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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Financial Analysis of the Smallmouth Bass Flows implemented at the Glen Canyon Dam during Water Year 2024

The Glen Canyon Dam (GCD) is a Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) power resource that is a component of the Salt Lake City Area Integrated Projects (SLCA/IP). The 2016 record of decision (ROD) for the GCD long-term experimental and management plan (LTEMP) final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) specifies criteria for GCD monthly water releases, daily and hourly operating limits, and experimental releases. This report presents a financial analysis of the Smallmouth bass (Micropterus dolomieu) (SMB) flows implemented at GCD during Water Year (WY) 2024. These bypass flows were introduced by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) as an emergency response to the growing threat posed by invasive SMB in the Colorado River ecosystem downstream of the dam. SMB are a non-native predatory species that pose a significant threat to native fish populations, including the endangered humpback chub (Gila cypha). The thermal regime below GCD, typically cold due to hypolimnetic releases from Lake Powell, has historically served as a thermal barrier limiting SMB establishment. However, persistently low reservoir levels in recent years have reduced stratification in Lake Powell, allowing warmer water to be released downstream. This has enabled SMB to spawn successfully below the dam, prompting urgent ecological concerns. To mitigate the risk of SMB proliferation, the USBR implemented a series of bypass flows in WY 2024. Drawn from a lower elevation than the penstocks, the bypass structures released cooler water downstream. These short-duration bypass flows aimed to keep temperatures cool enough to prevent SMB from spawning, thereby reducing the ecological threat posed by this invasive species. Although motivated by ecological objectives, these bypass flows came with financial tradeoffs. Releasing water through the bypass structures instead of the turbines at GCD reduced hydropower generation, resulting in a significantly lower financial position for Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), which is responsible for marketing the electricity produced by the GCD Powerplant. This report analyzes the financial impact of the SMB flows implemented from July to November 2024. These experimental releases led to an estimated financial cost of approximately $18.9 million, primarily driven by the substantial volume of water diverted through the bypass structures. This study applies an integrated set of tools to estimate WAPA financial impacts by simulating GCD under two types of cases; namely, (1) a “With Experiment” case that mimics the water operations that actually occurred, including the SMB bypass flows, and (2) a “Without Experiment” case that simulates operations under the assumption that the SMB flows did not occur. Both cases comply with LTEMP hourly and daily operating criteria, and the monthly water release volumes are assumed to be identical under both cases. The Colorado River Storage Project Python-based model (CRiSPPy) model was the main modeling tool used to simulate the dispatch of the GCD hydropower plant and associated water releases from Lake Powell. In the modeling process, the research team used extensive data sets and historical information on SLCA/IP power plant characteristics, hydrologic conditions, and WAPA’s power purchases and sales prices.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber Conservative Operations

In an era of increasingly sophisticated and pervasive cyber threats, robust cyber resilience strategies are more critical than ever. This paper introduces the concept of Cyber Conservative Operations, a proactive approach designed to assist critical infrastructure owners and operators in managing risk and maintaining resilience in the face of imminent, yet not occurring, cyber events. By leveraging the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and the energy sector’s practice of conservative operations, Cyber Conservative Operations offer a framework for planning and executing coordinated active defense and resilience-oriented actions ahead of cyber events. This approach aims to minimize the consequences of digitally-enabled hazards and ensure swift recovery from anticipated cyber threats. Cyber Conservative Operations enhance the ability of owners and operators to execute pre-planned defense and resilience actions, thereby reducing the impact of digitally-enabled hazards. These operations are crucial for addressing impacts that cannot be precisely quantified or forecasted and for preparing organizations for rapid recovery from imminent digital threats. The paper begins with a discussion of conservative operations as applied to the bulk power system (BPS), a current mechanism allowing BPS entities to enact defensive operating plans to mitigate impending grid unreliability. Building on this model, we present a concept for implementing cyber conservative operations at asset owner facilities. The paper concludes with two case studies of cyber conservative operations drawn from high-profile cyber events, illustrating the practical application and benefits of this proactive approach.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Trust-Based Detection and Mitigation of Cyber Attacks in Distributed Cooperative Control of Islanded AC Microgrids

