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At least 307 records · Page 17

Modular Software Interfaces for Revolutionary Flexibility in Space Operations

To make revolutionary improvements in exploration, space systems need to be flexible, realtime reconfigurable, and able to trade data transparently among themselves and mission operations. Onboard operations systems, space assembly coordination and EVA systems in exploration and construction all require real-time modular reconfigurability and data sharing. But NASA's current exploration systems are still largely legacies from hastily-developed, one-off Apollo-era practices. Today's rovers, vehicles, spacesuits, space stations, and instruments are not able to plug-and-play, Lego-like: into different combinations. Point-to-point dominates - individual suit to individual vehicle, individual instrument to rover. All are locally optimized, all unique, each of the data interfaces has been recoded for each possible combination. This will be an operations and maintenance nightmare in the much larger Project Constellation system of systems. This legacy approach does not scale to the hundreds of networked space components needed for space construction and for new, space-based approaches to Earth-Moon operations. By comparison, battlefield information management systems, which are considered critical to military force projection, have long since abandoned a point-to-point approach to systems integration. From a system-of-systems viewpoint, a clean-sheet redesign of the interfaces of all exploration systems is a necessary prerequisite before designing the interfaces of the individual exploration systems. Existing communications and Global Information Grid and middleware technologies are probably sufficient for command and control and information interfaces, with some hardware and time-delay modifications for space environments. NASA's future advanced space operations must also be information and data compatible with aerospace operations and surveillance systems being developed by other US Government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Aviation Administration and Department of Defense. This paper discusses fundamental system-of-systems infrastructure: approaches and architectures for modular plug-and-play software interfaces for revolutionary improvements in flexibility, modularity, robustness, ease of maintenance, reconfigurability, safety and productivity. Starting with middleware, databases, and mobile communications technologies, our technical challenges will be to apply these ideas to the requirements of constellations of space systems and to implement them initially on prototype space hardware. This is necessary to demonstrate an integrated information sharing architecture and services. It is a bottom-up approach, one that solves the problem of space operations data integration. Exploration demands uniform software mechanisms for application information interchange, and the corresponding uniformly available software services to enhance these mechanisms. We will examine the issues in plug-and-play, real-time-configurable systems, including common definition and management and tracking of data and information among many different space systems. Different field test approaches are discussed, including the use of the International Space Station and terrestrial analog mission operations at field sites.

Glass, Brian↗

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗

Nuclear Criticality Experiments Research Center Futures: A Report of a Workshop held September 6-9, 2022, Los Alamos, NM, November, 2022

Experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material (at or near the critical state) that explore reactivity phenomena are central to a number of national security challenges. From fission energy to nuclear weapons to a broad suite of scientific challenges, it is clear that additional capacity and capability are needed. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) marked 10 years of operations in 2021. This anniversary was an opportune time to celebrate our successes and progress, and to evaluate the remaining and emergent challenges. Against this backdrop, a workshop of approximately 140 national and international leaders in nuclear research was convened in Los Alamos, New Mexico to explore “NCERC Futures.” Therefore, the present workshop focused specifically on needed capabilities and tools to meet the research challenges in eight topical mission areas served by NCERC. As each Topical Group summarized their discussions in the out brief, it was recognized that key challenges could be met through enabling infrastructure investments and new critical assemblies. Enabling infrastructure includes staffing, additional space/buildings, developing an agile bounding safety basis, the ability to keep pace with technological advances in detectors and data acquisition systems (allowing use of those with Bluetooth™ and similar technologies), an expanded set of materials options (especially plutonium), a “Plug and Play” design and implementation mindset, and a facility that enabled free-field measurements. The new critical assemblies that were identified as having the most impact were a bare plutonium (Pu) Critical Assembly, a Horizontal Split Table (HST), a Super Comet, and a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly. NECRC is a unique, one-of-a-kind facility in the United States. If all the improvements were to be made, NCERC would enable the United States and its partners to address many important research questions related to criticality. These include but are not limited to: (1) Covering the entire neutron energy spectrum for both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pu in configurations for virtually all conceivable applications; (2) Performing multi-physics solution experiments and irradiations with a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly, which more closely resembles actual criticality accidents; (3) Conducting free-field experiments to make basic fission physics measurements and much cleaner benchmarks with various experimental observables; and (4) Providing more training classes and more experiments annually at greater cost efficiency enabled by additional buildings and machines and an agile, bounding, risk-balanced Safety Basis. In the end, workshop attendees enthusiastically concluded that NCERC Futures are bright and the workshop helped to identify a roadmap of capability gaps that need to be addressed. This report documents the results of those efforts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Adoption in University Engineering Programs: An Overview of CIE Integration Successes at Nine U.S. Educational Institutions

