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At least 289 records · Page 16

Overview of the High Reynolds Number Ascent Wind Tunnel Test of the Space Launch System at the National Transonic Facility

Transonic, high Reynolds number wind tunnel testing for the Space Launch System (SLS) ascent flight environment was conducted in the National Transonic Facility (NTF) at the NASA Langley Research Center from December 2019 to April 2021. The test was sponsored by the SLS Program and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center with the ob- jective of assessing and characterizing Reynolds number effects on the ascent aerodynamics of the SLS launch vehicle. The cryogenic test article was a 1.75%-scale representation of the SLS Block 1 Cargo configuration that was fabricated mostly out of stainless steel, but with several additive-manufactured components including the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) attach brackets and the SRB nozzles. This was the first use of additive manufacturing on structural components of a cryogenic model in the NTF, therefore post-fabrication material testing and inspections were performed to satisfy safety requirements. Force & moment and surface pressure data were acquired for Mach numbers between 0.50 and 0.95 over a range of Reynolds numbers based on core stage diameter between 2x10^6 and a maximum of 40x10^6 corresponding to 45% of flight Reynolds number. Additionally, flow visualization data using Pressure Sensitive Paint were acquired with a focus on the SRB forward attach area, which is susceptible to Reynolds number sensitivity at transonic speeds. This pa- per provides an overview of the test campaign including details on the unique test article and the experimental setup and test execution. General test findings and observations are also presented, but the majority of the test results and data analyses are provided in a companion paper.

Space Launch System↗

A Technology Maturation Plan for the Development of Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Over the last two years NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project formulated a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP) for development of the sub-systems needed for a MW-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) system which, combined with a high thrust chemical propulsion stage, would be suitable for human missions to Mars. Two recent assessments, independently conducted by the National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center, concluded that the technologies required for a high-power NEP system are immature and the attendant risks insufficiently quantified to justify initiating a flight project. For NEP to be available as a viable option to meet flight opportunities in the late 2030s / 2040s time frame, development of the key sub-systems must begin now. SNP has subdivided the NEP system into five Critical Technology Elements (CTE): the nuclear reactor, power conversion, power management and distribution, electric propulsion sub-system, and the primary heat rejection system. Development plans for each of these CTEs have been drafted which will serve as the template for a focused milestone-driven research and development campaign intended to advance each CTE to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5. This will be accomplished by building and testing hardware at relevant power levels (~ 1 MW) and for relevant durations (2,500 hours, ~10% of the required operational lifetime) and conducting numerical modeling of the CTEs anchored by the accumulated test data to predict system performance and reliability. Concurrent with this work, high-level coupled system/mission modeling will be carried out to refine the key performance parameters that the various CTEs must achieve. Non-advocate reviews will be held at milestone points to assess progress and inform down-select decisions. The strategy for formulating the TMP was described previously; this paper describes ongoing progress on the drafting and baselining of the plan, including key specific details.

Space Nuclear Propulsion↗

A Technology Maturation Plan for the Development of Nuclear Electric Propulsion

Over the last two years NASA’s Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) Project formulated a Technology Maturation Plan (TMP) for development of the sub-systems needed for a MW-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) system which, combined with a high thrust chemical propulsion stage, would be suitable for human missions to Mars. Two recent assessments, independently conducted by the National Academies for Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center, concluded that the technologies required for a high-power NEP system are immature and the attendant risks insufficiently quantified to justify initiating a flight project. For NEP to be available as a viable option to meet flight opportunities in the late 2030s / 2040s time frame, development of the key sub-systems must begin now. SNP has subdivided the NEP system into five Critical Technology Elements (CTE): the nuclear reactor, power conversion, power management and distribution, electric propulsion sub-system, and the primary heat rejection system. Development plans for each of these CTEs have been drafted which will serve as the template for a focused milestone-driven research and development campaign intended to advance each CTE to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5. This will be accomplished by building and testing hardware at relevant power levels (~ 1 MW) and for relevant durations (2,500 hours, ~10% of the required operational lifetime) and conducting numerical modeling of the CTEs anchored by the accumulated test data to predict system performance and reliability. Concurrent with this work, high-level coupled system/mission modeling will be carried out to refine the key performance parameters that the various CTEs must achieve. Non-advocate reviews will be held at milestone points to assess progress and inform down-select decisions. The strategy for formulating the TMP was described previously*; this paper describes ongoing progress on the drafting and baselining of the plan, including key specific details. * “Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems”, K.A. Polzin, et. al., International Electric Propulsion Conference IEPC 2022, IEPC-2022-155

