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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

EVALUATING NUCLEAR SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPLINTERNET

The internet, which for years has been viewed as a global online commons with standardized protocols but few regulations is, according to some experts, starting to mirror the contentious political and commercial contours of the physical world. Contributing to this is the rise in data breaches, cyber-enabled attacks on critical infrastructure, government surveillance operations, theft of intellectual property, manipulation of electoral processes, and perceived erosion of privacy, all of which are resulting in a growing skepticism that an open internet will naturally serve the best interests of users, communities, countries, and the global economy. In addition, the rapidly emerging and increasingly lucrative power of data has global superpowers scrambling to protect their informational sovereignty as an urgent matter of national security. Underscoring this urgency is the fact that, despite its global reach and cosmopolitan contributor base, internet infrastructure and governance of the World Wide Web remain largely under U.S. corporate auspices, which reinforces the perception of U.S. control. Whether fragmentation is politically, economically, or socially motivated, there appears to be a growing appetite for an internet that is partitioned and controlled at the national level. From “the Great Firewall of China” to the “Halal” internet of Iran, the trend towards a “Splinternet” has courts and governments embarking on what some call a "legal arms race" to impose a maze of national or regional rules, often conflicting, in the digital realm. The paper explores the emerging Splinternet phenomenon, analyses the implications of this trend on nuclear security, and identifies questions that present opportunities for future research.

Internet, Data Security, Cyber Security, Nuclear S↗
DOE OSTI2022

Achievements and Prospects of Global Broadband Seismographic Networks After 30 Years of Continuous Geophysical Observations

Global seismographic networks (GSNs) emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, facilitated by seminal international developments in theory, technology, instrumentation, and data exchange. The mid- to late-twentieth century saw the creation of the World-Wide Standardized Seismographic Network (1961) and International Deployment of Accelerometers (1976), which advanced global geographic coverage as seismometer bandwidth increased greatly allowing for the recording of the Earth's principal seismic spectrum. The modern era of global observations and rapid data access began during the 1980s, and notably included the inception of the GEOSCOPE initiative (1982) and GSN (1988). Through continual improvements, GEOSCOPE and the GSN have realized near-real time recording of ground motion with state-of-art data quality, dynamic range, and timing precision to encompass 180 seismic stations, many in very remote locations. Data from GSNs are increasingly integrated with other geophysical data (e.g., space geodesy, infrasound and Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar). Globally distributed seismic data are critical to resolving crust, mantle, and core structure; illuminating features of the plate tectonic and mantle convection system; rapid characterization of earthquakes; identification of potential tsunamis; global nuclear test verification; and provide sensitive proxies for environmental changes. As the global geosciences community continues to advance our understanding of Earth structure and processes controlling elastic wave propagation, GSN infrastructure offers a springboard to realize increasingly multi-instrument geophysical observatories. Here, we review the historical, scientific, and monitoring heritage of GSNs, summarize key discoveries, and discuss future associated opportunities for Earth Science.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Curifactory: A research experiment manager

Curifactory is a command line tool and framework for organizing Python experiment code, configuration parameters, and results. It is an opinionated and lightweight approach to workflow management infrastructure and is primarily intended to support researchers conducting experiments on one machine. This software was developed to support the reproducibility of results for several data science projects in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Curifactory is intended to be a general framework and is not specific to machine learning or data science. It can aid in any field in which experiments are primarily computation-based studies and can be implemented in Python (e.g., high-energy physics, astronomy, computational chemistry). Here, the design emphasizes the automated caching of intermediate data analysis artifacts to speed up development involving computationally intensive tasks. It also allows for data provenance and experiment reproduction. Individual experiment runs are tracked through logs and their output reports, and entire copies of a run with all cached data and metadata can be exported for others to run using Curifactory on another machine. Curifactory experiments can either be integrated into a project from the beginning or can be written on top of an existing codebase without needing significant modification. A few important views of the Curifactory library can be seen in Figure 1.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Technology and a Resilient Electric Grid

Making the electric grid cleaner and more resilient will require investing in a variety of new and emerging technologies. Advanced technologies including hydrogen, small modular nuclear reactors, and energy storage will all have a role to play in modernizing the electric grid. A diverse energy supply helps to keep the lights on and protects critical infrastructure, however it will also be important to assess the potential vulnerabilities and risks that come with unfamiliar and new technologies. This webinar will feature experts on resilience planning around advanced technologies from multiple sectors and share resources for states as they seek to modernize and decarbonize their electric grid.

