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Assessment of Rare Earth Element Fingerprints for Distinguishing Between Site-Related Wastes and Background - 19441

Actinides such as uranium, thorium and radium are known to be present in sites associated with various phases of the cold war weapons research, development and production. Remediation of these sites as well as others associated with chemical plants that may have generated radioactive actinide-containing wastes have been the focus of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) for the past 20 years. The goal is to remediate a site to established cleanup standards as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. For radiologically-contaminated sites, one potential challenge is the presence of non-FUSRAP media such as naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM) or technologically-enhanced naturally-occurring radioactive material (TENORM), from non-FUSRAP sources, at concentrations exceeding site cleanup standards. Such NORM and TENORM, and even byproduct radionuclides from other unrelated activities on or near the site, can be mistaken for project waste and thus incur significant additional excavation and waste transport and disposal costs. Past studies have provided examples of NORM and non-FUSRAP waste and described strategies to distinguish them from FUSRAP waste. This paper describes various sources of NORM, summarizes the types of project-related waste at some active FUSRAP sites, and identifies TENORM sites from which radionuclides could possibly migrate via various environmental pathways to nearby FUSRAP sites. The authors also examine two Case Studies that calculate distinctive elemental ratios and are examples of tools which may be used for distinguishing FUSRAP waste from other radionuclides present in natural or other man-made contributors to background. Case Study I examines two bodies of data and calculates distinctive elemental ratios between pairs of rare earth elements (REE) to see if significant differences may exist between such ratios in unregulated coal ash residue, common in fill in well-established towns and cities, and FUSRAP waste. The first group of data, consisting of eighteen sample results, was obtained from the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site's historical data while the second was obtained from a paper which provided extensive data (more than 100 samples) on the REE content in fly ash residues from three major coal-producing areas in the United States. This example illustrates statistically significant differences in five of six REE ratios and thus provides a potential tool for distinguishing FUSRAP waste from coal ash-based NORM. Case Study II examines differences in the mean REE:Actinide and REE:REE ratios in Welsbach-impacted sample results to distinguish project waste from background. While the purpose of this study was to distinguish project waste from background levels of the radionuclides of concern (ROC), it provides a good example of how one or more ratios could potentially be used to distinguish FUSRAP waste from NORM. Lastly, the authors recommend that future projects ensure robust characterization, that considers all potential radionuclide contributors from both FUSRAP activities as well as from other contributors to background for the region during the Planning Phase of the Data Life Cycle described within the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). It is expected that the incremental characterization sampling and analysis costs will be dwarfed by potential savings from efforts to better delineate and limit remediation to FUSRAP wastes rather than other potentially unregulated contributors to regional background. Other agencies or commercial entities with radiological environmental liabilities similar to FUSRAP would benefit from similar considerations of REEs and other radionuclides that could contribute to regional background. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration (DEMO) of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system for tracking and monitoring of nuclear materials.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [Environmental Management (EM), Office of Packaging and Transportation (EM-45)] Packaging Certification Program (PCP) has developed a radiofrequency identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring system for the management of nuclear materials packages during storage and transportation. The system, developed by the PCP team at Argonne National Laboratory, involves hardware modification, application software development, secured database and web server development, and irradiation experiments. In April 2008, Argonne tested key features of the RFID tracking and monitoring system in a weeklong, 1700 mile (2736 km) demonstration employing 14 empty type B fissile material drums of three designs (models 9975, 9977 and ES-3100) that have been certified for shipment by the DOE and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The demonstration successfully integrated global positioning system (GPS) technology for vehicle tracking, satellite/cellular (general packet radio service, or GPRS) technologies for wireless communication, and active RFID tags with multiple sensors (seal integrity, shock, temperature, humidity and battery status) on drums. In addition, the demonstration integrated geographic information system (GIS) technology with automatic alarm notifications of incidents and generated buffer zone reports for emergency response and management of staged incidents. The demonstration was sponsored by EM and the US National Nuclear Security Administration, with the participation of Argonne, Savannah River and Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Over 50 authorised stakeholders across the country observed the demonstration via secured Internet access. The DOE PCP and national laboratories are working on several RFID system implementation projects at selected DOE sites, as well as continuing device and systems development and widening applications beyond DOE sites and possibly beyond nuclear materials to include other radioactive materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MO-AB-201-01: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

MO-AB-201-02: The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

MO-AB-201-03: The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Statistical Uncertainty of Inhalation Dose Coefficients: Impact of Particle Deposition in ICRP 66 Human Respiratory Tract Model

