Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “corrective actions”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Investigation of International Space Station Major Constituent Analyzer Anomalous ORU 02 Performance

The Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) is a mass spectrometer-based instrument designed to provide critical monitoring of six major atmospheric constituents; nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, methane, and water vapor on-board the International Space Station. It is an integral part of the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). The MCA system is comprised of seven orbit-replaceable units (ORUs) that provide flexibility in maintaining the MCA. Of these, ORU 02, the analyzer assembly requires replacement every 1 to 2 years due to the consumption of limited life components including the ion pump and ion source filaments. Typically, ORU 02s that reach end of life are swapped out of the MCA on orbit and replaced with the on-orbit spare. The replaced ORU 02 is then cycled through the OEM for refurbishment and returned to service. Recently, two refurbished ORU 02s, serial numbers F0001 and F0003, failed on orbit shortly after being installed into the MCA. Both ORU 02s were returned to ground for TT&E and a failure investigation. The failure signatures were reproduced on the ground and the investigation determined that both ORU 02 failures involve either the ion source or the ion source control electronics. This paper discusses the results of the failure investigation, the steps required to refurbish the ORU 02s, and the corrective actions that are being incorporated into the build and refurbishment process to preclude the reoccurrence of these failures in the future.

Gardner, Ben D.↗
NASA NTRS2012

A Systems Modeling Approach for Risk Management of Command File Errors

The main cause of commanding errors is often (but not always) due to procedures. Either lack of maturity in the processes, incompleteness of requirements or lack of compliance to these procedures. Other causes of commanding errors include lack of understanding of system states, inadequate communication, and making hasty changes in standard procedures in response to an unexpected event. In general, it's important to look at the big picture prior to making corrective actions. In the case of errors traced back to procedures, considering the reliability of the process as a metric during its' design may help to reduce risk. This metric is obtained by using data from Nuclear Industry regarding human reliability. A structured method for the collection of anomaly data will help the operator think systematically about the anomaly and facilitate risk management. Formal models can be used for risk based design and risk management. A generic set of models can be customized for a broad range of missions.

probabilistic risk↗
NASA NTRS2013

Earned Value Management (EVM) Implementation Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide Earned Value Management (EVM) guidance for the effective application, implementation, and utilization of EVM on NASA programs, projects, major contracts and subcontracts in a consolidated reference document. EVM is a project management process that effectively integrates a project s scope of work with schedule and cost elements for optimum project planning and control. The goal is to achieve timely and accurate quantification of progress that will facilitate management by exception and enable early visibility into the nature and the magnitude of technical problems as well as the intended course and success of corrective actions.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Investigation of International Space Station Major Constituent Analyzer Anomalous ORU 02 Performance

The Major Constituent Analyzer (MCA) is a mass spectrometer based system that measures the major atmospheric constituents on the International Space Station. In 2011, two MCA ORU 02 analyzer assemblies experienced premature on-orbit failures. These failures were determined to be the result of off-nominal ion source filament performance. Recent product improvements to ORU 02 designed to improve the lifetime of the ion pump also constrained the allowable tuning criteria for the ion source filaments. This presentation describes the filament failures as well as the corrective actions implemented to preclude such failures in the future.

Gardner, Ben D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) Lubrication Interval Test and Evaluation (LITE). Post-Test Grease Analysis

The Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) is a mechanism of the International Space Station (ISS) that orients the solar power generating arrays toward the sun as the ISS orbits our planet. The orientation with the sun must be maintained to fully charge the ISS batteries and maintain all the other ISS electrical systems operating properly. In 2007, just a few months after full deployment, the starboard SARJ developed anomalies that warranted a full investigation including ISS Extravehicular Activity (EVA). The EVA uncovered unexpected debris that was due to degradation of a nitride layer on the SARJ bearing race. ISS personnel identified the failure root-cause and applied an aerospace grease to lubricate the area associated with the anomaly. The corrective action allowed the starboard SARJ to continue operating within the specified engineering parameters. The SARJ LITE (Lubrication Interval Test and Evaluation) program was initiated by NASA, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing to simulate the operation of the ISS SARJ for an extended time. The hardware was designed to test and evaluate the exact material components used aboard the ISS SARJ, but in a controlled area where engineers could continuously monitor the performance. After running the SARJ LITE test for an equivalent of 36+ years of continuous use, the test was opened to evaluate the metallography and lubrication. We have sampled the SARJ LITE rollers and plate to fully assess the grease used for lubrication. Chemical and thermal analysis of these samples has generated information that has allowed us to assess the location, migration, and current condition of the grease. The collective information will be key toward understanding and circumventing any performance deviations involving the ISS SARJ in the years to come.

