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At least 289 records · Page 16

Enabling Space Exploration Medical System Development Using a Tool Ecosystem

The NASA Human Research Program’s (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element is utilizing a Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to enhance the development of systems engineering products that will be used to advance medical system designs for exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit. In support of future missions, the team is capturing content such as system behaviors, functional decompositions, architecture, system requirements and interfaces, and recommendations for clinical capabilities and resources in Systems Modeling Language (SysML) models. As these products mature, SysML models provide a way for ExMC to capture relationships among the various products, which includes supporting more integrated and multi-faceted views of future medical systems. In addition to using SysML models, HRP and ExMC are developing supplementary tools to support two key functions: 1) prioritizing current and future research activities for exploration missions in an objective manner; and 2) enabling risk-informed and evidence-based trade space analysis for future space vehicles, missions, and systems. This paper will discuss the long-term HRP and ExMC vision for the larger ecosystem of tools, which include dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) capabilities, additional SysML models, a database of system component options, and data visualizations. It also includes a review of an initial Pilot Project focused on enabling medical system trade studies utilizing data that is coordinated across tools for consistent outputs (e.g., mission risk metrics that are associated with medical system mass values and medical conditions addressed). This first Pilot Project demonstrated successful operating procedures and integration across tools. Finally, the paper will also cover a second Pilot Project that utilizes tool enhancements such as medical system optimization capabilities, post-processing, and visualization of generated data for subject matter expert review, and increased integration amongst the tools themselves.

Amador, Jennifer R.↗

Enabling Space Exploration Medical System Development Using a Tool Ecosystem

The NASA Human Research Program's (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element is utilizing a Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to enhance the development of systems engineering products that will be used to advance medical system designs for exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit. In support of future missions, the team is capturing content such as system behaviors, functional decompositions, architecture, system requirements and interfaces, and recommendations for clinical capabilities and resources in Systems Modeling Language (SysML) models. As these products mature, SysML models provide a way for ExMC to capture relationships among the various products, which includes supporting more integrated and multi-faceted views of future medical systems. In addition to using SysML models, HRP and ExMC are developing supplementary tools to support two key functions: 1) prioritizing current and future research activities for exploration missions in an objective manner; and 2) enabling risk-informed and evidence-based trade space analysis for future space vehicles, missions, and systems. This paper will discuss the long-term HRP and ExMC vision for the larger ecosystem of tools, which include dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) capabilities, additional SysML models, a database of system component options, and data visualizations. It also includes a review of an initial Pilot Project focused on enabling medical system trade studies utilizing data that is coordinated across tools for consistent outputs (e.g., mission risk metrics that are associated with medical system mass values and medical conditions addressed). This first Pilot Project demonstrated successful operating procedures and integration across tools. Finally, the paper will also cover a second Pilot Project that utilizes tool enhancements such as medical system optimization capabilities, post-processing, and visualization of generated data for subject matter expert review, and increased integration amongst the tools themselves.

Amador, Jennifer R.↗

Risk-Informed Analysis for an Enhanced Resilient PWR with ATF, FLEX, and Passive Cooling

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during the fiscal year (FY) 2019 for the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk-Informed System Analysis (RISA) Pathway, Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) Systems research. The purpose of the RISA Pathway research and development is to support plant owner-operator decisions with the aim to improve the economics, reliability, and maintain the high levels of safety of current nuclear power plants over periods of extended plant operations. The concept of ERP refers to the combinations of Accident Tolerant Fuel (ATF), optimal use of Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategy (FLEX), enhancements to plant components and systems, and the incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, as well as improved fuel cycle efficiency. The objective of the ERP research effort is to use the RISA methods and toolkit in industry applications, including methods development and early demonstration of technologies, in order to enhance existing reactors safety features (both active and passive) and to substantially reduce operating costs through risk-informed approaches to plant design modifications to the plant and their characterization. The FY 2019 efforts documented in this report is an extension of those conducted in FY 2018. The same analysis process, risk analysis approaches, and analysis tools as in FY 2018 are used for near-term ATF cladding [i.e., Iron-Chromium-Aluminum (FeCrAl) cladding and Chromium (Cr) coated cladding] designs under the postulated loss of feedwater (LOFW) and steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident scenarios. In addition, FLEX analysis was presented for an overview of FLEX equipment and strategies implemented in nuclear industry after Fukushima accident. A FLEX model was developed and incorporated into the generic SAPHIRE model to assess the risk impact from FLEX. FLEX HRA analysis was performed which suggested an approach to HRA with FLEX strategies. Passive cooling system analysis includes an overview of the DNC system, the RELAP5-3D simulations of the DNC system in selected SBO scenarios, and the evaluation of the DNC system risk impact using the generic PRA model.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

