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At least 289 records · Page 16

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE RISING LIGHT CURVES OF RADIOACTIVELY POWERED SUPERNOVAE?

The light curve of the explosion of a star with a radius {approx}< 10-100 R{sub Sun} is powered mostly by radioactive decay. Observationally, such events are dominated by hydrogen-deficient progenitors and classified as Type I supernovae (SNe I), i.e., white dwarf thermonuclear explosions (Type Ia), and core collapses of hydrogen-stripped massive stars (Type Ib/c). Current transient surveys are finding SNe I in increasing numbers and at earlier times, allowing their early emission to be studied in unprecedented detail. Motivated by these developments, we summarize the physics that produces their rising light curves and discuss ways in which observations can be utilized to study these exploding stars. The early radioactive-powered light curves probe the shallowest deposits of {sup 56}Ni. If the amount of {sup 56}Ni mixing in the outermost layers of the star can be deduced, then it places important constraints on the progenitor and properties of the explosive burning. In practice, we find that it is difficult to determine the level of mixing because it is hard to disentangle whether the explosion occurred recently and one is seeing radioactive heating near the surface or whether the explosion began in the past and the radioactive heating is deeper in the ejecta. In the latter case, there is a ''dark phase'' between the moment of explosion and the first observed light emitted once the shallowest layers of {sup 56}Ni are exposed. Because of this, simply extrapolating a light curve from radioactive heating back in time is not a reliable method for estimating the explosion time. The best solution is to directly identify the moment of explosion, either through observing shock breakout (in X-ray/UV) or the cooling of the shock-heated surface (in UV/optical), so that the depth being probed by the rising light curve is known. However, since this is typically not available, we identify and discuss a number of other diagnostics that are helpful for deciphering how recently an explosion occurred. As an example, we apply these arguments to the recent SN Ic PTF 10vgv. We demonstrate that just a single measurement of the photospheric velocity and temperature during the rise places interesting constraints on its explosion time, radius, and level of {sup 56}Ni mixing.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Radioimmunotherapy with radioactive nanoparticles: Biological doses and treatment efficiency for vascularized tumors with or without a central hypoxic area

Purpose: Radioactive atoms attached to monoclonal antibodies are used in radioimmunotherapy to treat cancer while limiting radiation to healthy tissues. One limitation of this method is that only one radioactive atom is linked to each antibody and the deposited dose is often insufficient to eradicate solid and radioresistant tumors. In a previous study, simulations with the Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended code showed that physical doses up to 50 Gy can be delivered inside tumors by replacing the single radionuclide by a radioactive nanoparticle of 5 nm diameter containing hundreds of radioactive atoms. However, tumoral and normal tissues are not equally sensitive to radiation, and previous works did not take account the biological effects such as cellular repair processes or the presence of less radiosensitive cells such as hypoxic cells. Methods: The idea is to adapt the linear-quadratic expression to the tumor model and to determine biological effective doses (BEDs) delivered through and around a tumor. This BED is then incorporated into a Poisson formula to determine the shell control probability (SCP) which predicts the cell cluster-killing efficiency at different distances ''r'' from the center of the tumor. BED and SCP models are used to analyze the advantages of injecting radioactive nanoparticles instead of a single radionuclide per vector in radioimmunotherapy. Results: Calculations of BED and SCP for different distances r from the center of a solid tumor, using the non-small-cell lung cancer as an example, were investigated for {sup 90}Y{sub 2} O{sub 3} nanoparticles. With a total activity of about 3.5 and 20 MBq for tumor radii of 0.5 and 1.0 cm, respectively, results show that a very high BED is deposited in the well oxygenated part of the spherical carcinoma. Conclusions: For either small or large solid tumors, BED and SCP calculations highlight the important benefit in replacing the single {beta}-emitter {sup 90}Y attached to each antibody by a {sup 90}Y{sub 2} O{sub 3} nanoparticle.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Colloid Facilitated Transport of Radioactive Cations in the Vadose Zone (Final Report)

The overarching goal of this study was to improve understanding of colloid-facilitated transport of radioactive cations through unsaturated soils and sediments. We conducted a suite of laboratory experiments and field experiments on the vadose-zone transport of colloids, organic matter, and associated contaminants of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The laboratory and field experiments, together with transport modeling, were designed to accomplish the following detailed objectives: 1. Evaluation of the relative importance of inorganic colloids and organic matter to the facilitation of radioactive cation transport in the vadose zone; 2. Assessment of the role of adsorption and desorption kinetics in the facilitated transport of radioactive cations in the vadose zone; 3. Examination of the effects of rainfall and infiltration dynamics and in the facilitated transport of radioactive cations through the vadose zone; 4. Exploration of the role of soil heterogeneity and preferential flow paths (e.g., macropores) on the facilitated transport of radioactive cations in the vadose zone; 5. Development of a mathematical model of facilitated transport of contaminants in the vadose zone that accurately incorporates pore-scale and column-scale processes with the practicality of predicting transport with readily available parameters.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