Inhaled radioactive materials can pose a long-term health concern, as the material can be incorporated into the body’s metabolic pathways and remain in organs and tissues for extended durations. During the retention period, the radioactive material may localize in a source organ and irradiate adjacent target organs and tissues. Distribution of these materials changes over time, requiring biokinetic modeling to evaluate their movement through various tissues and organs. The evolving distribution depends on multiple inputs characterizing the inhaled material, such as particle size and size distribution, particle density, aspect ratio, specific radionuclide, the chemical form, and solubility. In addition, biological parameters such as breathing rate, breathing type (nasal or nasal/oral), respiratory system morphometry, tidal volume, functional residual capacity, and anatomical dead space all influence material transport. These aerosol properties and physiological characteristics of the respiratory tract jointly define a range of initial conditions that influence the time-dependent distribution of radioactive material. To evaluate both uncertainty in the initial conditions of inhalation exposure and the final output (committed effective dose) from biokinetic models, a Python-based software tool, Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL), was developed to propagate uncertainty within the human respiratory tract model. Focusing on deposition fraction uncertainty, the primary objective was to characterize the initial activity distribution across respiratory regions as a function of anticipated particle sizes and distributions. The impact of the deposition fraction uncertainty was propagated to committed effective dose coefficients for selected radionuclides in a companion publication. For each particle size, a lognormal distribution, characterized by its geometric mean as defined within ICRP Publication 66, serves as the basis for introducing uncertainty into the physical processes governing deposition in various lung regions. Finally, this study addresses the deposition process and examines how uncertainty in deposition mechanisms affects activity distribution in the airways, ultimately presenting the expected range and standard deviation of deposited activity as a function of particle size.

International Commission on Radiological Protectio↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Handling of Highly Radioactive Radiation Sources in a Hot Cell Using a Mechanically Driven Cell Crane - 13452

In 2010, Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH was awarded the contract for design and erection of a Hot Cell for handling and storage of highly radioactive radiation sources. This Hot Cell is part of a new hot cell laboratory, constructed for the NHZ (Neues Handhabungszentrum = New Handling Center) of the Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf GmbH (NES). All incurring radioactive materials from Austria are collected in the NHZ, where they are safely conditioned and stored temporarily until their final storage. The main tasks of the NES include, apart from the collection, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste, also the reprocessing and the decontamination of facilities and laboratories originating from 45 years of research and development at the Seibersdorf site as well as the operation of the Hot Cell Laboratory [1]. The new Hot Cell Laboratory inside the NHZ consists of the following room areas: - One hot cell, placed in the center, for remote controlled, radiation protected handling of radioactive materials, including an integrated floor storage for the long-term temporary storage of highly radioactive radiation sources; - An anteroom for the loading and unloading of the hot cell; - One control room for the remote controlling of the hot cell equipment; - One floor storage, placed laterally to the hot cell, for burial, interim storage and removal of fissionable radioactive material in leak-proof packed units in 100 l drums. The specific design activity of the hot cell of 1.85 Pbq relating to 1-Me-Radiator including the integrated floor storage influences realization and design of the components used in the cell significantly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

EARLY TESTS OF DRUM TYPE PACKAGINGS - THE LEWALLEN REPORT

The need for robust packagings for radioactive materials (RAM) was recognized from the earliest days of the nuclear industry. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Rocky Flats Plant developed a packaging for shipment of Pu in the early 1960's, which became the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 6M specification package. The design concepts were employed in other early packagings. Extensive tests of these at Savannah River Laboratory (now Savannah River National Laboratory) were performed in 1969 and 1970. The results of these tests were reported in 'Drum and Board-Type Insulation Overpacks of Shipping Packages for Radioactive Materials', by E. E. Lewallen. The Lewallen Report was foundational to design of subsequent drum type RAM packaging. This paper summarizes this important early study of drum type packagings. The Lewallen Report demonstrated the ability packagings employing drum and insulation board overpacks and engineered containment vessels to meet the Type B package requirements. Because of the results of the Lewallen Report, package designers showed high concern for thermal protection of 'Celotex'. Subsequent packages addressed this by following strategies like those recommended by Lewallen and by internal metal shields and supplemental, encapsulated insulation disks, as in 9975. The guidance provide by the Lewallen Report was employed in design of a large number of drum size packagings over the following three decades. With the increased public concern over transportation of radioactive materials and recognition of the need for larger margins of safety, more sophisticated and complex packages have been developed and have replaced the simple packagings developed under the Lewallen Report paradigm.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Impact of boundary layer simulation on predicting radioactive pollutant dispersion: a case study for HANARO Research Reactor using the WRF-MMIF-CALPUFF modeling system

