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Impact of the deployment schedule of fast breeding reactors in the frame of French act for nuclear materials and radioactive waste management

In the frame of the French Act of June 28, 2006 on 'a sustainable management of nuclear materials and radioactive waste' EDF R and D assesses various research scenarios of transition between the actual French fleet and a Generation IV fleet with a closed fuel cycle where plutonium is multi-recycled. The basic scenarios simulate a deployment of 60 GWe of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) in two steps: one third from 2040 to 2050 and the rest from 2080 to 2100 (scenarios 2040). These research scenarios assume that SFR technology will be ready for industrial deployment in 2040. One of the many sensitivity analyses that EDF, as a nuclear power plant operator, must evaluate is the impact of a delay of SFR technology in terms of uranium consumptions, plutonium needs and fuel cycle utilities gauging. The sensitivity scenarios use the same assumptions as scenarios 2040 but they simulate a different transition phase: SFRs are deployed in one step between 2080 and 2110 (scenarios 2080). As the French Act states to conduct research on minor actinides (MA) management, we studied different options for 2040 and 2080 scenarios: no MA transmutation, americium transmutation in heterogeneous mode based on americium Bearing Blankets (AmBB) in SFRs and all MA transmutation in heterogeneous mode based on MA Bearing Blankets (MABB). Moreover, we studied multiple parameters that could impact the deployment of these reactors (SFR load factor, increase of the use of MOX in Light Water Reactors, increase of the cooling time in spent nuclear fuel storage...). Each scenario has been computed with the EDF R and D fuel cycle simulation code TIRELIRE-STRATEGIE and optimized to meet various fuel cycle constraints such as using the reprocessing facility with long period of constant capacity, keeping the temporary stored mass of plutonium and MA under imposed limits, recycling older assemblies first... These research scenarios show that the transition from the current PWR fleet to an equivalent fleet of Generation IV SFR can follow different courses. The design of SFR-V2B that we used in our studies needs a high inventory of plutonium resulting in tension on this resource. Several options can be used in order to loosen this tension: our results lead to favour the use of axial breeding blanket in SFR. Load factor of upcoming reactors has to be regarded with attention as it has a high impact on plutonium resource for a given production of electricity. The deployment of SFRs beginning in 2080 instead of 2040 following the scenarios we described creates higher tensions on reprocessing capacity, separated plutonium storage and spent fuel storage. In the frame of the French Act, we studied minor actinides transmutation. The flux of MA in all fuel cycle plants is really high, which will lead to decay heat, a and neutron emission related problems. In terms of reduction of MA inventories, the deployment of MA transmutation cycle must not delay the installation of SFRs. The plutonium production in MABB and AmBB does not allow reducing the use of axial breeding blankets. The impact of MA or Am transmutation over the high level waste disposal is more important if the SFRs are deployed later. Transmutation option (americium or all MA) does not have a significant impact on the number of canister produced nor on its long-term thermal properties. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Data Processing Workflow for Fixed-wing Drone Based Radiation Mapping in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ) - 20119

April 2020 marks the 34. anniversary of the high-profile radiological release from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). The release of radioactive material from reactor number four began on the 26 April 1986 and continued over a period of about 10 days, releasing approximately 1700 PBq of radioactive material (including 85 PBq of 137-Cs) into the environment. To this day, the accident remains the most significant release of radioactive material since civil nuclear power generation began. In the years since the accident, automated and remote radiation monitoring technologies have advanced significantly in their capabilities. One such example of this is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in radiation mapping investigations. In April 2019, a team of scientists from the University of Bristol showcased a novel radiation mapping system within the CEZ, specifically aiming to map radiation over a large portion of the area immediately surrounding the ChNPP. Over six days of data collection, the system flew a total distance of 583.8 km, covering an area of 14.6 sq.km with an exceptional spatial resolution (sub 20 m/pixel). The work presented herein outlines and explains the data processing procedure to convert the raw data into 137-Cs activity (kBq/sq.m) and cesium-equivalent dose-rate (CED) at 1 m above ground level (μSv/hr). A demonstration of the validity of the method is demonstrated through the successful reduction of the raw data into a single linear relationship between the measured {sup 137}Cs net peak intensity and the {sup 137}Cs activity. (authors)