This report examines the adoption of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in university engineering programs, driven by the need to protect critical energy infrastructure from adversarial threats. CIE equips current and future engineers and technicians with the necessary mindset, skills, and competencies to enhance the resilience of engineered systems against cyber attacks. This report highlights nine academic partners who are incorporating CIE into their curricula through various approaches, including lectures, courses, and certificates.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Electric Grid Supply Chain Review: Large Power Transformers and High Voltage Direct Current Systems

The report “America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition” lays out the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the energy supply chain as well as the federal government plans to address these challenges and opportunities. It is accompanied by several issue-specific deep dive assessments, including this one, in response to Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” which directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base. The Executive Order is helping the federal government to build more secure and diverse U.S. supply chains, including energy supply chains. The need to modernize and increase the capacity of the U.S. power grid is increasing due to growing population, aging infrastructure, grid resilience requirements, operational flexibility needs, and a growing portfolio of renewable energy. As part of the Paris Climate Agreement the United States has committed to reducing its net greenhouse gas emissions by 50 to 52 percent below 2005 levels in 2030 and has set a goal of 100 percent carbon pollution free electricity by 2035 (The United States of America Nationally Determined Contribution, 2021). Meeting these targets will require a significant expansion of the power system to integrate a large amount of new renewable resources (United States Department of State & United States Executive Office of the President, 2021). However, many critical components supporting the power grid have limited to no domestic manufacturing capacity and face complex challenges in supporting a rapid expansion of the grid to meet multiple objectives, including decarbonization goals. This report focuses on two key grid components: large power transformers (LPTs) and high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

TrustDER: Trusted, Private and Scalable Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources

In this project, the Stanford and SLAC Teams have developed a Trusted, Private and Scalable platform for coordinating Coordination of Distributed Energy Resources (TrustDER). This is a layered system that ensures private, trusted and scalable coordination and monitoring of DERs. It accommodates a variety of resources, such as solar generation, gensets and loads, with a particular focus on battery systems-based resources, as they are a transformational technology experiencing fast growth in adoption by large critical facilities. The platform can be used as standalone or added to existing aggregation systems to enable trust, privacy and resilience. TrustDER consists of layers that address each of the shortcomings of the existing state of the art. Each layer in the platform can operate independently but provides information to the layers above it to enable a novel form of overall coordination architecture. The project consists of several tasks, with each task dedicated to the design of each layer. Task 2 Resource Virtualization defined a software abstraction layer for distributed energy resources (DERs). The goal of this abstraction was to simplify the implementation of algorithms utilizing cooperation of DERs resources in a variety of use cases. Task 3 is on Secure ID for Asset Authentication. Identity Management Systems (IDMS) are a foundational infrastructure for interactions between entities (organizations, users, devices, and services). Secure ID is blockchain-based a distributed identity management system allowing (1) identity provisioning, (2) authentication, (3) authorization, and (4) identity data sharing for IoT-enabled assets on the electricity grid. In this project, the SLAC team focused on designing and testing Keymaker, a protocol for authenticating device identity managed by Secure ID. Task 5 Private and Safe Integration is focused on the design and evaluation of a DER cooperation scheme which allows for the aggregation of DERs without impacting network reliability. The approach is designed based on realistic assumptions regarding data availability, communication infrastructure limitations, and privacy. Task 6 Scalable Distributed Privacy for Information explored how virtualized batteries could be managed privately. Specifically, it examined the case in which a principal provides a partitioned battery to multiple clients. Task 7 Use Cases was to ensure that this technology was applied in relevant situations and scenarios. Primarily, this means that virtualization needed to be employed in a manner that either improved flexibility, bolstered security or privacy, or decreased costs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Language-Theoretic Data Analysis to Support ICS Protocol Baselining