advanced technology↗
DOE OSTI2020

Alternative Treatment of Defense Waste Processing Facility Recycle via Reuse of Existing Liquid Waste Facilities - 20097

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at Savannah River Site (SRS) has been immobilizing high level waste since 1996. The chemical process within DWPF generates a large volume of condensate, which is recycled to the SRS H-Area Tank Farm. The recycle stream includes a small quantity of sludge solids, as well as soluble cesium that is volatilized during melter operation. The recycle waste is currently received into a large, underground waste tank that separates insoluble solids via decanting. The supernate is treated by an evaporator with a concentrate stream that is stored for future processing. The evaporator overheads are collected and sent to the Effluent Treatment Project (ETP) for final polishing and testing prior to discharge to local surface water. Recycle storage and treatment as described above complicates the overall mission within the tank farms, which are primarily engaged in waste retrieval and preparation activities that support sludge and salt disposition, as well as tank characterization and closure. The need to devote a portion of available storage space to recycle treatment limits operational flexibility, and ultimately the DWPF recycle stream must be diverted to fully close all the SRS waste tanks. An alternative treatment process is being explored to decouple the recycle stream from the tank farm. The proposed treatment process will accomplish solids separation via crossflow filtration and will utilize a wiped film evaporator to volume-reduce the filtrate stream. Evaporator overheads will continue to be further processed in ETP while the solids stream and evaporator concentrate stream will be returned for reprocessing with the DWPF and Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). This process will utilize existing facilities within DWPF and the tank farm that were previously dedicated to Interim Salt Disposition (ISD), but no longer have an identified mission with the startup of SWPF. The reuse of these facilities will remove several constraints from the current Liquid Waste (LW) System Plan without expanding the current footprint of Department of Energy Environmental Management (EM) infrastructure within LW. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyberattack Scenarios for the Rancor Microworld Simulator

The digitization of new generation nuclear power plants increases the risk of cyber-physical attacks. Hence, the collection of data from operators that respond to realistic cyberattacks can provide a paramount insight on the correlation of cyber evidence and physical alerts. The simplicity and configurability of the Rancor Microworld Simulator, enables the training of non-expert operators in a PWR environment, and the extensive and tailored collection of data. Therefore, we develop the necessary tools and infrastructure in Rancor that allow such attacks to take place. Additionally, we perform these attacks to examine the attention and situation awareness of operators during malicious infiltrations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Recent MCNP6 ® Code Developments and Improvements for Nuclear Engineering Applications [Slides]

The Los Alamos MCNP Monte Carlo radiation transport code has been the international gold standard for particle transport applications for over three decades. Many developments to the code have taken place with several significant new feature additions, major improvements, and enhancements to existing features. With significant institutional and programmatic investment in the code since the time of the last public release in 2018, important code development and infrastructure modernization has taken place and remains a high priority for all ongoing efforts across the code development team.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Validation Testing for Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment Equipment Removal and Disposal Techniques

The Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE) will be the first reactor featuring a fast-spectrum molten chloride circulating nuclear fuel system in the world. Planning for equipment removal and disposal (ERD) of MCRE has identified several technology gaps due to the unique environment of this nuclear experiment. Some of the gaps arise from the application of existing disassembly and/or sizing methods to novel material forms or in novel configurations. Others arise from unknown material behavior. This paper summarizes proposed test plans for ERD validation experiments to address these complicated or unknown equipment removal procedures. At the Waste Management Symposia in 2024, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) MCRE ERD team presented the challenges associated with hosting multiple nuclear experiments in series with only brief transition periods between systems. Such difficulties include higher dose rates, the presence of radioisotopes infrequently encountered in reactor decommissioning and radioactive waste management, lack of intrinsic remote-operations infrastructure in the test bed, space constraints in the test bed, and contamination minimization requirements. To address these challenges, remote or semi-remote technologies are planned to be implemented in a non-hot cell environment with limited space availability. The team also discussed how a systems engineering approach is being used for conceptual development and design of equipment removal systems to address these challenges. For example, to reduce constraints for the removal of more difficult components, non-activated, noncontaminated elements are planned to be taken out first where possible. Still, there are complexities associated with the remaining components. In this work, the operational framework for MCRE ERD was reviewed for technical gaps and open questions, and test plans were drafted to address these areas. The tests plans were written for the following categories: vision systems, pipe cutting, drill/grout/filler, flush salt, and miscellaneous, with the miscellaneous group consisting of tests like techniques for removing bearings and reflector bricks. The test plans explore material, infrastructure, and staffing requirements needed for test execution. The test plans additionally focus on the evaluation of success. Determining the outcome of a test is imperative - as these explorative actions have the potential to rearrange or re-scope planned ERD activities. Success criteria identified thus far include required tool output, required area(s), debris production and mitigation, and repeatability. Test plans are an essential aspect of the systems engineering approach to MCRE ERD. They are used as the beginning steps in defining use cases for the ERD system. Performance of the validation tests is expected to begin in the summer of 2025 and will take approximately 9 to 12 months to complete. Execution of these plans will be expedited by specifying test needs ahead of time, facilitating efficient interactions with any subcontractors tasked with running the requested tests. Evaluating the outcomes of these tests will inform MCRE ERD procedures and timing and will also identify additional technical constraints for the MCRE ERD System. This upfront process optimization effort will help the project save time and resources at the end of the experiment.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2024