Wind plays an important role in cases of unexpected radioactive pollutant dispersion, deciding distribution and concentration of the leaked substance. The accurate prediction of wind has been challenging in numerical weather prediction models, especially near the surface because of the complex interaction between turbulent flow and topographic effect. As such, in this study, we investigated the characteristics of atmospheric dispersion of radioactive material (i.e. 137 Cs) according to the simulated boundary layer around the HANARO research nuclear reactor in Korea using the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF)-Mesoscale Model Interface (MMIF)-California Puff (CALPUFF) model system. We examined the impacts of orographic drag on wind field, stability calculation methods, and planetary boundary layer parameterizations on the dispersion of radioactive material under a radioactive leaking scenario. We found that inclusion of the orographic drag effect in the WRF model improved the wind prediction most significantly over the complex terrain area, leading the model system to estimate the radioactive concentration near the reactor more conservatively. We also emphasized the importance of the stability calculation method and employing the skillful boundary layer parameterization to ensure more accurate low atmospheric conditions, in order to simulate more feasible spatial distribution of the radioactive dispersion in leaking scenarios.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Compton DIV: Using a Compton-Based Gamma-Ray Imager for Design Information Verification of Uranium Enrichment Plants

A feasibility study has been performed to determine the potential usefulness of Compton imaging as a tool for design information verification (DIV) of uranium enrichment plants. Compton imaging is a method of gamma-ray imaging capable of imaging with a 360-degree field of view over a broad range of energies. These systems can image a room (with a time span on the order of one hour) and return a picture of the distribution and composition of radioactive material in that room. The effectiveness of Compton imaging depends on the sensitivity and resolution of the instrument as well the strength and energy of the radioactive material to be imaged. This study combined measurements and simulations to examine the specific issue of UF{sub 6} gas flow in pipes, at various enrichment levels, as well as hold-up resulting from the accumulation of enriched material in those pipes. It was found that current generation imagers could image pipes carrying UF{sub 6} in less than one hour at moderate to high enrichment. Pipes with low enriched gas would require more time. It was also found that hold-up was more amenable to this technique and could be imaged in gram quantities in a fraction of an hour. another questions arises regarding the ability to separately image two pipes spaced closely together. This depends on the capabilities of the instrument in question. These results are described in detail. In addition, suggestions are given as to how to develop Compton imaging as a tool for DIV.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Transportation Package Seal Performance in Beyond Design Basis Thermal Exposures - 12472

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) technical report, NUREG/CR-6886, 'Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario', describes, in detail, an evaluation of the potential for a theoretical release of radioactive material from three different spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation packages, had they been exposed to the Baltimore tunnel fire that occurred in July of 2001. This evaluation determined the temperatures of various components of the packages, including the seals, using temperatures resulting from models of the Baltimore tunnel fire (as boundary conditions) and finite element models of the SNF packages. For two of the packages evaluated, the analyses indicated that the seals used would have exceeded their continuous-use rated service temperatures, meaning the release of radioactive material could not be ruled out with available information; However, for both of the packages evaluated, the analysis determined, by a bounding calculation, that the maximum potential release was well below the regulatory requirements for releases from a SNF package during the hypothetical accident condition (HAC) sequence of events in 10CFR Part 71. The NRC is investigating the performance of seals in SNF transportation packages exposed to fires that could exceed the HAC fire described in 10CFR Part 71, such as the Baltimore Tunnel Fire that occurred in 2001. The performance of package seals is important for determining the potential release of radioactive material from a package during a beyond-design-basis accident. The seals have lower temperature limits than other package components and are the containment barrier between the environment and the cask contents. The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research contracted the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct small-scale thermal testing to obtain experimental data of the performance of seals during extreme temperature exposures. The experimental testing consisted of several small-scale pressure vessels fabricated with a modified ASME flange design and tested metallic and elastomeric seals, similar to those that might be used on an actual SNF transportation package. The vessels were heated in an electrical oven to temperatures as high as 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), exceeding the rated temperatures of the seals in question. This paper will provide a summary of the testing conducted and present test results and conclusions. Fifteen metallic and elastomeric seal performance tests including two shakedowns were performed under beyond-design-basis thermal exposure conditions; twelve tests used metallic seals, two used ethylene-propylene seals, and one used a Teflon seal. Of the five repeat metallic-seal tests (Tests No.2, 3, 4, 8, and 9), leakage (decreasing vessel pressure) was observed in three of the tests (Tests No.3, 4, and 8) during the 9 h 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F) exposure. The times when the leakage occurred (the vessel pressure started to decrease) varied in the three tests performed. The two shakedown tests were conducted using a 30 min and 4 h exposure to 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), respectively, and the seal appeared to hold vessel pressure. No leakage (unchanged vessel pressure within the pressure measurement uncertainty) was also observed in the two metallic seal tests that used 100 deg. C incremental heating from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 627 deg. C (1160 deg. F) and from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 727 deg. C (1340 deg. F), respectively, with at least 9 h exposure to each temperature increment. Three repeat metallic seal tests were also conducted at the seal maximum operating temperature of 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) for 9 h. The seal maintained vessel pressure within the measurement of the pressure transducer in all three tests. No leakage was observed in one ethylene-propylene seal tested at 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) for more than 20 hours; however, leakage was found in another ethylene-propylene seal tested at 450 deg. C (842 deg. F) for more than 20 hours (Test No.15). Leakage was also observed in the test (Test No.12) that used a TFE seal subject to 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) exposure. In these fifteen tests the temperature and time exposure variables were changed to map the performance of the metallic and polymeric seals at elevated temperatures beyond the rated operating temperatures. Both the metallic and polymeric seals were able to hold pressure even after leaks were detected and no catastrophic seal failure (i.e., a rapid release of pressure to atmospheric) occurred. Further testing on the polymeric seals would need to be performed to confirm the results in these tests.(authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of a New Clearance Monitor for Exemption of NPP Radioactive Wastes and its Performance Test - 17200

