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In explosive joining technique, adapter flange from fuel channel machined to incorporate a V-notch interface. Ribbon explosive, 1/2 inch (1.3 cm) in width, drives V-notched wall of adapter into bellows assembly, producing atomic-level metallurgical bond. Ribbon charge yields joint with double parent metal strength.
Large containment capsule for nuclear reactor irradiation of explosive materials
The response of high explosives to shock loading is traditionally measured with a steady loading pressure. In many accident scenarios involving fragment impact, however, a loading duration that is shorter than the build up to detonation may occur. Fragments passing through multiple materials before reaching a high explosive charge may produce loading that is comprised of more than one shock wave. Additionally, the build up to detonation in high explosive corner turning loads the explosive a short duration pressure pulse, since rarefactions can often rapidly overtake the reactive wave. For these reasons, we have studied the response of the insensitive high explosive (IHE) materials PBX 9502 and LX-17 to complex loadings of varied intensity and duration. We refer to a single loading of limited duration as a “thin pulse”, whereas more complex scenarios were studied with an impactor that produces a double shock in the explosive. The following report presents experimental data and analyses of thin pulse shock initiation and double shock experiments designed to guide development of models of Insensitive High Explosives (IHEs) under controlled one-dimensional conditions relevant to accident scenarios and corner turning. Thin pulse shock initiation data on PBX 9502 and LX-17 were obtained under varied pulse duration, pressed density, and temperature conditions in order to probe various parameters essential for the development of a physics-based Cheetah reactive flow hotspot model. In situ pressure gauges provide insight into the degree of reaction in the explosive that are not obtainable with optical PDV measurements or distance measurements such as run to detonation. Double shock data was obtained to inform a Composition Aware Cheetah model which can be applied to any TATB-based IHEs. This model supports efforts to find a new IHE formulation and potentially incorporate new binders into IHE formulations. Simulations of each experiment are included to demonstrate the utility of these focused experiments to developing models of HE behavior. One-dimensional gas gun experiments are essential for characterizing shocked HE behavior and informing HE models.
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In this work we highlight a preliminary temporal source analysis of the six declared Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear tests. We use regional seismic data to estimate relative source time functions (RSTFs) via iterative time-domain deconvolution (Ammon, 2006; Pippin, 2022) of vertical-component ground motions recorded within 2000 km of the source region. Since RSTFs are ideally independent of site and propagation effects, their amplitude spectrum is equivalent to the source spectral ratio, but they also retain phase information. We compare observed RSTFs (in the time and frequency domains) with synthetic RSTFs derived from the Mueller & Murphy (1971) explosion source model. The resolution of these time functions varies, however, we generally obtain high-quality results within the limitations of the recording broadband instrumentation. The results indicate that this method effectively preserves source time-history information that can be used for temporal analysis of remote nuclear explosions. This preliminary analysis is intended to assess the viability of using time-domain deconvolution methods for extracting temporal source information.
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The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)
The United States faces an ever-increasingly multi-polar security environment dominated by great power competition with China and a lingering Russian threat as well as from would-be regional hegemons led by ambitions from Iran and North Korea. Our adversaries are pursuing and expanding the strategic means by-which they have an asymmetric offset (e.g., cyber, space, and other modes below the level of armed conflict). To combat and deter against the widening range of hostile actions, the U.S. must have additional capabilities with-which to deter. All of which drives us towards a more thoughtful integrated approach to deterrence, attempting to best align deterrent tools with the adversary actions in order to maximize the credibility of our deterrent. Such an approach complicates our deterrence strategy and demands a methodology to assess whether the U.S. has the deterrent tools necessary to deter the adversarial actions most costly to the U.S. To address this complexity, we create a framework to comprehensively and systematically assess our deterrent tools as qualitatively measured against the adversarial actions we wish to deter. Deterrence is ultimately an operation in the cognitive domain and at the heart of the framework presented here is the fundamental deterrence calculus which we use as the defining measure of whether a tool will credibly deter a given action. We describe the eight levers of the deterrence calculus and distill these levers to four products that are used to qualitatively assess the overall effectiveness of deterrence tools against adversarial actions. Credibility is determined by two principal variables: the technical credibility of the deterrent tool, and the principle of proportionality. Technical credibility of realized deterrence products is assessed through development of key mission requirements and hardware (e.g., components) that will impose costs, deny benefits, or encourage restraint. The principle of proportionality qualitatively asserts that for a deterrent tool to be cognitively credible, the costs imposed against, or benefits denied by, an action are commensurate to the magnitude of costs received from the adversarial action. By basing this framework on these two fundamentals, it is possible to compare deterrent tools in a systematic approach across the broad spectrum of hostile actions.