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Radiological Exposure Devices (RED) Technical Basis for Threat Profile

Facilities that manufacture, store or transport significant quantities of radiological material must protect against the risk posed by sabotage events. Much of the analysis of this type of event has been focused on the threat from a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty bomb" scenario, in which a malicious assailant would, by explosives or other means, loft a significant quantity of radioactive material into a plume that would expose and contaminate people and property. Although the consequences in cost and psychological terror would be severe, no intentional RDD terrorism events are on record. Conversely, incidents in which a victim or victims were maliciously exposed to a Radiological Exposure Device (RED), without dispersal of radioactive material, are well documented. This paper represents a technical basis for the threat profile related to the risk of nefarious use of an RED, including assailant and material characterization. Radioactive materials of concern are detailed in Appendix A.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Reuse of Material Containing Natural Radionuclides - 12444

Disposal of and use of wastes containing natural radioactive material (NORM) or technologically enhanced natural radioactive material (TENORM) with excessive natural background as a building material is very important in the supervision body activity. At the present time, the residents of Octyabrsky village are under resettlement. This village is located just near the Priargunsky mining and chemical combine (Ltd. 'PPGHO'), one of the oldest uranium mines in our country. The vacated wooden houses in the village are demolished and partly used as a building material. To address the issue of potential radiation hazard of the wooden beams originating from demolition of houses in Octyabrsky village, the contents of the natural radionuclides (K-40, Th-232, Ra-226, U- 238) are being determined in samples of the wooden beams of houses. The NORM contents in the wooden house samples are higher, on average, than their content in the reference sample of the fresh wood shavings, but the range of values is rather large. According to the classification of waste containing the natural radionuclides, its evaluation is based on the effective specific activity. At the effective specific activity lower 1.5 kBq/kg and gamma dose rate lower 70 μR/h, the material is not considered as waste and can be used in building by 1 - 3 classes depending upon A{sub eff} value. At 1.5 kBq/kg < A{sub eff} ≤ 4 kBq/kg (4 class), the wooden beams might be used for the purpose of the industrial building, if sum of ratios between the radionuclide specific activity and its specific activity of minimum significance is lower than unit. The material classified as the waste containing the natural radionuclides has A{sub eff} higher 1.5 kBq /kg, and its usage for the purpose of house-building and road construction is forbidden. As for the ash classification and its future usage, such usage is unreasonable, because, according to the provided material, more than 50% of ash samples are considered as radioactive waste containing natural radionuclides. All materials originated from demolition of houses in Octyabrsky village are subjected to the obligatory radiation control. The decision to use the wooden beams shall enter into force after agreement with the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision bodies. Conclusions: 1 - The wooden beam originated from the house demolition in Octyabrsky village might be used as the construction material only in case of compliance with the requirements of the regulatory documents, as well as under approval of the authorities responsible for the state sanitary and epidemiological supervision in this area. 2 - The industrial control is introduced to verify the compliance with the current regulations. 3 - The material originated from the house demolition might be used only if such usage does not cause increasing radiation exposure to the public. (authors)

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Nuclear Forensics for Irradiated Materials using Kernel Regression Models

