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At least 289 records · Page 16

Establishing and Monitoring an Aseptic Workspace for Building the MOMA Mass Spectrometer

Mars Organic Molecule Analyzer (MOMA) is an instrument suite on the European Space Agency (ESA) ExoMars 2020 Rover, and the Mass Spectrometer (MOMA-MS) is being built at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). MOMA-MS is a life-detection instrument and thus falls in the most stringent category of Planetary Protection (PP) biological cleanliness requirements. Less than 0.03 spore/m2 are allowed in the instrument sample path. In order to meet these PP requirements, MOMA-MS must be built and maintained in a low bioburden environment. The MOMA-MS project at GSFC maintains three clean rooms with varying levels of bioburden control. The Aseptic Assembly Clean room has the highest level of control, applying three different bioburden reducing methods: 70% Isopropyl Alcohol (IPA), 7.5% Hydrogen Peroxide, and Ultra-Violet C (UVC) light. The three methods are used in rotation and each kills microorganisms by a different mechanism, reducing the likelihood of microorganisms developing resistance to all three. The Integration and Mars Chamber Clean rooms use less biocidal cleaning, with the option to deploy extra techniques as necessary. To support the monitoring of clean rooms and verification that MOMA-MS hardware meets PP requirements, a new Planetary Protection lab was established that currently has the capabilities of standard growth assays for spore or vegetative bacteria, rapid bioburden analysis that detects Adenosine Triphosphate (ATP), plus autoclave and Dry Heat microbial Reduction (DHMR) verification. The clean rooms are monitored for vegetative microorganisms and by rapid ATP assay, and a clear difference in bioburden is observed between the aseptic and other clean room.

Contamination Control Engineering↗

Sample Return: What Happens to the Samples on Earth?

As space agencies throughout the world turn their attention toward human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and the solar system beyond, there has been an increase in the number of robotic sample return missions proposed as precursors to these human endeavors. In reality, however, we, as a global community, have very little experience with robotic sample return missions: 3 of the Russian Luna Missions successfully returned lunar material in the 1970s; 28 years later, in 2004, NASA s Genesis Mission returned material from the solar wind; and in 2006, NASA s Stardust Mission returned material from the Comet Wild2. [Note: The Japanese Hyabusa mission continues in space with the hope of returning material from the asteroid 25143 Itokawa.] We launch many spacecraft to LEO and return them to Earth. We also launch spacecraft beyond LEO to explore the planets, our solar system, and beyond. Some even land on these bodies. But these do not return. So as we begin to contemplate the sample return missions of the future, some common questions arise: "What really happens when the capsule returns?" "Where does it land?" "Who retrieves it and just how do they do that?" "Where does it go after that?" "How do the scientists get the samples?" "Do they keep them?" "Who is in charge?" The questions are nearly endless. The goal of this paper/presentation is to uncover many of the mysteries of the post-return phase of a mission - from the time the return body enters the atmosphere until the mission ends and the samples become part of a long term collection. The discussion will be based largely on the author s own experience with both the Genesis and Stardust missions. Of course, these two missions have a great deal in common, being funded by the same NASA Program (Discovery) and having similar team composition. The intent, however, is to use these missions as examples in order to highlight the general requirements and the challenges in defining and meeting those requirements for the final phase of sample return missions. The choices made by the Genesis and Stardust teams regarding recovery and sample handling will be discussed. These will be compared with the handling of returned lunar samples and the proposed handling of the Hyabusa samples as well. Finally, though none of these recent missions have been restricted within NASA s Planetary Protection Protocol, this is likely to change as missions venture farther from Earth. The implementation of Planetary Protection requirements will vary significantly based on mission scenario, however some of the potential implications of restricted Earth return will be considered.