Compilation of data on craters produced by explosives
In 1996, negotiations between the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NNC), the U.S. Defense Special Weapons Administration (DSWA) and the U.S. Department of Energy led to an agreement for a joint series of experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site Semipalatinsk (STS). These experiments had a dual purpose: to close holes and tunnels originally created for the purpose of testing nuclear weapons, and to characterize explosive sources at a former nuclear test site. This report covers the recovery of legacy data from the experiments conduct in 1997 and 1998. Two teams collected data. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in collaboration with the NNC, collected the near-source (local) data out to approximately 20 km. Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO), with funding from Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL), also in collaboration with NNC, collected regional data, 200 – 1000 km distant, leveraging the KZ regional seismic network that LDEO had recently installed in collaboration with NNC. The two teams also worked together to some extent, regarding instrumentation and planning. This report primarily addresses the near-source data collected by the LANL/NNC team.
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives incidents require rapid detection and characterization for appropriate response. For a nuclear detonation, visible-light cameras may be used to locate the cloud and characterize fallout deposition when coupled with numerical models. Films from the United States’ nuclear testing era compose the only sizeable collection of imagery depicting high-yield detonations. These films offer unique insights into characteristics of flows involving scales that are difficult to replicate experimentally, and they are a valuable source of data for the validation of models for nuclear fallout transport, either as part of emergency response or forensic activities. In this work, we implement modern computer vision and machine learning techniques to identify and track the cloud automatically and subsequently determine the time dependence of some of its features. We trained a ResNet-18 image classifier on hundreds of images to categorize nuclear cloud morphology. Each category or cloud regime is determined by early cloud evolution and is associated to constitutive properties of the flow, such as distribution of vorticity. Next, we identified keypoint features using the KAZE algorithm and tracked these keypoints in the images, allowing us to determine the dimensions and velocities of the cloud across film frames. These measurements converted to real-world units provide valuable experimental data that can be used in the development and validation of nuclear cloud models. We compared the results of this method against manual cloud rise measurements from two different films. In one, our automated method accelerated the feature extraction process without sacrificing measurement accuracy.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Task Group 120 (TG120) is developing ICRP recommendations for radiological protection for a wide range of radiation accidents and malicious events, complementing those given in ICRP Publication 146 (2020) for large nuclear accidents. The scope includes accidents involving criticalities, operating faults, and fires and explosions in nuclear facilities, inadvertent damage to sealed radiation sources, as well as malicious events, such as sabotage of nuclear facilities or materials, use of radiological dispersal devices, the contamination of food and drinking water supplies, and the deployment of nuclear weapons. A template has been designed to collate relevant information on a wide range of case studies and hypothetical malicious scenarios to ensure that the recommendations developed are broadly applicable and comprehensive. For all scenarios, a graded approach to protection is being taken, accepting that specific guidance may be required for some distinctive aspects, for example, protection during times of armed conflict. This paper provides an overview of the scenarios and scope of the work of TG120, including some of the radiological and non-radiological impacts of radiation emergencies, along the response and recovery timeline.
Uranium metal is associated with several aspects of nuclear technology; it is used as fuel for research and power reactors, targets for medical isotope productions, explosive for nuclear weapons and precursors in synthetic chemistry. The study of uranium metal at the laboratory scale presents the opportunity to evaluate metallic nuclear fuels, develop new methods for metallic spent fuel reprocessing and advance the science relevant to nuclear forensics and medical isotope production. Since its first isolation in 1841, from the reaction of uranium chloride and potassium metal, uranium metal has been prepared by solid-state reactions and in solution by electrochemical, chemical and radiochemical methods. The present review summarizes the methods outlined above and describes the chemistry associated with each preparation.