Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety Case”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 289 records · Page 16

Safety Assurance Framework for Nuclear Digital Instrumentation and Control Software

Software in digital instrumentation and control (D&C) systems poses unique challenges for the safety assurance of nuclear power plants. Through a literature survey of 21 sources, we analyzed various claims, arguments, and evidence used in safety assurance cases across industries. These were organized into a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) safety assurance case framework to organize and visualize the various arguments for DI&C safety. We developed a classification for the levels of the framework, which can be used in other safety assurance cases to improve clarity.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

A Case Study of Measuring Process Risk for Early Insights into Software Safety

In this case study, we examine software safety risk in three flight hardware systems in NASA's Constellation spaceflight program. We applied our Technical and Process Risk Measurement (TPRM) methodology to the Constellation hazard analysis process to quantify the technical and process risks involving software safety in the early design phase of these projects. We analyzed 154 hazard reports and collected metrics to measure the prevalence of software in hazards and the specificity of descriptions of software causes of hazardous conditions. We found that 49-70% of 154 hazardous conditions could be caused by software or software was involved in the prevention of the hazardous condition. We also found that 12-17% of the 2013 hazard causes involved software, and that 23-29% of all causes had a software control. The application of the TPRM methodology identified process risks in the application of the hazard analysis process itself that may lead to software safety risk.

Layman, Lucas↗

Development of a software safety process and a case study of its use

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a comprehensive approach to software safety and to evaluate the approach with a case study. The case study is a major part of the project, and it involves the analysis of a specific safety-critical system from the medical equipment domain. The particular application being used was selected because of the availability of a suitable candidate system. We consider the results to be generally applicable and in no way particularly limited by the domain. The research is concentrating on issues raised by the specification and verification phases of the software lifecycle since they are central to our previously-developed rigorous definitions of software safety. The theoretical research is based on our framework of definitions for software safety. In the area of specification, the main topics being investigated are the development of techniques for building system fault trees that correctly incorporate software issues and the development of rigorous techniques for the preparation of software safety specifications. The research results are documented. Another area of theoretical investigation is the development of verification methods tailored to the characteristics of safety requirements. Verification of the correct implementation of the safety specification is central to the goal of establishing safe software. The empirical component of this research is focusing on a case study in order to provide detailed characterizations of the issues as they appear in practice, and to provide a testbed for the evaluation of various existing and new theoretical results, tools, and techniques. The Magnetic Stereotaxis System is summarized.

Knight, John C.↗

AdvoCATE - User Guide

The basic vision of AdvoCATE is to automate the creation, manipulation, and management of large-scale assurance cases based on a formal theory of argument structures. Its main purposes are for creating and manipulating argument structures for safety assurance cases using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), and as a test bed and proof-of-concept for the formal theory of argument structures. AdvoCATE is available for Windows 7, Macintosh OSX, and Linux. Eventually, AdvoCATE will serve as a dashboard for safety related information and provide an infrastructure for safety decisions and management.

Safety Case↗

The reduction of a ""safety catastrophic'' potential hazard: A case history

A worst case analysis is reported on the safety of time watch movements for triggering explosive packages on the lunar surface in an experiment to investigate physical lunar structural characteristics through induced seismic energy waves. Considered are the combined effects of low pressure, low temperature, lunar gravity, gear train error, and position. Control measures constitute a seal control cavity and design requirements to prevent overbanking in the mainspring torque curve. Thus, the potential hazard is reduced to safety negligible.

Joseph P. Jones↗

DMBZ Polyimides Provide an Alternative to PMR-15 for High-Temperature Applications

PMR-15, a high-temperature polyimide developed in the mid-1970's at the NASA Lewis Research Center, offers the combination of ease of processing, low cost, and good stability and performance at temperatures up to 288 C (500 F). This material is widely regarded as one of the leading high-temperature matrix resins for polymer-matrix-composite aircraft engine components. PMR-15 is widely used in both military and civilian aircraft engines. The current worldwide market for PMR-15 is on the order of 50,000 lb, with a total sales of around $5 to $10 million. However, PMR-15 is made from methylene dianiline (MDA), a known animal mutagen and a suspected human mutagen. Recent concerns about the safety of workers involved in the manufacture and repair of PMR-15 components have led to the implementation of costly protective measures to limit worker exposure and ensure workplace safety. In some cases, because of safety and economic concerns, airlines have eliminated PMR-15 components from engines in their fleets. Current efforts at Lewis are focused on developing suitable replacements for PMR-15 that do not contain mutagenic constituents and have processability, stability, and mechanical properties comparable to that of PMR-15. A recent development from these efforts is a new class of thermosetting polyimides based on 2,2'-dimethylbenzidine (DMBZ). Autoclave processing developed for PMR-15 composites was used to prepare low-void-content T650-35 carbon-fiber-reinforced laminates from DMBZ-15 polyimides. The glass transition temperatures of these laminates were about 50 C higher than those of the T650- 35/PMR-15 composites (400 versus 348 C). In addition, DMBZ-15 polyimide composites aged for 1000 hr in air at 288 C (500 F) had weight losses close to those of comparable PMR-15 laminates (0.9 versus 0.7 percent). The elevated (288 C) and room temperature mechanical properties of T650-35-reinforced DMBZ-15 polyimide and PMR-15 laminates were comparable. Standard Ames tests are being conducted on this diamine to assess its mutagenicity.