The ultimate purpose of nuclear forensics is to locate the origin of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control used in nuclear security events such as classical forensics. For this purpose, some specific characteristics of interdicted materials (referred to as 'signatures') should be defined to compare the known sample database. In some cases, involved with irradiated material, the signatures could be specific amount of fission product inventory depending on reactor operational histories such as reactor type, initial enrichment, burn up rate of nuclear fuel and cooling period after irradiation in the reactor. In order to make inference model for irradiated material for nuclear forensics, we suggested 3 ways as follows; (i) analyzing ORIGEN produced nuclear substances for the fission product inventory, (ii) classifying the range of reactor type, (iii) predicting the operational history from the fission product inventory. In terms of nuclear substance analysis, the construction of spent fuel database has been internationally carried out since ITWG (Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group) was established in 1995. However, enough sample data cannot be obtained in Korea to determine reactor type and operational histories because analyzing nuclear substances have been limited due to the international regulation. Thus, this study does not mention how to obtain mass or ratios of nuclides for the spent fuel. We just have generated simulation sample data as a fission product inventory using ORIGEN to construct spent fuel database. When unidentified radioactive materials are discovered, it is assumed that mass or ratios of the nuclides are analyzed by certain methods which are available in Korea as well as other countries. Then, a reactor type is determined, and finally, regression model can locate the origin or source of the radioactive materials by inferring operational histories using the fission product inventory. There are some studies on the classification of reactor type using statistical methods. As a part of predicting the operational history, this paper focuses on the development of spent fuel inference algorithm for nuclear forensics to estimate reactor operational histories that reflect characteristics of a reactor from the fission product inventory. The spent fuel inference algorithm for nuclear forensics has been developed on the basis of Kernel Regression (KR) which can conditionally generate the estimated output data by giving weight depending on geometric distance between sample data and input data. Also the KR which comprises Auto-Associative KR and Inferential KR have some benefits that can estimate only using data without assumption for specific physical model and re-learning process. Auto-associative KR (AAKR) was used to sort out outliers of input data and Inferential KR (IKR) was carried out to predict the operational histories for spent fuel. All of regression algorithms were performed in R programming tool. From the validation of both AAKR and IKR, it is expected that kernel regression has enough accuracy to be applied to nuclear forensics for spent fuel. Once the nuclear substance is measured to fill the fission product inventory with a certain reactor type, this kernel regression algorithm would predict the operational histories of spent fuel with high accuracy. Finally, this information is expected to be useful to find the origin of irradiated materials. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

CODE ACCEPTANCE OF A NEW JOINING TECHNOLOGY FOR STORAGE CONTAINMENTS [REISSUE]

One of the activities associated with cleanup throughout the Department of Energy (DOE) complex is packaging radioactive materials into storage containers. Much of this work will be performed in high-radiation environments requiring fully remote operations, for which existing, proven systems do not currently exist. These conditions require a process that is capable of producing acceptable (defect-free) welds on a consistent basis; the need to perform weld repair, under fully-remote operations, can be extremely costly and time consuming. Current closure-welding technologies (fusion welding) are not well suited for this application and will present risk to cleanup cost and schedule. To address this risk, Fluor and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are proposing that a new and emerging joining technology, Friction Stir Welding (FSW), be considered for this work. FSW technology has been demonstrated in other industries (aerospace and marine) to produce near flaw-free welds on a consistent basis. FSW is judged capable of providing the needed performance for fully-remote closure welding of containers for radioactive materials for the following reasons: FSW is a solid-state process; material is not melted. FSW does not produce the type of defects associated with fusion welding, e.g., solidification-induced porosity, cracking, and distortion due to weld shrinkage. In addition, because FSW is a low-heat input process, material properties (mechanical, corrosion and environmental) experience less degradation in the heat affected zones than do fusion welds. When compared to fusion processes, FSW produces extremely high weld quality. FSW is performed using machine-tool technology. The equipment is simple and robust and well-suited for high radiation, fully-remote operations compared to the relatively complex equipment associated with fusion-welding processes. Additionally, for standard wall thicknesses of radioactive materials containers, the FSW process can perform the final closure in a single pass (GTAW requires multiple passes) resulting in increased productivity. The performance characteristics of FSW, Le., high weld quality, simple machine-tool equipment and increased welding efficiency, suggest that this new technology should be considered for radioactive materials packaging campaigns. FSW technology will require some development, adaptation for this application, along with several activities needed for commercialization. One of these activities will be to obtain approval from the governing construction code to use the FSW technology. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC) will govern this work; however, rules for the use of FSW are not currently addressed. A code case will be required, defining appropriate process variables within prescribed limits, and submitted to the Code for review/approval and incorporation.