McNamara, Karen↗

Mars Sample Return Using Commercial Capabilities: ERV Trajectory and Capture Requirements

Mars Sample Return was presented as the highest priority planetary science mission of the next decade [1]. Lemke et al. [2] present a Mars Sample Return mission concept in which the sample is returned directly from the surface of Mars to an Earth orbit. The sample is recovered in Earth Orbit instead of being transferred between spacecraft in Mars Orbit. This paper provides the details of this sample recovery in Earth orbit and presents as such a sub-element of the overall Mars sample return concept given in [2]. We start from the assumption that a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV), initially landed on Mars using a modified SpaceX Dragon capsule, has successfully delivered the sample, already contained within an Earth Return Vehicle (ERV), to a parking orbit around Mars. From the parking orbit, the ERV imparts sufficient Delta-V to inject itself into an earthbound trajectory and to be captured into an Earth orbit eventually. We take into account launch window and Delta-V considerations as well as the additional constraint of increased safety margins imposed by planetary protection regulations. We focus on how to overcome two distinct challenges of the sample return that are driven by the issues of planetary protection: (1) the design of an ERV trajectory meeting all the requirements including the need to avoid contamination of Earth's atmosphere; (2) the concept of operations for retrieving the Martian samples in Earth orbit in a safe way. We present an approach to retrieve the samples through a rendezvous between the ERV and a second SpaceX Dragon capsule. The ERV executes a trajectory that brings it from low Mars orbit (LMO) to a Moon-trailing Earth orbit at high inclination with respect to the Earth-Moon plane. After a first burn at Trans-Earth Injection (TEI), the trajectory uses a second burn at perigee during an Earth flyby maneuver to capture the ERV in Earth orbit. The ERV then uses a non-propulsive Moon flyby to come to a near-circular Moon-trailing orbit. To perform the Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR), a second Dragon capsule is then launched from Earth and a similar lunar flyby is performed to rendezvous with the ERV. The requirements for rendezvous, close proximity operations and capture of the sample canister are described. A concept of operations for sample retrieval is presented along with design specifications of the ERV, the required modifications to the Dragon capsule, as well as the hardware, software, sensors, actuators, and capture mechanisms used. In our concept, a container is mounted to the front hatch of Dragon, capable of accommodating the sample canister and sealing it from the rest of the capsule. The sample canister is captured using a robotic arm with a magnetic grappling mechanism. Dragon then performs a propulsive maneuver to return to Earth for a controlled re-entry while the ERV (sans sample container) is left in the Moon trailing orbit. Contingency cases and related mitigation strategies are also discussed, including the advantages and disadvantages of performing the ERV rendezvous with a crew.

Faber, Nicolas F.↗

Identifying and Inactivating Bacterial Spores

Problems associated with, and new strategies for, inactivating resistant organisms like Bacillus canaveralius (found at Kennedy Space Center during a survey of three NASA cleanrooms) have been defined. Identifying the particular component of the spore that allows its heightened resistance can guide the development of sterilization procedures that are targeted to the specific molecules responsible for resistance, while avoiding using unduly harsh methods that jeopardize equipment. The key element of spore resistance is a multilayered protein shell that encases the spore called the spore coat. The coat of the best-studied spore-forming microbe, B. subtilis, consists of at least 45 proteins, most of which are poorly characterized. Several protective roles for the coat are well characterized including resistance to desiccation, large toxic molecules, ortho-phthalaldehyde, and ultraviolet (UV) radiation. One important long-term specific goal is an improved sterilization procedure that will enable NASA to meet planetary protection requirements without a terminal heat sterilization step. This would support the implementation of planetary protection policies for life-detection missions. Typically, hospitals and government agencies use biological indicators to ensure the quality control of sterilization processes. The spores of B. canaveralius that are more resistant to osmotic stress would serve as a better biological indicator for potential survival than those in use currently.

Newcombe, David↗

Space Environmental Effects on Cleanroom Microbes: A Pathfinder Study

Microbes have an extraordinary ability to adapt to their environment, but little is known about the effects of space irradiation on microbial survival and adaptation. Microbial responses are relevant to both Planetary Protection (PP), where microbes could contaminate planetary bodies and inhibit scientific investigation, and in crew wellbeing where microbes may develop unknown, dangerous resistance mechanisms that impact human health. This project aimed to determine survivability of a collection of isolates collected from NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) cleanrooms. In this study, we developed a standard process for exposing dried microbes to various levels of proton irradiation, followed by evaluation of survival. Through multiple exposures at various intensities, we were able to narrow down a shortlist of cleanroom microbes deemed of highest threat to both PP and crew health. These findings could help to more clearly and accurately define risks associated with radiation impacts on microbes.