RCT Module 2.12: Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Material [Slides]

The basis of regulations governing the packaging and shipping of radioactive material is to keep radioactive material from affecting the environment during transportation and to keep the environment from affecting the integrity of the radioactive material. The package itself is to be designed and constructed to be the effective barrier between the environment and the radioactive material; thus, most of the regulatory restrictions apply to the package and the method of shipment used to transport the package. To reduce any potential hazard, the regulatory requirements become more restrictive as the quantity, concentration, and potential hazard of the radioactive material increase.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The Mean Life Squared Relationship for Abundances of Extinct Radioactivities

We discovered that the abundances of now extinct radioactivities (relative to stable reference isotopes) in meteorites vary as a function of their mean lifetimes squared. This relationship applies to chondrites, achondrites, and irons but to calcium-aluminum inclusions (CAIs). Certain meteorites contain excesses in isotopic abundances from the decay of radioactive isotopes with half-lives much less than the age of the solar system. These short-lived radioactivities are now extinct, but they were alive when meteorites assembled in the early solar system. The origin of these radioactivities and the processes which control their abundances in the solar nebula are still not well understood. Some clues may come from our finding that the meteoritic abundances of now extinct radioactivities (relative to stable reference isotopes) vary as a function of their mean lifetimes squared. This relationship applies to chondrites, achondrites, and irons, but not to CAIs. This points to at least two different processes establishing the abundances of short-lived isotopes found in the meteoritic record.

Lodders, K.↗

Methods of capturing and immobilizing radioactive nuclei with metal fluorite-based inorganic materials

Methods of capturing and immobilizing radioactive nuclei with metal fluorite-based inorganic materials are described. For example, a method of capturing and immobilizing radioactive nuclei includes flowing a gas stream through an exhaust apparatus. The exhaust apparatus includes a metal fluorite-based inorganic material. The gas stream includes a radioactive species. The radioactive species is removed from the gas stream by adsorbing the radioactive species to the metal fluorite-based inorganic material of the exhaust apparatus.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Integrated Decision Methodology for Final Disposal of Radioactive Sources

Radioactive sources are used throughout the world, and their beneficial uses are many. Sources are at the core of many applications in different branches of industry, medicine, agriculture and research. Sources are present in a very wide range of equipment that is used for, inter alia, cancer treatment, killing bacteria in food, sterilizing medical supplies, measuring instruments such as gauges used to measure soil moisture and soil density and many other components, irradiating seeds for enhancing food production, protecting buildings from lightning strikes, mapping underground sources of water, prospecting for oil and gas reserves, measuring density of soil for construction projects, or even detecting smoke. At their “cradle” and when in use, radioactive sources are usually properly managed and controlled. It is when a source has reached the end of its useful life when they are at a higher risk of being under inadequate control, poorly managed, or even becoming orphan. Sources that have reached the end of their useful life must be carefully and safely managed. The “grave” of disused sources needs a proper disposal process to prevent them from posing a potential threat to people or the environment. To protect the public and the environment from the potential hazards of ionizing radiation, and to prevent disused sources from becoming orphan, a “cradle-to-grave” control of radioactive sources is essential, as promoted by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This approach requires a national policy and strategy, an adequate legal and regulatory framework, and adequate resources and infrastructure. Many IAEAMember States have expressed the need for effective solutions to this challenge. There is also a gap related to the life cycle costs of potential disposal practices. This paper proposes a multi-attribute decision making methodology to compare disposal options using both economic and non-economic criteria leading to a preferred option for disposal and a strategy for final disposal of disused radioactive sources that is specific and optimized for each IAEA Member State.

Beatty, Randy↗

Radioactive Decay Computation with a Graph Approach for Solving a Linear Dynamic System

ABSTRACT: This article gives two graph-based algorithms for radioactive decay computation. The first algorithm identifies the connected components of the graph induced from the given radioactive decay dynamics to reduce the size of the problem. The solutions are derived over the precalculated connected components, respectively and independently. The second algorithm utilizes acyclic structure of radioactive decay dynamics. The algorithm evaluates the reachable vertices of the induced system graph from the initially activated vertices and finds the minimal set of starting vertices populating the entire reachable vertices. Then, the decay calculations are performed over the reachable vertices from the identified minimal starting vertices, respectively, with the partitioned initial value over the reachable vertices. A formal argument is given to show that the proposed graph inspired divide and conquer calculation methods perform the intended radioactive decay calculation. Empirical efforts comparing the proposed radioactive decay calculation algorithms are presented.

42 ENGINEERING↗

MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗

Systems and methods for assaying a radioactive gas, and related scintillation cells

A radioactive gas assay system comprises a scintillation cell production assembly, a detector assembly, a computer assembly, and a scintillation cell destruction assembly. The scintillation cell production assembly is configured to produce a scintillation cell comprising a glass scintillator shell containing a volume of radioactive gas. The detector assembly is configured to receive the scintillation cell and to detect photons emitted thereby. The computer assembly is configured to receive data from the detector assembly to automatically calculate an absolute activity of the volume of radioactive gas of the scintillation cell and radiation detection efficiencies of the detector assembly. The scintillation cell destruction assembly is configured to receive the scintillation cell and to rupture the substantially non-porous glass scintillator shell to release the volume of radioactive gas. A method of assaying a radioactive gas, and a scintillation cell are also described.

