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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Management Approach for NASA's Earth Venture-1 (EV-1) Airborne Science Investigations

The Earth System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) Program Office (PO) is responsible for programmatic management of National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Science Mission Directorate's (SMD) Earth Venture (EV) missions. EV is composed of both orbital and suborbital Earth science missions. The first of the Earth Venture missions is EV-1, which are Principal Investigator-led, temporally-sustained, suborbital (airborne) science investigations costcapped at $30M each over five years. Traditional orbital procedures, processes and standards used to manage previous ESSP missions, while effective, are disproportionally comprehensive for suborbital missions. Conversely, existing airborne practices are primarily intended for smaller, temporally shorter investigations, and traditionally managed directly by a program scientist as opposed to a program office such as ESSP. In 2010, ESSP crafted a management approach for the successful implementation of the EV-1 missions within the constructs of current governance models. NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements form the foundation of the approach for EV-1. Additionally, requirements from other existing NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs), systems engineering guidance and management handbooks were adapted to manage programmatic, technical, schedule, cost elements and risk. As the EV-1 missions are nearly at the end of their successful execution and project lifecycle and the submission deadline of the next mission proposals near, the ESSP PO is taking the lessons learned and updated the programmatic management approach for all future Earth Venture Suborbital (EVS) missions for an even more flexible and streamlined management approach.

Guillory, Anthony R.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Minimizing exposure to legacy wells and avoiding conflict between storage projects: Exploring area of review as a screening tool

Elevated pressure from large-volume injection is a key driver of risk and project cost. If transmissive features (e.g., non-isolating wells or fracture systems) are present, increased injection-zone pressure can drive fluids from depth toward protected freshwater resources. In US Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) law, the area at risk is known as the Area of Review (AoR). The size and number of potentially transmissive features to be evaluated and possibly remediated or managed is a function of the size and location of the AoR. The size of the AoR depends on several variables, including properties of the injection zone, properties of protected resources, and injection rate and duration. Evaluation of the intersection of these variables across a portfolio of sites highlights the injection zone depth and boundary conditions as top-level controls. Deep injection, use of multiple stacked injection zones, reduced injection rate and choice of injection well location can all be used to minimize AoR and the number of potentially transmissive features within it. Here, we introduce the concept of pressure space (defined as connected pore volume times pressure) as the key subsurface commodity for CO 2 storage and we suggest that it forms a more robust basis for leasing and regulation than pore space alone.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA’s Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V’s desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V’s assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2020

IV&V Assurance Case Design for Artemis II

As human-rated missions like those in NASA's Artemis program continue to grow in both size and complexity, and the role of software in achieving mission objectives expands dramatically, NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Teams face evolving challenges in assuring the safety and performance of the safety- and mission-critical embedded software that is essential to landing astronauts on the surface of the Moon by 2024. Key among these challenges is IV&V's desire to present a cohesive, integrated assurance statement to its stakeholders that encapsulates and summarizes our assurance positions across the integrated Artemis systems and their combined role in support of a safe and successful flight. In order to meet this challenge, the IV&V Teams have begun a transition to using formal assurance case concepts and documentation in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) to build an argument in support of software assurance. IV&V recognizes significant benefits to the logical argumentation structure provided by assurance cases and GSN over our current practices for documenting and managing assurance claims. In order to reap these benefits, IV&V is integrating the use of assurance case concepts with our paradigm of follow-the-risk capability based assurance. Because of this, assurance cases created and used by IV&V are distinct from the sort of assurance case created by a development project or embedded software assurance organization. IV&V's assurance cases depend much less upon standards and regulations, and more on evidence captured by IV&V regarding the environment, requirements, design, and implementation. IV&V constructs an independent network of claims based on an independent decomposition of arguments. Based upon the risk posture of these claims and their associated software and software artifacts, IV&V then develops and executes engineering analyses and testing, which provide evidence to either support or refute the claim. This emerging risk-informed assurance case methodology is being put into practice as IV&V plans for support of the Artemis II mission, the first flight of the Orion capsule and Space Launch System with astronauts on board.