Golden, Johnny L.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Toward Baseline Software Anomalies in NASA Missions

In this fast abstract, we provide preliminary findings an analysis of 14,500 spacecraft anomalies from unmanned NASA missions. We provide some baselines for the distributions of software vs. non-software anomalies in spaceflight systems, the risk ratings of software anomalies, and the corrective actions associated with software anomalies.

anonaly↗
NASA NTRS2016

Mobile Launch Platform Vehicle Assembly Area (SWMU 056) Biosparge Expansion Interim Measures Work Plan

This document presents the design details for an Interim Measure (IM) Work Plan (IMWP) for the Mobile Launch Platform/Vehicle Assembly Building (MLPV) Area, located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. The MLPV Area has been designated Solid Waste Management Unit Number 056 (SWMU 056) under KSC's Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Corrective Action Program. This report was prepared by Geosyntec Consultants (Geosyntec) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under contract number NNK09CA02B and NNK12CA13B, project control number ENV1642. The Advanced Data Package (ADP) presentation covering the elements of this IMWP report received KSC Remediation Team (KSCRT) approval at the December 2015 Team Meeting; the meeting minutes are included in Appendix A.

IMWP↗
NASA NTRS2015

Building M7-0505 Treatment Tank (SWMU 039) Annual Performance Monitoring Report

This Annual Performance Monitoring Report presents a summary of Interim Measure (IM) activities and an evaluation of data collected during the third year (June 2014 to September 2015) of operation, maintenance, and monitoring (OM&M) conducted at the Building M7-505 (M505) Treatment Tank area, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida ("the Site"). Under KSC's Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Program, the M505 Treatment Tank area was designated Solid Waste Management Unit 039. Arcadis U.S., Inc. (Arcadis) began IM activities on January 10, 2012, after completion of construction of an in situ air sparge (IAS) system to remediate volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in groundwater at concentrations exceeding applicable Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) Chapter 62-777, Florida Administrative Code, Natural Attenuation Default Concentrations (NADCs). This report presents a summary of the third year of OM&M activities conducted between June 2014 and September 2015.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

The SMART-NAS Testbed

The SMART-NAS Testbed for Safe Trajectory Based Operations Project will deliver an evaluation capability, critical to the ATM community, allowing full NextGen and beyond-NextGen concepts to be assessed and developed. To meet this objective a strong focus will be placed on concept integration and validation to enable a gate-to-gate trajectory-based system capability that satisfies a full vision for NextGen. The SMART-NAS for Safe TBO Project consists of six sub-projects. Three of the sub-projects are focused on exploring and developing technologies, concepts and models for evolving and transforming air traffic management operations in the ATM+2 time horizon, while the remaining three sub-projects are focused on developing the tools and capabilities needed for testing these advanced concepts. Function Allocation, Networked Air Traffic Management and Trajectory Based Operations are developing concepts and models. SMART-NAS Test-bed, System Assurance Technologies and Real-time Safety Modeling are developing the tools and capabilities to test these concepts. Simulation and modeling capabilities will include the ability to assess multiple operational scenarios of the national airspace system, accept data feeds, allowing shadowing of actual operations in either real-time, fast-time and/or hybrid modes of operations in distributed environments, and enable integrated examinations of concepts, algorithms, technologies, and NAS architectures. An important focus within this project is to enable the development of a real-time, system-wide safety assurance system. The basis of such a system is a continuum of information acquisition, analysis, and assessment that enables awareness and corrective action to detect and mitigate potential threats to continuous system-wide safety at all levels. This process, which currently can only be done post operations, will be driven towards "real-time" assessments in the 2035 time frame.

Trajectory Based Operations↗
NASA NTRS2018

Earned Value Management (EVM) Implementation Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide Earned Value Management (EVM) guidance for the effective application, implementation, and utilization of EVM on NASA programs, projects, major contracts and subcontracts in a consolidated reference document. EVM is a project management process that effectively integrates a project?s scope of work with schedule and cost elements for optimum project planning and control. The goal is to achieve timely and accurate quantification of progress that will facilitate management by exception and enable early visibility into the nature and the magnitude of technical problems as well as the intended course and success of corrective actions.

