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At least 307 records · Page 17

A Method for Evaluating the Safety Impacts of Air Traffic Automation

This report describes a methodology for analyzing the safety and operational impacts of emerging air traffic technologies. The approach integrates traditional reliability models of the system infrastructure with models that analyze the environment within which the system operates, and models of how the system responds to different scenarios. Products of the analysis include safety measures such as predicted incident rates, predicted accident statistics, and false alarm rates; and operational availability data. The report demonstrates the methodology with an analysis of the operation of the Center-TRACON Automation System at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport.

Kostiuk, Peter↗

SWS TechTalk Systems Modelling for SWS Safety Demonstrator 1 (SD-1): Wildfire Response Operations

Build out a System Safety Model for System-Wide Safety’s first Technical Challenge 5 (TC5) Safety Demonstrator (SD-1), which will be a demonstration of an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System in emerging wildfire response operations. Supporting the Systems Engineer and using Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) practices, languages, and tools. Summer 2022 SD1 milestones: TC5-03-01 Initial Stakeholder Engagement Concept of Operations Development milestone and the upcoming TC5-03-02 Identification of key gaps and prioritization of NASA, SWS milestone.

model-based systems engineering↗

A New Spectrum Management Concept for Future NAS Communications

With the growth of aviation operations and the emergence of new entrants into the National Airspace System, there has been an increasing demand for aeronautical communications. However, the existing VHF/UHF frequency allocations for NAS operations have become increasingly scarce and unable to support the projected growth in demand. While traditional approaches to address the spectrum scarcity issue (such as reduction of channel bandwidth) have provided some relief, there is a need for a more scalable and sustainable solution. Consequently, NASA is investigating a new approach to spectrum management within the NAS using Artificial Intelligence and other advanced technologies. The concept considers both air-ground and air-air communication networks with the anticipated outcome that the proposed concept will meet the spectrum needs of future NAS communications.

Rafael Daniel Apaza↗

A New Spectrum Management Concept for Future NAS Communications

With the growth of aviation operations and the emergence of new entrants into the National Airspace System, there has been an increasing demand for aeronautical communications. However, the existing VHF/UHF frequency allocations for NAS operations have become increasingly scarce and unable to support the projected growth in demand. While traditional approaches to address the spectrum scarcity issue (such as reduction of channel bandwidth) have provided some relief, there is a need for a more scalable and sustainable solution. Consequently, NASA is investigating a new approach to spectrum management within the NAS using Artificial Intelligence and other advanced technologies. The concept considers both air-ground and air-air communication networks with the anticipated outcome that the proposed concept will meet the spectrum needs of future NAS communications

Rafael D. Apaza↗

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗

An Alternative for Emergency Preemption of Traffic Lights

An electronic communication-and-control system has been developed as a prototype of advanced means of automatically modifying the switching of traffic lights to give priority to emergency vehicles. This system could be used alternatively or in addition to other emergency traffic-light-preemption systems, including a variety of systems now in use as well as two proposed systems described in "Systems Would Preempt Traffic Lights for Emergency Vehicles" (NPO-30573), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 2004), page 36. Unlike those prior systems that depend on detection of sounds and/or lights emitted by emergency vehicles, this system is not subject to severe range limitations. This system can be retrofitted into any pre-existing traffic-light-control system, without need to modify that system other than to make a minimal number of wire connections between the two systems. This system comprises several subsystems, including a transponder and interface circuitry on each emergency vehicle, a monitoring and control unit at each intersection equipped with traffic lights, and a wide-area two-way radio communication network that connects the emergency vehicles and intersection units. Computers in the various intersections and vehicle units run special-purpose software that implements the traffic- light-preemption scheme. The operations of the intersection and vehicle units are synchronized by use of Global Positioning System (GPS) timing signals. The transponder in each vehicle estimates its own position and velocity by use of GPS signals, deductive ("dead") reckoning, data from the onboard diagnostic (OBD) computer of the vehicle, and/or triangulation of beacon signals. When the operator of an emergency vehicle turns on its flashing lights and sirens in response to a request for an emergency response, the transponder unit goes into action, reading the OBD data to determine speed and acceleration, and reading and gathering further navigational data as described above. The position, velocity, and acceleration data are combined with vehicle-identification data in a prescribed format, and the resulting set of data is transmitted to the intersections within communication range of the transponder.

Foster, Conrad↗

An Ontological Approach to Integrate Commercial Space Operations with an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS)

The emergence of commercial space operations (CSO) is one of many Advanced Air Mobility domains that pose major challenges to in-time safety assurance because of the different architectures used by the operators and other agents. The National Academies recognized the need to improve integration of disparate architectures and recommended that an In-time Aviation Safety Management System(IASMS) be developed to provide seamless connectivity across interacting architectures and enable in-time safety assurance. An ontological approach to integrating CSO with IASMS involves in-time Services, Functions, and Capabilities design to manage operational risks and inform changes to design. The resulting integrated architecture provides a common basis for risk management and in-time safety assurance.