METHODOLOGY AND APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON DYNAMIC FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELING

This paper describes ongoing work within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to optimize security and cost of nuclear power plants (NPPs). It reviews the conservatisms in conventional physical security posture and regulations. It introduces the dynamic risk assessment tool developed at INL, Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The dynamic assessment methodology leverages EMRALD to process results of force-on-force (FOF) simulations and crediting safety mitigation actions from probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models as well as diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) mitigation strategies. Timing information from these simulations are compared against the available time to perform mitigations obtained from Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5) simulations. To illustrate the methodology, a station blackout (SBO) attack scenario was modeled in commercially available FOF simulation tools. The simulation results provide valuable insights into possible attack outcomes and as the probabilistic risk of a core damage event given these outcomes. Safety mitigation procedures were modeled in EMRALD, and were dependent on the attack outcomes by considering human operator uncertainties. RELAP5 simulations incorporating human and hardware uncertainties were performed to estimate the distribution of time-to-core damage. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, plant mitigation strategies provide significantly high-likelihood of preventing radiological release. The proposed modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Performance Risk Model Validation with Operationally Relevant Tasks

Human Research Program aims to develop methods to support astronauts’ health and productivity during spaceflight. The Crew Health and Performance Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team uses powerful computational methods to predict mission risk in both domains: medical and performance. Here, we show how CHP-PRA uses the Performance Risk Model (PRisM) to quantify the performance risk and show an application of the model on operationally relevant tasks. There are various metrics adopted across performance researchers that PRisM can accommodate. For data analysis, interpretation, and integration, we use a method of unifying data from multiple sources by converting each to a single metric. We consult subject matter experts prior to integrating the converted data into PRisM. The method we use is inspired by the Cooper-Harper rating scale [1]. Using this unified metric, we can easily combine data from various tests and lab groups. We explain our conversion method in detail and show how it pertains to the process of testing and validation of PRisM on operational tasks. We conducted an initial validation in collaboration with the Behavioral Health and Performance (BHP) lab. We test PRisM using data on their operationally relevant task ROBoT-r, a track-and-capture task for grappling incoming resupply vehicles [2]. Several other labs at NASA Johnson Space Center worked together to design 7 Functional Task Tests (FTTs) in pursuit of simulating the tasks required after landing on a planetary surface and after return to Earth [3]. Here we use the results from both ROBoT-r and the 7 FTTs and compare their experiment data to PRisM’s computational output to demonstrate how PRisM can support operations by predicting crew performance on future missions.

performance modeling↗

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Modeling In-Space Aborts for NASA Human Exploration Missions

NASA is developing new capabilities to send humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) for the first time in several decades with the new Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion spacecraft and Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle. As part of these capabilities, NASA is developing means to terminate missions prior to reaching mission destinations in order to save the crew in the event of critical life-threatening failures. This abort capability exists for both ascent and in-space operations. While the risk associated with ascent aborts has been modeled in detail, less has been done in the area of in-space aborts (e.g. Apollo 13). Recent efforts have started to better assess the risk associated with in-space aborts. This paper will describe these efforts. The in-space abort model described in this paper is part of a larger Cross-Program PRA (XPRA) model of exploration missions planned in the next few years to the vicinity of the Moon. The model consists of linked event trees and fault trees and associated rules built using the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) tool. This model structure is being built with flexibility in mind in order to perform risk trades and further expansion of the model.