Planetary Protection↗

A Reliable Earth Return System for Safe Recovery of Mars Samples

The objective of a Mars sample return mission is to bring selected Mars surface materials to Earth. Numerous approaches for the Earth-return segment have been analyzed including propulsive or aerocapture return to low-Earth orbit followed by Space Shuttle rendezvous and direct entry. Of these approaches, ballistic entry of a small capsule terminating in a ground landing has been shown to be the lowest risk strategy. Over the past two years, significant work has been performed towards development of a robust direct entry vehicle for Mars sample return. In June 1999, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer provided initial guidance to the former Mars Sample Return Project. The sample return phase of the mission was assigned a restricted Earth return planetary protection classification. The draft mission requirement states that the total mean probability of release of unsterilized Mars material into the Earth;s biosphere must be less than 1.0E-06 (1 in a million). This strict requirement drives the approach and design of the Earth return system. To meet this requirement, selection of the Earth return strategy and development of the Earth return system must be guided by risk, not performance, based decisions. An initial Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to address the direct entry Earth return system containment assurance reliability and to identify high-risk elements of this system. The results of this PRA identified risk elements that include thermal protection system performance during entry, spin-eject orientation and aerodynamic stability during entry, structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and tracking/recovery of this system. This initial probabilistic risk quantification demonstrates that, with the proper development program, a prototypical direct entry design can satisfy the containment assurance reliability requirement. Through the current Mars Sample Return Advanced Technology Development effort, an extensive design, analysis, and test program is presently proceeding with the aim of reducing the containment assurance risk of this system. This technology development effort, guided by a continuing PRA, focuses on key risk areas of a direct entry Earth return system including: the thermal protection system, impact dynamics, structural performance, aerodynamic stability, and ground recovery. This development program will culminate in a system validation flight test, 1-2 years prior to launch of the flight system. This flight test would include the launch, entry, and recovery of a full-scale Earth return system, as a scientific validation of the key risk elements to verify nominal design performance. The results of the initial PRA suggested several dominant failure sequences that can be validated in a flight test. These include: demonstrating the thermal protection system reliability and performance during entry, demonstrating the spin-eject orientation and aero-dynamic stability during entry, demonstrating the structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and demonstrating tracking and recovery of the Earth return system. This single test will directly address over 50% of the total containment assurance risk elements. This presentation will begin by presenting the relative risk of various Earth return strategies. The results of the initial probabilistic risk assessment will be presented followed by a discussion of the development accomplishments and plans for demonstration of a highly reliable direct entry Earth return system.

Braun, R.↗

Contamination Mitigation Strategies for Long Duration Human Spaceflight Missions

Contamination control issues are particularly challenging for long-term human spaceflight and are associated with the search for life, dynamic environmental conditions, human-robotic-environment interaction, sample collection and return, biological processes, waste management, long-term environmental disturbance, etc. These issues impact mission success, human health, planetary protection, and research and discovery. Mitigation and control techniques and strategies may include and integrate long-term environmental monitoring and reporting, contamination control and planetary protection protocols, habitation site design, habitat design, and surface exploration and traverse pathways and area access planning.

enviroment↗

Asteroid, Lunar and Planetary Regolith Management A Layered Engineering Defense

During missions on asteroid and lunar and planetary surfaces, space systems and crew health may be degraded by exposure to dust and dirt. Furthermore, for missions outside the Earth‐Moon system, planetary protection must be considered in efforts to minimize forward and backward contamination. This paper presents an end‐to‐end approach to ensure system reliability, crew health, and planetary protection in regolith environments. It also recommends technology investments that would be required to implement this layered engineering defense.

Wagner, Sandra↗

A methodology of MSL breakup analysis for Earth accidental reentry and its application to breakup analysis for Mars off-nominal entry

Vehicle breakup analysis has been performed for missions that may carry nuclear fuel for heating or power purposes to assess nuclear safety in case of launch failure leading to atmospheric reentry. Also, failure scenarios exist which could lead to breakup during Entry / Descent / Landing (EDL) at Mars due to off-nominal entries, with implications for planetary protection requirements. Since the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) spacecraft may include a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG), an analysis of breakup in case of launch failure is required. Also, breakup during Mars EDL due to off-nominal entries could release the RTG heat source that has implications for planetary protection requirements. This paper presents a methodology of MSL breakup analysis for launch failure with application to Mars off-nominal entry.

