Integrated Cyber and Physical Anomaly Location and Classification in Power Distribution Systems
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Some extreme weather events, such as the hurricane, pass through an area sequentially and thus are called sequential extreme weather events (SEWEs). This paper proposes a data-based robust optimization (RO) model to enhance the resilience of the integrated electricity and gas system (IEGS) against SEWEs. Specifically, the SEWE strikes the IEGS sequentially. After each attack, the system state is adjusted immediately to minimize the maximized expected system cost caused by the SEWE. The attack-defense procedures are repeated alternatively during the SEWE. Preventive measures, hardening, are made in advance to reduce the impact of sequential attacks. The entire process is formulated as a multi-period RO model. Furthermore, it is proved that the most effective resilience enhancement strategies for this model are the same as those for a two-stage RO model, which can be solved by the nested column-and-constraint generation (C&CG) algorithm. In addition, the property of SEWEs, sequentially endangering limited regions of the IEGS, is incorporated to build a data-based uncertainty set and reduce its conservativeness. Simulation results on two IEGSs validate the effectiveness of the proposed model.
The Energy Efficient Transport (EET) Program began in 1976 as an element of the NASA Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE) Program. The EET Program and the results of various applications of advanced aerodynamics and active controls technology (ACT) as applicable to future subsonic transport aircraft are discussed. Advanced aerodynamics research areas included high aspect ratio supercritical wings, winglets, advanced high lift devices, natural laminar flow airfoils, hybrid laminar flow control, nacelle aerodynamic and inertial loads, propulsion/airframe integration (e.g., long duct nacelles) and wing and empennage surface coatings. In depth analytical/trade studies, numerous wind tunnel tests, and several flight tests were conducted. Improved computational methodology was also developed. The active control functions considered were maneuver load control, gust load alleviation, flutter mode control, angle of attack limiting, and pitch augmented stability. Current and advanced active control laws were synthesized and alternative control system architectures were developed and analyzed. Integrated application and fly by wire implementation of the active control functions were design requirements in one major subprogram. Additional EET research included interdisciplinary technology applications, integrated energy management, handling qualities investigations, reliability calculations, and economic evaluations related to fuel savings and cost of ownership of the selected improvements.
This paper presents a systems analysis approach to characterizing the risk of a Smart Grid to a load-drop attack. A characterization of the risk is necessary for the design of detection and remediation strategies to address the consequences of such attacks. Using concepts from systems health management and system engineering, this work (a) first identifies metrics that can be used to generate constraints for security features, and (b) lays out an end-to-end integrated methodology using separate network and power simulations to assess system risk. We demonstrate our approach by performing a systems-style analysis of a load-drop attack implemented over the AMI subsystem and targeted at destabilizing the underlying power grid.
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This project establishes a Cybersecurity Center for Offshore Wind Energy with the objective of designing and operating a cyber-physical testbed for wind energy farms (WEFs) that enables comprehensive cybersecurity research. The testbed incorporates a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system connected to turbine models via industrial-grade programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs). It supports side-channel data acquisition, implementation and analysis of various cyberattack scenarios, and development of attack detection, mitigation, and best-practice guidance tailored to wind energy systems. During the project, the team expanded the number and fidelity of mathematical turbine models (MTMs), integrated these models with SCADA infrastructure, and deployed a scaled physical turbine and associated sensors. High-resolution operational and side-channel data streams were collected and used to refine machine-learning (ML)-based attack detection systems and to extend the WindCRAFT framework to multi-turbine threat scenarios. The project demonstrated a realistic, scalable environment for evaluating cyber threats, validated attack detection approaches using enriched datasets, and identified new multi-turbine and inter-turbine communication attack vectors. The resulting testbed, models, and security mechanisms provide a foundation for ongoing R&D and deployment of cyber-resilient offshore wind energy systems.