Bigler, Mark A.↗

Modeling the Risk of U.S. Offshore Oil & Gas Exploration-Well Drilling, Commercial Nuclear Plants, and Human Spaceflight

Nuclear power, offshore oil & gas exploration, and human spaceflight all have high consequence potential if something goes wrong. Each has had at least one major incident that pointed to a need for improved risk assessment. Careful risk analysis is very important for technologies having complexity, uncertainty, and high consequence potential. All rely on multiple barriers/controls/redundancy to minimize risk. NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has moved towards risk informed regulation with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as a major input.

PRA↗

Integration of Human Reliability Analysis Models into the Simulation-Based Framework for the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Toolkit

This report presents an application of a computation-based human reliability analysis (HRA) framework called the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER). HUNTER has been developed not as a standalone HRA method but rather as framework that ties together different HRA methods to model dynamic risk of human activities as part of an overall probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). While we have adopted particular methods to build an initial model, the HUNTER framework is meant to be intrinsically flexible to new pieces that achieve particular modeling goals. In the present report, the HUNTER implementation has the following goals: • Integration with a high fidelity thermal-hydraulic model capable of modeling nuclear power plant behaviors and transients • Consideration of a PRA context • Incorporation of a solid psychological basis for operator performance • Demonstration of a functional dynamic model of a plant upset condition and appropriate operator response This report outlines these efforts and presents the case study of a station blackout scenario to demonstrate the various modules developed to date under the HUNTER research umbrella.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Advanced Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Technical Exchange Meeting

During FY13, the INL developed an advanced SMR PRA framework which has been described in the report Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Detailed Technical Framework Specification, INL/EXT-13-28974 (April 2013). In this framework, the various areas are considered: Probabilistic models to provide information specific to advanced SMRs Representation of specific SMR design issues such as having co-located modules and passive safety features Use of modern open-source and readily available analysis methods Internal and external events resulting in impacts to safety All-hazards considerations Methods to support the identification of design vulnerabilities Mechanistic and probabilistic data needs to support modeling and tools In order to describe this framework more fully and obtain feedback on the proposed approaches, the INL hosted a technical exchange meeting during August 2013. This report describes the outcomes of that meeting.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Systematic Enterprise Risk Management by Integrating the RISMC Toolkit and Cost-Benefit Analysis (Final Report)

The goal of this research is to theorize and quantify the relationships between safety and the financial performance of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The Socio-Technical Risk Analysis (SoTeRiA) theoretical framework, which connects the social aspects (e.g., safety culture) and structural features (e.g., safety practices) of an organization with organizational safety and financial risks, is used to theorize the direct and indirect relationships between safety and the financial performance of NPPs. An Integrated Enterprise Risk Management (I-ERM) methodological framework is developed to operationalize SoTeRiA to quantify NPP safety and financial performance in a unified platform where their underlying physical degradation mechanisms, coupled with maintenance performance (considering human and organizational factors), are explicitly incorporated to depict the interconnections and dependencies between safety and financial performance. In this study, NPP safety refers to both occupational safety and system safety (estimated from Probabilistic Risk Assessment, PRA), and financial performance refers to the monetary values associated with NPP operation and maintenance (O&M) strategies. This report covers a case study demonstrating the feasibility of the I-ERM methodological framework. More detailed development of one of the I-ERM modules, i.e., Probabilistic Physics-of-Failure (PPoF) analysis, and its connection with other I-ERM modules is demonstrated in a second case study. The outcome of this research will help NPP decision-makers create cost-saving maintenance strategies while maintaining safety by providing cost- and risk-informed recommendations regarding maintenance work processes and operational strategies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

External Impact Effects on Operational Availability ESMO Experience

Presentation to support a Summit/TIM with various Stakeholders (Ground and Flight) to perform a GAP analysis associated with ground and spacecraft maintenance, maintainability, and availability activities in order to identify missing Agency planning and guidance materials.