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Implications of DOE O 1027 Guidance on Rad-NESHAP Programs

This presentation is for the national Radionuclide NESHAP meeting, an embedded topic of the 2012 Health Physics Society Annual Meeting in Sacramento, CA. The Radionuclide NESHAP program is responsible for measuring and reporting the amount of airborne radioactive material released from DOE facilities. The issue at hand is recent guidance put forth by the Department of Energy regarding threshold limits for Category 3 and Category 2 nuclear facilities. Updates to calculation methods have resulted in increased amounts of radioactive material allowed in inventory for facilities before they reach levels which require them to be categorized as a Category 2 or 3 nuclear facility. With larger radioactive material inventories, there may be a corresponding increase in overall facility emissions. This can have permitting and monitoring impacts for DOE sites, as well as political ramifications with citizen organizations. This presentation is intended to raise awareness of the new guidance and associated issues, and to stimulate discussion among DOE Radionuclide NESHAP representatives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Impact of different standard type A7A drum closure-ring practices on gasket contraction and bolt closure distance - 15621

The Department of Energy, the Savannah River National Laboratory, several manufacturers of specification drums, and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) are collaborating in the development of a guidance document for DOE contractors and vendors who wish to qualify containers to DOT 7A Type A requirements. Currently, the effort is focused on DOT 7A Type A 208-liter (55-gallons) drums with a standard 12-gauge bolted closure ring. The U.S. requirements, contained in Title 49, Part 178.350 'Specification 7A; general packaging, Type A specifies a competent authority review of the packaging is not required for the transport of (Class 7) radioactive material containing less than Type A quantities of radioactive material. For Type AF drums, a 4 ft. regulatory free drop must be performed, such that the drum 'suffers maximum damage.' Although the actual orientation is not defined by the specification, recent studies suggest that maximum damage would result from a shallow angle top impact, where kinetic energy is transferred to the lid, ultimately causing heavy damage to the lid, or even worse, causing the lid to come off. Since each vendor develops closure recommendations/procedures for the drums they manufacture, key parameters applied to drums during closing vary based on vendor. As part of the initial phase of the collaboration, the impact of the closure variants on the ability of the drum to suffer maximum damage is investigated. Specifically, closure testing is performed varying: 1) the amount of torque applied to the closure ring bolt; and, 2) stress relief protocol, including: a) weight of hammer; and, b) orientation that the hammer hits the closure ring. After closure, the amount of drum lid gasket contraction and the distance that the closure bolt moves through the closure ring is measured. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Impact of Different Standard Type A7A Drum Closure-Ring Practices on Gasket Contraction and Bolt Closure Distance– 15621