Nuclear Electric Propulsion↗

Overview of the High Reynolds Number Ascent Wind Tunnel Test of the Space Launch System at the National Transonic Facility

Transonic, high Reynolds number wind tunnel testing for the Space Launch System (SLS) ascent flight environment was conducted in the National Transonic Facility (NTF) at the NASA Langley Research Center from December 2019 to April 2021. The test was sponsored by the SLS Program and the NASA Engineering & Safety Center with the ob- jective of assessing and characterizing Reynolds number effects on the ascent aerodynamics of the SLS launch vehicle. The cryogenic test article was a 1.75%-scale representation of the SLS Block 1 Cargo configuration that was fabricated mostly out of stainless steel, but with several additive-manufactured components including the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) attach brackets and the SRB nozzles. This was the first use of additive manufacturing on structural components of a cryogenic model in the NTF, therefore post-fabrication material testing and inspections were performed to satisfy safety requirements. Force & moment and surface pressure data were acquired for Mach numbers between 0.50 and 0.95 over a range of Reynolds numbers based on core stage diameter between 2x10^6 and a maximum of 40x10^6 corresponding to 45% of flight Reynolds number. Additionally, flow visualization data using Pressure Sensitive Paint were acquired with a focus on the SRB forward attach area, which is susceptible to Reynolds number sensitivity at transonic speeds. This paper provides an overview of the test campaign including details on the unique test article and the experimental setup and test execution. General test findings and observations are also presented, but the majority of the test results and data analyses are provided in a companion paper.

Space Launch System↗

Recommendations on the Use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts for NASA Missions - Phase II