nuclear safety↗

Integrating Public Perspectives in Sample Return Planning

Planning for extraterrestrial sample returns, whether from Mars or other solar system bodies, must be done in a way that integrates planetary protection concerns with the usual mission technical and scientific considerations. Understanding and addressing legitimate societal concerns about the possible risks of sample return will be a critical part of the public decision making process ahead. This paper presents the results of two studies, one with lay audiences, the other with expert microbiologists, designed to gather information, on attitudes and concerns about sample return risks and planetary protection. Focus group interviews with lay subjects, using generic information about Mars sample return and a preliminary environmental impact assessment, were designed to obtain an indication of how the factual content is perceived and understood by the public. A research survey of microbiologists gathered information on experts' views and attitudes about sample return, risk management approaches and space exploration risks. These findings, combined with earlier research results on risk perception, will be useful in identifying levels of concern and potential conflicts in understanding between experts and the public about sample return risks. The information will be helpful in guiding development of the environmental impact statement and also has applicability to proposals for sample return from other solar system bodies where scientific uncertainty about extraterrestrial life may persist at the time of mission planning.

Race, Margaret S.↗

Forward Contamination of the Moon and Mars: Implications for Future Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined new visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moon, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require that all spacecraft and instrumentation be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under COSPAR's current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft. Nonetheless, future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗

Molecular Identification of Microbial Contaminants

Microorganisms can have significant impacts on the success of NASA’s missions, including the integrity of materials, the reliability of scientific results, and maintenance of crew health. Robust cleaning and sterilization protocols are currently in place in NASA facilities, but agency experts agree that microbial contamination is unavoidable and its impact on NASA’s missions and science must be minimized. Therefore, it is critical to understand: 1) what specific microorganisms are present, 2) how they may impact scientific objectives, and 3) how to select appropriate mitigation strategies. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Planetary Protection (PP) microbiology lab historically relied solely upon enumeration of culturable microbial contamination associated with spacecraft materials or cleanrooms. However, this process is time consuming, many microbes cannot be cultured, and very few can be identified with any fidelity using NASA standard microbiological methods. The work described in this white paper includes the establishment of molecular identification capabilities at MSFC, including DNA isolation, amplification, purification, and Sanger sequencing. This capability will not only improve planetary protection efforts at MSFC (i.e. by identifying contaminating microorganisms in cleanrooms or on spacecraft) but also offers a service center-wide for the identification of contaminants that arise in other projects, processing locations, or during set up and roll out of spacecraft. This work also lays the foundation for higher throughput efforts to identify large populations of microbes across the lifetime of a project and serves as the starting point for future work into whole genome sequencing, non-culture based methods, or additional characterization studies. Ultimately, accurate identification informs appropriate mitigation strategies, increasing the chances of success for NASA’s missions and objectives.

C. D. Cassilly↗

Life sciences and space research XXIII(2): Planetary biology and origins of life; Proceedings of the Topical Meeting and Workshops XX, XXI and XXIII of the 27th COSPAR Plenary Meeting, Espoo, Finland, July 18-29, 1988

This volume includes chapters on exobiology in space, chemical and early biochemical evolution, life without oxygen, potential for chemical evolution in the early environment of Mars, planetary protection issues and sample return missions, and the modulation of biological evolution by astrophysical phenomena. Papers are presented on the results of spaceflight missions, the action of some factors of space medium on the abiogenic synthesis of nucleotides, early peptidic enzymes, microbiology and biochemistry of the methanogenic archaeobacteria, and present-day biogeochemical activities of anaerobic bacteria and their relevance to future exobiological investigations. Consideration is also given to the development of the Alba Patera volcano on Mars, biological nitrogen fixation under primordial Martian partial pressures of dinitrogen, the planetary protection issues in advance of human exploration of Mars, and the difficulty with astronomical explanations of periodic mass extinctions.