A tri-level optimization model for interdependent infrastructure network resilience against compound hazard events

Resilient operation of interdependent infrastructures against compound hazard events is essential for maintaining societal well-being. To address consequence assessment challenges in this problem space, we propose a novel policy-guided tri-level optimization model applied to a proof-of-concept case study with fuel distribution and transportation networks – encompassing one realistic network; one fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as networks drawn from three synthetic distributions. Mathematically, our approach takes the form of a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model—a multi-agent tri-level optimization, comprised of a defender, attacker, and an operator acting in sequence. Here, in this study, our notional operator may choose proxy actions to operate an interdependent system comprised of fuel terminals and gas stations (functioning as supplies) and a transportation network with traffic flow (functioning as demand) to minimize unmet demand at gas stations. A notional attacker aims to hypothetically disrupt normal operations by reducing supply at the supply terminals, and the notional defender aims to identify best proxy defense policy options which include hardening supply terminals or allowing alternative distribution methods such as trucking reserve supplies. We solve our DAD formulation at a metropolitan scale and present practical defense policy insights against hypothetical compound hazards. We demonstrate the generalizability of our framework by presenting results for a realistic network; a fictitious, yet realistic network; as well as for three networks drawn from synthetic distributions. Additionally, we demonstrate the scalability of the framework by investigating runtime performance as a function of the network size. Steps for future research are also discussed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Energy Transition: Advanced Nuclear Needed but Address Climate Vulnerabilities Now

The term “Energy Transition” is an attempt to capture an elaborate set of activities related to the modernization and decarbonization of energy grids. Performed concurrently and often in an ad hoc manner across local, state, regional and national boundaries, it is bringing chaos to what should arguably be one of the most conservatively managed of all critical infrastructure sectors. What’s more, with climate change producing an increasing tempo of extreme events, confidence in the intended resilient and redundant structure of the electric grids is likely to ebb. Even without these climate induced stressors, the nation’s electric grid was built for an earlier century. In addition to a drive towards greater efficiency via digitization and a continuing price decline in distributed energy resources (DERs), one could argue that climate change concerns are the primary driver of the energy transition. Non-CO2 emitting generation sources like wind and solar have become an important part of the overall generation fleet, albeit ones that cannot be counted upon to provide dispatchable power. Current projections indicate deployment of even larger percentages of DERs in coming years. Until far better storage capabilities arrive, the variability of wind and solar, inconsistent performance of traditional thermal generation plants, and energy delivery failures associated with natural gas pipelines will reinforce mounting reliability concerns. This pertains to both electric transmission and distribution. The recent shuttering of nuclear power plants in Germany, Japan, the US and elsewhere are also putting more downward pressure on dispatchable generation. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has roiled energy markets worldwide and forced some countries to return to coal as a primary fuel. In view circumstances such as these, it is essential that significant changes be made to policies and planning criteria, and to the standards and code on which they are based. Given the accelerating pace of extreme weather events, this needs to occur as soon as possible.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear explosion monitoring network design considerations

Design of an efficient monitoring network requires information on the type and size of releases to be detected, the accuracy and reliability of the measuring equipment, and the desired network performance. This work provides a scientific basis for optimizing or minimizing networks of 133 Xe samplers to achieve a desired performance level for different levels of release. The approach of this work varies the density of sampling locations to find optimal location subsets, and to explore the properties of variations of those subsets – how crucial is a specific subset; are substitutions problematic? The choice of possible station locations is arbitrary but constrained to some extent by the location of islands, land masses, difficult topography (mountains, etc.) and the places where infrastructure exists to run and support a sampler. Performance is evaluated using hypothetical releases and atmospheric transport models that cover an entire year.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