This assessment had two Phases. Phase I captured NASA Centers’ current practices for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) parts 1 used in spaceflight systems and ground support equipment (available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20205011579) [ref. 1]. The Phase II report provides guidance for selecting and using COTS parts in NASA missions. The approaches proposed in this report differ from current agency practices. This top-level executive summary touches on these new approaches for using COTS parts but does not provide the detailed information that is critical in understanding the rationale behind these new approaches. Readers will need to read the entire report to gain full understanding and effectively use the recommendations herein. NASA’s historical approach to selecting and applying parts has been to define certain parts, primarily specific classes of military specification (MIL-SPEC) parts, as “standard”, leaving all others, including COTS parts, as nonstandard. Standard parts typically are used without further testing (“use-as-is”). Nonstandard parts are subjected to initial screening and subsequent lot acceptance testing of representative samples from each procured lot per MIL-SPEC or similar requirements. Decades later, top-tier commercial part manufacturers have evolved significant manufacturing, statistical control, and technological improvements that can now provide parts as reliable or more reliable than MIL-SPEC parts, when used within their datasheet limits. Concurrently, the space science and exploration community’s needs demand technological advances unavailable with MIL-SPEC parts. This ongoing change necessitates using COTS parts for space missions. Properly selected COTS parts in appropriate applications can offer performance and supply availability advantages compared to MIL-SPEC parts. Their utility and demonstrated reliability result from large volumes and automated production and testing processes. However, careful review and a thorough understanding of their specifications (i.e., datasheet limitations) is needed, and verifying that manufacturer specifications and reliability meet space hardware application needs are necessary. This report recommends MIL-SPEC screening and non-radiation-related lot acceptance testing be reduced or eliminated in cases where evidence of sufficient quality and reliability exists for COTS parts. The extent of NASA's insight into COTS manufacturers and the amount and nature of the needed evidence will differ by mission and will likely be driven by a mission's resources and associated risk posture. To facilitate this goal, two new terminologies have been defined and described: “Industry Leading Parts Manufacturer (ILPM)” and “Established COTS parts.” An ILPM is a COTS manufacturer that produces high quality and reliable parts. Some parts produced by ILPMs, defined as Established COTS parts, do not need any additional MIL-SPEC or NASA screening and lot acceptance testing to be used in space applications. This report provides guidance for selecting, procuring, and applying COTS parts and for performing part-, board-, and system-level COTS parts verification. The recommendation to select Established COTS parts from ILPMs will assure those COTS parts will have comparable quality to corresponding MIL-SPEC parts. Selecting, applying, and verifying Established COTS parts from ILPMs requires a holistic team approach, engaging parts engineers, circuit designers, quality, reliability, and systems engineers, procurement specialists, radiation specialists, avionics leads, and program/project managers. A mission-specific approach tailored to a project’s Mission, Environment, Applications and Lifetime (MEAL) [ref. 2] requirements should be developed and approved by program/project managers. Any associated risks should be clearly identified, quantified, mitigated, and/or accepted. Different approaches are recommended according to program/project Risk Classes A, B, C, and D [ref. 3] and human-rated missions [ref. 4]: 1. Recommend Classes A and B and human-rated missions consider a “MIL-SPEC parts- based design” approach. ”MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach is one in which most parts are MIL-SPEC parts and Established COTS parts from ILPMs are used only when an equivalent MIL-SPEC part does not meet functional or size, weight, and power (SWaP) or performance requirements, or is not available. 2. Recommend Classes D and Sub-D missions consider a “System of COTS” approach. “System of COTS” approach is one which most parts are Established COTS parts from ILPMs. 3. Recommend Class C missions determine which approach is the best for their projects; that is, use either a “MIL-SPEC parts-based design” approach, “System of COTS” approach, or a combined approach utilizing elements of both. This report intends to provide guidance in using COTS parts for NASA missions with risk classifications of A through D and human-rated missions; but it does not address the costs of using COTS parts. Costs of using COTS parts in different NASA mission classes can vary significantly even if the same parts are used in different risk postures, due to differing verification levels needed. The guidance does not distinguish between critical or non-critical systems, and a given project will need to apply the appropriate guidance based on their risk posture. The intended audience of this report are NASA personnel and commercial practitioners who support NASA’s spaceflight missions, including spaceflight program or project managers, parts engineers, parts manufacturers, radiation engineers, avionics engineers, system engineers, circuit design engineers, reliability engineers, safety and mission assurance (SMA) personnel, and parts procurement specialists. The NEPP Program will perform a pathfinder study to explore implementing the guidance in this NESC report. An ILPM verification process is not the same as conventional vendor qualification processes performed according to military standards and specifications. This NESC report intends to provide guidance in utilizing available parts data from ILPM manufacturers for parts assurance assessments needed for NASA missions. The report also captured the current practices from DoD and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Section 10. Note each DoD and FAA report was provided by the corresponding agencies regarding their practices, which are independent from the NESC recommendations in the report.

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf↗

NASA Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment System Status and Development Priorities 2023

This paper discusses the current focus of NASA’s Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment Technology Development team’s efforts, the status of that work, and a summary of longer term technology development priorities and activities. The Exploration Extra-vehicular Activity Mobility Unit (xEMU) has been the team’s primary effort over the past several years. ICES papers in 2022 detailed the design of the xEMU pressure garment components. This paper outlines the design updates to the xPGS since that time. More notably, this paper documents the various tests executed with the xPGS to evaluate its performance, durability, and acceptability for microgravity and Lunar missions. An overview of ongoing and planned xEMU testing and training is provided. The PGS team’s transition from xEMU development and testing, to supporting the Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) vendors will also be discussed. In addition, technology development efforts in coordination with the EVA and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), the NASA Engineering Safety Council (NESC) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program will be discussed in the context of supporting sustaining EVA operations on the Lunar surface over the coming decade. Finally, a brief review of longer-term pressure garment challenges and technology gaps will be presented to provide an understanding of the advanced pressure garment team’s technology investment priorities and needs.

spacesuit↗

Metallurgical Factors that Govern ST Properties in Commercial 2219-T87 Thick Plate

This report is contained within a NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) assessment of the variability in short-transverse (ST) mechanical properties of commercial lots of 12.7-cm-thick 2219-T87 plate. The document comprises a review of the potential metallurgical reasons for the variations in ST tensile ductility and fracture behavior observed. Preliminary data from through-thickness mechanical testing and microstructural analyses conducted early in the investigation are referenced. The report concludes with a summary of considerations for the NESC based on the key results of this literature survey.