Critical infrastructure stakeholders need to baseline their systems to understand expected protocol communications. Baseline behaviors may vary based on operational context. Expected operations during a maintenance window, for example, may be different from normal operations. Furthermore, constructing system baselines for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is difficult and time-consuming. ICS processes generate artifacts expressed across heterogeneous data sources such as network traffic and device logs. This paper explores the hypothesis that such ICS artifacts form a language in the language-theoretic sense. From a theoretical perspective, the variety of implementations of ICS protocols and constrained environment of OT networks provide a rich application domain for language-theoretic approaches. We present several use cases related to the practical construction of system baselines: grammars for data fusion, language dialects for device fingerprinting, and security automata for system baselining

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Review on the State of the Art of Machine Learning and Satellite Imaging: Detecting Scene Changes in Selected Nuclear Fuel Cycle Datasets

The timely detection of clandestine nuclear facilities is one of the greatest challenges faced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA). Idaho National Laboratory is currently applying machine learning (ML) to existing satellite imagery (SI) datasets to find facilities within the nuclear fuel life cycle, with primary focus placed on identifying critical predecessor (i.e., fuel fabrication and fuel enrichment) and successor (i.e., nuclear power plants) facilities. This could provide a satellite image methodology that the IAEA could leverage to discover clandestine facilities. The work presented in this paper describes the evolution of a workflow developed by this team for object detection related to critical infrastructure by expanding that workflow for the purpose of identifying nuclear fuel cycle components and automating dependency assessments. This will be done using two methods housed within a single pipeline. The first method involves implementing a DenseNet161 convolutional neural network to classify the images and explain the results using Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME). The second method implements You Only Look Once version 5 (YoloV5), to detect objects within images, provide a probability for the detection, and provide a bounding box that corresponds to the object of interest. The results of this work are anticipated to provide a clear picture of this portion of the nuclear fuel cycle and perform as a stand-alone tool for image assessment that can be expanded to additional fuel cycle components and implemented in international safeguards and national security domains. This capability addresses the IAEA’s need to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities within a state while encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Scalable Unit Commitment with Security Constrained AC Power Flow via ADMM and Hybrid Modeling Strategies

This research introduces a more efficient way to optimize power grid operations, breaking the problem into manageable steps and using advanced mathematical techniques to speed up calculations. By incorporating smart heuristics, improved preprocessing, and contingency analysis, the approach allows operators to make better decisions faster. These innovations enhance our understanding of how to optimize energy generation, making it possible to anticipate failures before they happen, reduce system costs, and improve overall grid performance. Ultimately, this research helps bridge the gap between theoretical models and real-world applications, paving the way for a smarter, more resilient power grid. This research directly benefits the public by making electricity more affordable, reliable, and sustainable. By improving how power grids schedule and distribute electricity, the project helps energy providers reduce operational costs, which can lead to lower electricity prices for consumers. Additionally, the ability to predict and prevent power system failures enhances grid reliability, reducing the likelihood of blackouts that can disrupt homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure such as hospitals. From an environmental perspective, optimizing power generation reduces energy waste and lowers carbon emissions, contributing to cleaner air and a more sustainable energy system. Furthermore, with extreme weather events becoming more frequent, these advancements make the power grid more resilient, ensuring communities are better prepared for emergencies and natural disasters. By strengthening the nation's energy infrastructure, this research plays a crucial role in improving economic stability, public safety, and environmental sustainability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Integrating Cyber-Informed Engineering into Enterprise Risk Management

This document supports the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) within the context of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) to enhance cyber-resilience. It highlights that many critical infrastructure organizations use ERM to manage business risks and emphasizes the importance of evaluating critical systems and assets. The proposed approach can be adopted independently of formal ERM processes and offers a starting point for integrating CIE alongside existing or new ERM practices. Both CIE and ERM are iterative, and their alignment fosters continuous improvement and supports the engineering and operations cultures of an organization.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ARM Aerial Instrument Workshop Report

