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At least 289 records · Page 16

A Moving Target Defense Control Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems

This paper considers the problem of efficiently and securely controlling cyber-physical systems that are operating in uncertain, and adversarial environments. To mitigate sensor, actuator attacks, and performance loss due to such attacks, we formulate a secure control algorithm that consists of a proactive and a reactive defense mechanism. The proactive mechanism, which is based on the principles of moving target defense, utilizes a stochastic switching structure to dynamically and continuously alter the parameters of the system, while hindering the attacker's ability to conduct successful reconnaissance to the system. The unpredictability of the current actuator and sensor is optimized using an information entropy measure, which is induced by probabilistic switching. The reactive mechanism on the other side, detects potentially attacked components, namely sensors and actuators, by leveraging online data to compute an integral Bellman error. A rigorous mathematical framework is presented to guarantee the stability of the equilibrium point of the closed-loop system, and provide a quantified bound on the performance loss when utilizing both reactive and proactive mechanisms. Simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed approaches on a benchmark aircraft model.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Evaluating software defined networking solutions to reduce the digital attack surface of nuclear security systems

Most nuclear security systems used today were not designed for today’s threat environment. Systems that were intended to be stand alone are now interconnected. Devices that have a single purpose are built on multi-purpose platforms and communication protocols that, while effective, have no ability to authenticate authorized versus unauthorized commands. These attributes provide an attacker significant ability to affect the system, pivot throughout the interconnected networks, and remain undetected if he/she is able to compromise a single node. Software defined networking (SDN) has been used for years by information technology (IT) cloud service providers to quickly provision or remove servers or other systems to meet changing demand. The same concept has recently been applied to operational technology (OT) systems to enable very fast failover on critical systems that have stringent and deterministic (<5ms) transmit/receive times. By carefully engineering the communication flows through a network using preplanned routes and specific pathways it is possible to achieve deterministic and extremely reliable message delivery even when components fail. This engineering approach to network design has added security benefits including securing the networking control plane, eliminating network scanning and mapping, inhibiting ARP spoofing and host masquerading, eliminating unauthorized network pivoting and enabling greater situational awareness on the network. SDN in OT environments is new but early testing in electrical power and other critical infrastructure has shown it to be a very powerful tool for building reliable networks and reducing the digital attack surface of the network. The authors tested a software defined network switch on a simple physical protection system with components commonly found in nuclear security systems and found improved mitigations to denial of service attacks, lateral movement and network reconnaissance. The paper details the tests and their results.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, software defined↗

Warming Permafrost Model Intercomparision Project (WrPMIP): Pan-Arctic Perturbation Warming Simulations

Title: Warming Permafrost Model Intercomparision Project (WrPMIP): Pan-Arctic Perturbation Warming Simulations Description: WrPMIP Pan-Arctic simulations including historial baseline and two warming simulations. Models were perturbed similarly to known experimental warming trials that have been implemented across the Pan-Arctic over the last several decades. More information about the dataset can be found at the following links: https://warmingpermafrost.nau.edu/ The dataset is available at: https://esgf-node.ornl.gov/search/project=WrPMIP&mip_era=CMIP6&activity_id=WrPMIP

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Obstacles to Practical Digital Supply Chain Risk Management in the Energy Sector

Cyber supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) programs must consider operations that depend on the lifecycles of digital components such as hardware, firmware, software, and services. We integrate academic literature, historical incidents, and existing standards to identify obstacles faced by C-SCRM programs.

Business Process Management & Integration↗

Memory forensic analysis of a programmable logic controller in industrial control systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are used to automate physical processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations, and are often subject to cyber attacks. As in conventional IT domain, the memory analysis of the PLCs can help answer important forensic questions about the attack, such as the presence of malicious firmware, injection of modified control logic (the program running on the PLC), and manipulation of I/O devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). Unlike conventional IT domain, PLCs have heterogeneous hardware architecture, proprietary firmware and control software, making it challenging to employ a unified framework for their memory forensics. For merely extracting artifacts of forensic importance, reverse-engineering the firmware is a tedious task, and the effort needs to be repeated for every PLC model. As a community, a step-wise approach to tackle this challenge is to analyze the memory of specific PLCs, and subsequently find a generic framework applicable to all PLCs. Our work is a step forward in this direction. By following a methodology that focuses on the functional layer of PLCs instead of reverse engineering the firmware, we analyze the digital forensic artifacts available in a common PLC, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61. Before diving into the memory dump, we analyze the PLC control software to create a list of important artifacts that are sure to exist in the PLC memory dump. The approach employs a setup where PLC control software RSLogix-5000 is connected to the PLC, and the memory dump can be obtained as and when needed. We create test cases that sequentially highlight each category of artifacts, followed by an examination of the resultant impact on memory. After attaining the listed artifacts, we employ conventional string and known data searches to extract interesting information present in this PLC's memory. The memory analysis profile, presented as a Python library and shared with the community, can help a forensic investigator to readily extract forensic artifacts from the same model's controller. The adopted approach may help researchers in creating memory profile of other PLCs, and ultimately formulating a generic PLC memory analysis framework.