Aluminum alloy↗

Identification of Risks to Eva Created By Ambient Lighting Conditions at the Lunar South Pole

In the coming years, NASA’s Artemis Campaign intends to return humans to the Moon, both to explore and to establish a permanent human presence. The targeted landing and habitation sites are near the Lunar South Pole (LSP). Compared to the middle latitudes where the Apollo landings occurred, the sun at the LSP is consistently low in the sky, creating a much more challenging visual experience. The NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) is working to characterize the extremes in ambient illumination that astronauts will encounter at the LSP, and to help programs characterize the lighting systems and glare protection that will be required to conduct safe surface operations. This paper will describe the LSP natural environments, and efforts to simulate that visual experience. It will also explain the risks derived from the lighting environment for the mission goals currently planned, and the kinds of new capabilities both in simulation techniques and in surface equipment that will be required to support those mission goals.

Identification of Risks↗

NASA Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment System Status and Development Priorities 2023

This paper discusses the current focus of NASA’s Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment Technology Development team’s efforts, the status of that work, and a summary of longer term technology development priorities and activities. The Exploration Extra-vehicular Activity Mobility Unit (xEMU) has been the team’s primary effort over the past several years. ICES papers in 2022 detailed the design of the xEMU pressure garment components. This paper outlines the design updates to the xPGS since that time. More notably, this paper documents the various tests executed with the xPGS to evaluate its performance, durability, and acceptability for microgravity and Lunar missions. An overview of ongoing and planned xEMU testing and training is provided. The PGS team’s transition from xEMU development and testing, to supporting the Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) vendors is discussed. In addition, technology development efforts in coordination with the EVA and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), the NASA Engineering Safety Council (NESC) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program will be discussed in the context of supporting sustaining EVA operations on the Lunar surface over the coming decade. Finally, a brief review of longer-term pressure garment challenges and technology gaps will be presented to provide an understanding of the advanced pressure garment team’s technology investment priorities and needs.

spacesuit↗

NASA Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment System Status and Development Priorities 2024

This paper discusses the current focus of NASA’s Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment Technology Development team’s efforts, the status of that work, and a summary of longer term technology development priorities and activities. The Exploration Extra-vehicular Activity Mobility Unit (xEMU) has been the team’s primary effort over the past several years. This paper documents the various tests executed with the xPGS to evaluate its performance, durability, and acceptability for microgravity and Lunar missions. An overview of ongoing and planned xEMU testing and training is provided. The PGS team’s efforts in supporting the Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) vendors is discussed. In addition, technology development efforts in coordination with the EVA and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), the NASA Engineering Safety Council (NESC) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program will be discussed in the context of supporting sustaining EVA operations on the Lunar surface over the coming decade. Finally, a brief review of longer-term pressure garment challenges and technology gaps will be presented to provide an understanding of the advanced pressure garment team’s technology investment priorities and needs.

Shane M McFarland↗

NASA Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment System Status and Development Priorities 2024

This paper discusses the current focus of NASA’s Advanced Space Suit Pressure Garment Technology Development team’s efforts, the status of that work, and a summary of longer term technology development priorities and activities. The Exploration Extra-vehicular Activity Mobility Unit (xEMU) has been the team’s primary effort over the past several years. This paper documents the various tests executed with the xPGS to evaluate its performance, durability, and acceptability for microgravity and Lunar missions. An overview of ongoing and planned xEMU testing and training is provided. The PGS team’s efforts in supporting the Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) vendors is discussed. In addition, technology development efforts in coordination with the EVA and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), the NASA Engineering Safety Council (NESC) and the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program will be discussed in the context of supporting sustaining EVA operations on the Lunar surface over the coming decade. Finally, a brief review of longer-term pressure garment challenges and technology gaps will be presented to provide an understanding of the advanced pressure garment team’s technology investment priorities and needs.