The Department of Energy, the Savannah River National Laboratory, several manufacturers of specification drums, and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) are collaborating in the development of a guidance document for DOE contractors and vendors who wish to qualify containers to DOT 7A Type A requirements. Currently, the effort is focused on DOT 7A Type A 208-liter (55-gallons) drums with a standard 12-gauge bolted closure ring. The U.S. requirements, contained in Title 49, Part 178.350 “Specification 7A; general packaging, Type A specifies a competent authority review of the packaging is not required for the transport of (Class 7) radioactive material containing less than Type A quantities of radioactive material. For Type AF drums, a 4 ft. regulatory free drop must be performed, such that the drum “suffers maximum damage.” Although the actual orientation is not defined by the specification, recent studies suggest that maximum damage would result from a shallow angle top impact, where kinetic energy is transferred to the lid, ultimately causing heavy damage to the lid, or even worse, causing the lid to come off. Since each vendor develops closure recommendations/procedures for the drums they manufacture, key parameters applied to drums during closing vary based on vendor. As part of the initial phase of the collaboration, the impact of the closure variants on the ability of the drum to suffer maximum damage is investigated. Specifically, closure testing is performed varying: 1) the amount of torque applied to the closure ring bolt; and, 2) stress relief protocol, including: a) weight of hammer; and, b) orientation that the hammer hits the closure ring. After closure, the amount of drum lid gasket contraction and the distance that the closure bolt moves through the closure ring is measured.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Radiation Safety of Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are used in a wide variety of occupational settings and under differing regulatory/licensing structures. The definition of a sealed radioactive source varies between US regulatory authorities and standard-setting organizations. Potential problems with sealed sources cover a range of risks and impacts. The loss of control of high activity sealed sources can result in very high or even fatal doses to members of the public who come in contact with them. Sources that are not adequately sealed, and that fail, can cause spread of contamination and potential intake of radioactive material. There is also the possibility that sealed sources may be (or threatened to be) used for terrorist purposes and disruptive opportunities. Until fairly recently, generally-licensed sealed sources and devices received little, if any, regulatory oversight, and were often forgotten, lost or unaccounted for. Nonetheless, generally licensed devices can contain fairly significant quantities of radioactive material and there is some potential for exposure if a device is treated in a way that it was never designed. Industrial radiographers use and handle high activity and/or high-dose rate sealed sources in the field with a high degree of independence and minimal regulatory oversight. Failure to follow operational procedures and properly handle radiography sources can and has resulted in serious injuries and death. Industrial radiographers have experienced a disproportionately large fraction of incidents that result in unintended exposure to radiation. Sources do not have to contain significant quantities of radioactive material to cause problems in the event of their failure. A loss of integrity can cause the spread of contamination and potential exposure to workers and members of the public. The NCRP has previously provided recommendations on select aspects of sealed source programs. Future efforts to provide recommendations for sealed source programs are discussed.

radioactive material↗

Complete Documentation of Applicable Regulations and Regulatory Authority for Transportation

This report fulfills the M4 milestone M4MR-20PN0303023, “Complete Documentation of Applicable Regulations and Regulatory Authority for Transportation. Microreactors are very small nuclear reactors with a power output of 20MWe or less and are designed to be factory-built, modular in nature, and highly portable. The objective of this report is to identify and document applicable regulations, the appropriate regulatory authority, and the associated framework for microreactor transport. Sections 2 and 3 of this report summarize U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC regulations related to the transportation of Class 7 (radioactive) materials. These sections concentrate on the transport of fissile material packages and Type B packages, which would be most applicable to the transport of a microreactor before and after irradiation. Section 4 summarizes DOE hazardous and radioactive material transportation regulations. Section 5 summarizes U.S. Coast Guard regulations related to the transport of radioactive material. Section 6 discusses state requirements for the permitting of oversize and/or overweight truck shipments. Section 7 presents detailed schedules of requirements for transporting fissile material packages and Type B packages based on NRC and DOT regulations. The schedules are presented in a two-column format, the right column is the regulatory requirement and the left column is the citation of the regulation in which the requirement is found.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Second Line of Defense Program, Secondary Screening Operations Field Data Collection

Secondary screening is a key component of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program’s capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The primary detection system—the radiation portal monitor—makes alarm decisions based on gross counts of gamma and neutron radiation; it is able to provide little other information regarding what may have caused an elevated radiation level. Conducting a proper secondary screening with an instrument capable of identifying radioisotopes is the only way to determine what radioactive material is present—most importantly if it is a threat material. Only by knowing the radioactive material can a prudent decision be made with regard to disposition and response—and can the mistaken release of a threat be avoided.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NORM in Building Materials: A Case Study in Releasing and Disposing of Building Debris within the DOE System - 18123