Whitman, Gerek↗
NASA NTRS2024

X-Plane Knowledge Capture Workshop Summary Report

The history of experimental aircraft research and development at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) provides a large body of work for current and future team members to learn from and apply. NASA values the knowledge it gains from all the research it performs and desires to have that knowledge grow with each new project, incrementally adding to the collective knowledge base. To support this knowledge growth and sharing, in May 2019, NASA convened over 60 engineers; researchers; and other personnel (internal and external to NASA) for the X-plane1 Knowledge Capture Workshop to discuss their over 50-years’ worth of experiences in developing, operating, and managing experimental aircraft. Over the course of a two-day workshop, the group not only focused, primarily, on current X-plane development but also discussed a wide range of topics about experimental aircraft and flight research. In addition to the discussions, senior NASA aeronautics leaders shared their personal lessons learned with the workshop audience. Broadly, these discussions centered around the topics of organizational and cultural practices, the project lifecycle, flight, and risk and safety. Many of the observations offered by participants are applicable to other NASA team-based projects, demonstrating the value in sharing lessons learned and best practices across projects regardless of their research focus. To share the most valuable lessons learned as broadly as possible, a summary of these discussions has been compiled into the following report. These discussions are mostly included in their entirety, with some light editing for clarity and privacy. NASA is sharing this knowledge internally and making it available to the public in hopes that others can learn from the experimental aircraft challenges and successes at NASA. Note: this document represents the perspectives, experiences, and opinions of others but does not necessarily represent the official view of NASA.

Steven R Hirshorn↗
NASA NTRS2005

Managing Lunar and Mars Mission Radiation Risks: Cancer Risks, Uncertainties, and Shielding Effectiveness - Part 1

This document addresses calculations of probability distribution functions (PDFs) representing uncertainties in projecting fatal cancer risk from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and solar particle events (SPEs). PDFs are used to test the effectiveness of potential radiation shielding approaches. Monte-Carlo techniques are used to propagate uncertainties in risk coefficients determined from epidemiology data, dose and dose-rate reduction factors, quality factors, and physics models of radiation environments. Competing mortality risks and functional correlations in radiation quality factor uncertainties are treated in the calculations. The cancer risk uncertainty is about four-fold for lunar and Mars mission risk projections. For short-stay lunar missins (<180 d), SPEs present the most significant risk, but one effectively mitigated by shielding. For long-duration (>180 d) lunar or Mars missions, GCR risks may exceed radiation risk limits. While shielding materials are marginally effective in reducing GCR cancer risks because of the penetrating nature of GCR and secondary radiation produced in tissue by relativisitc particles, polyethylene or carbon composite shielding cannot be shown to significantly reduce risk compared to aluminum shielding. Therefore, improving our knowledge of space radiobiology to narrow uncertainties that lead to wide PDFs is the best approach to ensure radiation protection goals are met for space exploration.

Cucinotta, Francis A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Zero to Integration in Eight Months, the Dawn Ground Data System Engineering Challange

The Dawn Project has presented the Ground Data System (GDS) with technical challenges driven by cost and schedule constraints commonly associated with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery Projects. The Dawn mission consists of a new and exciting Deep Space partnership among: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), responsible for project management and flight operations; Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), spacecraft builder and responsible for flight system test and integration; and the University of California, at Los Angeles (UCLA), responsible for science planning and operations. As a cost-capped mission, one of Dawn s implementation strategies is to leverage from both flight and ground heritage. OSC's ground data system is used for flight system test and integration as part of the flight heritage strategy. Mission operations, however, are to be conducted with JPL s ground system. The system engineering challenge of dealing with two heterogeneous ground systems emerged immediately. During the first technical interchange meeting between the JPL s GDS Team and OSC's Flight Software Team, August 2003, the need to integrate the ground system with the flight software was brought to the table. This need was driven by the project s commitment to enable instrument engineering model integration in a spacecraft simulator environment, for both demonstration and risk mitigation purposes, by April 2004. This paper will describe the system engineering approach that was undertaken by JPL's GDS Team in order to meet the technical challenge within a non-negotiable eight-month schedule. Key to the success was adherence to an overall systems engineering process and fundamental systems engineering practices: decomposition of the project request into manageable requirements; definition of a structured yet flexible development process; integration of multiple ground disciplines and experts into a focused team effort; in-process risk management; and aggregation of the intermediate products to an integrated final product. In addition, this paper will highlight the role of lessons learned from the integration experience. The lessons learned from an early GDS deployment have served as the foundation for the design and implementation of the Dawn Ground Data System.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2004