Schwartz, A. W.↗

Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide as Alternative to Dry Heat Microbial Reduction

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in conjunction with the NASA Planetary Protection Officer, has selected vapor phase hydrogen peroxide (VHP) sterilization process for continued development as a NASA approved sterilization technique for spacecraft subsystems and systems. The goal is to include this technique, with appropriate specification, in NPG8020.12C as a low temperature complementary technique to the dry heat sterilization process. A series of experiments were conducted in vacuum to determine VHP process parameters that provided significant reductions in spore viability while allowing survival of sufficient spores for statistically significant enumeration. With this knowledge of D values, sensible margins can be applied in a planetary protection specification. The outcome of this study provided an optimization of test sterilizer process conditions: VHP concentration, process duration, a process temperature range for which the worst case D value may be imposed, a process humidity range for which the worst case D value may be imposed, and robustness to selected spacecraft material substrates.

vapor hydrogen peroxide↗

The Importance of Contamination Knowledge - Insights into Mars Sample Return

The Astromaterials Acquisition and Curation Office at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), in Houston, TX (henceforth Curation Office) manages the curation of all past, present, and future extraterrestrial samples returned by NASA missions and shared collections from international partners, preserving their integrity for future scientific study while providing the samples to the international community in a fair and unbiased way. The Curation Office also curates all reference and witness materials for each mission (e.g., flight and non-flight hardware coupons; lubricants; non-flight, flight-like, and flown witness plates). These reference and witness materials provide the scientific community with the fundamental ability to reconstruct the contamination/alteration history of the sample collection through the course of the mission, with the overall goal of strengthening the scientific conclusions drawn from the study of returned materials. The information gained from characterizing the physical, biological, inorganic, and organic chemical properties of reference and witness materials is defined as the Contamination Knowledge (CK) of the sample collection. Unlike the data collected for Contamination Control (CC) and Planetary Protection (PP), CK is exclusively concerned with preserving reference and witness materials for study by future scientists upon sample return. Although CC and PP data collected for sample integrity and forward contamination purposes can be complementary to CK, they are two separate data sets with distinct objectives. A robust collection of samples for CK is necessary to allow the extraterrestrial material in a returned sample to be distinguished from terrestrial contamination. Traditionally CK is utilized by sample scientists in order to accomplish the mission’s scientific objectives, however this information can also be utilized by the Office of Planetary Protection to help evaluate the presence of any back contamination. Mars 2020, the first phase of a potential multipart Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign, is expected to contribute to NASA’s Mars Exploration Program Science Goals by filling in knowledge gaps concerning: 1) the existence of past or present life on Mars, 2) the past and present climate of Mars, 3) the geology of Mars, and 4) hazards associated with human exploration of Mars. Although there is debate concerning which samples will best answer these questions, the necessity for proper sample blanks is well-understood. The CC and PP requirements, driven by the restricted Class V mission designation, are the most stringent of any sample return mission in recent history. The extremely low levels of allowable terrestrial contamination on the spacecraft and rover can complicate these analyses given the detection limits of current analytical instrumentation, especially in the case of biological contamination. By collecting and curating unanalyzed samples specifically for CK, future sample scientists will not be relegated to: 1) relying on data collected using possibly obsolete tools and techniques for return sample blanks, or 2) using remnants of extracted and/or cultured samples from ATLO (Assembly, Test, and Launch Operations), which could be incompatible with the desired experimental endpoints or state-of-the-art techniques available at the time of sample return.The addition of biological experimental endpoints to a sample return campaign’s objectives broadens the requisite range in preservation environments (e.g. inert ultra-pure nitrogen gaseous environment at 18 degrees Centigrade versus less than or equal to minus 80 degrees Centigrade) and types of CK samples. As a result, the Curation Office will also curate the following CK samples at less than or equal to minus 80 degrees Centigrade for the Mars 2020 mission: 1) unanalyzed swabs and wipes in sterile containers, 2) all recirculation filters from the clean rooms used for sample and caching subsystem assembly and all filters from the laminar flow benches used to assemble sample intimate hardware, and 3) witness plates collecting airborne contamination within the assembly clean rooms. It has been Curation Office policy since the Apollo missions to preserve as many pristine samples as possible for future scientific research. Although CK is required to be collected for all stages of the MSR campaign, the CK for the Mars 2020 mission is the most critical for understanding contamination in the returned samples given the intimacy between the Martian samples and the Mars 2020 flight hardware. This presentation highlights the importance of CK for sample return missions as well as the traditional and novel types of CK samples required for a successful MSR campaign.

