Robust Dynamic Watermarking for Cyber-Physical Security of Inverter-Based Resources in Power Distribution Systems
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High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.
High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.
The development of smart grid technologies has resulted in increased interdependence between power and communication systems. Many of the operations in the existing power system rely on a stable and secured communication system. For electrically weak systems and time‐critical applications, this reliance can be even greater, where a small degradation in communication performance can degrade system stability. However, despite inter‐dependencies between power and communication systems, only a few studies have investigated the impacts of communication system performance on power system dynamics. This study investigates the dependencies of power system dynamics operations on a communication system performance. First, a detailed, dynamic networked microgrid model is developed in the GridLAB‐D simulation environment, along with a representative multi‐traffic, multi‐channel, multi‐protocol communication system model, developed in the network simulator (ns‐3). Second, a hierarchical engine for large‐scale infrastructure co‐simulation framework is developed to co‐simulate microgrid dynamics, its communication system, and a microgrid control system. The impact of communication system delays on the dynamic stability of networked microgrids is evaluated for the loss of generation using three use‐cases. While the example use‐cases examine microgrid applications and the impact to resiliency, the framework can be applied to all levels of power system operations.
Interception of a moving and potentially evading target can be a challenging problem, in particular for conditions in which the target may be moving at high speeds and difficult to detect. We have proposed to merge two Sandia LDRD efforts, the SPARR Spiking/Processing Array (neuromorphic event-driven sensing) and the Dragonfly-Inspired Algorithms for Intercept- Trajectory Planning (neural-inspired algorithms for interception) toward a unified system with direct application to national security. Neuromorphic systems demonstrate the most potential for speed and efficiency gains when communication is event-driven and computations are simple but parallelizable. Accordingly, we anticipate fully realizing potential benefits from a neuromorphic interception system if event-driven sensing is combined with processing and acting also implemented on event-driven (spiking) systems. We have successfully translated a neural-inspired interception algorithm to a neural network architecture for evaluation on neuromorphic hardware. Preliminary implementations of the neural network designed for implementation on the Loihi chip are still too immature for conclusive evaluation, but the results of this effort have demonstrated a viable path for a previously developed dragonfly-inspired interception algorithm to be implemented on neuromorphic hardware.
Part Two expands upon Part One in an attempt to translate the methodology for ground system personnel. The goal is to build upon the methodology presented in Part One by showing examples and details on how to implement the methodology. Section 1: Ground Systems Overview; Section 2: Secure Software Development; Section 3: Defense in Depth for Ground Systems; Section 4: What Now?
A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
A mini split cooling system will be used to maintain temperature requirements in a mobile secure transport system. While the split cooling system was designed to be used in static residential or commercial applications, it was selected for this transportation application due to a unique set of security requirements. However, the system’s ability maintain reliability and survive prolonged long-term shock and vibration is a significant concern. The mitigation strategy is to select vibration isolation mounts and perform lifetime shock and vibration testing to demonstrate survivability. The goal of this study is to generate a finite element model of the system and perform modal analysis to inform selection of vibration mounts to minimize the amount of vibrational energy transferred to the split cooling system. The scope of this report is limited to study of the condensing unit only, and geometric variation of the assembly will not be allowed.
Design of a reliable and secure protection system for a 100% renewable microgrid with only inverter-based resources (IBRs), is quite challenging. Most of the existing protection schemes in the state-of-the-art are suitable for microgrids with mixed-type of distributed energy resources (DERs) that covers both rotating machine-based DERs as well as IBR-based DERs, where the fault current level is moderately high. Due to drastic reduction in fault current level based on mode of operation and the variation of the low fault current level based on the operating level of the IBRs, the existing protection schemes face critical challenges, in case of a 100% renewable microgrid. This article proposes a zone-based hierarchical protection scheme that partitions a microgrid into various zones-of-protection and assigns speed-based hierarchical protection schemes in order to address the fundamental challenges of such microgrids. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated using time-domain simulation study on a microgrid test system. The results corroborates that the proposed hierarchical zone-based protection scheme exhibits enhanced reliability, security and dependability while tested with various fault cases (fault types, locations, and impedances), and non-fault cases during both grid-tied and islanded mode.
Transport of high-consequence shipments requires a resilient and robust systems of systems to guarantee cargo arrival. Furthermore, rising adoption of technologies such as connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), intelligent infrastructure, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication presents unique challenges for securing transportation systems. Within these Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), several additional vulnerabilities exist that create pathways for adversarial attacks and cargo interception. For example, connectivity provides cyber pathways directly into vehicle systems and infrastructure for malicious actors. Furthermore, advanced vehicle automation exposes additional vehicle control necessary for shipment interception otherwise unavailable to adversaries. Within this paper, we will discuss the specific threats introduced by ITS-enabled technologies currently deployed and in development. These include those mentioned related to connectivity and automation, but will be expanded into grid, infrastructure, and vehicle specific threats. In addition, we will discuss how to potentially mitigate these emerging challenges as well as how to safeguard transportation systems from next generation attacks.