Characterization of microbial and chemical composition of shuttle wet waste with permanent gas and volatile organic compound analyses

Solid-waste treatment in space for Advanced Life Support, ALS, applications requires that the material can be safely processed and stored in a confined environment. Many solid-wastes are not stable because they are wet (40-90% moisture) and contain levels of soluble organic compounds that can contribute to the growth of undesirable microorganisms with concomitant production of noxious odors. In the absence of integrated Advanced Life Support systems on orbit, permanent gas, trace volatile organic and microbiological analyses were performed on crew refuse returned from the volume F "wet" trash of three consecutive Shuttle missions (STS-105, 109, and 110). These analyses were designed to characterize the short-term biological stability of the material and assess potential crew risks resulting from microbial decay processes during storage. Waste samples were collected post-orbiter landing and sorted into packaging material, food waste, toilet waste, and bulk liquid fractions deposited during flight in the volume F container. Aerobic and anaerobic microbial loads were determined in each fraction by cultivation on R2A and by acridine orange direct count (AODC). Dry and ash weights were performed to determine both water and organic content of the materials. Experiments to determine the aerobic and anaerobic biostability of refuse stored for varying periods of time were performed by on-line monitoring of CO2 and laboratory analysis for production of hydrogen sulfide and methane. Volatile organic compounds and permanent gases were analyzed using EPA Method TO15 by USEPA et al. [EPA Method TO15, The Determination of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in Ambient Air using SUMMA, Passivated Canister Sampling and Gas Chromatographic Analysis,1999] with gas chromatography/mass spectrometry and by gas chromatography with selective detectors. These baseline measures of waste stream content, labile organics, and microbial load in the volume F Shuttle trash provide data for waste subsystem analysis and atmospheric management within the ALS Project. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of COSPAR.

NASA Center KSC↗
NASA NTRS2007

The MSFC Systems Engineering Guide: An Overview and Plan

As systems and subsystems requirements become more complex in the pursuit of the exploration of space, advanced technology will demand and require an integrated approach to the design and development of safe and successful space vehicles and there products. System engineers play a vital and key role in transforming mission needs into vehicle requirements that can be verified and validated. This will result in a safe and cost effective design that will satisfy the mission schedule. A key to successful vehicle design within systems engineering is communication. Communication, through a systems engineering infrastructure, will not only ensure that customers and stakeholders are satisfied but will also assist in identifying vehicle requirements; i.e. identification, integration and management. This vehicle design will produce a system that is verifiable, traceable, and effectively satisfies cost, schedule, performance, and risk throughout the life-cycle of the product. A communication infrastructure will bring about the integration of different engineering disciplines within vehicle design. A system utilizing these aspects will enhance system engineering performance and improve upon required activities such as Development of Requirements, Requirements Management, Functional Analysis, Test, Synthesis, Trade Studies, Documentation, and Lessons Learned to produce a successful final product. This paper will describe the guiding vision, progress to date and the plan forward for development of the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Systems Engineering Guide (SEG), a virtual systems engineering handbook and archive that will describe the system engineering processes that are used by MSFC in the development of complex systems such as the Ares launch vehicle. It is the intent of this website to be a "One Stop Shop" for our systems engineers that will provide tutorial information, an overview of processes and procedures and links to assist system engineering with guidance and references, and provide an archive of systems engineering artifacts produced by the many NASA projects developed and managed by MSFC over the years.

Shelby, Jerry A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Testing Strategies and Methodologies for the Max Launch Abort System

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was tasked to develop an alternate, tower-less launch abort system (LAS) as risk mitigation for the Orion Project. The successful pad abort flight demonstration test in July 2009 of the "Max" launch abort system (MLAS) provided data critical to the design of future LASs, while demonstrating the Agency s ability to rapidly design, build and fly full-scale hardware at minimal cost in a "virtual" work environment. Limited funding and an aggressive schedule presented a challenge for testing of the complex MLAS system. The successful pad abort flight demonstration test was attributed to the project s systems engineering and integration process, which included: a concise definition of, and an adherence to, flight test objectives; a solid operational concept; well defined performance requirements, and a test program tailored to reducing the highest flight test risks. The testing ranged from wind tunnel validation of computational fluid dynamic simulations to component ground tests of the highest risk subsystems. This paper provides an overview of the testing/risk management approach and methodologies used to understand and reduce the areas of highest risk - resulting in a successful flight demonstration test.

