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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering (REV B)

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses, GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System Safety Engineering for NASA if adequate modeling processes and environment are established.

NASA↗
NASA NTRS2017

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project KDP-C Review

The topics discussed are the UAS-NAS project life-cycle and ARMD thrust flow down, as well as the UAS environments and how we operate in those environments. NASA's Armstrong Flight Research Center at Edwards, CA, is leading a project designed to help integrate unmanned air vehicles into the world around us. The Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System project, or UAS in the NAS, will contribute capabilities designed to reduce technical barriers related to safety and operational challenges associated with enabling routine UAS access to the NAS. The project falls under the Integrated Systems Research Program office managed at NASA Headquarters by the agency's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. NASA's four aeronautics research centers - Armstrong, Ames Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Glenn Research Center - are part of the technology development project. With the use and diversity of unmanned aircraft growing rapidly, new uses for these vehicles are constantly being considered. Unmanned aircraft promise new ways of increasing efficiency, reducing costs, enhancing safety and saving lives 460265main_ED10-0132-16_full.jpg Unmanned aircraft systems such as NASA's Global Hawks (above) and Predator B named Ikhana (below), along with numerous other unmanned aircraft systems large and small, are the prime focus of the UAS in the NAS effort to integrate them into the national airspace. Credits: NASA Photos 710580main_ED07-0243-37_full.jpg The UAS in the NAS project envisions performance-based routine access to all segments of the national airspace for all unmanned aircraft system classes, once all safety-related and technical barriers are overcome. The project will provide critical data to such key stakeholders and customers as the Federal Aviation Administration and RTCA Special Committee 203 (formerly the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) by conducting integrated, relevant system-level tests to adequately address safety and operational challenges of national airspace access by unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS. In the process, the project will work with other key stakeholders to define necessary deliverables and products to help enable such access. Within the project, NASA is focusing on five sub-projects. These five focus areas include assurance of safe separation of unmanned aircraft from manned aircraft when flying in the national airspace; safety-critical command and control systems and radio frequencies to enable safe operation of UAS; human factors issues for ground control stations; airworthiness certification standards for UAS avionics and integrated tests and evaluation designed to determine the viability of emerging UAS technology. Five Focus Areas of the UAS Integration in the NAS Project Separation Assurance Provide an assessment of how planned Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) separation assurance systems, with different functional allocations, perform for UAS in mixed operations with manned aircraft Assess the applicability to UAS and the performance of NASA NextGen separation assurance systems in flight tests with realistic latencies and uncertain trajectories Assess functional allocations ranging from today's ground-based, controller-provided aircraft separation to fully autonomous airborne self-separation Communications Develop data and rationale to obtain appropriate frequency spectrum allocations to enable safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Develop and validate candidate secure safety-critical command and control system/subsystem test equipment for UAS that complies with UAS international/national frequency regulations, standards and recommended practices and minimum operational and aviation system performance standards for UAS Perform analysis to support recommendations for integration of safety-critical command and control systems and air traffic control communications to ensure safe and efficient operation of UAS in the NAS Human Systems Integration Develop a research test bed and database to provide data and proof of concept for GCS - ground control station - operations in the NAS Coordinate with standards organizations to develop human-factors guidelines for GCS operation in the NAS Certification Define a UAS classification scheme and approach to determining Federal Aviation Regulation airworthiness requirements applicable to all UAS digital avionics Provide hazard and risk-related data to support development of type design criteria and best development practices Integrated Tests and Evaluation Integrate and test mature concepts from technical elements to demonstrate and test viability Evaluate the performance of technology development in a relevant environment (full-mission, human-in-the-loop simulations and flight tests)

outreach↗
NASA NTRS2016

Forward Skirt Structural Testing on the Space Launch System (SLS) Program

Structural testing was performed to evaluate heritage forward skirts from the Space Shuttle program for use on the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) program. Testing was needed because SLS ascent loads are 35% higher than Space Shuttle loads. Objectives of testing were to determine margins of safety, demonstrate reliability, and validate analytical models. Testing combined with analysis was able to show heritage forward skirts were acceptable to use on the SLS program.