The mission of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Biological and Environmental Research (BER) program is to “support transformative science and scientific user facilities to achieve a predictive understanding of complex biological, earth, and environmental systems for energy and infrastructure security, independence, and prosperity.” (https://science.osti.gov/ber) Aligned with the BER central mission, the Earth and Environmental Systems Sciences Division (EESSD) plays a vital role in supporting the fundamental research to understand and predict Earth’s climate and environmental systems, and is also in a unique position to inform the development of sustainable solutions to the nation’s energy and environmental challenges. Specifically, EESSD manages two scientific user facilities: the Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility and the Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory (EMSL). These facilities provide the broader scientific community with scientific expertise, technical capabilities, and unique data sets to facilitate science in areas of importance to DOE. As a multi-platform scientific user facility, ARM aims to fulfill the needs predominantly within the EESSD Atmospheric System Research (ASR) and the Earth and Environmental System Modeling (EESM) mission areas, and provide the critical measurements required to improve understanding of aerosol and cloud life cycles and their interactions, and their coupling with the Earth’s surface. Over the years, ARM has carried out piloted and unmanned aircraft campaigns under different organizational and operational paradigms (Schmid et al. 2014, 2016). Building on its success, the ARM Aerial Facility (AAF) continues to complement the ground-based observations with airborne in situ cloud, aerosol, and trace gas observations as well as measurements of atmospheric state and atmospheric radiation. During the past three years, ARM has managed field campaigns using unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and tethered balloon systems (TBS) at Oliktok Point in Alaska to improve understanding of atmospheric processes in the Arctic. In 2019, following a careful evaluation of scientific community needs, ARM acquired a Bombardier Challenger 850 regional jet to replace the vintage Grumman Gulfstream-159 turboprop aircraft previously used by AAF. With this new “laboratory in the sky”, AAF is evaluating its current and future aerial observation capabilities to continue satisfying the needs of the research community.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Review on Preprocessing Strategies, Deactivation, Thermal Safety, and Future Perspectives in Lithium-Ion Battery Recycling

The rapid growth in the use of lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) in electric vehicles, consumer electronics, and renewable energy storage has made effective end-of-life management essential. Recycling LIBs is critical not only for resource recovery and environmental protection but also for ensuring safety and economic viability. This review focuses on the preprocessing technologies that precede typical recovery processes, including disassembly, sorting, discharging, electrolyte removal, dismantling, thermal treatment, separation, and flotation. These steps play a foundational role in determining the efficiency, safety, and environmental impact of LIB recycling. LIBs pose substantial fire and explosion risks due to residual charge, flammable electrolytes, and reactive materials. The conditions and successive progression of the exothermic reactions which lead to thermal runaway has been discussed. It also explores secure deactivation techniques such as external circuit discharge, saline immersion, and thermomechanical methods, alongside fire prevention strategies including the use of flame retardants, elimination of oxidants, and reduction of heat generation and accumulation. Challenges and future directions are outlined, highlighting the need for standardized designs, automation, and safer, more sustainable recycling infrastructure. Furthermore, this review is distinguished by its focused analysis of preprocessing and deactivation steps, with particular attention to the thermal safety engineering aspects of LIB recycling.