In 2013, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum 2013-02, clarifying its 'Freeze the Footprint' policy. Memorandum 2013-02 requires that all federal agencies maintain or reduce their total square footage, within each subsequent year, from a FY2012 baseline. Memorandum 2013-02 also requires that total square footage remain constant with respect to the type/intended use of a building. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), this means that new construction cannot occur without demolition of equivalent (both in type and square footage) building(s). Since 2013, decommissioning and demolition of aging, unused facilities at LANL has increased. In 2016, the TA16-280 building complex was scheduled for demolition. TA16-280 is a former high explosives (HE) processing facility that consists of six buildings connected to each other via weatherproof walkways. It was constructed in the 1950's and has been subsequently used for HE shipping, receiving, and storage. Interviews with radiation protection staff suggest that some of the buildings within the complex may have been used to store depleted uranium metal parts in a non-dispersible form. It is LANL policy to conduct decommissioning surveys for radioactive materials when building history cannot confirm that a structure is radiologically non-impacted. LANL follows the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) process to develop its surveys and clear structures from radiological control. After clearance, a structure may be dispositioned as non-regulated waste, at a significant cost savings compared to regulated disposition pathways such as low-level waste. MARSAME measurements conducted in the 16-280 complex were elevated compared to reference measurements of surrogate materials, and a majority of the survey units failed to pass indistinguishable from background (IFB), which is LANL's unregulated clearance criteria. Further measurements conducted both in situ and in the laboratory indicated the presence of naturally-occurring thorium in several building materials including: poured concrete, the glaze atop ceramic blast tiles, and the porcelain enamel on the exterior of blast-proof ceiling lamps. Other than naturally-occurring thorium, there were no elevated radionuclide concentrations detected in building materials. It should be noted that there was no history of thorium use in the 16-280 complex, and the material in question was in all cases fixed to and within the building materials in question. Except in certain specific cases, such material is exempt from regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [3], as amended, and is therefore exempt from regulation under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and agreement state regulatory frameworks. Despite this regulatory exemption, disposition of material from the 16-280 complex proved to be challenging, principally because local industrial landfills stipulate 'No radioactive material' in their Waste Acceptance Criteria. This disconnect between what is regulated and what is disposable creates a situation where some DOE sites find it easier to disposition property as Low Level Waste in lieu of pursuing a non-regulated disposition pathway. This presentation will explore the specifics of the 16-280 decommissioning project as well as the implications of the release/disposition disconnect for naturally occurring radioactive material and project planning at LANL. (authors)

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EVALUATION OF TROQUE VS CLOSURE BOLT PRELOAD FOR A TYPICAL CONTAINMENT VESSEL UNDER SERVICE CONDITIONS

Radioactive material package containment vessels typically employ bolted closures of various configurations. Closure bolts must retain the lid of a package and must maintain required seal loads, while subjected to internal pressure, impact loads and vibration. The need for insuring that the specified preload is achieved in closure bolts for radioactive materials packagings has been a continual subject of concern for both designers and regulatory reviewers. The extensive literature on threaded fasteners provides sound guidance on design and torque specification for closure bolts. The literature also shows the uncertainty associated with use of torque to establish preload is typically between 10 and 35%. These studies have been performed under controlled, laboratory conditions. The ability to insure required preload in normal service is, consequently, an important question. The study described here investigated the relationship between indicated torque and resulting bolt load for a typical radioactive materials package closure using methods available under normal service conditions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

RadCat 3.0 user guide.

RADTRAN is an internationally accepted program and code for calculating the risks of transporting radioactive materials. The first versions of the program, RADTRAN I and II, were developed for NUREG-0170 (USNRC, 1977), the first environmental statement on transportation of radioactive materials. RADTRAN and its associated software have undergone a number of improvements and advances consistent with improvements in both available data and computer technology. The version of RADTRAN currently bundled with RadCat is RADTRAN 6.0. This document provides a detailed discussion and a guide for the use of the RadCat 3.0 Graphical User Interface input file generator for the RADTRAN code. RadCat 3.0 integrates the newest analysis capabilities of RADTRAN 6.0 which includes an economic model, updated loss-of-lead shielding model, and unit conversion. As of this writing, the RADTRAN version in use is RADTRAN 6.0.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Rare Earth Element Fingerprints for Distinguishing Between Site-Related Wastes and Background - 19441