Harrington, A. D.↗

X-Ray Computed Tomography: The First Step in Mars Sample Return Processing

The Mars 2020 rover mission will collect and cache samples from the martian surface for possible retrieval and subsequent return to Earth. If the samples are returned, that mission would likely present an opportunity to analyze returned Mars samples within a geologic context on Mars. In addition, it may provide definitive information about the existence of past or present life on Mars. Mars sample return presents unique challenges for the collection, containment, transport, curation and processing of samples [1] Foremost in the processing of returned samples are the closely paired considerations of life detection and Planetary Protection. In order to achieve Mars Sample Return (MSR) science goals, reliable analyses will depend on overcoming some challenging signal/noise-related issues where sparse martian organic compounds must be reliably analyzed against the contamination background. While reliable analyses will depend on initial clean acquisition and robust documentation of all aspects of developing and managing the cache [2], there needs to be a reliable sample handling and analysis procedure that accounts for a variety of materials which may or may not contain evidence of past or present martian life. A recent report [3] suggests that a defined set of measurements should be made to effectively inform both science and Planetary Protection, when applied in the context of the two competing null hypotheses: 1) that there is no detectable life in the samples; or 2) that there is martian life in the samples. The defined measurements would include a phased approach that would be accepted by the community to preserve the bulk of the material, but provide unambiguous science data that can be used and interpreted by various disciplines. Fore-most is the concern that the initial steps would ensure the pristine nature of the samples. Preliminary, non-invasive techniques such as computed X-ray tomography (XCT) have been suggested as the first method to interrogate and characterize the cached samples without altering the materials [1,2]. A recent report [4] indicates that XCT may minimally alter samples for some techniques, and work is needed to quantify these effects, maximizing science return from XCT initial analysis while minimizing effects.

Welzenbach, L. C.↗

Dynamic Simulation Probabalistic Risk Assessment Model for an Enceladus Sample Return Mission

Enceladus, a moon of Saturn, has geyser-like jets that spray plumes of material into orbit. These jets could enable a free-flying spacecraft to collect samples and return them to Earth for study to determine if they contain the building blocks of life. The Office of Planetary Protection at NASA requires containment of any unsterilized samples and prohibits destructive impact of the spacecraft upon return to Earth, with a sample release probability of less than 1 in 1,000,000 as a recommended goal. This paper describes a probabilistic risk assessment model that uses dynamic simulation techniques to capture the physics-based, time- and state-dependent interactions between the sample return system and the environment, which drive the risk of sample release. The dynamic approach uses a Monte Carlo-style simulation to integrate the many phases and sources of risk for a sample return mission. The model is used to assess the achievability of the planetary protection reliability goal. This is accomplished by performing sensitivity studies assessing the impact of modeling assumptions to identify where uncertainties drive the risk. These results, in turn, are used to examine the feasibility of meeting key design and performance parameters that are needed to achieve the reliability goal for a given architecture with existing technologies.

Dynamic Simulation↗

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2a (Sterilization)

The Space Studies Board of the National Research Council provided a series of recommendations to NASA on planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions. One of the Board's key findings suggested, although current evidence of the martian surface suggests that life as we know it would not tolerate the planet's harsh environment, there remain 'plausible scenarios for extant microbial life on Mars.' Based on this conclusion, all samples returned from Mars should be considered potentially hazardous until it has been demonstrated that they are not. In response to the National Research Council's findings and recommendations, NASA has undertaken a series of workshops to address issues regarding NASA's proposed sample return missions. Work was previously undertaken at the Mars Sample Handling and Protocol Workshop 1 (March 2000) to formulate recommendations on effective methods for life detection and/or biohazard testing on returned samples. The NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened the Mars Sample Sterilization Workshop, the third in the Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series, on November 28-30, 2000 at the Holiday Inn Rosslyn Westpark, Arlington, Virginia. Because of the short timeframe between this Workshop and the second Workshop in the Series, which was convened in October 2000 in Bethesda, Maryland, they were developed in parallel, so the Sterilization Workshop and its report have therefore been designated as '2a'). The focus of Workshop 2a was to make recommendations for effective sterilization procedures for all phases of Mars sample return missions, and to answer the question of whether we can sterilize samples in such a way that the geological characteristics of the samples are not significantly altered.

Rummel, John D.↗