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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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301 records · Page 17
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Blueprint: Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) Adoption for Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)-Like Groups

The electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) industry is an incredibly diverse set of participants (EVSE manufacturers, charge network operators (CNOs), original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), etc.), and with the potential for an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) or ISAC-like group, it requires a series of guidance for doing a multiparty coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) such that a group like this could be successful. This blueprint provides a template and guidance to stakeholders in the EVSE industry for conducting a multiparty CVD. It also formalizes what multiparty CVD could look like in an ISAC-like group with multiple entities as well as vulnerability coordinators by specifically calling out who in the ISAC-like group may be involved, and which industry members it may apply to. This blueprint leverages tools such as Vultron, VINCE, etc. along with open resources such as the Software Engineering Institutes guide for coordinated vulnerability disclosure, for the stakeholder in the EVSE industry to start up a CVD program of their own.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Development of the INL Thermal Energy Distribution System (TEDS) in the Modelica Eco-System for Validation and Verification

This report provides an overview on the development of the Thermal Energy Distribution System (TEDS) in the Modelica process model eco-system at Idaho National Laboratory as part of the integrated energy system initiative. Model development has led to the creation of a dynamic process model of the experimental TEDS facility housed within the Engineering Science Laboratory (ESL) at INL. The model was then used during the pre-construction phase of the experimental effort to inform experimental design (insulation requirements, bypass line placement, expected performance of components) and to test innovative control schemes prior to the initial operation. The TEDS model developed in Modelica includes the primary components of the TEDS experimental unit including: a 200kW Chromalox heater, a single-tank packed bed thermal energy storage system filled with 0.125 inch Alumina (Al 2 O 3 ), an ethylene-glycol to Therminol-66 heat exchanger, system piping, six control valves, and all associated temperature, pressure, and mass flow sensors. The model does not include nitrogen fill gas tanks, or associated overfill tanks, as these are not part of standard system control. Two simulation sets were run. The first is a five-hour test that operates as a shakedown test for the facility. This simulation puts the facility through all five potential operating modes and showcases the ability of valving, control sensors, and component controllers to meet the system demands. The second case imposes a typical summer day demand on the system from a region with mixed commercial and residential electrical needs where the generator alone cannot meet peak demand but instead requires the thermal storage unit to act as a peaking unit. Over the course of the fifteen-hour discharge cycle heat losses account for a heat loss of approximately 15°C in outlet temperature. Such heat losses would lead to a decrease in overall system efficiency and may lead to additional design changes for such designs in the future that may include a topping heater. Through commencement of this work, a systems level model of TEDS with associated control systems, sensors, piping diameters, and component capabilities has been created. This model has been utilized in the pre-experimental phase to inform system design, insulation thicknesses, and potential control schemes to operate the system effectively and safely. Once TEDS begins operation, this model will be refined, tuned, and used for validation and verification purposes.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Real-Time Federated Cyber-Transmission-Distribution Testbed Architecture for the Resiliency Analysis

With the ongoing automation driven by the push toward the smart electric grid and the advancement in associated cyber infrastructure, the interaction between physical [electric transmission and distribution (T&D) systems], cyber (communication, automation, and control), and human (grid operators and decision-makers) is increasingly becoming more complex. This creates the requirement of analyzing the effect of the transmission system on the distribution system and vice versa with consideration of the additional complexity of the cyber infrastructure. Such an integrated testbed will also help with resiliency analysis, where resiliency refers to the ability of the system to continue serving energy to the critical loads even with limited extreme contingencies. Interaction of the physical power grid with the cyber layer can be effectively modeled using real-time (RT) simulator for developing and validating various operational and control algorithms. Testbeds using RT simulators with multiple capabilities have been developed at different institutions. Still, no single existing testbed can offer full scalability while simultaneously meeting high fidelity requirements for resiliency experimentation. Co-simulating federated testbed assets can provide a scalable experimentation platform that can be leveraged for verification and validation. In this article, an architecture is developed for federated cyber-physical testbed. A local federation with two real-time simulators is developed: real-time digital simulator (RTDS) and OPAL-RT have been interfaced using VILLAS framework for end-to-end testing. Also, a real-time linear predictor is developed and integrated here to address the communication latency impact on geographically allocated federated RT simulation. Finally, resiliency analysis tools are formulated and utilized for T&D systems. Finally as an illustrative use case, the resiliency of a T&D test system is simulated, and the results are analyzed. A 179-bus Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) transmission system is developed using OPAL-RT/ HYPERSIM, and a modified IEEE 13 node feeder system is modeled in RTDS/RSCAD and interfaced for resiliency analysis.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Risk Analysis for Remote Operation of Microreactors