Lohrer, J. D.↗
NASA NTRS2003

A Comparison of Two Panasonic Lithium-Ion Batteries and Cells for the IBM Thinkpad

The IBM Thinkpad 760XD has been used in the Orbiter and International Space Station since 2000. The Thinkpad is powered by a Panasonic Li-ion battery that has a voltage of 10.8 V and 3.0 Ah capacity. This Thinkpad is now being replaced by the IBM Thinkpad A31P which has a Panasonic Li-ion battery that has a voltage of 10.8 V and 4.0 Ah capacity. Both batteries have protective circuit boards. The Panasonic battery for the Thinkpad 760XD had 12 Panasonic 17500 cells of 0.75 Ah capacity in a 4P3S cOnfiguration. The new Panasonic battery has 6 Panasonic 18650 cells of 2.0 Ah capacity in a 2P3S configuration. The batteries and cells for both models have been evaluated for performance and safety. A comparison of the cells under similar test conditions will be presented. The performance of the cells has been evaluated under different rates of charge and discharge and different temperatures. The cells have been tested under abuse conditions and the safety features in the cells evaluated. The protective circuit board in the battery was also tested under conditions of overcharge, overdischarge, short circuit and unbalanced cell configurations. The results of the studies will be presented in this paper.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Shuttle safety

Experiences with batteries for the Apollo Soyuz Test Project are related and the need for safety criteria for space shuttle orbiter and payload battery handling and design is assessed.

Bragg, B. J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Probabilistic Requirements (Partial) Verification Methods Best Practices Improvement. Variables Acceptance Sampling Calculators: Empirical Testing

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to improve on the Best Practices document produced for the NESC assessment, Verification of Probabilistic Requirements for the Constellation Program, by giving a recommended procedure for using acceptance sampling by variables techniques as an alternative to the potentially resource-intensive acceptance sampling by attributes method given in the document. In this paper, the results of empirical tests intended to assess the accuracy of acceptance sampling plan calculators implemented for six variable distributions are presented.

Johnson, Kenneth L.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Force testing manual for the Langley 20-inch Mach 6 tunnel

Data reduction and procedures for conducting force tests in a 20 inch Mach 6 tunnel are described. A discussion of pretest and testing phases are included. Items that are to be checked during model design and construction are outlined as well as safety requirements, starting loads tests, instructions for data acquisition and model installation. Measurement of balance and model misalignment and instructions for calibrating the angle of attack screen are covered. Procedures for making reference pressure, attitude tare, and data runs are included. The 20 inch tunnel force program is examined, and a description of data recording system input and load contrast sheets is given. An appendix presents a description, operating characteristics, and Mach number calibration of the tunnel, as well as tunnel characteristics.

Keyes, J. W.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Refurbishment and Automation of the Thermal/Vacuum Facilities at the Goddard Space Flight Center

The thermal/vacuum facilities located at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) have supported both manned and unmanned space flight since the 1960s. Of the 11 facilities, currently 10 of the systems are scheduled for refurbishment and/or replacement as part of a 5-year implementation. Expected return on investment includes the reduction in test schedules, improvements in the safety of facility operations, reduction in the complexity of a test and the reduction in personnel support required for a test. Additionally, GSFC will become a global resource renowned for expertise in thermal engineering, mechanical engineering and for the automation of thermal/vacuum facilities and thermal/vacuum tests. Automation of the thermal/vacuum facilities includes the utilization of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and the use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These components allow the computer control and automation of mechanical components such as valves and pumps. In some cases, the chamber and chamber shroud require complete replacement while others require only mechanical component retrofit or replacement. The project of refurbishment and automation began in 1996 and has resulted in the computer control of one Facility (Facility #225) and the integration of electronically controlled devices and PLCs within several other facilities. Facility 225 has been successfully controlled by PLC and SCADA for over one year. Insignificant anomalies have occurred and were resolved with minimal impact to testing and operations. The amount of work remaining to be performed will occur over the next four to five years. Fiscal year 1998 includes the complete refurbishment of one facility, computer control of the thermal systems in two facilities, implementation of SCADA and PLC systems to support multiple facilities and the implementation of a Database server to allow efficient test management and data analysis.