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enable the smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among system components as well as with outside entities, such as the cloud, to enable low-cost remote management, optimized automation via outsourced cloud analytics, and increased building-grid integrations. As smart buildings move towards open communication technologies, providing access to BASs through the building's intranet, or even remotely through the Internet, has become a common practice. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber resilient control strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols (i.e., BACnet, KNX, LonWorks, and Modbus) are reviewed, followed by a discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. Furthermore, the impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber resilient control strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally discussed.
Design of a reliable and secure protection system for a 100% renewable microgrid with only inverter-based resources (IBRs), is quite challenging. Most of the existing protection schemes in the state-of-the-art are suitable for microgrids with mixed-type of distributed energy resources (DERs) that covers both rotating machine-based DERs as well as IBR-based DERs, where the fault current level is moderately high. Due to drastic reduction in fault current level based on mode of operation and the variation of the low fault current level based on the operating level of the IBRs, the existing protection schemes face critical challenges, in case of a 100% renewable microgrid. This article proposes a zone-based hierarchical protection scheme that partitions a microgrid into various zones-of-protection and assigns speed-based hierarchical protection schemes in order to address the fundamental challenges of such microgrids. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated using time-domain simulation study on a microgrid test system. The results corroborates that the proposed hierarchical zone-based protection scheme exhibits enhanced reliability, security and dependability while tested with various fault cases (fault types, locations, and impedances), and non-fault cases during both grid-tied and islanded mode.
Climate change influences on the major pillars of food security. Each of the four elements of food security (availability,access,utilization,andstability) is vulnerable to changes in climate. For example,reductions in production related to regional drought influence food availability at multiple scales. Changes in price influences the ability of certain populations to purchase food (access). Utilization maybe affected when production zones shift, reducing the availability of preferred or culturally appropriate types of food within a region. Stability of the food supply may be highly uncertain given an increased incidence of extreme climatic events and their influence on production patterns.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tens of thousands of networked computer systems and applications. Software Security vulnerabilities present risks such as lost or corrupted data, information theft, and unavailability of critical systems. These risks represent potentially enormous costs to NASA. The NASA Code Q research initiative 'Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach' offers formal verification of information technology (IT), through the creation of a Software Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI), to address software security risks.
Technologies for providing secure emergency power control of a high voltage direct current transmission (HVDC) system include a controller. The controller includes circuitry configured to receive status data indicative of a present physical status of a power system. The circuitry is also configured to obtain an emergency power control command triggered by a remote source. The emergency power control command is to be executed by an HVDC transmission system of the power system. Further, the circuitry is configured to determine, as a function of the status data, whether the emergency power control command is consistent with the present physical status of the power system and block, in response to a determination that the emergency power control command is not consistent with the present physical status of the power system, execution of the emergency power control command by the HVDC transmission system.
Cities are upgrading their infrastructure and converting traditional indoor and outdoor luminaires to Connected Lighting Systems equipped with sensors in an aggressive effort to reduce energy consumption, increase sustainability, and improve the quality of life. When you take something seemingly benign like a lighting system and connect it to the internet, if improperly secured a potential attack vector for hackers is created. Hackers could then access sensitive information, pivot into other networks, shut down services, or enslave devices to do their bidding. In attempt to close this attack vector and secure these systems, this paper extends previous work that investigated, compared and contrasted authentication vulnerabilities in Connected Lighting Systems that identified the need for additional testing and improved test method documentation. One additional authentication test and four new authorization tests were developed utilizing the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) as a test development and documentation guide. The new tests were integrated with the previous work to develop an updated test method with a focus on describing test procedures to make them easy to understand and repeat. In addition, a first Connected Lighting System use case was established to begin developing threat profiles that will aid in the identification of vulnerabilities whose focus areas extend beyond authentication and authorization. This use case describes the generation and flow of CLS data which assists in specifying methods to harden CLSs from outside interference and exploitation that can be implemented immediately on existing CLSs and as new products come to market.
This paper presents a continuous-time resilient distributed optimization algorithm based on competitive interaction design method on connected graphs in the presence of adversaries. Here, the competitive interaction method allows us to design a network that protects the multi-agent systems from adversaries without requiring high network connectivity. In addition, the proposed algorithm does not require the global information about the number of adversaries. First, we show that the proposed distributed algorithm solves the resilient distributed optimization problem with no attack on the communication links. Second, we show that the proposed continuous-time distributed optimization algorithm on connected graphs converges to the small neighborhood of the optimal solution in the presence of cyber-attacks onto the communication channel. Simulations are presented to illustrate our theoretical results.
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