that the Oak Ridge National Laboratory had taken action to establish and enforce hardware standards on both its administrative and scientific workforce. Although these actions are positive steps, additional action is needed to strengthen Science's IT program. To that end, our report contains several recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help Science improve the management of its IT resources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

INFORMATION: Special Report on "Management Challenges at the Department of Energy"

Responsible for some of the Nation's most important and technically advanced missions, the Department of Energy faces an array of challenges that are more wide-ranging and complex than at any time in its history. While its origins can be largely traced to the Manhattan Project, the Department has evolved into a multi-faceted agency that encompasses a broad range of scientific, environmental, and national security activities. Since its creation under the Department of Energy Organization Act in 1977, the Department has shifted its emphasis and priorities over time as the energy and security needs of the Nation have changed. The Department has recently refocused these efforts, adding particular emphasis on the science and renewable energy components of its portfolio. In this regard, the Department has taken a lead role in the implementation and execution of the energy technology initiatives related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). As a means of accomplishing these initiatives, the Department received a substantial increase in its annual appropriation, rising from nearly $25 billion in 2008 to approximately $34 billion in 2009 as a result of additional funding in the Department's loan program and numerous science, energy, and national security initiatives. In addition, the Department was provided more than $36 billion in Recovery Act funding to be used over a two to three year period. Further, the Department, through existing authorities and those expanded by the Recovery Act, has been authorized to provide more than $100 billion in loan guarantees for innovative, clean energy technologies. To accomplish its vital missions, the Department employs approximately 115,000 Federal and contractor personnel and manages assets valued at more than $189 billion, including the 17 national laboratories at the heart of its science program. On an annual basis, the Office of Inspector General is required to identify what it considers to be the most significant management challenges facing the Department. Our effort addresses new or emerging issues and evaluates the Department's progress in resolving previously identified challenges. The challenges identified by this process represent risks inherent in the Department's wide ranging and complex operations, as well as those related to problems with specific management processes. As noted in past reports, we recognize that often these challenges cannot be resolved in a single year and must, therefore, be addressed through a concentrated, persistent effort over time. Consistent with our mission, the overall goal is to focus attention on significant issues with the objective of working with Department managers to enhance the effectiveness of agency programs and operations. During the past year, the Department has taken a number of actions to promote its ongoing strategy of resolving the management challenges identified in our prior reports. There have been many notable advances. However, in our judgment, on the basis of the results of our work during the past year and other risk assement tools, the following management challenges remain for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010: Contract Administration; Cyber Security; Energy Supply; Environmental Cleanup; Safeguards and Security; and Stockpile Stewardship. As with a number of Federal agencies, the Department received an unprecedented infusion of funds as a result of the Recovery Act. These funds, along with the overarching goals set forth in the Act, were transformative in nature. On a positive note, the Department and its staff have been energized by the new and evolving programmatic initiatives resulting from the Recovery Act. However, as would be expected in an effort of this magnitude, the Departmnent has experienced significantly increased management stresses and strains, impacting virtually every program and operation. In fact, the essentially unavoidable burden placed on existing human capital and other resources has, in our judgment, affected the Department's ability to resolve its existing management challenges, at least in the near term. To capture these emerging factors, as part of this report, we have added two additional Departmental management challenges: Recovery Act Implementation; and Human Capital Management.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