Rais, Muhammad Haris↗

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and Insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

The Stuxnet attack at the Natanz facility is an example of a targeted and successful cyber attack on a nuclear facility. Snowden's release of National Security Agency documents demonstrated the consequences of the insider threat. More recently, the United States tried to attack North Korea but failed, South Korea was attempting to attack North Korea, and both applied Stuxnet-like approaches. These sophisticated targeted attacks differ from web-site hacking events that are reported almost daily in the news mainly because targeted attacks require detailed design and operation information of the systems attacked and/or are often carried out by insiders. For instance, in order to minimize disruption of facilities around the world, Stuxnet remained idle until it recognized the specific configuration of the Natanz facility, demonstrating that the attackers possessed extremely detailed information about the facility. Such targeted cyber attacks could become a national-level military weapon and be used in coercion of hostile countries. While U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) are well designed and protected and not easily attacked through internet hacking, there have been a few digital-system-related incidents. For example, in 2003, the Slammer worm breached the private network of the Davis Besse plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for almost five hours. The breach did not pose a safety hazard because the plant was offline, but it demonstrates the vulnerability of NPP systems. The worm did not enter the plant systems directly; it began by entering the systems of a Davis Besse contractor, and entered through the T1 line bridging the contractor's computer and Davis Besse's corporate networks. The T1 line was not protected by the plant's firewall. The success of the Stuxnet-Natanz case demonstrates that supply-chain level attack (i.e., physically tampering with digital systems to install undetectable malware for the purpose of bringing harm to a player further down the supply chain network) plays a crucial role in a successful attack. Although attacking an NPP naturally requires more complex strategies and tactics than internet hacking, NPP's have a variety of sophisticated and possibly sensitive systems that may be attacked. Previous studies, for example, Baylon, have identified and confirmed that such attack strategies and tactics can be designed and could produce severe damage to an NPP. Current NPPs were designed according to design basis accidents that predate use of the internet by the general public and did not take into consideration potential cyber attacks that could be carried out by state-sponsored attackers and malicious insiders. To date, no detailed engineering analysis has been performed to realistically examine the consequences these attacks may have on the plants. In this paper, we discuss an approach for assessing the potential consequences of Stuxnet type of attacks. We will examine the engineering criteria used in designing the plants, develop possible attack scenarios in terms of the structures, components, and systems (SSCs) being controlled by digital systems at the NPPs, perform engineering analysis to determine if the attacks would impose conditions that are beyond design bases, and categorize the consequences of the potential accidents. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA’s Secured Airspace for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) architecture is leveraged from the Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) concept of operations. Within the UAM environment, UAM operators work collaboratively to manage aerial vehicles in the urban environment. Providers of Services for UAM (PSU), UAM operators, and Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) provide services to support flight operations within that environment. As a recognized need, various views of UAM flight information are provided to the public and public safety entities. To accomplish this, among other goals, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can coordinate flight information between the FAA controlled National Airspace System (NAS) and the UAM environments through the FAA-Industry Data Exchange Protocol (FIDXP). This concept of UAM proposes to develop short-range, point-to-point transportation systems in metropolitan areas using vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) or short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft to overcome increasing surface congestion. To garner the support of UAM and to realize its potential, an assurance of cybersecurity is critical for public acceptance. Understanding the various components communicating with one-another cybersecurity, like in other industries, has come to the forefront highlighting the need to protect these networks and systems from cyberattacks. With the planned growth and reach of UAM systems, it’s clear that the associated data exchange and service interactions will be at risk due to numerous types of cybersecurity attacks. Consequently, as these threats evolve, the UAM cybersecurity capabilities must adapt to these changes as well. While learning is always the goal, the overall intent of this workshop is to make recommendations on the following: (1) how future UAM environments can be protected against cyber-attacks, and (2) what mechanisms should be put in place to detect attacks against UAM environments.