Source record↗

To the 'Safety related?' Question: What is Related to Safety? - 18430

Most, if not all, national programs for radioactive waste management (RWM) pledge their overall commitment to safety or - in the case of radioactive waste disposal - to long-term safety. Therefore, it may be somewhat surprising to find that the term 'safety' is hardly defined in these programs. The same holds for some of the core international guidance literature on the deep geological repository (DGR) 'safety case' concept. With respect to stakeholder concern over the safety of geological disposal, it seems, however, advisable to seek common ground in the understanding of the idea of 'safety'. In this paper, we review and discuss the most relevant international guidance literature's provision (or non-provision) of definitions of 'safety' in the context of radioactive waste disposal. Against this background, we develop a tentative, practical, glossary-style definition of 'safety' in the DGR context. As a seed of discussion, it may help to eventually expose possible mismatches in the base assumptions of safety experts and other stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Interrelation Between Safety Factors and Reliability

An evaluation was performed to establish relationships between safety factors and reliability relationships. Results obtained show that the use of the safety factor is not contradictory to the employment of the probabilistic methods. In many cases the safety factors can be directly expressed by the required reliability levels. However, there is a major difference that must be emphasized: whereas the safety factors are allocated in an ad hoc manner, the probabilistic approach offers a unified mathematical framework. The establishment of the interrelation between the concepts opens an avenue to specify safety factors based on reliability. In cases where there are several forms of failure, then the allocation of safety factors should he based on having the same reliability associated with each failure mode. This immediately suggests that by the probabilistic methods the existing over-design or under-design can be eliminated. The report includes three parts: Part 1-Random Actual Stress and Deterministic Yield Stress; Part 2-Deterministic Actual Stress and Random Yield Stress; Part 3-Both Actual Stress and Yield Stress Are Random.

Elishakoff, Isaac↗

Development of a Software Safety Process and a Case Study of Its Use

Research in the year covered by this reporting period has been primarily directed toward: continued development of mock-ups of computer screens for operator of a digital reactor control system; development of a reactor simulation to permit testing of various elements of the control system; formal specification of user interfaces; fault-tree analysis including software; evaluation of formal verification techniques; and continued development of a software documentation system. Technical results relating to this grant and the remainder of the principal investigator's research program are contained in various reports and papers.

Knight, J. C.↗

Development of a Software Safety Process and a Case Study of Its Use

Research in the year covered by this reporting period has been primarily directed toward the following areas: (1) Formal specification of user interfaces; (2) Fault-tree analysis including software; (3) Evaluation of formal specification notations; (4) Evaluation of formal verification techniques; (5) Expanded analysis of the shell architecture concept; (6) Development of techniques to address the problem of information survivability; and (7) Development of a sophisticated tool for the manipulation of formal specifications written in Z. This report summarizes activities under the grant. The technical results relating to this grant and the remainder of the principal investigator's research program are contained in various reports and papers. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. In the next section, an overview of the project is given. This is followed by a summary of accomplishments during the reporting period and details of students funded. Seminars presented describing work under this grant are listed in the following section, and the final section lists publications resulting from this grant.

Knight, J. C.↗

SAFETY AT FLUOR HANFORD (B) CASE STUDY - PREPARED BY THE THUNDERBIRD SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