Donohue, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Development of Composite Sandwich Bonded Longitudinal Joints for Space Launch Vehicle Structures

The NASA Composite Technology for Exploration (CTE) Project is developing and demonstrating critical composite technologies with a focus on composite bonded joints; incorporating materials, design/analysis, manufacturing, and tests that utilize NASA’s expertise and capabilities. The project has goals of advancing composite technologies and providing lightweight structures to support future NASA exploration missions. In particular, the CTE project will demonstrate weight-saving, performance-enhancing composite bonded joint technology for Space Launch System (SLS)-scale composite hardware. Advancements from the CTE project may be incorporated as future block upgrades for SLS structural components. This paper discusses the details of the development of a composite sandwich bonded longitudinal joint for a generic space launch vehicle structure called the CTE Point Design. The paper includes details of the design, analysis, materials, manufacturing, and testing of sub-element joint test articles to test the capability of the joint design. The test results show that the composite longitudinal bonded joint design significantly exceeds the design loads with a 2.0 factor of safety. Analysis pre-test failure predictions for all sub-element bonded joint test coupons were all within 10% of the average test coupon failure load. This testing and analysis provides confidence in the potential use of composite bonded joints for future launch vehicle structures.

Segal, Kenneth N.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Human Factors Process Task Analysis Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure for the Advanced Technology Development Center

A process task analysis effort was undertaken by Dynacs Inc. commencing in June 2002 under contract from NASA YA-D6. Funding was provided through NASA's Ames Research Center (ARC), Code M/HQ, and Industrial Engineering and Safety (IES). The John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Engineering Development Contract (EDC) Task Order was 5SMA768. The scope of the effort was to conduct a Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA) of a hazardous activity and provide recommendations to eliminate or reduce the effects of errors caused by human factors. The Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Pump Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) was selected for this analysis. The HF PFMEA table (see appendix A) provides an analysis of six major categories evaluated for this study. These categories include Personnel Certification, Test Procedure Format, Test Procedure Safety Controls, Test Article Data, Instrumentation, and Voice Communication. For each specific requirement listed in appendix A, the following topics were addressed: Requirement, Potential Human Error, Performance-Shaping Factors, Potential Effects of the Error, Barriers and Controls, Risk Priority Numbers, and Recommended Actions. This report summarizes findings and gives recommendations as determined by the data contained in appendix A. It also includes a discussion of technology barriers and challenges to performing task analyses, as well as lessons learned. The HF PFMEA table in appendix A recommends the use of accepted and required safety criteria in order to reduce the risk of human error. The items with the highest risk priority numbers should receive the greatest amount of consideration. Implementation of the recommendations will result in a safer operation for all personnel.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Verification of an altitude decompression sickness prevention protocol for Shuttle operations utilizing a 10.s psi pressure stage

Three test series involving 173-man tess were conducted to define and verify a pre-extravehicular activity (EVA) denitrogenation procedure that would provide acceptable protection against altitude decompression sickness while minimizing the required duration of oxygen (O2) prebreathe in the suit prior to EVA. The tests also addressed the safety, in terms of incidence of decompression sickness, of conducting EVA's on consecutive days rather than on alternate days. The tests were conducted in an altitude chamber, subjects were selected as representative of the astronaut population, and EVA periods were simulated by reducing the chamber pressure to suit pressure while the subjects breathed O2 with masks and worked at EVA representative work rates. A higher than anticipated incidence of both venous bubbles (55%) and symptoms (26%) was measured following all denitrogenation protocols in this test. For the most part, symptoms were very minor and stabilized, diminished, or disappeared in the six-hour tests. Instances of clear, possible, or potential systemic symptoms were encountered only after use of the unmodified 10.2 psi protocol and not after the modified 10.2 psi protocol, the 3.5-hour O2 prebreathed protocol, or the 4.0-hour O2 prebreathe protocol. The high incidence of symptoms is ascribed to the type and duration of exercise and the sensitivity of the reporting technique to minor symptoms. Repeated EVA exposures after only 17 hours did not increase symptom or bubble incidence.