In this study, we address the challenge of detecting and mitigating cyber attacks in the distributed cooperative control of islanded AC microgrids, with a particular focus on detecting False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), a significant threat to the Smart Grid (SG). The SG integrates traditional power systems with communication networks, creating a complex system with numerous vulnerable links, making it a prime target for cyber attacks. These attacks can lead to the disclosure of private data, control network failures, and even blackouts. Unlike machine learning-based approaches that require extensive datasets and mathematical models dependent on accurate system modeling, our method is free from such dependencies. To enhance the microgrid’s resilience against these threats, we propose a resilient control algorithm by introducing a novel trustworthiness parameter into the traditional cooperative control algorithm. Our method evaluates the trustworthiness of distributed energy resources (DERs) based on their voltage measurements and exchanged information, using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to dynamically adjust control actions. We validated our approach through simulations on both the IEEE-34 bus feeder system with eight DERs and a larger microgrid with twenty-two DERs. The results demonstrated a detection accuracy of around 100%, with millisecond range mitigation time, ensuring rapid system recovery. Additionally, our method improved system stability by up to almost 100% under attack scenarios, showcasing its effectiveness in promptly detecting attacks and maintaining system resilience. These findings highlight the potential of our approach to enhance the security and stability of microgrid systems in the face of cyber threats.

Computer Science↗
DOE OSTI2020

IMPLEMENTING CYBERSECURITY INTO AN EXISTING NATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMME – A CASE STUDY

Cyber threat profiling and risk mitigation is critical to any nuclear state organization and should be considered as part of any comprehensive nuclear security programme. Defining and evaluating the impact of the cyber threat to mission can be challenging. An existing national nuclear non-proliferation organization undertook an effort to incorporate computer security activities into its programme to address cyber risk. One of the primary goals of this endeavour was to develop a set of prioritised recommendations for organizational follow-through. The organization dedicated subject matter expert resources in the form of a cyber task force to support this goal. Opportunities were identified where computer security could be built into each programme including office-level strategies and tools. Of course, no new identified threat vector is easily considered and incorporated into existing programmes without impact. There are many obstacles to be overcome. Technically literate subject matter experts are difficult to find, management has comparatively less experience applying computer security into its programmes, and trying to change the culture to consider computer security risk at policy and programmatic levels takes time and management attention. As an outcome of this process, a roadmap for program integration was developed, including the establishment of a cyber support team. This paper will discuss the challenges and successes associated with establishing such a team.

Cyber Security, Nuclear, Non-proliferation↗
DOE OSTI2021

EMERGING CYBER-PHYSICAL LANDSCAPE OF TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY

Technology is rapidly progressing in transportation and shipping industries across the globe, including the nuclear, radioactive and hazardous material transportation sectors. With this progress comes unprecedented opportunities for improved transparency, safety, and security in transportation, as well as novel threat surfaces and attack vectors. Therefore, the transport safety and security interface is affected through the application of these technologies. We provide an investigative overview of the developing fields of “trans-tech” or “freight- tech” with a look towards technology development and adoption over the next 3-5 years across three primary categories: Transportation IoT (Internet of Things), Smart Infrastructure, and digitization of transportation management. We also investigate the safety and security implications of utilizing these technologies. Each of these categories presents novel threats as well as opportunities. We examine the role of technology in each as an emerging cyber-physical threat to nuclear and radioactive material transportation security, and plausible mitigation considerations at both the state and operator levels in additional to opportunities for addressing the interface between safety and security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

From Count Rates to Quantifying Isotopic Activities – Field Analysis of Radiation Monitoring Data

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a comprehensive bicoastal radiological and nuclear emergency response to United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. A major part of the support is to provide systematic radiological search for lost or stolen sources, Radiological search is a core competency of the NNSS with its origin dating back to nuclear weapons test era. Search operations from multiple platforms is the common thread among the various NNSS assets, which include Aerial Measuring System (AMS), Maritime Support Team (MST), National Capitol Response (NCR), National Search Team (NST) and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Information collected and analyzed during search operations add to the actionable intelligence for the law enforcement agencies and provide valuable guidance for the tactical resolution of a nuclear or radiological crisis. Search is an intelligence and situational awareness driven operation and most often called upon during a radiological emergency, however it can be brought into play to thwart a potential threat by providing monitoring and surveillance support. The Office of Nuclear Incident Response (NA-84) serves as the technical leader in responding to and resolving nuclear and radiological threats worldwide and integrates its efforts with other NNSA stakeholders (e.g., NNSA office of Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation NA-22). The response includes expertise in the areas of radiological search, render safe, and consequence management. This article will discuss the methodologies, tools, procedures, and techniques to extract maximum radiological characterization information (isotopic composition, activities for individual isotopes, threat assessment etc.) from field monitoring or Search operation data.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Reveal of Uranium Bioremediation Mechanisms by Bacillus Species through Proteomics Studies