One year into the Hanford contract, Fluor had learned a number of hard lessons very quickly. Although the Hanford remediation contract was in many ways a new endeavor for Fluor and a different kind of contract, the organization moved quickly to increase communication with all employees, attack head-on what it considered unsafe and inappropriate safety practices, and strongly inject its own corporate cultural beliefs into the Hanford organization. It wasn't easy, and it didn't happen overnight. From the beginning, Fluor established processes and programs to drive down injury rates. For example, whereas the previous contractor's approach to injuries had been passive, Fluor took a much more aggressive approach to worker injuries. The previous contractor had established a practice of sending injured workers home with the basic directive 'to come back when you are well'. Instead of using outsourced medical assessment, Fluor internalized it and evaluated all claims aggressively. Legitimate claims were quickly settled, and management moved to identify 'repeat offenders' when it came to reportable safety incidents. In the first year of Fluor's management, reportable injuries dropped from 5.37 to 2.99 per 200,000 man-hours. Despite the drop in injury rates, the safety record at Fluor Hanford was not at a level that met either Fluor or the Department of Energy's expectations. Earlier in 1997, Fluor Hanford's proposed safety program was rejected by the DOE. The DOE was not satisfied with Fluor Hanford's proposal for various reasons, including insufficient worker involvement and a lack of accountability. With the need for change clearly established, Fluor Hanford management embarked on a decade-long mission to change the safety culture and improve safety performance. This case describes the key changes and their impact on Fluor Hanford.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Business Case Analysis for Digital Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control System Modernizations

This LWRS research seeks to assist in breaking the impasse which has precluded digital safety system upgrades by generating and demonstrating a process and related business case tool to enable a Business Case Analysis (BCA). The purpose of a BCA is to show such upgrades can be economically justified. This BCA methodology first systematically establishes a forecast of expected lifecycle costs for I&C identified for upgrade by: • Definitively bounding the scope of current I&C systems envisioned for upgrade. • Collecting historical labor and material usage data that bound cost contributors related to the systems to be upgraded. • Synthesizing and analyzing the data to establish lifecycle cost forecasts for the current systems. In collaboration with engineers familiar with the attributes of the digital equipment to be used in the upgrade and how it is envisioned to be applied, cost savings categories and expected savings in those categories are then identified and applied using the analysis tools developed for this purpose. The result is an estimate NPV of savings enabled by the upgrade. This includes both direct cost savings (e.g., surveillance labor costs) as well as cost avoidance items (e.g., inventory carrying costs). Finally, when utility-provided digital upgrade costs estimates are included, the resultant BCA provides an NPV for the upgrade project. Development of a useful BCA methodology requires a real-world basis. With the cooperation of Exelon Generation (“Owner”), an Exelon-owned 2-Unit BWR Station (“Station”) was used as the foundation for this research. Exelon is pursuing a digital upgrade of current, first-echelon, safety-related I&C systems at these units, including the following: • Reactor Protection System (RPS) • Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (N4S) • Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) • Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation System

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Comparison of Alternatives to the 2004 Vacuum Vessel Heat Transfer System

A study comparing different alternatives for the Vacuum Vessel Primary Heat Transfer System has been completed. Three alternatives were proposed in a Project Change Request (PCR-190) by relocating the heat exchangers (HXs) from the roof of the Tokamak building to inside the Vacuum Vessel Pressure Suppression System (VVPSS) tank. The study evaluated the three alternatives and recommended modifications to one of them to arrive at a preferred configuration that included relocating the HXs inside the Tokamak building but outside the VVPSS tank as well as including a small safety-rated pump and HX in parallel to the main circulation pump and HX. The Vacuum Vessel (VV) Primary Heat Transfer System (PHTS) removes heat generated in the VV during normal operation (10 MW, pulsed power) as well as the decay heat from the VV itself and from the structures/components attached to the VV (first wall, blanket, and divertor {approx}0.48 MW peak). Therefore, the VV PHTS has two safety functions: (1) contain contaminated cooling water (similar to the other PHTSs) and (2) provide passive cooling during an accident event. The 2004 design of the VV PHTS consists of two independent loops, each loop cooling half of the 18 VV segments with a nominal flow of 475 kg/s of water at about 1.1 MPa and 100 C. The total flow for both loops is 950 kg/s. Both loops are required to remove the heat load during normal plasma operation. During accident conditions, only one loop is needed to remove by natural convection (no pump needed) the decay heat of the complete VV and attached components. The heat is transferred to heat exchanger (HXs) located on top of the roof, outside the Tokamak building. These HXs are air-to-water (A/W) HXs. Three alternatives have been proposed for this cooling system. For a detailed discussion of these alternatives, please refer to Project Change Request, PCR-190 (Ref. 1). A brief introduction is given here. Alternative 1 includes only one main forced circulation loop with a small safety-rated pump in parallel with the main circulation pump. In addition, this alternative has two natural circulation safety loops. Both the safety and main loops supply water to the bottom of the VV with six branch lines and collect the heated water at the top of the vessel through six branches. The distribution headers are located in the lower pipe chase and the collection headers in the upper pipe chase. Each of these loops (one main and two emergency) has a HX mounted in the Vacuum Vessel Pressure Suppression System (VVPSS) tank. The main HX is cooled using either Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) or Chilled Water System (CHWS) water, and the emergency HXs are cooled by natural circulation of the VVPSS water. See Fig. 1 taken from PCR-190. Alternative 2 is exactly the same as Alternative 1 except that there is only one emergency loop and one emergency HX. See Fig. 2 taken from PCR-190. Alternative 3 also has one main forced circulation loop with a small safety-rated pump in parallel with the main circulation pump and one natural circulation safety loop. In this case, both the safety and main loops supply water to the top of the VV with three branch lines and collect the heated water at the top of the vessel through three branches. Here, the distribution header is located in the upper pipe chase as is the collection header. As before, each of these loops has a HX mounted in the VVPSS tank. The main HX is cooled using either CCWS or CHWS water, and the emergency HXs are cooled by natural circulation of the VVPSS water. See Fig. 3 taken from PCR-190. The preferred configuration is developed by selecting specific attributes of the other configurations analyzed and the logic for selecting this configuration is discussed at the end of the document. It is a modification of Alternative 2 that eliminates the separate safety loop, but incorporates a small safety rated HX and pump in parallel with the main HX and pump. It uses 18 inlet and 18 outlet branches (as did the 2004 design) and locates the HXs outside of the VVPSS tank. Tables 1 and 2 examine alternatives to the 2004 VV heat transfer system design that were proposed in PCR-190, as well as the preferred option.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗

Safety Assurance of Software and Machine Learning Development for Nuclear Instrumentation and Controls

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems monitor and control parameters in nuclear power plants. Ensuring their safety is a critical part of ensuring overall plant safety. Nuclear power plant licensing generates thousands of safety documents that could be organized more effectively using a safety assurance case (SAC). We conducted a literature survey of SACs and created a SAC framework for DI&C software using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). This framework focuses on four software development processes: management & assurance, pre-developed software (PDS) qualification, the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), and the Machine Learning Development Life Cycle (MLDLC). We organized our framework using a novel level structure that can be applied to other SACs to improve their clarity. Finally, we demonstrate how our framework can be incorporated as part of a SAC for a larger reactor system.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

Modernizing NASA’s Space Flight Safety and Mission Success (S&MS) Assurance Framework In Line With Evolving Acquisition Strategies and Systems Engineering Practices

This paper presents the objectives-driven, case-based safety and mission success (S&MS) assurance framework being developed by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), including its motivations and its implementation via a S&MS Assurance Standard that is under development, supplemented by supporting standards including an S&MS Analysis Management Standard that is also under development. A need to evolve NASA’s S&MS assurance framework has emerged in recent years, resulting from the need to accommodate new acquisition models; the need to accommodate evolving systems engineering (SE) practices; the need to stipulate acceptable levels of S&MS risk; the need for improved integration of S&MS into SE; and the need for clearer risk acceptance accountability. The objectives-driven, case-based S&MS assurance framework proposed here is responsive to that need. Its key features include: • The establishment, by NASA Acquirers, of fundamental S&MS performance objectives that define limits of acceptability for the likelihoods that mission technical objectives will be accomplished and that people, assets, and environments put at risk by the mission will not be adversely affected; • The development and approval of Providers’ S&MS plans for meeting Acquirers’ S&MS performance objectives, including commitments to support Acquirer audit, investigation, and reporting needs; • The development, by Providers, of S&MS assurance cases that argue, supported by evidence, that the Provider has met, or is on track to meeting, the fundamental S&MS objectives; • The evaluation, throughout the program/project life cycle, of Provider S&MS assurance cases as the primary S&MS-related technical basis for Acquirer risk acceptance and the granting to the Provider of authority to proceed through the program/project life cycle. This proposed S&MS assurance framework is notable for its lack of prescription of traditional S&MS requirements and strategies such as defined failure tolerances, margins, or analysis requirements. Instead, Providers are given latitude to propose their own strategies for meeting the fundamental S&MS performance objectives, subject to independent review and Acquirer approval. The result is a framework for S&MS assurance that is at once both rigorous and flexible.

Assurance Case↗

System Safety in Early Manned Space Program: A Case Study of NASA and Project Mercury

This case study provides a review of National Aeronautics and Space Administration s (NASA's) involvement in system safety during research and evolution from air breathing to exo-atmospheric capable flight systems culminating in the successful Project Mercury. Although NASA has been philosophically committed to the principals of system safety, this case study points out that budget and manpower constraints-as well as a variety of internal and external pressures can jeopardize even a well-designed system safety program. This study begins with a review of the evolution and early years of NASA's rise as a project lead agency and ends with the lessons learned from Project Mercury.

Hansen, Frederick D.↗