Battery deactivation↗

Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology has significant potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change, particularly in hard to decarbonize industrial and commercial sectors. CCUS involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from industrial processes or power generation and utilizing it for other purposes, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or storing the captured CO 2 underground. CCUS technology can reduce the environmental impact of continued fossil fuel use while smoothing the transition to a low-carbon economy. CCUS can create new economic opportunities, such as the development of new industries and job creation, and can enhance energy security by diversifying energy sources. For these reasons, enabling CCUS has become a key objective of the Biden-Harris administration’s clean energy policy and has received bipartisan support. Despite its environmental and economic potential, CCUS faces multiple barriers to widespread deployment. One of the main challenges is the high cost and technical difficulty of implementing and operating large-scale CCUS infrastructure. CCUS remains a relatively expensive way to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., compared to solar photovoltaic technology’s displacement of coal generation). Additionally, financial incentives and supportive policies like those enacted to support solar photovoltaic development, especially at the state level, are inconsistent or nonexistent, which can discourage investment in CCUS projects. There are also technical challenges associated with safe and secure underground CO 2 storage and the development of new carbon utilization technologies. Public opposition to various aspects of CCUS technologies, ranging from concerns that CCUS will extend reliance on fossil fuels to CCUS infrastructure being sited in disadvantaged communities, is a growing challenge. This paper focuses on another significant barrier to broad CCUS deployment: the need for considerable expansion of the dedicated land-based CO 2 pipeline network in the United States to meet CCUS goals and the unique regulatory challenges to its development. To reach carbon emissions targets in the United States by 2050, CCUS technology will need to be supported by tens of thousands of miles of CO 2 pipelines. Estimates range from a minimum of roughly 29,000 pipeline miles (according to a 2020 Great Plains Institute study) to 66,000 pipeline miles (as per a 2021 Princeton University–led study). As of October 2022, however, the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) reports fewer than 5,400 miles of U.S. pipelines carrying CO 2 . This deficit—and what it means for the prospect of moving substantially larger quantities of CO 2 from source to use or storage—threatens to stifle the development of CCUS projects and technologies identified as an important tool to meet emissions targets. The current regulatory landscape facing CO 2 pipeline development can best be described as uncertain. At the federal level, the U.S. DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees safety regulation of pipelines transporting hazardous materials, including CO 2 upon commencement of operation. However, PHMSA’s definition of CO 2 as “a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent CO 2 molecules compressed to a supercritical state” has not been updated since its 1991 addition to the Federal Register. Because CO 2 can be transported in a gaseous, liquid, or supercritical state (indeed, the physical state of CO 2 can fluctuate within a single pipeline due to environmental changes), doubts persist about the extent of PHMSA’s purview—and raise questions about what, if anything, states should do to address this apparent gap. PHMSA has begun a major revision of its existing rules, but the agency does not expect a first draft before 2024. Economic oversight of CO 2 pipelines is even less clear. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Surface Transportation Board (STB)—which regulate the rates of interstate oil/natural gas and non-energy pipelines, respectively—have both declined jurisdiction over interstate CO 2 pipelines. This presumably leaves economic regulation to state and/or local governments, but few if any states have the laws or resources in place to oversee just and reasonable rates. Further, the interstate nature of CO 2 pipeline development creates questions around how different states should align their rate-making decisions. Onshore U.S. Carbon Pipeline Deployment: Siting, Safety, and Regulation Currently, regulatory responsibilities regarding CO 2 pipeline siting and permitting fall to state and local governments. The variety of laws and regulations across the country, however, creates a maze of requirements for pipeline developers to navigate. To secure necessary permits, most states require pipeline companies to be “common carriers” that provide transport service to the public at uniform rates. However, the specific definition of that term varies. Some states require clear evidence that a pipeline services the public, while others automatically deem any pipeline company transporting energy products or hazardous materials to be a “common carrier”—with little consideration for accessibility to third parties. Other states have eschewed common-carrier terminology entirely, placing private and publicly accessible pipelines on equal footing. Much like the variation in common-carrier requirements, laws governing eminent domain authority to secure rights-of-way (ROW) to commence construction on a planned pipeline route differ by state. Several states have no laws or rules governing CO 2 pipelines. In addition to creating questions about whether long-standing rules for other pipelines (e.g., natural gas or petroleum products) apply to CO 2 , this policy vacuum leaves local governments as the sole authority over sections of pipe within their boundaries. With dozens of counties along a given route, the probability of inconsistent regulation of the same pipeline is significant. Even in states with CO 2 pipeline laws in place, local regulatory attempts to address rising concerns over pipeline routing and safety have triggered lawsuits by pipeline companies seeking to delimit areas of federal, state, and local government responsibility. Meanwhile, legislators across the country have introduced bills to restrict the application of eminent domain to CO 2 pipeline projects, which could threaten a key means of securing ROW that companies cannot secure through negotiation with landowners. Taken separately, any of these regulatory issues—the narrow federal definition of CO 2 , FERC’s and STB’s decisions that CO 2 pipelines are not within their jurisdiction, and the considerable variation in state and local governments’ laws regulating CO 2 pipeline technologies—are extremely difficult to resolve. Adding the required scale of CO 2 pipeline expansion and the currently identified narrow window of time in which to reach climate target goals, the task becomes even more difficult—and raises a host of urgent questions for regulators. How should CO 2 be defined in federal regulations to ensure consistent safety standards across the country? What is the potential impact radius of a CO 2 pipeline rupture, and how should that inform local emergency response? In the absence of centralized federal oversight, what should state legislatures do to increase alignment for interstate CO 2 pipeline projects? This paper intends to serve as a primer for regulators and stakeholders who seek to better understand the regulatory challenges and opportunities facing this critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Pilot Demonstration of an Attestation and Anomaly Detection Framework using Distributed Ledger Technology for Power Grid Infrastructure