UAM↗

Energy Efficiency and Infrastructure Upgrades on Nuclear Clean-up Sites: The Hanford Experience - 18641

The Hanford site, located in southeastern Washington, produced much of our nation's weapons-grade plutonium for the Defense nuclear weapons program. This production lasted the better part of four decades with production ending in 1987. Since 1987, the focus of the Hanford site has turned to clean-up activities. Mission Support Alliance (MSA) is the integrator of the multi-contractor effort to clean up the Hanford site. MSA collaborates with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and all Hanford site contractors in finding and implementing new, cost-saving, safe and practical solutions to cleanup challenges with a continual focus on innovative processes and technologies that reduce costs, energy use and bring safety improvements to the site. Support Services include environmental integration and land management; fleet and road maintenance; water/electric and utilities; cyber security and information management as well as the preservation of the site's cultural artifacts. This paper describes the process, challenges, and focus on infrastructure upgrade and energy efficiency projects in the context of a multi-contractor nuclear clean-up site. Project development and new technology deployment at Hanford has long been plagued with economic challenges. For example, despite extensive auditing, analysis, and project development, most of the energy-related projects on the Hanford site have gone unfunded due to the low cost of electricity, the relatively high cost of labor, and costs associated with detailed safety and cultural reviews. - The Hanford site is a direct-service customer of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and has a marginal electricity rate of $0.033/kWh. - Labor costs on the Hanford site track high because of the requirements associated with the safety and security necessary to operate a legacy nuclear weapons complex. - In partnership with three federally recognized and other affected Native American tribes (Yakama Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Nez Perce Tribe, and Wanapum People), most activities on the Hanford site are afforded in-depth cultural reviews. To work within these constraints, the MSA Energy Management team has embarked on a three-pronged approach to energy project development: Program Visibility: The MSA Energy Management team has promoted both project opportunities and requirements across the Hanford site. This information comes in the form of site-wide newsletters, group meetings, e-mails, success stories, and recognition of staff. Single-point Analysis: To by-pass the inevitable duplications of effort, learning curve issues, and to improve project consistency/delivery, the MSA Energy Management team serves as the single resource to the site for energy project analysis. This resource includes initial assessment, engineering analysis, efficiency calculation and project recommendations. Contractor/utility Interface: In addition to the infrastructure under its own purview, MSA provides all support services for the contractor/utility interface. These activities include formulation and submission of incentive-based efficiency projects, project tracking, and incentive awards. All incentive awards are forwarded to the relevant contractor and then highlighted in the visibility campaign. Successful energy efficiency projects at Hanford have included high efficiency heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) systems, interior and exterior lighting/lighting control systems, pump and motor systems, and the right-sizing of transformers and area-wide electrical distribution systems. Prior to the initiation of this program and structure (roughly 3 years ago) the average annual energy efficiency incentive applied for and received was under $10,000, with an annual energy savings of approximately 36,000 kilowatt hours (kWh). In fiscal year 2017, the annual incentive received was over $419,000, with identified energy savings of over 1.3 million kWh. Details and case studies of the major project accomplishments are included. The success of this program can be traced to an understanding of the constraints, the development of a program to address these constraints, and good communication/coordination across DOE and the multiple contractors serving the Hanford site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Secure Software Defined Radio Project: Secure Wireless Systems for the Energy Sector (Briefing 6)

Strong industry interest in the SEL-FLT/FLR products has led to a large number of customers conducting various lab and field trial evaluations of the system. These trials are on-going but have allowed SEL to collect enough information about operation and deployment and security capabilities of the system to conclude the field demo phase of the project. The field-testing topical report has been completed and submitted. SEL has also prepared a SEL-FLT/FLR best practices guide based on learnings from the field demo phase of the project. This best practice guide has also been submitted. The final deliverable from this phase of the project is an economic and operational benefits white paper, which has also been written and submitted. The overall objective of the project, extending the cyber security capabilities of utility wired networks into last mile wireless networks has been successfully achieved. SEL chose to target a sensor network for implementation of this capability because it was one area of last mile networking where there was substantial need and opportunity. Based on customer interest in the product these efforts have been a success. Interest in, and support for many of the security features of the product has been expressed by customers trialing the product system. Key security features customers value are strong data encryption, sensor white listing, and use of secure account based log on for access to the system. These and other features of the product have gained strong acceptance from customers interested in purchasing these products. All project deliverables and tasks are now complete, and the project can be closed out.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Basic Research Needs for Microelectronics: Report of the Office of Science Workshop on Basic Research Needs for Microelectronics, October 23 – 25, 2018