Waligora, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Guidelines for structural verification and fracture control of Shuttle payloads

The procedures followed by the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer in developing the guidelines concerning the structures, materials, and fracture control of the Space Shuttle payloads are described. Factors controlling the payload launch safety, such as crew and passenger safety, reusability, and mixes of payloads in a single launch are emphasized. Special consideration is given to the STS design and testing approaches, materials considerations, safety criticality review processes, nondestructive evaluation inspection for STS payload fracture control, fracture mechanics screening procedures, and components of special concern (e.g., pressurized vessels, fasteners, and composite structures).

Lifer, C. E.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Weather Information Communication (WINCOMM) VDL-3 and 1090ES Final Test Requirements, Test Plans, and Test Results

NASA s Aviation Safety Program was created for the purpose of making a significant reduction in the incidents of weather related aviation accidents by improving situational awareness. The objectives of that program are being met in part through advances in weather sensor technology, and in part through advances in the communications technology that are developed for use in the National Airspace System. It is this latter element, i.e., the improvements in aviation communication technologies, that is the focus of the Weather Information Communications project. This report describes the final flight test results completed under the WINCOMM project at the NASA Glenn Research Center of the 1090 Extended Squitter (1090ES) and VDL Mode 3 (VDL-3) data links as a medium for weather data exchange. It presents the use of 1090ES to meet the program objectives of sending broadcast turbulence information and the use of VDL-3 to send graphical weather images. This report provides the test requirements and test plans, which led to flight tests, as well as final results from flight testing. The reports define the changes made to both avionics and ground-based receivers as well as the ground infrastructure to support implementation of the recommended architecture, with a focus on the issues associated with these changes.

Griner, James H.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Spacecraft and Navy Materials Flammability: Review of Some Concepts and Test Methods

The agenda covered by this viewgraph presentation includes: 1) Concepts of Spacecraft Fire Safety; 2) Spacecraft materials flammability test methods; 3) Evaluation of flight hardware flammability; 4) Review of flammability data in conditions of interest to the Navy; 5) Overview of some flammability test methods recommended for the Navy.

Hirsch, David↗
NASA NTRS2008

Space-Based Range

Space-Based Range (SBR), previously known as Space-Based Telemetry and Range Safety (STARS), is a multicenter NASA proof-of-concept project to determine if space-based communications using NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) can support the Range Safety functions of acquiring tracking data and generating flight termination signals, while also providing broadband Range User data such as voice, video, and vehicle/payload data. There was a successful test of the Range Safety system at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF) on December 20, 2005, on a two-stage Terrier-Orion spin-stabilized sounding rocket. SBR transmitted GPS tracking data and maintained links with two TDRSS satellites simultaneously during the 10-min flight. The payload section deployed a parachute, landed in the Atlantic Ocean about 90 miles downrange from the launch site, and was successfully recovered. During the Terrier-Orion tests flights, more than 99 percent of all forward commands and more than 95 percent of all return frames were successfully received and processed. The time latency necessary for a command to travel from WFF over landlines to White Sands Complex and then to the vehicle via TDRSS, be processed onboard, and then be sent back to WFF was between 1.0 s and 1.1 s. The forward-link margins for TDRS-10 (TDRS East [TDE]) were 11 dB to 12 dB plus or minus 2 dB, and for TDRS-4 (TDRS Spare [TDS]) were 9 dB to 10 dB plus or minus 1.5 dB. The return-link margins for both TDE and TDS were 6 dB to 8 dB plus or minus 3 dB. There were 11 flights on an F-15B at Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) between November 2006 and February 2007. The Range User system tested a 184-element TDRSS Ku-band (15 GHz) phased-array antenna with data rates of 5 Mbps and 10 Mbps. This data was a combination of black-and-white cockpit video, Range Safety tracking and transceiver data, and aircraft and antenna controller data streams. IP data formatting was used.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2017

Safeguard: Progress and Test Results for a Reliable Independent On-Board Safety Net for UAS