Actinides such as uranium, thorium and radium are known to be present in sites associated with various phases of the cold war weapons research, development and production. Remediation of these sites as well as others associated with chemical plants that may have generated radioactive actinide-containing wastes have been the focus of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) for the past 20 years. The goal is to remediate a site to established cleanup standards as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. For radiologically-contaminated sites, one potential challenge is the presence of non-FUSRAP media such as naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM) or technologically-enhanced naturally-occurring radioactive material (TENORM), from non-FUSRAP sources, at concentrations exceeding site cleanup standards. Such NORM and TENORM, and even byproduct radionuclides from other unrelated activities on or near the site, can be mistaken for project waste and thus incur significant additional excavation and waste transport and disposal costs. Past studies have provided examples of NORM and non-FUSRAP waste and described strategies to distinguish them from FUSRAP waste. This paper describes various sources of NORM, summarizes the types of project-related waste at some active FUSRAP sites, and identifies TENORM sites from which radionuclides could possibly migrate via various environmental pathways to nearby FUSRAP sites. The authors also examine two Case Studies that calculate distinctive elemental ratios and are examples of tools which may be used for distinguishing FUSRAP waste from other radionuclides present in natural or other man-made contributors to background. Case Study I examines two bodies of data and calculates distinctive elemental ratios between pairs of rare earth elements (REE) to see if significant differences may exist between such ratios in unregulated coal ash residue, common in fill in well-established towns and cities, and FUSRAP waste. The first group of data, consisting of eighteen sample results, was obtained from the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site's historical data while the second was obtained from a paper which provided extensive data (more than 100 samples) on the REE content in fly ash residues from three major coal-producing areas in the United States. This example illustrates statistically significant differences in five of six REE ratios and thus provides a potential tool for distinguishing FUSRAP waste from coal ash-based NORM. Case Study II examines differences in the mean REE:Actinide and REE:REE ratios in Welsbach-impacted sample results to distinguish project waste from background. While the purpose of this study was to distinguish project waste from background levels of the radionuclides of concern (ROC), it provides a good example of how one or more ratios could potentially be used to distinguish FUSRAP waste from NORM. Lastly, the authors recommend that future projects ensure robust characterization, that considers all potential radionuclide contributors from both FUSRAP activities as well as from other contributors to background for the region during the Planning Phase of the Data Life Cycle described within the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). It is expected that the incremental characterization sampling and analysis costs will be dwarfed by potential savings from efforts to better delineate and limit remediation to FUSRAP wastes rather than other potentially unregulated contributors to regional background. Other agencies or commercial entities with radiological environmental liabilities similar to FUSRAP would benefit from similar considerations of REEs and other radionuclides that could contribute to regional background. (authors)

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Demonstration (DEMO) of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system for tracking and monitoring of nuclear materials.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) [Environmental Management (EM), Office of Packaging and Transportation (EM-45)] Packaging Certification Program (PCP) has developed a radiofrequency identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring system for the management of nuclear materials packages during storage and transportation. The system, developed by the PCP team at Argonne National Laboratory, involves hardware modification, application software development, secured database and web server development, and irradiation experiments. In April 2008, Argonne tested key features of the RFID tracking and monitoring system in a weeklong, 1700 mile (2736 km) demonstration employing 14 empty type B fissile material drums of three designs (models 9975, 9977 and ES-3100) that have been certified for shipment by the DOE and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The demonstration successfully integrated global positioning system (GPS) technology for vehicle tracking, satellite/cellular (general packet radio service, or GPRS) technologies for wireless communication, and active RFID tags with multiple sensors (seal integrity, shock, temperature, humidity and battery status) on drums. In addition, the demonstration integrated geographic information system (GIS) technology with automatic alarm notifications of incidents and generated buffer zone reports for emergency response and management of staged incidents. The demonstration was sponsored by EM and the US National Nuclear Security Administration, with the participation of Argonne, Savannah River and Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Over 50 authorised stakeholders across the country observed the demonstration via secured Internet access. The DOE PCP and national laboratories are working on several RFID system implementation projects at selected DOE sites, as well as continuing device and systems development and widening applications beyond DOE sites and possibly beyond nuclear materials to include other radioactive materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MO-AB-201-01: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