K Ellis↗

Writing the Programs of Programmable Catalysis

It has long been known that non-steady state and periodic catalytic reactor operation in terms of temperature, pressure, and composition can lead to higher overall productivity and/or product selectivity than the best steady operation. Recently, the emergence of catalysts whose intrinsic properties can be made to oscillate with time, introduces advanced forcing capabilities that can be “programmed” into the catalysts to broaden the scope and applicability of periodic operation to surface chemistry. In this work, an algorithmic approach is implemented to significantly accelerate the discovery and optimization of periodic steady states of catalytic reactors. Decomposition of complex dynamics into fundamental mechanistic fast–slow steps is seen to improve conceptual understanding of the relationship between binding energy oscillation protocols and overall catalytic rates. Finding structured forcing protocols, optimally tailored to the multiple time scales of a given individual mechanism, requires an efficient search of high-dimensional parameter spaces. Here, this is enabled here through active learning (Bayesian optimization, enhanced by our proposed Bayesian continuation). Implementation of these methods is shown to accelerate the evaluation of catalyst programs by up to several orders of magnitude. Faster screening of programmable catalysts to discover periodic steady states enables the optimization of catalytic operating protocols and thus opens the possibility for catalyst engineering based on optimal forcing programs to control rate and product selectivity, even for complex multistep catalytic mechanisms.

catalysis↗

Helicopter Pilot Assessments of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XR With Automated Maneuvering

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current study was a human-in-the-loop simulation that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in a fixed-base eVTOL simulator with varying levels of automation. Objective results showed that pilots complied with all RAs within the expected 5-second time window and responded to DAA alerts quicker than in earlier studies with ACAS XU. Pilots often made larger horizontal deviations during Manual RAs, but often favored vertical and blended maneuvers. No NMACs occurred, and losses of well clear were mainly attributed to the obligation of the pilots and system to maneuver only after the CA phase of the encounter had begun. Other losses were due to pilots’ noncompliance or disregard for ACAS XR’s alerting and guidance. Noncompliance with RAs most frequently occurred when pilots determined they were too close to the terrain to continue to follow Descend RAs, performing vertical maneuvers instead of following Horizontal RAs, or rejecting Horizontal RA updates because they felt that enough maneuvering had been performed. Subjectively, pilots found the DAA and RA alerting and guidance intuitive and useful for VFR helicopter operations. Slightly more pilots preferred the Automated RA condition to the Manual RA condition. Lastly, they also felt that ACAS led to occasional unsafe Descend RAs. Caveats and future implications are discussed.

eVTOL↗

Helicopter Pilot Assessments of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System XR With Automated Maneuvering

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current study was a human-in-the-loop simulation that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in a fixed-base eVTOL simulator with varying levels of automation. Objective results showed that pilots complied with all RAs within the expected 5-second time window and responded to DAA alerts quicker than in earlier studies with ACAS XU. Pilots often made larger horizontal deviations during Manual RAs, but often favored vertical and blended maneuvers. No NMACs occurred, and losses of well clear were mainly attributed to the obligation of the pilots and system to maneuver only after the CA phase of the encounter had begun. Other losses were due to pilots’ noncompliance or disregard for ACAS XR’s alerting and guidance. Noncompliance with RAs most frequently occurred when pilots determined they were too close to the terrain to continue to follow Descend RAs, performing vertical maneuvers instead of following Horizontal RAs, or rejecting Horizontal RA updates because they felt that enough maneuvering had been performed. Subjectively, pilots found the DAA and RA alerting and guidance intuitive and useful for VFR helicopter operations. Slightly more pilots preferred the Automated RA condition to the Manual RA condition. Lastly, they also felt that ACAS led to occasional unsafe Descend RAs. Caveats and future implications are discussed.

eVTOL↗

Advanced Air Mobility Operations & Automation Part II Technical Lecture

The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is a next-generation collision avoidance tool developed to support different aircraft types and operations. The rotorcraft variant – referred to as ACAS XR – is designed to accommodate existing helicopter platforms as well as in-development, electric vertical takeoff and landing concepts, which are critical to the emerging concept of operations referred to as Advanced Air Mobility. The fundamental role of ACAS XR is to provide Detect and Avoid (DAA) and/or Collision Avoidance (CA) protection against airborne traffic. DAA alerting and guidance in the context of ACAS XR is caution-level and “suggestive,” and is to be used by the pilot if, and when, they decide to maneuver against an identified threat to DAA “well clear.” The CA alerting, by contrast, is warning-level and “directive,” with the pilot required to comply with the associated guidance to prevent a predicted Near Midair Collision (NMAC). The CA alerts generated by ACAS XR are referred to as Resolution Advisories (RAs) consistent with previous CA systems. Unlike earlier CA systems, ACAS XR issues RAs in the horizontal and vertical dimensions as well as multi-axis RAs (referred to as “Blended” RAs). According to the Minimal Operational Performance Standards of DAA systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, maneuvers to comply with RAs may be automated, whereas maneuvers based on DAA alerting assume a manual response. The current presentation discusses two human-in-the-loop simulations that presented rotorcraft pilots with ACAS XR alerts and guidance in eVTOL simulators with varying levels of automation. It also presents overviews of these studies as well as how they assisted live flight tests, which will occur throughout 2023.