As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate them without compromising safety or disrupting traditional airspace operations. For small UAS, several operational rules have been established; e.g., do not operate beyond visual line-of-sight, do not fly within five miles of a commercial airport, do not fly above 400 feet above ground level. Enforcing these rules is challenging for UAS, as evidenced by the number of incident reports received by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This paper reviews the development of an onboard system - Safeguard - designed to monitor and enforce conformance to a set of operational rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial stay-out or stay-in regions, speed limits, and altitude constraints). Unlike typical geofencing or geo-limitation functions, Safeguard operates independently of the off-the-shelf UAS autopilot and is designed in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable functions to simplify compliance with existing standards for safety-critical systems (e.g. for spacecraft and manned commercial transportation aircraft systems). A framework is described that decouples the system from any other devices on the UAS as well as introduces complementary positioning source(s) for applications that require integrity and availability beyond what can be provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS). This paper summarizes the progress and test results for Safeguard research and development since presentation of the design concept at the 35th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC '16). Significant accomplishments include completion of software verification and validation in accordance with NASA standards for spacecraft systems (to Class B), development of improved hardware prototypes, development of a simulation platform that allows for hardware-in-the-loop testing and fast-time Monte Carlo evaluations, and flight testing on multiple air vehicles. Integration testing with NASA's UAS Traffic Management (UTM) service-oriented architecture was also demonstrated.

Young, Steven D.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Implementing Software Safety in the NASA Environment

Until recently, NASA did not consider allowing computers total control of flight systems. Human operators, via hardware, have constituted the ultimate safety control. In an attempt to reduce costs, NASA has come to rely more and more heavily on computers and software to control space missions. (For example. software is now planned to control most of the operational functions of the International Space Station.) Thus the need for systematic software safety programs has become crucial for mission success. Concurrent engineering principles dictate that safety should be designed into software up front, not tested into the software after the fact. 'Cost of Quality' studies have statistics and metrics to prove the value of building quality and safety into the development cycle. Unfortunately, most software engineers are not familiar with designing for safety, and most safety engineers are not software experts. Software written to specifications which have not been safety analyzed is a major source of computer related accidents. Safer software is achieved step by step throughout the system and software life cycle. It is a process that includes requirements definition, hazard analyses, formal software inspections, safety analyses, testing, and maintenance. The greatest emphasis is placed on clearly and completely defining system and software requirements, including safety and reliability requirements. Unfortunately, development and review of requirements are the weakest link in the process. While some of the more academic methods, e.g. mathematical models, may help bring about safer software, this paper proposes the use of currently approved software methodologies, and sound software and assurance practices to show how, to a large degree, safety can be designed into software from the start. NASA's approach today is to first conduct a preliminary system hazard analysis (PHA) during the concept and planning phase of a project. This determines the overall hazard potential of the system to be built. Shortly thereafter, as the system requirements are being defined, the second iteration of hazard analyses takes place, the systems hazard analysis (SHA). During the systems requirements phase, decisions are made as to what functions of the system will be the responsibility of software. This is the most critical time to affect the safety of the software. From this point, software safety analyses as well as software engineering practices are the main focus for assuring safe software. While many of the steps proposed in this paper seem like just sound engineering practices, they are the best technical and most cost effective means to assure safe software within a safe system.

Wetherholt, Martha S.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Overview of the Space Launch System Ascent Aeroacoustic Environment Test Program

Characterization of accurate flight vehicle unsteady aerodynamics is critical for component and secondary structure vibroacoustic design. The Aerosciences Branch at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Marshall Space Flight Center has conducted a test at the NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) Unitary Plan Wind Tunnels (UPWT) to determine such ascent aeroacoustic environments for the Space Launch System (SLS). Surface static pressure measurements were also collected to aid in determination of local environments for venting, CFD substantiation, and calibration of the flush air data system located on the launch abort system. Additionally, this test supported a NASA Engineering and Safety Center study of alternate booster nose caps. Testing occurred during two test campaigns: August - September 2013 and December 2013 - January 2014. Four primary model configurations were tested for ascent aeroacoustic environment definition. The SLS Block 1 vehicle was represented by a 2.5% full stack model and a 4% truncated model. Preliminary Block 1B payload and manned configurations were also tested, using 2.5% full stack and 4% truncated models respectively. This test utilized the 11 x 11 foot transonic and 9 x 7 foot supersonic tunnel sections at the ARC UPWT to collect data from Mach 0.7 through 2.5 at various total angles of attack. SLS Block 1 design environments were developed primarily using these data. SLS Block 1B preliminary environments have also been prepared using these data. This paper discusses the test and analysis methodology utilized, with a focus on the unsteady data collection and processing.

Herron, Andrew J.↗