Microreactors are a subset of advanced nuclear reactors that can be factory fabricated, transportable, and self-regulating. They have the potential to be used in microgrids, rural and remote areas, or emergency response applications, replacing fossil fuel sources like diesel generators and enabling sustainable energy generation. In order to make microreactor operation cost-effective, it is likely that remote communications will be needed to reduce the number of personnel required to be on site. While remote operation of energy generation and other industrial control systems is common in other industries, it is not yet adopted in the nuclear community and has many perceived and actual risks. In this paper, the severity of the risks introduced by remote operations for microreactors are explored. The primary changes in the operations involve the addition of a remote communications network and a certification system for data and controls. These changes lend themselves to considerations of cyber risks, whether unintentional or adversarial, but the assessment considers not just cyber risks introduced, but also how physical and human factors-based risks will impact the remote operations system and change the overall risk profile. This initial assessment indicates that there are standard cyber and mitigation measures that can be put in place so the risk of doing remote operations does not dramatically increase compared to local operations. This evaluation is a critical step in the process of evaluating if remote operations of microreactors is a suitable solution to meet future sustainable grid needs

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Phasor-Measurement-Unit-Based Data Analytics Using Digital Twin and PhasorAnalytics Software

A major objective of this project was to apply GE’s commercial machine learning and data analytics toolsets to large-scale, real-world, anonymized Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) datasets in order to extract signatures, correlated and/or causal factors, and precursor patterns associated with significant power system phenomena. The project had a particular emphasis on extraction of insights relevant to asset health monitoring, real-time load modeling and cybersecurity monitoring. Additionally, the team was directed to undertake a comprehensive data quality analysis for the provided datasets and encouraged to estimate the ‘machine-learning readiness’ of the datasets by documenting any major obstacles to the application of commercial machine learning algorithms. To accomplish the aforementioned objectives, the project team’s work centered around the identification of key event signatures and application of the identified event signatures for event detection and event classification. The industry-validated, semi-supervised machine learning strategy employed for event signature identification involved several major tasks, including data-preprocessing, generation of an overabundance of features, normal data identification, normality modeling, and event signature identification through a methodical, quantitative ranking of features in order of relevance to each studied event type. Throughout the project, data quality issues and mitigation techniques were investigated. In this report, insights are provided regarding the readiness of the provided synchrophasor datasets for application of machine learning and data analytics. The methodologies employed for this technical strategy are summarized in this report. With regards to data preprocessing and feature generation, the provided Training and Test Datasets were ingested into GE’s big data environment. Subsequently, the team applied bad data cleansing and data imputation scripts, event detection scripts, and application programming interfaces (APIs) to the datasets for convenient data access. The project team completed development and validation of dozens of physics-based, statistics-based and transformation-based feature functions used for the extraction of over 60 synchrophasor features. Using a new parallel feature generation technology developed on this project, over 60 features have been rapidly generated for the full two years’ worth of Training and Test Dataset data associated with both the Eastern and Western interconnects. Even accommodating for temporal down-sampling inherent to the feature extraction procedure, this parallel feature generation activity resulted in a massive feature set with a storage requirement approximately equal to that of the raw training dataset itself. With regards to normal data identification and normality modeling, a normality model was built using the feature data extracted from the Training Dataset and iteratively refined subsequent to incremental adjustments and expansions of the Training Dataset feature data. With respect to event characterization and signature identification, an event signature identification pipeline was developed and used in conjunction with the normality model to identify over 15 event signatures for key event categories within the Training Dataset. The identified event signatures were used to characterize hundreds of key events in terms of relative severity, duration, and location of the event. An investigation was undertaken to identify correlated and causal factors involved in transformer events. A separate investigation into temporal trends in ring-down analysis results was undertaken to determine possible associations between system dynamics and various other factors such as loading, season or year. To validate the identified event signatures, additional work was undertaken to develop signature-based anomaly detection and classification tools suitable for convenient application to the synchrophasor datasets. The anomaly detection and classification tools, suitable for online application, were then applied to the entirety of the Eastern Interconnect Training and Test Datasets. Performance of the event detection and classification tools was evaluated upon receipt of the Test Dataset event logs (i.e., the labels for events contained in the Test Dataset), and promising results were obtained despite several challenges (documented herein) associated with application of supervised or semi-supervised machine learning methods to large-scale, anonymized datasets. Finally, the detection and classification tools were used to detect, classify, and characterize thousands of new events not included in the original event logs provided by the DOE within both the Training and Test Datasets.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Analysis of AP1000 Small-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Using Reactor Transient Simulator