In nuclear power plants, it is common practice to clear radioactive wastes for free release by using clearance monitor with plastic scintillation detectors so as to reduce disposal costs. These monitors are possible in part thanks to the excellent detection levels achievable with high energy and high yield photons emitted from contaminants such as Cs-137 and Co-60. However, it is difficult for the monitors to separate Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) from the radioactive wastes because the plastic scintillation detectors have poor resolution compared to NaI or HPGe detectors. KHNP has developed a new clearance monitor for determining whether or not the radioactivity level of metal scraps satisfies regulatory criteria. The monitor is composed of 12 large area plastic scintillation detectors and 3 NaI scintillation detectors. The measuring chamber is surrounded by a 5 cm-thick lead shield with chamber dimensions of 1.5 m x 1.0 m x 1.0 m. Its algorithm has a function of measuring total gamma activity while analyzing gamma nuclides and identifying 27 hotspots in radioactive wastes. The detection limit of this system, according to the MCNP simulation, was determined to be about 45 Bq for Co-60 and 78 Bq for Cs-137 with the condition of an empty chamber and measuring time of 1 minute. We evaluated the self - shielding effect of waste for background correction factor and waste height (volume in the chamber) correction factor. We also tested its MDA, location determination of hot-spots, temperature compensation function and convenience of operation. In the future, we will plan to install it at a nuclear site for more tests including evaluating its durability. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Concept of an inherently-safe high temperature gas-cooled reactor

As the challenge to ensure no harmful release of radioactive materials at the accidents by deterministic approach instead to satisfy acceptance criteria or safety goal for risk by probabilistic approach, new concept of advanced reactor, an inherently-safe high temperature gas-cooled reactor, is proposed based on the experience of the operation of the actual High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) in Japan, High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), and the design of the commercial plant (GTHTR300), utilizing the inherent safety features of the HTGR (i.e., safety features based on physical phenomena). The safety design philosophy of the inherently-safe HTGR for the safety analysis of the radiological consequences is determined as the confinement of radioactive materials is assured by only inherent safety features without engineered safety features, AC power or prompt actions by plant personnel if the design extension conditions occur. Inherent safety features to prevent the loss or degradation of the confinement function are identified. It is proposed not to apply the probabilistic approach for the evaluation of the radiological consequences of the accidents in the safety analysis because no inherent safety features fail for the mitigation of the consequences of the accidents. Consequently, there are no event sequences to harmful release of radioactive materials if the design extension conditions occur in the inherently-safe HTGR concept. The concept and future R and D items for the inherently-safe HTGR are described in this paper.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Trends and Patterns in the Evolving Threat to Radioactive and Nuclear Material Transportation