This report summarizes the design and pilot demonstration of a framework called Grid Guard that was created to provide increased data and device trustworthiness to electric grid devices by leveraging distributed ledger technology (DLT), specifically blockchain. Grid Guard contains a combination of core cryptographic methods such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA), and asymmetric cryptography, private permissioned blockchain, baselining configuration data, consensus algorithm (Raft) and the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) framework. The system implements a low energy, fast, and robust enhancement to system trustworthiness within and across electric grid systems such as substations, control centers and metering infrastructures. Blockchain is a distributed database structured that provides a practically unalterable (immutable) timeline of stored transactions. By relying on hashing and the Raft consensus algorithm, if an entity tries to illegitimately alter a record at one instance of the database the other ledger nodes are not altered. They work to cross-reference each other and easily locate any incorrectly added data and remove it. The bulk raw data is stored in an off-chain storage (outside of the blockchain ledger) and a hash of this baseline data is stored in the Blockchain ledger via hashing windows of time-series and configuration data, after aggregation and filtering. The bulk off-chain data repository is then considered to be trust-anchored using the hashes stored in the blockchain. To secure the electric grid testbed devices and data, device configuration baselines were compared to those baselines that had been previously stored in the ledger. Statistical baselines for device configurations, network communication patterns, and high-speed sensor data are calculated and then stored off-chain and hashes stored in the ledger. Measurements such as three-phase voltage and current, frequency, breaker status, protection scheme settings, network configuration settings (and other device configuration artifacts) and network traffic features (packet interarrival times) are compared every minute or other selected time windows. During phase 1 of the Grid Guard DLT project different DLT technologies were studies, and an assessment was performed on DLT technology vulnerabilities, uses, and key characteristics. DLT consensus protocols were studies (e.g., RAFT, named after Reliable, Replicated, Redundant, And Fault-Tolerant). Also, cryptography, public, private and permissioned or permissionless systems were assessed. Grid Guard implements a permissioned private DLT. Consensus algorithm selection and choice of DLT implementation depended heavily on the use-case. For this use-case, parameters were selected to measure performance and existing tools for assessment. Benchmarking was performed theoretically and practically. During phase 2 hashed transactions/blocks were inserted into the ledger every second. During phase 2 of the Grid Guard DLT project, a prototype framework was developed and demonstrated for attestation of critical substation devices and data using precision timing systems that use PTP and IRIG-B protocols) on a testbed of operational devices that emulated a distribution substation, control center, and power metering infrastructure using real Operational Technology (OT). The testbed includes OT devices such as protective relays, human machine interfaces (HMI), and power meters. To determine when to collect and compare system and network baselines, an initial examination of an anomaly detection capability to identify malicious manipulation of data streams was conducted. The resulting anomaly detection was demonstrated in a set of experiments and leveraged to trigger device artifact attestation checks. Attestation checks occur against device configuration baselines when compared with the immutable blockchain-stored baselines, which provided a cryptographically supported means by which to store baselines. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to test the Grid Guard framework. The testbed emulates the operations of a portion of a power grid and SCADA systems as closely as possible. The testbed integrates real protocols, mainly IEC 61850 standard protocols, such as the Sampled Value (SV) and the GOOSE protocols. The testbed also supports DNP3 and other layer 2 and layer 3 protocols such as Telnet, SSH, SFTP/FTP and other proprietary protocols needed to connect to industrial control system equipment. The testbed emulates real power conditions using the OpalRT hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) device which can create fault situations that cannot be easily tested on real systems. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that electrical utilities commonly use.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

PAS: Privacy Algorithms in Systems

Today we face an explosion of data generation, ranging from health monitoring to national security infrastructure systems. More and more systems are connected to the Internet that collects data at regular time intervals. These systems share data and use machine learning methods for intelligent decisions, which resulted in numerous real-world applications (e.g., autonomous vehicles, recommendation systems, and heart-rate monitoring) that have benefited from it. However, these approaches are prone to identity thief and other privacy related cyber-security attacks. So, how can data privacy be protected efficiently in these scenarios? More dedicated efforts are needed to propose the integration of privacy techniques into existing systems and develop more advanced privacy techniques to address the complex challenges of multi-system connectivity and data fusion. Therefore, we have introduced Privacy Algorithms in Systems (PAS) at CIKM which provides a venue to gather academic researchers and industry researchers/practitioners to present their research in an effort to advance the frontier of this critical direction of privacy algorithms in systems.