As the solar energy sector continues to expand, its integration into the broader energy infrastructure presents both unprecedented opportunities and new risks. The increasing reliance on digital technologies and interconnected systems in solar energy creates an expanded attack surface for motivated cyber adversaries. Cyberattacks have the potential to cause disruptions in energy production, damage to equipment, financial losses, and compromises in national security. Therefore, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is paramount to protect the integrity, availability, confidentiality, and access control of solar energy systems. However, there are still key gaps and challenges to be addressed in industry and research, which stakeholders must race to address as they combat a growing number of real-world cyber incidents that affect solar energy systems and a growing number of vulnerabilities discovered and disclosed in key types of equipment. This roadmap explore the current state of solar PV cybersecurity and the gaps and challenges still to be addressed.
The following details the implementation of a real-time optical angle-of-attack capability under development at the NASA Ames Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT). Recent advancements in the integration of high bandwidth imaging systems at the Ames UPWT has laid the groundwork for the deployment of a calibrated, imaging based measurement capability. Some of the measurement goals of this data system include: an estimation of the orientation of a wind tunnel model to six degrees of freedom, measurements made at framerates high enough to time resolve model dynamics, triangulate corresponding points of interest from multiple camera views in three-dimensional space, acquire imagery with no impact to the productivity of the test matrix, provide results in real-time, and finally compute an estimation of the errors associated with the measurement. The following will outline the imaging hardware and data systems architecture, describe the data flow and image processing routines currently implemented, and explore example data and results from previous wind tunnel test entries.
The project addresses both fundamental and practical challenges of GFM/GFL inverter control for the power grids with high inverter based resources (IBRs) penetration. A data- driven modeling technique is applied to accurately model dynamics of PWM inverters, including electromagnetic-transient (EMT). Systematic and integrative designs of grid- forming (GFM) and grid-following (GFL) primary controls are developed to guarantee system performance under either normal or abnormal operating conditions without violating constraints. This modeling and control framework provides black-start capability in case of an outage without relying on rotating generators, and its secondary control is also shown to enhance resilience against cyber-physical attacks.
In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016 - both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The actual events of 2015 and 2016 were well-documented - the adversaries in these attacks gained access to a few power companies’ corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages.
In cybersecurity, the ability to efficiently analyze and respond to vulnerabilities, weaknesses, attack patterns, and threat tactics is critical for effective defense strategies. With the increasing complexity and volume of cybersecurity data, traditional methods of querying and retrieving information are often inadequate. To address this challenge, we implemented Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems—CyRAG and GraphCyRAG—that integrate large language models (LLMs) with both structured data from relational databases and knowledge graphs such as Neo4j. CyRAG is designed to handle structured data, focusing on CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) and CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) entities to generate accurate and context-rich responses. In contrast, GraphCyRAG leverages Neo4j knowledge graphs to retrieve interconnected information from CVE, CWE, CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification), and ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) datasets. By utilizing Neo4j’s graph-based framework, GraphCyRAG enables deeper traversal of relationships between vulnerabilities and attack patterns, providing cybersecurity analysts with more comprehensive insights into potential attack vectors and mitigation strategies. Our preliminary results demonstrate that integrating knowledge graphs with RAG significantly enhances both the accuracy and depth of threat analysis, allowing for the retrieval of dynamic, real-time data and the generation of contextually aware responses. This approach helps analysts uncover hidden relationships between cyber entities, predict exploit paths, and prioritize mitigation efforts effectively. The integration of RAG with cybersecurity knowledge graphs represents a significant advancement in cybersecurity threat intelligence, enabling more informed decision-making and stronger defense strategies.
Liquid radioactive waste has been stored in large, underground carbon steel tanks of 4.92-million-liter capacity at the United States Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina since the 1950s. The In-service inspection of the Savannah River Site High Level Waste tanks will be reviewed as well as Ultrasonic testing (UT) for detecting for general wall thinning, pitting and interface attack through accessible regions of the tanks. In-service inspection [1] of the Savannah River Site (SRS) High Level Waste (HLW) tanks is an essential element of a comprehensive structural integrity program. Inspection confirmed the effectiveness of chemistry and temperature controls used to preclude localized and general corrosion of the tanks. Ultrasonic testing is used to detect general wall thinning, pitting and interface attack, as well as vertically oriented cracks through inspection of a 21.59 cm (8.5-in.) wide strip extending over the accessible height of the primary tank wall.