Robinson, Troy A.↗

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗

Trends and Patterns in the Evolving Threat to Radioactive and Nuclear Material Transportation

Roughly 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported worldwide each year via commercial transportation vectors. Many of these can be considered a significant movement of risk-significant quantities of radioactive and nuclear material. A strong argument can be made to support the idea that transportation presents the greatest vulnerability in radioactive sealed source and nuclear material life-cycles. Historical and current information strongly suggests adversarial interest in obtaining radiological and nuclear materials with the intent of malicious use. In this context, it is necessary to understand the current trends and patterns in transportation threats as they apply to these materials in order to better understand security needs and current adversarial methods and mind-set.The authors propose to summarize current threats posed to radiological and nuclear materials during the transportation phase of the lifecycle. The paper and ensuing presentation will focus on a review of historical events where the adversarial intent was to disrupt the transportation phase of nuclear and radioactive material with malicious intent, as reported in open source literature. Its purpose is to better understand the nature of current and past transportation incidents involving these materials in order to clarify the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities they reveal. Relevant incidents involving transportation of these materials will be discussed as well as the historical trends associated with these events. A regional perspective based on an analysis of transportation incidents involving these materials will be discussed. While not necessarily predictive of the types of malicious disruptions that might occur in the future, this study will provide a rich information source from which lessons can be gleaned pertinent to the potential security and public safety threats posed by the transportation of commercial radioactive and nuclear material.

Shannon, Michael↗

Radcalc: An Analytical Tool for Shippers of Radioactive Material and Waste

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) ships radioactive materials in support of its research and development, environmental restoration, and national defense activities. The Radcalc software program assists personnel working on behalf of DOE in packaging and transportation determinations (e.g., isotopic decay, decay heat, regulatory classification, and gas generation) for shipment of radioactive materials and waste. Radcalc performs: - The U.S. Department of Transportation determinations and classifications (i.e., activity concentration for exempt material Type A or B, effective A1/A2, limited quantity, low specific activity, highway route controlled quantity, fissile quantity, fissile excepted, reportable quantity, list of isotopes required on shipping papers) - DOE calculations (i.e., transuranic waste, Pu-239 equivalent curies, fissile-gram equivalents) - The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission packaging category (i.e., Category I, II, or III) - Dose-equivalent curie calculations - Radioactive decay calculations using a novel decay methodology and a decay data library of 1,867 isotopes typical of the range of materials encountered in DOE laboratory environments - Hydrogen and helium gas calculations - Pressure calculations. Radcalc is a validated and cost-effective tool to provide consistency, accuracy, reproducibility, timeliness, quality, compliance, and appropriate documentation to shippers of radioactive materials and waste at DOE facilities nationwide. Hundreds of shippers and engineers throughout the DOE Complex routinely use this software to automate various determinations and to validate compliance with the regulations. The effective use of software by DOE sites contributes toward minimizing risk involved in radioactive waste shipments and assuring the safety of workers and the public. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Discharges in 2017

This report documents radioactive discharges from the TA50 Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF) during calendar year 2017. During 2017, all treated water was fed to the effluent evaporator. The evaporator was operated 3574 hours on 224 days, primarily in one-burner mode (63% of the time). A total of 3.42 million liters of treated water were fed to the evaporator, and 3.36 million liters were discharged to the environment as steam from the evaporator stack. Evaporator operation continued the single-tank feed mode that was begun in 2014. Specifically, when a Frac tank was filled with treated water, contents of the tank were mixed; a representative sample was collected; and the sample was analyzed to assess water quality. A total of 49 tanks of treated water were sampled, analyzed, and then fed to the evaporator during 2017. Tank samples were analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, tritium, and a few inorganic parameters such as nitrate and dissolved solids. Frac tank samples of evaporator feed were held, then composited at the end of each month. Each monthly composite sample was then analyzed for gross alpha, gross beta, tritium, and 36 radioisotopes (eight alpha-emitting isotopes, 28 beta emitters). Samples were also collected of water drained from the evaporator. These samples, analyzed for alpha, beta, and tritium concentrations, were then used to estimate radioactive quantities present in evaporator drain water. The difference, rad fed less rad drained, yielded quantities of radioactivity discharged through the stack into the environment . Table 1 summarizes this information.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2nd Quarter Transportation Report FY2016: Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter of FY2016.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Shipments To and From the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex (4th Quarter / Annual Transportation Report FY2015)

This report satisfies the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary report of waste shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex at Area 5. This report summarizes the 4th quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste shipments and classified non-radioactive shipments. There were no shipments sent for offsite treatment and returned to the NNSS this quarter or during FY 2015.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