Kotevska, Olivera↗

Semiconductor: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment

In February 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order (EO) 14017, “America’s Supply Chains,” directing seven executive agencies to evaluate the resilience and security of the nation’s critical supply chains and to craft strategies for six industrial bases that underpin America’s economic and national security. See Sec. 3(b) of E.O. 14017. As part of the one-year response to EO 14017, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through the national laboratories, conducted evaluations of the supply chains that encompass the Energy Sector Industrial Base, with a particular focus on technologies required to decarbonize the U.S. by 2050. This report focuses on one of these technologies, semiconductors, both conventional and wide bandgap (WBG) power electronics (PE). As noted in the 100-Day report, conventional semiconductors are a keystone technology that are essential for the operation of nearly every electronic device, including those that are critical to decarbonization, such as electric vehicles (EVs), industrial and building applications, and electricity generation and end use. In addition, power electronics have been applied to industrial equipment to improve energy efficiency and enhance controllability. Power electronics have also been used to improve the reliability of data centers and critical infrastructure, including the stabilization of the electric grid while subjected to disturbances. Increasingly, power electronics are being used to integrate renewable energy and battery storage systems, enabling new grid services and the development of microgrids. It is estimated that 30% of the electricity used in the U.S. passes through power electronic devices, and studies suggest that this number could reach 80% as power electronics are deployed in more markets. Nearly all forms of electrified transportation will depend on power electronics. Power electronic systems utilize high-capacity semiconductor devices at their core. The continued growth in power electronics depends on sustained innovation in the semiconductor industry.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Quantitative risk assessment examples for underground hydrogen storage facilities

Hydrogen energy storage can be used to achieve goals of national energy security, renewable energy integration, and grid resilience. Adapting underground natural gas storage facility (UNGSF) infrastructure for underground hydrogen storage (UHS) is one method of storing large quantities of hydrogen that has already largely been proven to work for natural gas. There are currently some underground salt caverns in the United States that are being used for hydrogen storage by commercial entities, but it is still a fairly new concept in that it has not been widely deployed nor has it been done with other geologic formations like depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs. Assessments of UHS systems can help identify and evaluate risks to people both working within the facility and residing nearby. This report provides example risk assessment methodologies and analyses for generic wellhead and processing facility configurations, specifically in the context of the risks of unintentional hydrogen releases into the air. Assessment of the hydrogen containment in the subsurface is also critically important for a safety assessment for a UHS facility, but those geomechanical assessments are not included in this report.

08 HYDROGEN↗

A Typology of Quantum-Classical Faults

This paper introduces an extended taxonomy of faults specific to hybrid quantum-classical systems, addressing the unique challenges that arise from integrating quantum accelerators into high-performance computing (HPC) infrastructures. Building on the foundational fault classification by Avizienis et al., we incorporate fault types unique to quantum computing-such as qubit decoherence, spontaneous gate errors, and photon loss-alongside traditional and human-induced faults including development errors, operational mistakes, and malicious attacks. Our taxonomy classifies faults by their origin (natural vs. human-made), intent (accidental, deliberate non-malicious, or malicious), system boundaries (internal vs. external), and persistence (transient to permanent). We also explore how different architectural integration patterns-ranging from tight coupling to loose on-premise and cloud-based configurations-shape the manifestation and propagation of faults. These scenarios are analyzed in terms of timing mismatches, interface inconsistencies, and security threats such as data tampering and denial-of-service attacks. Through this fault-centric lens, we aim to support the co-design of dependable quantum-classical systems and highlight the critical role that integration strategies play in ensuring reproducibility, resilience, and security across hybrid computing platforms.

Giusto, Edorado [University of Naples Federico II,↗