Using network simulation to generate high fidelity networks is essential to test adversarial search problems, in addition to their benefits of privacy preservation and benchmarking purposes. Different generative models have been developed to generate single-channel, homogeneous networks that can model domains such as social networks, communication, and co-authorship. Modeling adversarial activity compounds the complexity of network simulation as it requires generating multi-channel networks simultaneously with correlated channel attributes at scale. We present a methodology along with scalable graph modeling and generation tools to produce realistic large-scale synthetic background activity graphs with embedded an adversarial activity. We present a concrete use case based on an attack scenario developed with the help of subject matter experts (SMEs). We discuss challenges in modeling integration across channels, scalability of the generative models, and integration across such models. We also discuss required aspects to simulate high fidelity multi-channel networks up-to an order of billion edges.
Understanding membrane degradation continues to be of significant importance when studying fuel cell durability. Fuel cell performance and durability depends heavily on the membrane's chemical and mechanical integrity. In Nafion® membranes, hydroxyl radicals are the primary cause of chemical membrane degradation as they attack the membrane's polymer structure. Radical formation can ensue via peroxide decomposition at the cathode or gases reacting on Pt particles within the membrane. Here, a previous research effort on membrane degradation as a function of ultra-low Pt loadings (≤ 0.1 mgPt cm -2 ) showed the degradation rate increases with Pt loading. This is most likely due to more heterogenous sites for radical formation. Manufacturing MEAs with ultra-low Pt loadings can yield thin, non-uniform catalyst layers. In this research effort we studied membrane degradation with ultra-low Pt loadings while varying catalyst layer thickness, I/C ratio, and types of carbon support.
Membrane chemical degradation is one of many factors that can impact fuel cell durability. Additionally, the fuel cell’s lifetime heavily depends on the membrane and its ability to maintain chemical and mechanical integrity. Previous studies indicate that chemical degradation is due to the formation of hydroxyl radicals that attack the polymer structure resulting in membrane thinning, pinhole formation, and the release of fluoride and sulfate ions. Membrane durability was investigated using ultra-low Pt electrode loadings (≤ 0.1 mg Pt cm -2 ). Accelerated stress testing (US-DOE protocols) demonstrated that the degradation rate was found to increase with higher Pt loadings. This is most likely due to more heterogeneous sites for radical formation due to hydrogen crossover to the cathode. We also explored membrane degradation rates while varying catalyst layer thickness, ionomer to carbon ratio, and types of carbon support. All of the aforementioned variables impact the membrane degradation rates.
Cybersecurity is a persistent concern to the safety and security of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), but has lacked data-driven, evidence-based research. Rigorous cybersecurity analysis is critical for the licensing of advanced reactors using a performance-based approach. One tool that enables cybersecurity analysis is modeling and simulation. The nuclear industry makes extensive use of modeling and simulation throughout the decision process but lacks a method to incorporate cybersecurity analysis with existing models. To meet this need, the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) was developed. ARCADE is a suite of publicly available tools that can be used to develop emulations of industrial control system devices and networks and integrate those emulations with physics simulators. This integration of cyber emulations and physics models enables rigorous cyber-physical analysis of cyber-attacks on NPP systems. This report provides an overview of key considerations for using ARCADE with existing physics models and demonstrates ARCADE’s capabilities for cybersecurity analysis. Using a model of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR), ARCADE was able to determine the sensitivity of the primary heat exchangers (PHX) to coordinated cyber-attacks. The analysis determined that while the PHX’s failures cause disruption to the reactor, they did not cause any safety limits to be exceeded because of the plant design, including passive safety features. Further development of ARCADE will enable rigorous, repeatable, and automated cyber-physical analysis of advanced reactor control systems. These efforts will also help reduce regulatory uncertainty by presenting similar types of cybersecurity analyses in a common format, driving standard approaches and reporting.
The tumbling motion of vehicles entering planetary atmospheres is analyzed. A differential equation governing the tumbling motion, its arrest, and the subsequent oscillatory motion is obtained and identified as the equation for the fifth Painleve transcendant. An approximate analytical solution for the transcendant is derived. Comparisons with results obtained from numerical integration of the exact equations of motion indicate that the solution for the angle-of-attack history is sufficiently accurate to be of practical use.