air taxis↗

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The ISS emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of Russian gas masks to positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Emergency↗

A Systems Model for System-Wide Safety Safety Demonstrator (SD-1): Wildfire Response Operations

The aim of this internship-based project was to contribute to the ongoing development of a systems model for System-Wide Safety’s first Technical Challenge 5 (TC5) series Safety Demonstrator (SD-1), which will be a demonstration of an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) in emerging wildfire response operations. Using Models-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles to develop the model, I organized and traced previously collected stakeholder needs from the Spring 2022 NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Virtual Workshop (https://nari.arc.nasa.gov/sws-wildfire) to system elements, creating connections which can be used in the future by the project engineers to identify and address requirements gaps throughout the system design process. I also identified and modeled preliminary use case scenarios for aerial assets in the demonstrator and, building on previously produced preliminary high-level models of the 8 SD-1 Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) and their IASMS data flows, worked to model the Real-Time Risk Assessment (RTRA) tool as an implementation of Risk Assessment and Management that can take in multiple sets of data monitored by SFCs. Project deliverables include stakeholder requirements tables and matrices and systems model diagrams produced with MagicDraw software in the SysML Systems Modeling Language, with eventual plans to connect model diagrams to a Department of Defense Operational Viewpoint (OV-1) graphic, a high-level operational concept graphic that will be used to visualize the SD-1 scenarioin a future phase. The system model serves to provide a common understanding of the scope of and activities necessary for the completion of SD-1,and traces how stakeholder needs are to be addressed.

model-based systems engineering↗

Evolution of Hardware and Philosophy of Emergency Response Actions on the International Space Station and Future Spacecrafts

Human spaceflight is dangerous for numerous reasons. This ranges from the dynamic environment of launching on a rocket, flying in space among the thousands and thousands pieces of space debris, to the hazards of re-entry & landing, as well as being surrounded by vehicle systems containing hazardous materials or gasses. In-flight emergencies fall into four categories: Rapid Depressurization, Fire, Toxic Spill, and Medical emergency. This paper will address the first three, which fall under the responsibility of the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Systems flight control and engineering teams. It will review the evolution of the International Space Station’s emergency response philosophy, procedures, training, and equipment changes over the years. The International Space Station (ISS) emergency equipment has evolved over the last two decades of operations in many ways, but in some it has remained the same. The core actions the flight crew takes to ensure team safety, personal safety, vehicle safety, and equipment safety has not changed. However, the equipment and capabilities provided to them have. From early days of minimal capability when the ISS consisted of a few modules, to today’s 30,000 ft^3 vehicle with over a dozen isolatable segments. From use of positive pressure O2 masks, to the development of respirators. From a lack of procedures for a deadly ammonia leak scenario to a memorized response utilizing numerous atmosphere measurement systems. This paper will review all these various areas that fall under the umbrella of “on-board emergencies”. In addition, the comparison to the planned emergency operations on the Orion vehicle will be reviewed. The Orion vehicle differs from the ISS in that it has no isolatable volume, being approximately 2% the size of ISS, as well as not having a quick return to earth capability.

Barry Tobias↗

Towards Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗

Towards Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA): A Gap Analysis and Concept for Emerging Aviation Systems

Given the current evolution of the National Airspace and future trajectory towards novel and evolving operations with varying levels of autonomy, complexity, and acceptable risk, there is an opportunity to support safety assurance by extending existing methodologies, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). In response to challenges in performing FHA for novel aviation concepts, we propose a concept for Computational Functional Hazard Assessment (CFHA), which provides processes, methods, and tools for incorporating external data to facilitate further exploration of the hazard space iterativelty throughout the design process. The core components of CFHA involve knowledge capture from historical and operational data, functional architecture specification via a formal modeling language, and simulation for hazardous scenario analysis. Through this concept, we aim to adapt conventional safety assessment to address the increasingly complex hazard space generated from emerging operations.

Seydou Mbaye↗

A matrix-free approach for finite-strain hyperelastic problems using geometric multigrid

This paper investigates matrix-free algorithms for problems in quasi-static finite-strain hyperelasticity. Iterative solvers with matrix-free operator evaluation have emerged as an attractive alternative to sparse matrices in the fluid dynamics and wave propagation communities because they significantly reduce the memory traffic, the limiting factor in classical finite element solvers. Specifically, we study different matrix-free realizations of the finite element tangent operator and determine whether generalized methods of incorporating complex constitutive behavior might be feasible. Furthermore, in order to improve the convergence behavior of iterative solvers, we also propose a method by which to construct level tangent operators and employ them to define a geometric multigrid preconditioner. Additionally, the performance of the matrix-free operator and the geometric multigrid preconditioner is compared to the matrix-based implementation with an algebraic multigrid (AMG) preconditioner on a single node for a representative numerical example of a heterogeneous hyperelastic material in two and three dimensions. We find that matrix-free methods for finite-strain solid mechanics are very promising, outperforming linear matrix-based schemes by two to five times, and that it is possible to develop numerically efficient implementations that are independent of the hyperelastic constitutive law.

42 ENGINEERING↗