Radionuclides, such as Uranium (U) and heavy metals continue to pose threats to the ecosystem health and processes at the Department of Energy (DOE) managed, Savannah River Site (SRS), located along the Savannah River near Aiken, SC. Such co-contaminated environments are difficult to remediate using conventional excavation and disposal or pump-and-treat approaches. Globally, more than 109 tons of uranium contaminated areas pose a long term threat to human and ecological health. Even with presented low concentrations in the brain, central nervous effects are still observed. Uranium and depleted uranium (DU) have long term effects on the kidneys. Some small general health effects include severe headaches and breathing problems. Uranus ions are toxic to living cells because they inhibit metabolism of carbohydrates by blocking ATP binding sites. Bioremediation by microorganisms represents an alternative solution, which is advantageous because of the possibility of biosorbent regeneration, cost-effectiveness, increased metal removal and easy recovery of some valuable metals. Bacillus sp. bacterium was previously used in the bioremediation of heavy metals in coal mine run off waters of SRS. However, its ability to bioremediate uranium was unknown so far. Hence, in the present study, uranium bioremediation by Bacillus sp. bacterium was investigated. The mechanism of bioremediation was also revealed through proteomics studies. Heavy metals contamination poses a serious threat to water, soil and human health. Soil and water are contaminated due to excessive exploitation of uranium mines for generation of nuclear energy and weaponry. It is not degradable easily and persist in soil and water for a long period of time due to its long half- life. Savannah river site (SRS) is one of the uranium contaminated sites. The physical or chemical remediation techniques are costly and complex. Microbial system approaches with competent bacteria has received increased attention due to its adaptability in various environmental matrices and cost effectiveness. However, even though there are multiple suggested pathways (F1), the specific mechanisms that drive this behavior are still unclear, especially with popular microorganisms such as Bacillus species. In a previous research (Ibeanusi et al, 2003) Bacillus sp. was shown to detoxify and precipitate a variety of heavy metals in coal pile runoff waters of SRS site. Additionally, genomic analysis demonstrated that this microorganism posses multiple attributes for chemical transport regulation and metabolic pathways. U remediation occurs during the first 20 hours of exposure. During this time period, Bacillus sp. may work primarily under two mechanisms - sorption and accumulation. These two mechanisms simultaneously work to protect the microorganism from high concentrations. Figure 10 demonstrates that certain proteins are up regulated and down regulated under extreme stressful conditions. Membrane fraction proteins were up regulated. Cytosolic fraction proteins were down regulated. This protein information coincides with the adsorption behavior. Bacillus sp. is a good candidate for U remediation at various concentrations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Using Structured Intelligence Graph (STIG) to protect our critical infrastructure against cyber attacks [Poster]

STIG is a revolutionary cybersecurity tool developed by researchers at the U. S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory and it is a software that allows utility owners and operators to easily visualize, create, and edit cyberthreat intelligence information. STIG uses Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and converts complex data on cybersecurity vulnerabilities into a visualization that is easy to understand and act on. With STIG, utility owners and operators have a common system for sharing threat intelligence information, thus increasing the chances of detecting and mitigating cyber exploits before they lead to a cyberattack.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Cohort 1: Authentication and Authorization

In the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Biden-Harris Administration defines the need for a "defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them." The strategy cites the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) as an exemplary effort to bolster the security and resilience of clean energy generation. These efforts help "secure the clean energy grid of the future and [generate] security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors" and promise broad and far-reaching impacts to bridge the capabilities of private industry and the needs of energy production. Cohort 1 of CECA launched in the fall of 2022 with a focus on solutions that provide strong authentication and authorization for industrial control systems to mitigate attacks on the energy grid. Authentication and authorization verify that the identity (authentication) and permissions (authorization) of a user or device are aligned with their assigned roles. Weaknesses in either can have serious repercussions. To assess the strength of Cohort 1's solutions, CECA devised threat scenarios grounded in historical precedents: the CECA team reviewed exploits from real-world case studies of state-sponsored actors to match the assessment's attack paths and targets. Cohort 1 results provided the energy industry, product vendors, and related agencies valuable insights into the efficacy and applicability of solutions in common system configurations under realistic threat scenarios. The results of the assessment highlight points for interrogation and improvement in subsequent technology iterations. CECA's evaluations are part of an ongoing conversation and collaboration to bolster U.S. cyber resilience against adversaries today and in the future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Attack Surface of Wind Energy Technologies in the United States [Slides]