Planning Package↗
NASA NTRS2018

Robonaut 2 and Watson: Cognitive Dexterity for Future Exploration

Future exploration missions will dictate a level of autonomy never before experienced in human spaceflight. Mission plans involving the uncrewed phases of complex human spacecraft in deep space will require a coordinated autonomous capability to be able to maintain the spacecraft when ground control is not available. One promising direction involves embedding intelligence into the system design both through the employment of state-of-the-art system engineering principles as well as through the creation of a cognitive network between a smart spacecraft or habitat and embodiments of cognitive agents. The work described here details efforts to integrate IBM's Watson and other cognitive computing services into NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC)'s Robonaut 2 (R2) anthropomorphic robot. This paper also discusses future directions this work will take. A cognitive spacecraft management system that is able to seamlessly collect data from subsystems, determine corrective actions, and provide commands to enable those actions is the end goal. These commands could be to embedded spacecraft systems or to a set of robotic assets that are tied into the cognitive system. An exciting collaboration with Woodside provides a promising Earth-bound testing analog, as controlling and maintaining not normally manned off-shore platforms have similar constraints to the space missions described.

Badger, Julia M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Topic Modeling of NASA Space System Problem Reports: Research in Practice

Problem reports at NASA are similar to bug reports: they capture defects found during test, post-launch operational anomalies, and document the investigation and corrective action of the issue. These artifacts are a rich source of lessons learned for NASA, but are expensive to analyze since problem reports are comprised primarily of natural language text. We apply topic modeling to a corpus of NASA problem reports to extract trends in testing and operational failures. We collected 16,669 problem reports from six NASA space flight missions and applied Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to the document corpus. We analyze the most popular topics within and across missions, and how popular topics changed over the lifetime of a mission. We find that hardware material and flight software issues are common during the integration and testing phase, while ground station software and equipment issues are more common during the operations phase. We identify a number of challenges in topic modeling for trend analysis: 1) that the process of selecting the topic modeling parameters lacks definitive guidance, 2) defining semantically-meaningful topic labels requires nontrivial effort and domain expertise, 3) topic models derived from the combined corpus of the six missions were biased toward the larger missions, and 4) topics must be semantically distinct as well as cohesive to be useful. Nonetheless,topic modeling can identify problem themes within missions and across mission lifetimes, providing useful feedback to engineers and project managers.

Data Mining↗
NASA NTRS2018

Results of a Manned Over Pressurization Event in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit Space Suit Assembly

The Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) is a 102 x 202 x 40-foot-deep tank holding over 6 million gallons of water used to simulate weightlessness for Astronaut training. The maxim "Train Like You Fly" refers to the desire to have the suit perform, during training, as close as possible to how it performs during an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), particularly with respect to mobility. Therefore, the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) used in the NBL is a downgraded hardware version of the flight SSA; it is not designed for the NBL environment or operations. A classification system defines the flight Space Suit Assembly hardware as Class I, and the NBL training hardware SSA as Class IIIW. On July 20, 2017, during a manned training event in the NBL, the SSA was inadvertently over-pressurized to 22 psid; normal operating pressure being 4.3 psid. The suit subject was removed from the suit with no injury. The event was investigated by a NASA Mishap Team. The Team investigated common causes and differences between the Class I and Class IIIW Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The investigation determined that the event was limited to Class IIIW hardware and its external flow-controlled open loop ventilation systems. The flight EMU is a pressure regulated closed loop ventilation system. This paper will examine the differences between the Class I and Class IIIW SSA hardware and provide details of the Mishap Investigation. Corrective actions taken to mitigate risk with hardware, operations, and hazard documentation will be discussed.

Spacesuit↗
NASA NTRS2018

Quality Assurance Surveillance Tool Designed for SLS EM-1 Certificate of Flight Readiness

Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) is an uncrewed mission that is launching on the Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1 vehicle. This is a critical flight test for the agency's human deep space exploration goals. Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) Quality (SA-F2) is responsible for providing Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASPs) for NASA contracts and facilities. A QASP assures products and services are provided to EGS in accordance with the contract requirements. In order to encapsulate the multiple KSC Safety and Mission Assurance surveillance and audit activities that need to be accomplished specifically for EM-1 Certificate of Flight Reediness (CoFR), a QASP tool needed to be implemented. This tool would be able to intuitively track Work Authorization Documents (WADs) under development by Test Operations Support Contract (TOSC), reviewed and accepted WADs, Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPs), Nonconformances (NCs), Material Review Board (MRB) Status, Corrective Actions, Alterations, Deviations, and Waivers for flight hardware and Ground Support Equipment (GSE). This would help ensure that all SLS EM-1 flight hardware and related GSE surveillances and requirements are being recognized and completed with zero constraints identified for the mission.