Moore’s Law — realized via a combination of device physics advances, technology investments, and economic returns— allowed the number of transistors on a chip to double roughly every two years for over five decades. During those five decades, the cost of a unit of computing dropped by eight orders of magnitude. Those declines and the associated computing advances have dramatically affected every aspect of society, from science and technology through business and health to national security. Today, further computing advances are limited by the economics of chip fabrication and the physical limits on transistors, electrical interconnects, and memory elements at the nanoscale. If we are to evolve new generations of computing systems over the next decades that are both faster and more energy efficient, a complete reorganization of the science and technology underlying computing is needed. Within the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) mission, which includes a pivotal and historical role in the evolution of computing, the needs are critical as well. Advanced computing and simulation underpin all aspects of DOE missions in energy, the environment, and national security, requiring energy-efficient computing beyond the exascale range. Edge computing, low-power computing technologies, and computers optimized for artificial intelligence are key to next-generation scientific facilities for high-energy physics research, as well as neutron and x-ray facilities. Finally, microelectronics will also play a major role in reshaping the U.S. electricity grid: from its current state to one that is cleaner, more efficient, cyber-secure, and resilient to widespread events, both natural and manmade. Realizing this vision will require advancements in both system architecture and power electronics. To enable continued advances in computing technologies, a fundamental rethinking is needed of the science behind the materials, synthesis and placement technologies, architectures, and algorithms. This cannot be modular and linear, as it has been in the past. Rather, these advances must be developed collectively, in a spirit of co-design, where each scientific discipline informs and engages the other to achieve orders of magnitude improvements in system-level performance. To explore these challenges, the Office of Science convened a Basic Research Needs Workshop for Microelectronics in October 2018 and charged workshop participants to conduct a thorough assessment of the scientific issues associated with advanced microelectronics technologies for applications relevant to the DOE mission. The workshop examined research relevant to the extension of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) and beyond CMOS technologies; however, topics of direct relevance to quantum information science and quantum computing were outside the scope of this workshop.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity Assessments on Emulated DER Communication Networks

An increasing number of public utility commissions are adopting Distributed Energy Resource (DER) interconnection standards which require photovoltaic (PV) inverters, energy storage systems, and other DER to include interoperable grid-support functionality. The recently updated national standard, IEEE 1547-2018, requires all DER to include a Sun Spec Modbus, IEEE 2030.5, or IEEE 1815 communication interface in order to provide local and bulk power system services. Those communication protocols and associated information models will ensure system interoperability for PV and storage systems, but these new utility-to-DER communication networks must be deployed with sufficient cybersecurity to protect the U.S. power system and other critical infrastructure reliant on dependable power. Unlike bulk generators, DER are commonly connected to grid operators via public internet channels. These DER networks are exposed to a large attack surface that may leverage sophisticated techniques and infrastructure developed on IT systems, including remote exploits and distributed attacks. Although DER make up a growing portion of the national generation mix, they have limited processing capabilities and do not typically support modern security features such as encryption or authentication. In this work, Sandia National Laboratories constructed simulated DER communication net- works with a range of security features in order to study the security posture of different communication approaches. The experimental test environment was created in a Sandia-developed co-simulation platform, called SCEPTRE, which emulated Sun Spec-compliant DER equipment, the utility DER management system, communication network, and distribution power system. Adversary-based assessments were conducted and a quantitative scoring criteria was applied to evaluate the resilience of various architectures against cyber attacks and to measure the systemic impact during such attacks. The team found that network segmentation, encryption, and moving target defense improved the security of these networks and would be recommended for utility, aggregator, and local DER networks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Dynamic Non-Hierarchical File Systems for Exascale Storage