The Westinghouse Electric Company’s Advanced Passive Reactor (AP1000) is characterized by the incorporation of passive safety systems (PSSs) designed to ensure core cooling during transient events. The assessment of PSSs requires evaluation of their performance through a combination of experiments and simulations employing various thermal-hydraulic codes. In addition, detailed evaluation of PSSs for a specific reactor system transient analysis such as loss-of-coolant-accident analysis supports understanding representative integral effects test facility development and the further evolution model development and assessment process. Developing a reactor system code is a complex and time-consuming process that requires significant engineering expertise and effort. It can take several months to even years to complete in the early stages of reactor system design and analysis. However, this process can be expedited through the use of transient simulator models for similar reactor systems, which can be used for lesson learning and training purposes. This study uses the Personal Computer Transient Analyzer (PCTRAN) code. The main advantage of PCTRAN is its ease of use and ability to run faster than real time. This study presents the results obtained for a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) for two breaks using the full version (licensed) of PCTRAN. The purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the overall system behavior during the postulated SBLOCA event as well as assess the capability of the PCTRAN code to reproduce the system response during transient events. The obtained results were compared with the Westinghouse NOTRUMP system code. The PCTRAN code proved to be reliable in predicting the qualitative behavior of the system in both transient cases. As for the system response, it was found that it is contingent on the activation time of the PSSs. The differences in reactor coolant system pressure between the two codes were attributed to the critical flow model and simplification of mass and energy balance. Despite PCTRAN’s limitations, it can still provide a reasonable prediction of various reactor parameters such as pressure, mass flow rate, and void fraction during a SBLOCA scenario. It is worth noting that PCTRAN currently employs a bulk approach similar to that of the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) and MELCOR codes. However, the upcoming version of PCTRAN will include an artificial intelligence–based detection and accident prevention system, as well as different models for different reactor components. Consequently, PCTRAN has the potential to be upgraded to match the system thermal-hydraulic codes of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and become more widely used in cybersecurity to safeguard nuclear power plants from cyberattacks.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Testing SOAR tools in use

Investigations within Security Operation Centers (SOCs) are tedious as they rely on manual efforts to query diverse data sources, overlay related logs, correlate the data into information, and then document results in a ticketing system. Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) tools are a relatively new technology that promise, with appropriate configuration, to collect, filter, and display needed diverse information; automate many of the common tasks that unnecessarily require SOC analysts’ time; facilitate SOC collaboration; and, in doing so, improve both efficiency and consistency of SOCs. There has been no prior research to test SOAR tools in practice; hence, understanding and evaluation of their effect is nascent and needed. Here, in this paper, we design and administer the first hands-on user study of SOAR tools, involving 24 participants and six commercial SOAR tools. Our contributions include the experimental design, itemizing six characteristics of SOAR tools, and a methodology for testing them. We describe configuration of a cyber range test environment, including network, user, and threat emulation; a full SOC tool suite; and creation of artifacts allowing multiple representative investigation scenarios to permit testing. We present the first research results on SOAR tools. Concisely, our findings are that: per-SOC SOAR configuration is extremely important; SOAR tools increase efficiency and reduce context switching, although with potentially decreased ticketing accuracy/completeness; user preference is slightly negatively correlated with their performance with the tool; internet dependence varies widely among SOAR tools; and balance of automation with assisting decision making is preferred by senior participants. We deliver a public user- and tool-anonymized and -obfuscated version of the data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2025

TRIM: AI Guided Random Number Generation for Resource-Constrained IoT Systems

Random numbers often serve as the backbone for many security solutions in diverse domains such as cryptography, side channel leakage prevention, and moving target defense. However, generating true random numbers requires a physical source of entropy (e.g. hardware, quantum, environmental phenomenon) making it difficult to realize at a large scale and at a low cost. On the flip side, pseudorandom number generators (easy to implement) following a specific distribution (e.g. Gaussian) can be easily compromised given a sufficient amount of traces. In this work, we have developed a machine learning-guided generative approach that can be used to create portable, resource-efficient, and cost-effective random number generators with high throughput and true randomness characteristics. We implement the proposed approach as a highly parameterized framework and perform extensive evaluation for different settings. The framework was able to learn from true random sources such as irrational numbers and environmental audio noise and imitate those sources towards generating new good quality random numbers on demand. We have generated more than 1 billion bits and observed robust performance in terms of true randomness metrics obtained from NIST SP 800-22 and FIPS 140-1 randomness test suites achieving a throughput of up to 142.85 Mbps. Compared to the state-of-the-art (SOTA) technique, the iso-cost setup of our framework can achieve more than 500 Mbps in a distributed setting. We have evaluated the efficacy of running the true randomness imitation AI models on target edge devices such as Raspberry Pi 4 (Model B), Nvidia Jetson Nano, Nvidia Jetson Orin Nano and Nvidia Jetson Xavier. We have also looked at the security of the TRIM framework itself against different adversarial threat models.