Morris, Patrick↗
NASA NTRS2016

Mars Cube One (MarCO) Shifting the Paradigm in Relay Deep Space Operations

A very significant challenge in the planetary mission design and operations is communications with ground control teams during critical events and highly risky maneuvers. These include entry, descent, and landing (EDL) and orbit insertion, which should not be carried out in the blind. Although vast planetary distances and long round-trip light times disallow real-time intervention from controllers, acquiring the relevant event performance parameters in near real-time can be imperative for determining the corrective actions needed immediately following or, in the case of significant anomalies, aid in the diagnostic analysis. During several previous Mars missions landing events, and the Huygens probe landing on Titan, the communications strategy relied on proximity links to planetary orbiters, which then relayed the data to the Deep Space Network (DSN). In addition, attempts were successfully made in parallel to receive the signal carrier directly at Earth often using large radio telescopes when the wavelength was outside the DSN’s reception bands. This Direct-to-Earth (DTE) back-up method was only possible due to special techniques utilizing the DSN’s open-loop Radio Science Receivers. In every case, it was very challenging since the link budget of a landing vehicles were designed for proximity orbiter relays and not for distances across the solar system. A new method is introduced since not all future missions can rely on the presence of pre-existing orbiters at their planetary targets to relay their critical data ad, furthermore, most missions would not likely have the resources to implement a reliable DTE link at acceptable data rates, bypassing a need for a relay asset. With the advent CubeSat form-factor spacecraft, one or more, for added reliability, CubeSats can be launched with the primary mission, travel to the target, and be positioned to view the critical event, such as EDL, and carry out real-time relay of the data to the DSN at higher rates. CubeSats have flown in the Earth environment but never flown or been operated in deep space or planetary environment so careful design as well as flight experience are needed. The relay function requires the development of radio and antenna systems to meet challenging specifications. After initial technical demonstration of the concept and operational experience, the cost can decrease as systems become more standardized with increased reliability. This paper describes the invention of the “carry your own relay” concept and the formulation of the mission likely to be the first planetary CubeSat mission called Mars Cube One (MarCO). It also describes the operational concept of relay small spacecraft and their role reducing mission risk as well as overall mission cost.

Asmar, Sami↗
NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗
NASA NTRS2019

The International Space Station (ISS) Port 1 (P1) External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) Ammonia Leak

From 2011 to 2017, the crew onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was at risk of dire consequences due to an external ammonia leak. Ammonia is used in the External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) to cool the pressurized modules and external electrical systems. Engineers at NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC) initially detected the leak in one of two cooling loops by monitoring the system ammonia inventory decay over time. White flakes seen on High Definition (HD) cameras were also thought to be associated with the leakage but not confirmed. Initially, the leak was small enough that the ammonia inventory and system operations were not in jeopardy. However, the leak began to accelerate to the point where troubleshooting and corrective action were vital to the sustainability of the ISS. Therefore, it became imperative that the leak be located and repaired for ISS operations to continue. No tools were readily available on the ISS to locate such a leak when it was initially detected, however NASA engineers were already in the process of developing a new device for this purpose called the Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL). The RELL is a robotic instrument package with a mass spectrometer and an ion pressure gauge. Initial checkout operations with RELL happened to coincide with the increasing leak, and ammonia vapors were measured around the P1 EATCS Radiator #3 flexible jumper hoses. The leak stopped after the radiator and its flexible hoses were remotely isolated from the loop and the ammonia from the isolated segment was vented to space. Astronauts conducted a spacewalk that successfully removed the hoses, which were returned to ground for further investigation. The purpose of this paper is to review the leak detection and isolation efforts, investigation results, lessons learned and the recovery plan.

Cowan, Darnell T.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Gary Johnson: Lessons Learned from 50+ Years in Human Spaceflight and Safety

Future spacecraft designers and managers need to be aware of problems, corrective actions, and the resulting lessons learned to avoid experiencing the same problems in new programs. Fewer and fewer people with firsthand experience of the design, test, and operations of past programs, such as Apollo, are available today to pass on their experience. This white paper, sponsored by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate Flight Safety Office (FSO), will discuss the major lessons I learned during my 50+ years (and counting) working in human spaceflight.

Johnson, Gary W.↗