Schaible, Dawn M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Numerical Investigation of Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow within Electrochemical Hydrogen Peroxide Generation Unit

Long-term manned space missions require the onboard production of disinfectants essential for maintaining crew health and supporting life systems. Currently, disinfection aboard the International Space Station (ISS) relies on disposable wetted wipes, which are regularly resupplied from Earth. This approach imposes a significant burden on resupply logistics, storage, and waste management. To address these challenges and support future missions, efforts are underway to develop an in-situ solution that electrochemically generates hydrogen peroxide disinfectant using onboard resources. In collaboration with NASA, Faraday Technology, Inc. has advanced this concept through a series of Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) projects, resulting in the development of a Peroxide Generation Unit (PGU). The PGU can produce up to 3 wt.% hydrogen peroxide on-demand at a rate of 1 liter per day, providing a sustainable alternative to Earth-dependent supplies. The resulting aqueous hydrogen peroxide (H₂O₂) is an effective disinfectant, safe for crew use, compatible with spacecraft systems, and free from volatiles, off-gassing, or residues. This innovation offers a reliable, efficient solution for onboard disinfection, reducing dependence on Earth-based resupply while ensuring the health and safety of space crews. Generating hydrogen peroxide at the required rate needs high voltages and currents, exceeding 20V and 2A respectively, which leads to significant heat generation from Joule heating. This temperature rise poses a risk to sensitive system components, especially critical and expensive membranes that can degrade under thermal stress. To mitigate this risk, the thermal, fluid, and electrical flows within the system are modeled computationally using the commercial software COMSOL. The numerical simulations are validated against experimental data from both sub-scale and alpha-scale systems. Once verified, the model is employed to identify thermal hotspots, investigate their underlying causes, and explore solutions to prevent them.

Life Support Systems (LSS)↗
NASA NTRS2006

Zero to Integration in Eight Months, the Dawn Ground Data System Engineering Challenge

The Dawn Project has presented the Ground Data System (GDS) with technical challenges driven by cost and schedule constraints commonly associated with National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery Projects. The Dawn mission consists of a new and exciting Deep Space partnership among: the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), manages the project and is responsible for flight operation; Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), is the spacecraft builder and is responsible for flight system test and integration; and the University of California, at Los Angeles (UCLA), is responsible for science planning and operations. As a cost-capped mission, one of Dawn's implementation strategies is to leverage from both flight and ground heritage. OSC's ground data system is used for flight system test and integration as part of the flight heritage strategy. Mission operations, however, are to be conducted with JPL's ground system. The system engineering challenge of dealing with two heterogeneous ground systems emerged immediately. During the first technical interchange meeting between the JPL's GDS Team and OSC's Flight Software Team, August 2003, the need to integrate the ground system with the flight software was brought to the table. This need was driven by the project's commitment to enable instrument engineering model integration in a spacecraft simulator environment, for both demonstration and risk mitigation purposes, by April 2004. This paper will describe the system engineering approach that was undertaken by JPL's GDS Team in order to meet the technical challenge within a non-negotiable eight-month schedule. Key to the success was adherence to fundamental systems engineering practices: decomposition of the project request into manageable requirements; integration of multiple ground disciplines and experts into a focused team effort; definition of a structured yet flexible development process; definition of an in-process risk reduction plan; and aggregation of the intermediate products to an integrated final product. In addition, this paper will highlight the role of lessons learned from the integration experience. The lessons learned from an early GDS deployment have served as the foundation for the design and implementation of the Dawn Ground Data System.