Shane McFarland↗

Exploration Systems Exterior Lighting Design Guidance

Humans are returning to the Moon — this time, to stay. NASA has selected a location that maximizes line-of-sight communication with Earth, solar visibility, and access to water ice: the Lunar South Pole (LSP). While the Sun is more consistently in the lunar sky at the poles, it never rises more than 7° above the horizon in the target landing regions. This harsh lighting environment--never experienced during the Apollo missions or in human spaceflight--presents an engineering challenge: Support and protect functional vision. The human vision system, which despite having a high-dynamic range, cannot see well into bright light and cannot adapt quickly from bright to dark or vice versa. The design of helmets, windows, and lighting solutions must work in a complementary fashion to achieve a system of lighting and functional vision support that enables crews to see into darkness while their eyes are light-adapted and see in bright light while still dark-adapted that protects their eyes from injury. This report brings together information and identifies gaps related to LSP Natural environment (topology, regolith, temperature, lighting, and so forth), NASA historical experience exploring the Moon, human vision capabilities and needs, exploration operations, simulation capabilities and needs (for design verification, training, mission planning, and so forth) and existing engineering, safety, medical and performance requirements related to support human exploration.

Simulation↗

Applying Value at Risk Analysis towards Energy Efficiency Investments

Value at Risk (VaR) is a measure of risk for potential losses within a portfolio of investments. Investments in energy efficiency in a manufacturing environment compete in terms of payback period, ease of investment, and transaction costs with other investments (production, safety, engineering, etc.). Because manufacturers have limited amounts of capital to allocate, investments in productivity tend to be prioritized over energy efficiency projects that offer similar paybacks. Value at Risk (VaR) can be used to quantify how risk-weighted expenditures change over time. Energy efficiency investments are often believed to offer relatively stable payoffs compared to changes in production and other assets, particularly when evaluated using methodologies such as simple payback. Incorporating methodologies such as VaR can provide a stronger business case for energy efficiency investments by quantifying value beyond what is captured in other Return on Investment calculations.In this paper we outline a methodology for applying VaR in the context of the variety of investments made by manufacturing organizations. Additionally, we profile the stability of energy efficiency (EE) and renewable energy (RE) investments compared to other types of investments made in manufacturing. By applying VaR to these investments, energy managers can better translate the financial benefits of energy-related capital projects in a way that is more compelling to Corporate Finance and Treasury departments. This common language also allows Corporate Finance and Treasury departments to support large, strategic deployments of capital for such projects based on a targeted objective – the management of financial risk for the organization’s shareholders.

Levine, Eli↗

CAAS-3S Radiation Testing for Y-12 and UPF with Godiva-IV

The Y-12 National Security Complex and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) selected the Mirion CAAS-3S as the Criticality Accident Alarm System for UPF and for Y-12 facilities replacing their legacy CAAS as part of efforts to extend the facility lifespans. As part of this process, the CAAS-3S system was exposed to a high radiation dose and dose rate during reactor testing with the Godiva-IV fast burst reactor. The reactor testing was designed around preliminary analyses that determined Y-12 and UPF requirements, and simulations of the radiation field within the reactor facility were used to determine reactor operating parameters, CAAS equipment locations, and the design of a neutron shield wall. This paper presents the design and results of the testing, and discusses how the test results were interpreted by criticality safety engineers at Y-12 and UPF.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Visualizing Fault Induced Traveling Waves in Medium Voltage Systems: Preprint

Traveling waves are induced in power systems during most transient events in the grid. These waves travel close to the speed of light in overhead lines and 50% to 60% the speed of light in underground cables. Even though traveling wave-based protection schemes for transmission systems are available commercially, traveling waves in medium voltage distribution networks are still in research space. Compared to transmission system, medium voltage distribution systems contain more reflections and refractions. Thus, visualization is challenging and is critical in locating faults in distribution network. To address this visualization challenge, this paper presents an open-source tool to visualize the traveling waves using Bewley lattice approach. The developed visualization tool will be useful for the protection and safety engineers to detect and triangulate fault locations in the medium voltage systems and isolate the faults.