This slide deck presents an overview of the threat landscape for wind energy technologies. It highlights unique cybersecurity considerations for wind, the growing penetration and potential impact of an attack. Standard architectures are shared to highlight where vulnerabilities may exist and attack paths to reach critical infrastructure. We discuss threat actors and attack paths. Several recent events impacting wind assets or wind companies are explained.

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) [Poster]

Cybersecurity companies such as CrowdStrike, Dragos, Microsoft and Unit 42 categorize Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) using their own naming schemes. As a result, these APTs are mapped to different malware sources and campaigns, all from differing sources, leading to inconsistent mapping. Inconsistent mapping causes confusion and adds further obscurity around these groups, making it difficult to track and mitigate APT cyberattacks. The Evidence-based Graph Adversary Mapping (EGRAM) tool remediates the mapping challenge by collecting, updating and converting adversary data and their sources into a valid, codified STIX v2.1 bundle which is then stored in a Neo4j graph database. It utilizes graph traversal methods and centrality analysis to generate actionable information as a Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG), based on user queries. EGRAM exists as Python code and a Jupyter Notebook that acts as a searchable, evidence-based, source of intelligence for APT groups’ artifacts and cyber campaigns.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

How Cooperative Engagement Programs Strengthen Sequencing Capabilities for Biosurveillance and Outbreak Response

The threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases continues to be a challenge to public and global health security. Cooperative biological engagement programs act to build partnerships and collaborations between scientists and health professionals to strengthen capabilities in biosurveillance. Biosurveillance is the systematic process of detecting, reporting, and responding to especially dangerous pathogens and pathogens of pandemic potential before they become outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemics. One important tool in biosurveillance is next generation sequencing. Expensive sequencing machines, reagents, and supplies make it difficult for countries to adopt this technology. Cooperative engagement programs help by providing funding for technical assistance to strengthen sequencing capabilities. Through workshops and training, countries are able to learn sequencing and bioinformatics, and implement these tools in their biosurveillance programs. Cooperative programs have an important role in building and sustaining collaborations among institutions and countries. One of the most important pieces in fostering these collaborations is trust. Trust provides the confidence that a successful collaboration will benefit all parties involved. With sequencing, this enables the sharing of pathogen samples and sequences. Obtaining global sequencing data helps to identify unknown etiological agents, track pathogen evolution and infer transmission networks throughout the duration of a pandemic. Having sequencing technology in place for biosurveillance generates the capacity to provide real-time data to understand and respond to pandemics. We highlight the need for these programs to continue to strengthen sequencing in biosurveillance. By working together to strengthen sequencing capabilities, trust can be formed, benefitting global health in the face of biological threats.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems-Part 1: Identifying Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Determining Risk

Technology innovation, market demand, and the potential impacts of a changing climate are driving the marine renewable energy (MRE) industry to develop market-ready systems to provide low-carbon electricity for emerging, off-grid markets. The advanced operational and information technology devices used in MRE systems create a pathway for a cyber threat actor to gain unauthorized access to data or disrupt operation. To improve the resiliency of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy from oceans and rivers, guidance was developed for an end users' organization that describes a framework for identifying and managing cybersecurity risk. The development of the cybersecurity guidance is based on standards described in the Risk Management Framework and Cybersecurity Framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper is the first of a two-part series that describes an approach to determine the cybersecurity risk for MRE systems based on assessing potential cyber threats, identifying vulnerabilities (people, processes, and technology, including physical and operational environment), and evaluating the consequences a cyberattack would have on operation of the MRE system and impact on end users' mission and business objectives. MRE developers and stakeholders can use this approach to assess their current cybersecurity risk posture to incorporate appropriate cybersecurity controls to reduce the consequences and impacts from a cyberattack on MRE systems. This approach can be refined further as MRE systems are deployed and operational configurations are available.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗
DOE OSTI2022

Achieving American Leadership in Cybersecurity and Digital Components Factsheet

The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

CCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