This constitutes the final report for “Dynamic Non-Hierarchical File Systems for Exascale Storage”. The ultimate goal of this project was to improve data management in scientific computing and high-end computing (HEC) applications, and to achieve this goal we proposed: to develop the first, HEC-targeted, file system featuring rich metadata and provenance collection, extreme scalability, and future storage hardware integration as core design goals, and to evaluate and develop a flexible non-hierarchical file system interface suitable for providing more powerful and intuitive data management interfaces to HEC and scientific computing users. Data management is swiftly becoming a serious problem in the scientific community – while copious amounts of data are good for obtaining results, finding the right data is often daunting and sometimes impossible. Scientists participating in a Department of Energy workshop noted that most of their time was spent “...finding, processing, organizing, and moving data and it’s going to get much worse”. Scientists should not be forced to become data mining experts in order to retrieve the data they want, nor should they be expected to remember the naming convention they used several years ago for a set of experiments they now wish to revisit. Ideally, locating the data you need would be as easy as browsing the web. Unfortunately, existing data management approaches are usually based on hierarchical naming, a 40 year-old technology designed to manage thousands of files, not exabytes of data. Today’s systems do not take advantage of the rich array of metadata that current high-end computing (HEC) file systems can gather, including content-based metadata and provenance1 information. As a result, current metadata search approaches are typically ad hoc and often work by providing a parallel management system to the “main” file system, as is done in Linux (the locate utility), personal computers, and enterprise search appliances. These search applications are often optimized for a single file system, making it difficult to move files and their metadata between file systems. Users have tried to solve this problem in several ways, including the use of separate databases to index file properties, the encoding of file properties into file names, and separately gathering and managing provenance data, but none of these approaches has worked well, either due to limited usefulness or scalability, or both. Our research addressed several key issues: High-performance, real-time metadata harvesting: extracting important attributes from files dynamically and immediately updating indexes used to improve search; Transparent, automatic, and secure provenance capture: recording the data inputs and processing steps used in the production of each file in the system; Scalable indexing: indexes that are optimized for integration with the file system; Dynamic file system structure: our approach provides dynamic directories similar to those in semantic file systems, but these are the native organization rather than a feature grafted onto a conventional system. In addition to these goals, our research effort will include evaluating the impact of new storage technologies on the file system design and performance. In particular, the indexing and metadata harvesting functions can potentially benefit from the performance improvements promised by new storage class memories.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Exascale Virtualized and Programmable Distributed Cyber Resource Control: Final Scientific Technical Report

Extreme-science drives the need for distributed exascale processing and communications that are carefully, yet flexibly, managed. Exponential growth of data for scientific simulations, experimental data, collaborative data analyses, remote visualization and GRID computing requirements of scientists in fields as diverse as high energy physics, climate change, genomics, fusion, synchrotron radiation, material science, medicine, and other scientific disciplines cannot be accommodated by simply applying existing transport protocols to faster pipes. Further, scientific challenges today demand diverse research teams, heightening the need for and increasing the complexity of collaboration. To address these issues within the network layer and physical layer, we have performed a number of research activities surrounding effective allocation and management of elastic optical network (EON) resources, particularly focusing on FlexGrid transponders. FlexGrid transponders support the opportunity to build Layer-1 connections at a wide range of bandwidths and to reconfigure them rapidly. The new flexibility supports complex new ways of using the physical layer that must be carefully managed and hidden from the scientist end-users. FlexGrid networks utilize flexible (or elastic) spectral bandwidths for each data link without using fixed wavelength grids. The flexibility in spectrum allocation brings many appealing features to network operations. Current networks are designed for the worst case impairments in transmission performance and the assigned spectrum is over-provisioned. In contrast, the FlexGrid networks can operate with the highest spectral efficiency and minimum bandwidth for the given traffic demand while meeting the minimum quality of transmission (QoT) requirement. Two primary focuses of our research are: (1) resource and spectrum allocation (RSA) for IP traffic over EONs, and (2) RSA for cross-domain optical networks. Previous work concentrates primarily on large file transfers within a single domain. Adding support for IP traffic changes the nature of the RSA problem: instead of choosing to accept or deny each request for network support, IP traffic is inherently elastic and thus lends itself to a bandwidth maximization formulation. We developed a number of algorithms that could be easily deployed within existing and new FlexGrid networks, leading to networks that better support scientific collaboration. Cross-domain RSA research is essential to support large-scale FlexGrid networks, since configuration information is generally not shared or coordinated across domains. The results presented here are in their early stages. They are technically feasible and practical, but still require coordination among organizations and equipment owners and a higher-layer framework for managing network requests.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Global Spectra-Trait Initiative: A database of paired leaf spectroscopy and functional traits associated with leaf photosynthetic capacity (v1.0.0)