Cybersecurity↗
DOE OSTI2023

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Laboratory-Directed Research and Development 2016 Summary Annual Report

The Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) reports its status to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by March of each year. The program operates under the authority of DOE Order 413.2C, “Laboratory Directed Research and Development” (April 19, 2006), which establishes DOE’s requirements for the program while providing the laboratory director broad flexibility for program implementation. LDRD funds are obtained through a charge to all INL programs. This report includes summaries of all INL LDRD research activities supported during Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. INL is the lead laboratory for the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). The INL mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure with a vision to change the world’s energy future and secure our critical infrastructure. Operating since 1949, INL is the nation’s leading research, development, and demonstration center for nuclear energy, including nuclear nonproliferation and physical and cyber-based protection of energy systems and critical infrastructure, as well as integrated energy systems research, development, demonstration, and deployment. INL has been managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (a wholly owned company of Battelle) for DOE since 2005. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, is a partnership between Battelle, BWX Technologies, Inc., AECOM, the Electric Power Research Institute, the National University Consortium (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, North Carolina State University, University of New Mexico, and Oregon State University), and the Idaho university collaborators (i.e., University of Idaho, Idaho State University, and Boise State University). Since its creation, INL’s research and development (R&D) portfolio has broadened with targeted programs supporting national missions to advance nuclear energy, enable clean energy deployment, and secure and modernize critical infrastructure. INL’s research, development, and demonstration capabilities, its resources, and its unique geography enable integration of scientific discovery, innovation, engineering, operations, and controls into complex large-scale testbeds for discovery, innovation, and demonstration of transformational clean energy and security concepts. These attributes strengthen INL’s leadership as a demonstration laboratory. As a national resource, INL also applies its capabilities and skills to the specific needs of other federal agencies and customers through DOE’s Strategic Partnership Program.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2026

A Centralized AI Lakehouse Framework for Brain Tumor MRI Classification and Segmentation, University KPI Forecasting, and Water Potability Prediction

In many university and healthcare projects, models are built for very different data types such as tables, institutional time series, and medical images, but they are deployed as separate applications. In this work, that separation made testing and maintenance difficult because each module had its own pipeline and runtime requirements. This paper presents an integrated AI lakehouse-style implementation that runs three model pipelines inside one containerized backend. For medical imaging, we used MRI datasets from IEEE DataPort: a four-class classification set with 7012 images (5708 train/1304 test) and a segmentation set with 3063 image–mask pairs. The classification model (ResNet50 transfer learning) is evaluated using a proper train–validation–test protocol across multiple splits (80/10/10, 70/10/20, 60/10/30, and 10/30/60), achieving a test accuracy of 99.00% under the standard 80/10/10 split. Additionally, a patient-level evaluation is conducted using an external glioma dataset to provide a more realistic assessment without data leakage. The segmentation model (DeepLabV3-ResNet50) achieved 83.09% validation mIoU and 88.79% Dice score. For university KPI forecasting, we used annual IPEDS and NSF HERD data from 2010 to 2023 for three universities (BSU, EOU, and UAB). To examine the effect of preprocessing on forecasting performance, two case studies are conducted. In the first case, linear interpolation is applied to generate semester-level data. In the second case, the original annual data is used directly without interpolation. Random Forest regression and ARIMA models are evaluated using MAE, RMSE, MAPE, and R 2 . The results showed that interpolation improved apparent forecasting performance due to smoothing, while evaluation on the original annual data provided a more realistic assessment of model behavior. To further validate the framework on a larger dataset, an additional case study is conducted using a student dropout dataset. For water potability, we trained and compared multiple tabular classifiers on a large dataset (1,048,575 samples). A Random Forest model (100 trees, max depth 10) achieved 85.86% test accuracy and high recall for unsafe samples (0.8447). All modules are served via FastAPI and deployed together using Docker, with workflow automation routing requests to the correct endpoint. System-level benchmarking indicates that the backend maintains stable throughput and latency under concurrent requests.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