Roughly 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported worldwide each year via commercial transportation vectors. Many of these can be considered a significant movement of risk-significant quantities of radioactive and nuclear material. A strong argument can be made to support the idea that transportation presents the greatest vulnerability in radioactive sealed source and nuclear material life-cycles. Historical and current information strongly suggests adversarial interest in obtaining radiological and nuclear materials with the intent of malicious use. In this context, it is necessary to understand the current trends and patterns in transportation threats as they apply to these materials in order to better understand security needs and current adversarial methods and mind-set.The authors propose to summarize current threats posed to radiological and nuclear materials during the transportation phase of the lifecycle. The paper and ensuing presentation will focus on a review of historical events where the adversarial intent was to disrupt the transportation phase of nuclear and radioactive material with malicious intent, as reported in open source literature. Its purpose is to better understand the nature of current and past transportation incidents involving these materials in order to clarify the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities they reveal. Relevant incidents involving transportation of these materials will be discussed as well as the historical trends associated with these events. A regional perspective based on an analysis of transportation incidents involving these materials will be discussed. While not necessarily predictive of the types of malicious disruptions that might occur in the future, this study will provide a rich information source from which lessons can be gleaned pertinent to the potential security and public safety threats posed by the transportation of commercial radioactive and nuclear material.

Shannon, Michael↗

Scintillators

As concerns about the illicit movement of radioactive materials across international borders increase, so too has the need for increased protection of those borders both foreign and domestic. The challenge is not only to detect hidden radioactive materials, but also to distinguish them from legitimate radionuclides such as radio-pharmaceuticals that are often transported across borders and shipped throughout a country. With more than 600 U.S. border sites to protect, screening imported radioactive material requires a careful balance of high throughput and high search efficiency. However, these requirements are difficult to meet as rapid screening operations leave less time for radiation detectors to efficiently evaluate materials. In support of border security, Sandia developed organic glass scintillators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Maritime Interdiction Operations Small Craft Detection

The Naval Postgraduate School has been conducting Tactical Network Topology (TNT) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) experiments with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) since early in 2005. In this work, we are investigating cutting edge technology to evaluate use of networks, advanced sensors and collaborative technology for globally-supported maritime interdiction operations. Some examples of our research include communications in harsh environments, between moving ships at sea; small boat drive-by radiation detection; network-centric collaboration with global partners; situational awareness; prototype sensors & biometric instruments. Since 2006, we have studied the concept of using a small vessel with fixed radiation sensors to do initial searches for illicit radioactive materials. In our work, we continue to evaluate concepts of operation for small boat monitoring. For example, in San Francisco Bay we established a simulated choke point using two RHIBs. Each RHIB had a large sodium iodide radiation sensor on board, mounted on the side nearest to the passing potential target boats. Once detections were made, notification over the network prompted a chase RHIB also equipped with a radiation sensor to further investigate the potential target. We have also used an unmanned surface vessel (USV) carrying a radiation sensor to perform the initial discovery. The USV was controlled remotely and to drive by boats in different configurations. The potential target vessels were arranged in a line, as a choke point and randomly spaced in the water. Search plans were problematic when weather, waves and drift complicated the ability to stay in one place. A further challenge is to both detect and identify the radioactive materials during the drive-by. Our radiation detection system, ARAM, Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor, is able to detect, alarm and quickly identify plausible radionuclides in real time. We have performed a number of experiments to better understand parameters of vessel speed, time, shielding, and distance in this complex three-dimensional space. At the NMIOTC in September 2009, we employed a dual detector portal followed by a chase. In this event, the challenge was to maintain communications after a lapse. When the chase went past the line-of sight reach of the Tactical Operational Center's (TOC) antenna, with interference from a fortress island in Suda Bay, Wave Relay extended the network for continued observation. Sodium iodide radiation detectors were mounted on two Hellenic Navy SEAL fast boats. After making the detection one of the portal boats maintained line-of sight while the other pursued the target vessel. Network access via Wave Relay antennas was maintained until the conclusion of the chase scenario. Progress has been made in the detection of radioactive materials in the maritime environment. The progression of the TNT MIO experiments has demonstrated the potential of the hardware to solve the problems encountered in this physically challenging environment. There continue to be interesting opportunities for research and development. These experiments provide a variety of platforms and motivated participants to perform real-world testing as solutions are made available.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

A methodology to quantify the release of spent nuclear fuel from dry casks during security-related scenarios

Assessing the risk to the public and the environment from a release of radioactive material produced by accidental or purposeful forces/environments is an important aspect of the regulatory process in many facets of the nuclear industry. In particular, the transport and storage of radioactive materials is of particular concern to the public, especially with regard to potential sabotage acts that might be undertaken by terror groups to cause injuries, panic, and/or economic consequences to a nation. For many such postulated attacks, no breach in the robust cask or storage module containment is expected to occur. However, there exists evidence that some hypothetical attack modes can penetrate and cause a release of radioactive material. This report is intended as an unclassified overview of the methodology for release estimation as well as a guide to useful resource data from unclassified sources and relevant analysis methods for the estimation process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