The Global Spectra-Trait Initiative (GSTI) aims to generate generalizable spectra trait models using reflectance data to predict leaf traits associated with the photosynthesis capacity of leaves. It comprises a synthesized dataset of leaf trait data, input datasets and code. Leaf traits include the maximum carboxylation rate of rubisco (Vcmax), the maximum electron transport rate (Jmax), the dark respiration, as well as the prediction of leaf nitrogen, leaf mass per area (LMA), and leaf water content (LWC). The dataset comprises >7500 paired observations from around 400 species from a broad range of biomes. This dataset comprises a zip file of the GSTI GitHub repository (https://github.com/plantphys/gsti), the synthesized database (.csv) and database metadata files. This dataset was updated on 2025-12-12 with minor edits to mirror the accepted manuscript version and GitHub release (Version 1.0.0 (ESSD accepted version)). Edits included minor changes to the project documentation on GitHub and removal of 12 duplicate entries from the database.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Cybersecurity for Distance Relay Protection

This project is a DOE follow-up effort on the CREDC workshop held on September 13, 2018 in Cambridge, MA to discuss cybersecurity of distance relays, which considered the benefits, vulnerabilities and risk mitigations for the use of communication systems in power system protection. The objectives of this project are to define the taxonomy of relay protection and associated communications; define use cases describing approaches to reduce the cyber-attack surface on those protective relays; and evaluate the loss of operational functional capability from changes to communication coverage. Mitigating controls will also be evaluated to understand if there are other approaches to reduce attack surfaces while maintaining communications or partial communications. Distance relays are used to protect transmission lines of approximately 10 to 300 miles in length, by detecting short circuits (i.e., faults) on the lines and then tripping circuit breakers in the substation. Such protection systems are a subset of the power system and they incorporate sensing, logic and communication functions. Protection system exposure to cyberattack could be drastically limited by disconnecting relays from all vulnerable communication systems, but this may adversely impact overall power system performance in the absence of cyberattack. This project began with a use case analysis of protection systems with communications, as summarized in this report. It continued with modeling, testing and evaluation in a miniature power system (MPS), located in the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Electric Power Training Center (EPTC). The project also incorporated feedback from two industry meetings held in February and September 2019. The suggested next steps account for and complement the work already underway with DOE/CESER funding: 1. Study the performance of LCD and PC vs. PUTT, which is less reliant on communication system performance and GPS timing references. The PUTT scheme could prove to be more resilient to cyberattack or communications-related disruption. It could also be more tolerant of message re-routing with SDN/SDR communication systems. On the other hand, it will be more vulnerable to false tripping during dynamic events or to loss of the voltage signal. The optimum choice of scheme may depend on the specific power system and risk assessment. This study could provide a new template for evaluation based on business functions. 2. Research and develop new methods to detect and monitor distributed physical attacks, possibly using drones, video sensors, thermal sensors, machine learning and other advanced techniques. This will help mitigate the impact of cyberattack on the protection system, and will also help mitigate the impact of wild fires. 3. Implement a scalable PKI for use in electric utility protection systems. This will encourage widespread adoption of secure authentication methods that are already available, but not widely used at present. This will help secure engineering access to the relays. 4. Investigate the use of SDN in combination with SDR to achieve better cybersecurity and electromagnetic security of the network, incorporating path variability. This would help secure both engineering access and peer-to-peer GOOSE messaging. 5. Perform additional testing, with operator evaluation of “red button” scenarios, PUTT vs. LCD, relay mis-operations, and other cyberattacks in the EPTC. This is an important advantage of testing in the EPTC rather than by computer simulation or even hardware-in-the-loop simulation; the EPTC is already dedicated to managing the situational awareness, operator response times and other human impacts. One of the project objectives was to settle on a common nomenclature for this problem space. We have concluded that the OSI layer model, supplemented by ANSI device numbers and other IEEE standards, is already well-accepted by the industry. The IEEE PSRC knowledge base provides a great deal of public information

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