Ground Data System (GDS)↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Contrasting Responses of Hailstorms to Anthropogenic Climate Change in Different Synoptic Weather Systems

Hailstones and extreme precipitation generate substantial economic losses across the United States (US) and the globe. Their strong association with short-lived, intense convective storms poses a great challenge in predicting their future changes. Here, we conducted model simulations at 1.2 km grid spacing for severe convective storms with large hail and heavy precipitation that occurred in two typical types of synoptic-scale environments in spring seasons over the central US under both current and future climate conditions. We find that the responses of large hail (diameters >2.5 cm) to anthropogenic climate change (ACC) are markedly different between the hailstorms developed in the two types of synoptic-scale environments, with over 110% increase in large hail occurrences for the frontal systems, whereas less than 30% increase for the Great Plains low-level jet (GPLLJ) systems. This is explained by the larger increase in convective intensity and updraft width and a smaller increase in warm cloud depth in the frontal storms compared with the GPLLJ storms. Interestingly, the occurrences and intensity of heavy precipitation (rain rate >20 mm hr-1) in both types of systems are similarly sensitive to ACC (e.g., 40% and 33% increases in the occurrences for the frontal and GPLLJ systems, respectively). These results advance our knowledge of hail projection and have important implications for managing risks for future hail.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Full-Scaled Advanced Systems Testbed: Ensuring Success of Adaptive Control Research Through Project Lifecycle Risk Mitigation

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Dryden Flight Research Center completed flight testing of adaptive controls research on the Full-Scale Advance Systems Testbed (FAST) in January of 2011. The research addressed technical challenges involved with reducing risk in an increasingly complex and dynamic national airspace. Specific challenges lie with the development of validated, multidisciplinary, integrated aircraft control design tools and techniques to enable safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions such as structural damage, control surface failures, or aerodynamic upsets. The testbed is an F-18 aircraft serving as a full-scale vehicle to test and validate adaptive flight control research and lends a significant confidence to the development, maturation, and acceptance process of incorporating adaptive control laws into follow-on research and the operational environment. The experimental systems integrated into FAST were designed to allow for flexible yet safe flight test evaluation and validation of modern adaptive control technologies and revolve around two major hardware upgrades: the modification of Production Support Flight Control Computers (PSFCC) and integration of two, fourth-generation Airborne Research Test Systems (ARTS). Post-hardware integration verification and validation provided the foundation for safe flight test of Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion and Model Reference Aircraft Control adaptive control law experiments. To ensure success of flight in terms of cost, schedule, and test results, emphasis on risk management was incorporated into early stages of design and flight test planning and continued through the execution of each flight test mission. Specific consideration was made to incorporate safety features within the hardware and software to alleviate user demands as well as into test processes and training to reduce human factor impacts to safe and successful flight test. This paper describes the research configuration, experiment functionality, overall risk mitigation, flight test approach and results, and lessons learned of adaptive controls research of the Full-Scale Advanced Systems Testbed.

Pavlock, Kate M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Medical Updates Number 5 to the International Space Station Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) Model Using the Integrated Medical Model

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project has been developing a probabilistic risk assessment tool, the IMM, to help evaluate in-flight crew health needs and impacts to the mission due to medical events. This package is a follow-up to a data package provided in June 2009. The IMM currently represents 83 medical conditions and associated ISS resources required to mitigate medical events. IMM end state forecasts relevant to the ISS PRA model include evacuation (EVAC) and loss of crew life (LOCL). The current version of the IMM provides the basis for the operational version of IMM expected in the January 2011 timeframe. The objectives of this data package are: 1. To provide a preliminary understanding of medical risk data used to update the ISS PRA Model. The IMM has had limited validation and an initial characterization of maturity has been completed using NASA STD 7009 Standard for Models and Simulation. The IMM has been internally validated by IMM personnel but has not been validated by an independent body external to the IMM Project. 2. To support a continued dialogue between the ISS PRA and IMM teams. To ensure accurate data interpretation, and that IMM output format and content meets the needs of the ISS Risk Management Office and ISS PRA Model, periodic discussions are anticipated between the risk teams. 3. To help assess the differences between the current ISS PRA and IMM medical risk forecasts of EVAC and LOCL. Follow-on activities are anticipated based on the differences between the current ISS PRA medical risk data and the latest medical risk data produced by IMM.

Butler, Doug↗