Criticality safety training for critical assembly operators
Abstract Not Provided
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Abstract Not Provided
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
The global effort to curb carbon emissions is accelerating demand for clean energy technologies and the materials they rely on. Demand for these materials will only continue to grow, especially as some nations aim to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. While some major materials like steel, copper, and aluminum are already powering the fossil fuel economy, others are more minor materials with potential supply risks. These risks could jeopardize the ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the desirable timeframe to avoid significant climate change. In some cases, it may be necessary to take action to improve the resilience of material supply chains and mitigate supply risks. Understanding the importance of individual materials to clean energy and the supply risks associated with them is necessary to identify which materials may serve as potential roadblocks to a clean energy future. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a series of 13 supply chain deep dive assessment reports on various energy technologies in 2022 in response to President Biden’s Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains (E.O. 14017). These reports emphasized that supply chain bottlenecks can occur at any stage of the value chain from mining and refining to component and even sub-system manufacturing. The bottlenecks are a combination of factors such as material availability, equipment availability, work force availability and quality, logistics, regulatory framework, and market conditions. These bottlenecks were worsened during the global Covid-19 pandemic. Its lingering impacts have hindered capacity expansion for material supply chains and prevented product lead-time recovery. One approach to reduce supply chain risks for the United States is to have a strong domestic manufacturing sector with a diverse set of producers. Boosting responsible domestic production would require leveraging the latest science not only in material extraction but also in developing substitutes, recycling, reuse, and remanufacturing. This report is an updated analysis of previous Critical Materials Strategy (CMS) reports published by the DOE in 2010, 2011, and 2019 based on national and global priorities, technology advancement, and technology adoption trends. Like the CMS reports, this analysis presents the results of a formal material criticality assessment to identify which materials are critical to the continued deployment of clean energy technologies globally. The analysis in this report leveraged the DOE supply chain deep dive assessments to develop the initial list of materials to evaluate. This DOE Critical Materials Assessment (CMA) is conducted independently of criticality assessments performed by other U.S. government agencies, such as that conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). This analysis complements the USGS critical minerals determination in three aspects. First, the DOE assessment is performed from a global perspective, while the USGS analysis focusses on the importance of minerals to the U.S. economy. Second, this report focuses on the importance of materials to clean energy technologies, rather than to the economy in general. Lastly, this study is forward looking to 2035 based on clean energy deployment scenarios, whereas the USGS assessment is retrospective. Materials evaluated in this report that do not appear in the USGS Critical Minerals List include copper, uranium, electrical steel, and SiC. A draft version of this report received ~80 public comments related to supporting data and methodological improvement. Those comments have been incorporated as much as possible where appropriate. Highlights of findings from this 2023 CMA include: Rare earth materials (neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium) used in magnets in electric vehicle (EV) motors and wind turbine generators continue to be critical. While dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) are both heavy rare earth elements that serve the same function in magnets, the criticality of Tb is slightly lower than that for Dy in the short term due to the widespread use of Dy in high-grade magnets and Tb’s present role as a substitute. Similarly, praseodymium (Pr) is critical in the medium term but only near critical in the short term because it is more substitutable in magnets than neodymium (Nd); Materials used in batteries for EVs and stationary storage are now considered to be critical. While cobalt (Co) was found to be critical in this and previous reports, lithium (Li) becomes critical in the medium term due to its broader use in various battery chemistries and the rampant growth of the EV industry. Natural graphite is a new addition in this assessment and is also found to be critical; Platinum group metals used in hydrogen electrolyzers, such as platinum (Pr) and iridium (Ir), are critical due to an increased focus on hydrogen technologies to achieve net zero carbon emissions, while those used in catalytic converters, such as rhodium (Rh) and palladium (Pd), were screened out due to the decreased importance of catalytic converters in the medium term; Gallium (Ga) continues to be critical due to its use in light-emitting diodes (LEDs). In addition, the use of Ga has increased in magnet manufacturing and in semiconductor in forms such as gallium arsenide (GaAs) or gallium nitride (GaN); Major materials like Aluminum (Al), copper (Cu), nickel (Ni), and silicon (Si) move from noncritical in the short term to near critical in the medium term due to their importance in electrification; Electrical steel is near critical due to its use in transformers for the grid and electric motors in EVs.
Nuclear power is a valuable and efficient energy alternative in our energy-intensive society. However, material that can generate nuclear power has properties that require this material be handled with caution. If improperly handled, a criticality accident could result, which could severely harm workers. This document is a modular self-study guide about Criticality Safety Principles. This guide's purpose it to help you work safely in areas where fissionable nuclear materials may be present, avoiding the severe radiological and programmatic impacts of a criticality accident. It is designed to stress the fundamental physical concepts behind criticality controls and the importance of criticality safety when handling fissionable materials outside nuclear reactors. This study guide was developed for fissionable-material-handler and criticality-safety-officer candidates to use with related web-based course 00INL189, BEA Criticality Safety Principles, and to help prepare for the course exams. These individuals must understand basic information presented here. This guide may also be useful to other Idaho National Laboratory personnel who must know criticality safety basics to perform their assignments safely or to design critically safe equipment or operations. This guide also includes additional information that will not be included in 00INL189 tests. The additional information is in appendices and paragraphs with headings that begin with 'Did you know,' or with, 'Been there Done that'. Fissionable-material-handler and criticality-safety-officer candidates may review additional information at their own discretion. This guide is revised as needed to reflect program changes, user requests, and better information. Issued in 2006, Revision 0 established the basic text and integrated various programs from former contractors. Revision 1 incorporates operation and program changes implemented since 2006. It also incorporates suggestions, clarifications, and additional information from readers and from personnel who took course 00INL189. Revision 1 also completely reorganized the training to better emphasize physical concepts behind the criticality controls that fissionable material handlers and criticality safety officers must understand. The reorganization is based on and consistent with changes made to course 00INL189 due to a review of course exam results and to discussions with personnel who conduct area-specific training.
Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls (e.g. fissile material limits and/or water barriers) will ensure that waste packages are sub-critical. These controls, plus the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will also ensure that criticality is prevented for a long time after disposal. However, over post-closure timescales conditions in the GDF will evolve, and therefore underpinning knowledge is required to demonstrate: under what conditions criticality could occur; what the likelihood of such conditions developing is; and what the consequences would be if a post-closure criticality did occur. These requirements are set out in the UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation of a GDF. This paper discusses the disposal of Pressurised Water Reactor fuel, as an example of a waste type that may require disposal. It briefly selects relevant research to combine and summarise results from three recent RWM research projects. The first 'Likelihood of Criticality' considered under what conditions post-closure criticality could occur, whilst a second 'Modelling of Consequences of Hypothetical Criticality' focused on understanding the local physical consequences (temperature rise, power and rock response) of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. The paper then explains how this understanding is applied to make safety arguments as to why post-closure criticality is not a significant concern. This is achieved via a third, stream of work that has considered the effects of a potential criticality on pathways that might give rise to a post-closure risk in the future, such as transport of radionuclides in groundwater. Collectively RWMs post-closure criticality safety work allows us to conclude in our generic environmental safety case that a post closure criticality is a low likelihood event, and even if one of these low likelihood events was to occur its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. This paper also serves to give context to two companion UK post-closure criticality safety papers which communicate further information on our modelling development and more detailed results underpinning our demonstration of post-closure criticality safety. (authors)
The implementation process involved in translating Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) intention into action is vital to an effective SEA. Many factors influence implementation and thus the effectiveness of an SEA. Empirical studies have identified and documented some factors influencing the implementation of an SEA. This research is fragmented, however, and it is still not clear what are the most critical factors of effective SEA performance, and how these relate to different stages of the implementation process or other contextual circumstances. The paper takes its point of departure in implementation theory. Firstly, we introduce implementation theory, and then use it in practice to establish a more comprehensive model related to the stages in the implementation process. Secondly, we identify the critical factors in order to see how they are related to the different stages of SEA or are more general in character. Finally we map the different critical factors and how they influence the overall results of an SEA. Based on a literature review, we present a comprehensive picture of the critical factors and where they are found in the process. We conclude that most of the critical factors identified are of a more general character influencing the SEA process as such, while only one out of four of these factors relates to the specific stages of the SEA. Based on this mapping we can sketch a picture of the totality of critical factors. In this study 266 notions of critical factors were identified. Seen at the level of notions of critical factors, only 24% of these relate to specific stages while for 76% the critical factors are of a more general nature. These critical factors interact in complex ways and appear in different combinations in different stages of the implementation process so tracing the cause and effect is difficult. The pervasiveness of contextual and general factors also clearly suggests that there is no single way to put SEA into practice. The paper identifies some of the critical factors for effective SEA implementation, but further research is still needed to conclude which factors are more critical than others, just as the contingencies on which they depend are not easy to unravel. - Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer The research on critical factors influencing SEA implementation is fragmented. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer The critical factors are used to discuss 'hot-spots' in the implementation process. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Critical factors are just as broad as the concept of effectiveness. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Both stage and general factors are relevant in explaining the effectiveness of SEA.
Although human factors assessment typically involves specialist expertise, it is considered that enhanced local knowledge of this area for criticality safety specialists supports the incorporation of human factors consideration into tasks such as safety assessment, design and hazard reviews, development of operational and engineered criticality controls, training, incident investigation and emergency response. At the Westinghouse Springfields Fuel Manufacturing Site in the United Kingdom, specialist human factor support has been engaged to identify key competencies and training plans for criticality safety specialists. In addition, discussions have been held with the UK's Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to outline the proposal and to discuss the approach. Following completion of an internationally recognised human factors training course the learning is now being applied by criticality safety specialists. Recent examples of learning applied include: 1) Review of past events and incidents to support the consideration of operator/equipment interfaces, leading to improved designs and processes. 2) Identification of critical tasks and the level of human factor assessment that is likely to be required. To support this, guidance has been produced by the criticality section for staff and contractors performing criticality safety assessments. 3) Assessment of the 'aims and operability' of engineered and procedural controls derived as part of the criticality safety assessment process. This involves participation of plant management and operators. 4) Consideration of human factors in emergency response activities such as infrequent tasks and tasks being undertaken under time pressures etc. This has been examined in recent emergency exercises and in the development of a recent criticality exercise scenario. 5) Criticality training has been reviewed with Plant Management, focussing on the methods utilised to deliver training (e.g. classroom based, computer training, on plant walk-downs); the aims and scope of training and how understanding is validated. 6) The link between criticality safety assessment and how the operations are / will be conducted has been reviewed as part of formal and informal criticality meetings and inspections. A key aspect of this is the criticality specialist's interaction with both plant management and operational staff. The development of human factors awareness into the criticality safety specialist's competency framework continues to be developed at Westinghouse but real benefits to criticality safety are already being demonstrated by this approach. (author)