Simulation↗

Improving Limit Surface Search Algorithms in RAVEN Using Acceleration Schemes: Level II Milestone

The RAVEN code is becoming a comprehensive tool to perform Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA); Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) and Propagation; and Verification and Validation (V&V). The RAVEN code is being developed to support the Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway by developing an advanced set of methodologies and algorithms for use in advanced risk analysis. The RISMC approach uses system simulator codes applied to stochastic analysis tools. The fundamental idea behind this coupling approach to perturb (by employing sampling strategies) timing and sequencing of events, internal parameters of the system codes (i.e., uncertain parameters of the physics model) and initial conditions to estimate values ranges and associated probabilities of figures of merit of interest for engineering and safety (e.g. core damage probability, etc.). This approach applied to complex systems such as nuclear power plants requires performing a series of computationally expensive simulation runs. The large computational burden is caused by the large set of (uncertain) parameters characterizing those systems. Consequently, exploring the uncertain/parametric domain, with a good level of confidence, is generally not affordable, considering the limited computational resources that are currently available. In addition, the recent tendency to develop newer tools, characterized by higher accuracy and larger computational resources (if compared with the presently used legacy codes, that have been developed decades ago), has made this issue even more compelling. In order to overcome to these limitations, the strategy for the exploration of the uncertain/parametric space needs to use at best the computational resources focusing the computational effort in those regions of the uncertain/parametric space that are “interesting” (e.g., risk-significant regions of the input space) with respect the targeted Figures Of Merit (FOM): for example, the failure of the system, subject of the analysis. These methodologies are named, in the RAVEN environment, adaptive sampling strategies. These methodologies infer system responses from surrogate models constructed from already existing samples (produced using high fidelity simulations) and suggest the most relevant location (coordinate in the input space) of the next sampling point to be explored in the uncertain/parametric domain. When using those methodologies, it is possible to understand features of the system response with a small number of carefully selected samples. This report focuses on the development and improvement of the limit surface search. The limit surface is an important concept in system reliability analysis. Without going into the details, which will be covered later in the report, the limit surface could be briefly described as an hyper-surface in the system uncertainty/parametric space separating the regions leading to a prescribed system outcome. For example, if the uncertainty/parametric space is the one generated by the reactor power level and the duration of the batteries, the system is a nuclear power plant and the system outcome discriminating variable is the clad failure in a station blackout scenario, then the limit surface separates the combinations of reactor power level and battery duration that lead to clad failure from the ones that do not.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Modeling FLEX Human Actions Using the EMRALD Dynamic Risk Assessment Tool

Most current efforts have modified and applied existing human reliability analysis (HRA) methods to treat human actions related to beyond-design-basis external events in which diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) equipment would be deployed. However, many questions remain regarding the suitability of legacy HRA methods to address FLEX human actions, sparking the need for a new method of reasonably evaluating them. In this context, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) researched a relatively new approach to treating FLEX human actions via Event Modeling Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) software. EMRALD was developed to support the increasing need for dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models that can respond to evolving plant conditions during simulations. A couple benefits were identified when analyzing FLEX human actions through this software. In general, it is especially useful for evaluating a strategy’s feasibility, including FLEX human actions that require a relatively long time to perform. In this paper, we suggest how FLEX human actions can be modeled using the EMRALD software. Two different HRA modeling approaches using EMRALD are introduced: (1) procedure-based modeling and (2) PRA/HRA-based modeling. The former approach was introduced in the authors’ previous paper, whereas this paper mainly discusses how the latter approach works for an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) scenario with relevant procedures and PRA models. A hybrid method combining the two modeling approaches is introduced at the paper’s conclusion.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗

Decision Support Tool for Solar Energy Cybersecurity Policy and Regulation

The Decision Support Tool helps users address four discrete challenges: (1) complex requirements of relevant codes and standards, (2) technical complexity of solar assets, (3) undefined cyber risk severity, and (4) unclear roles and responsibilities. Content includes an analysis of cyber vulnerability risks, a decision support resource for policymakers to mitigate cyber risks to solar photovoltaic systems, and background resources for informing policy development. A key component of this tool is the Probable Risk Assessment (PRA), based on established, formal variables, models, and consequences, which helps users understand the determined risk and assigned ownership of the physical components. It helps states draw logical lines between vulnerabilities and mitigative solutions, of which some have been further detailed as Cybersecurity Advisory Team for State Solar (CATSS) tools.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