Bewley Lattice↗

Book Chapter: Small Modular Reactors

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) have been a very promising development in nuclear power over the last two decades. SMRs are defined as nuclear reactors with a power output of less than 300 MWe. This is in comparison to gigawatt-size reactors, which can have electrical output of 1000–1500 MWe or more. This chapter will consist of two major sections. The first will be a detailed summary of the small modular reactor designs being proposed around the world. This section will focus on those that are the furthest along in their development, but will also include some information about the wide variety of proposed designs that require significant research and development. The second part will be a discussion of the remaining challenges to the adoption of SMRs as a major energy source. SMRs are not a new concept, but they do represent a new vision for an older concept. These reactors have the potential to become a major source of energy in the near future. The development of small, modular designs can help promote the adoption of nuclear energy by reducing upfront costs, reducing the financial risk associated with nuclear power, and the barriers to entry. However, the adoption of SMRs is not without challenges. Regulatory and licensing changes to address the unique benefits and concerns associated with SMRs will continue to be a challenge as regulators adapt to the unique features emerging from the design process. The development of new instrumentation and control systems is an ongoing issue. And economics is possibly the most significant challenge, with high construction costs, cheap natural gas, and government subsidies, combining to result in significant financial risk associated with adopting nuclear generation.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

ESBWR response to an extended station blackout/loss of all AC power

U.S. federal regulations require light water cooled nuclear power plants to cope with Station Blackouts for a predetermined amount of time based on design factors for the plant. U.S. regulations define Station Blackout (SBO) as a loss of the offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency AC power system. According to U.S. regulations, typically the coping period for an SBO is 4 hours and can be as long as 16 hours for currently operating BWR plants. Being able to cope with an SBO and loss of all AC power is required by international regulators as well. The U.S. licensing basis for the ESBWR is a coping period of 72 hours for an SBO based on U.S. NRC requirements for passive safety plants. In the event of an extended SBO (viz., greater than 72 hours), the ESBWR response shows that the design is able to cope with the event for at least 7 days without AC electrical power or operator action. ESBWR is a Generation III+ reactor design with an array of passive safety systems. The ESBWR primary success path for mitigation of an SBO event is the Isolation Condenser System (ICS). The ICS is a passive, closed loop, safety system that initiates automatically on a loss of power. Upon Station Blackout or loss of all AC power, the ICS begins removing decay heat from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) by (i) condensing the steam into water in heat exchangers located in pools of water above the containment, and (ii) transferring the decay heat to the atmosphere. The condensed water is then returned by gravity to cool the reactor again. The ICS alone is capable of maintaining the ESBWR in a safe shutdown condition after an SBO for an extended period. The fuel remains covered throughout the SBO event. The ICS is able to remove decay heat from the RPV for at least 7 days and maintains the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The water level in the RPV remains well above the top of active fuel for the duration of the SBO event. Beyond 7 days, only a few simple actions are needed to cope with the SBO for an indefinite amount of time. The operation of the ICS as the primary success path for mitigation of an SBO, allows for near immediate plant restart once power is restored. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Diversity and defense-in-depth analysis for I and C systems of research reactors: A case study on two research reactors - 376

This paper provides the analysis results of the diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) applied to two research reactors designed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. The D3 assessments for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems of two research reactors are performed according to the guidelines documented in NUREG/CR-6303. The I and C systems are classified into four echelons of defense: control echelon, reactor trip echelon, engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation echelon, and monitoring and indication echelon. The diversity between the echelons of defense is assessed to determine that a single software common cause failure (CCF) does not impair the functions of multiple echelons of defense. In addition, the effects of a software CCF of the reactor protection system on the design basis events of the research reactors are analyzed by assuming that the automated reactor trip and ESF actuation functions of the reactor protection system are inoperable due to the software CCF. From the D3 analyses for the research reactors, it is verified that (1) adequate diversity has been provided, (2) adequate defense-in-depth has been provided, and (3) the displays and manual controls for critical safety functions initiated by operator action are diverse from digital systems used in the automatic portion of the protection system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