Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “NONPROLIFERATION”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 289 records · Page 16

The NPR, NPT and the prospects for disarmament

In Prague's Hradcany Square on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama offered a bold vision of the nuclear future that encompasses both reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining, as long as nuclear weapons remain, a safe secure, and effective arsenal, to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America's security commitments. The agenda put forward in Prague involves the full range of issues from deterrence to nonproliferation and disarmament. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report, reflecting the twin objectives of the Prague speech, for the first time places the United States effort to lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at the top the U.S. nuclear agenda. This attention underscores the fact that the top priority of the United States is to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities and to stop terrorist groups from acquiring weapon-usable nuclear materials. It also reinforced the view that positively influencing the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a key objective of the Obama Administration. The NPR developed both the vision and the policy, but details of implementation will need to be developed and better understood. This paper will address the Nuclear Posture Review and its implementation, as well as it's relation to, and impact on, the NPT RevCon and the long term prospects for nonproliferation and disarmament.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

automated, nondestructive assay verification techn↗

SIGNATURES OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROCUREMENT NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY APPROACHES AND RESULTS

The illicit trafficking of strategic nuclear commodities (defined here as the goods needed for a covert nuclear program excluding special nuclear materials) poses a significant challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation community. Export control regulations, both domestically and internationally, seek to inhibit the spread of strategic nuclear commodities by restricting their sale to parties that may use them for nefarious purposes. However, export controls alone are not sufficient for preventing the illicit transfer of strategic nuclear goods. There are two major pitfalls to relying solely on export control regulations for the deterrence of proliferation of strategic goods. First, export control enforcement today relies heavily on the honesty and willingness of participants to adhere to the legal framework already in place. Secondly, current practices focus on the evaluation of single records which allow for the necessary goods to be purchased separately and hidden within the thousands of legitimate commerce transactions that occur each day, disregarding strategic information regarding several purchases. Our research presents two preliminary data-centric approaches for investigating procurement networks of strategic nuclear commodities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been putting significant effort into nonproliferation activities as an institution, both in terms of the classical nuclear material focused approach and in the examination of other strategic goods necessary to implement a nuclear program. In particular, the PNNL Signature Discovery Initiative (SDI) has codified several scientific methodologies for the detection, characterization, and prediction of signatures that are indicative of a phenomenon of interest. The methodologies and tools developed under SDI have already been applied successfully to problems in bio-forensics, cyber security and power grid balancing efforts and they have now made the nonproliferation of strategic goods into a challenge problem for testing their methodology and tools. As a first step towards the detection and characterization of illicit procurement networks, our research examines procurement networks as defined by a system of entities (people or companies) that enter into transactions of specific items with one another. Once we have defined such networks, we are interested in answering questions about the behavior and characterization of such networks. The questions we wish to answer regarding procurement networks are, first, “Can we detect networks within large, noisy datasets?” and second, “To what extent can we compare multiple networks and identify their similarities?” As procurement networks can be naturally viewed as a graph, we have employed several graph analytic tools to aid in these tasks. In particular, Graphscape, an SDI tool, uses a novel method to approximate edit distance, a graph distance measure based on the number of changes needed to transform one graph into another, in order to measure how similar two given graphs are to each other. Given a set of graphs where vertices represent companies and edges represent a shipment from company A to company B, we can calculate an all-for-all comparison of graphs. In this way, we are able to determine which graphs are most similar, and which require more changes to transform one into the other. The set of graphs to be compared can be further specialized to provide more insight, e.g., using different time periods to explore events in a company life cycle.

graph analysis↗

Toward a Multimodal-Deep Learning Retrieval System for Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation Activities

As the amount of available data increases, the human ability to locate, process, and analyze it is strained and eventually overwhelmed. To address this challenge for nonproliferation analysts, the authors have been creating a large-scale multimodal retrieval system to help analysts triage and search open source science, technology, and news data for indicators of nuclear proliferation capabilities and activities. The system relies on a set of deep neural networks (DNNs) trained to evaluate conceptual similarities across data modalities, such as text, image, and video. These DNNs can be used to search and prioritize data, according to a nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) process template, that are conceptually closest to the seed query items regardless of data modality. The DNNs have been trained to map conceptually related words, sentences, and images to nearby points in a multimodal feature space, enabling intra- and intermodal retrieval via nearest-neighbor calculations to seed query points. The authors evaluate the system’s ability to retrieve NFC-related data that have been purposely hidden in collections of unrelated background data. They demonstrate quantitative and qualitative results for text-to-image, image-to-image, and image-to-video retrievals. This paper discusses data challenges confronting nonproliferation analysts, describes the DNNs designed to retrieve multimodal data that are proximal in the semantic space, and demonstrates their effectiveness by applying the DNNs to nonproliferation-specific multimodal data sets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution researchers; (3) openness to and ease of access by international users working through U.S. government sponsoring agencies; and (4) the availability of requisite infrastructure to support research, testing and demonstration. While there is still work to do in closing the gap between material accessibility and demand, the steps taken by INL to date begin to address this important challenge.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of nuclear safeguards infrastructure in countries with credible plans for nuclear energy as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. Developing an adequate safeguards infrastructure is critical to becoming a responsible 'owner' of nuclear power. The 3S concept is the optimal path forward to achieving this goal.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Market-based Policies for Non-Proliferation

Access to weapons-useable fissile material—highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium—is the primary technical barrier to nuclear weapons development. Nuclear non-proliferation policy is largely concerned with the secure distribution and use of these materials and the technologies that produce them. To the extent that both materials and technologies are traded in markets, the problem may be viewed as one of regulating markets to give an acceptable set of allocative outcomes. While a laissez-faire approach to these markets was rejected long ago, most current policy is based on prescribed or proscribed behavior rather than market incentives. “Market-based” non-proliferation policies would act through incentives in the nuclear materials and technology markets rather than by prescribing outcomes or behavior. Possible polices of this sort include subsidized enrichment services, credits to impute value to spent nuclear fuel, and new markets for special scarce nuclear materials. While market-based policies will not replace command-and-control policies entirely, they could lead to efficient regulation which suffices for most market participants, reserving special, more discriminatory instruments for the few hard cases.

nulcear fuel markets, nonproliferation, SWU↗

Evaluation of Light-Element Reactions in the Resolved Resonance Region

Light-element reactions at low energies in the resolved resonance region are important for a range of applications in basic and applied sciences including nuclear reactors, nonproliferation, cultural heritage, forensics and environmental control, rare event investigations and nuclear astrophysics. In this paper, we report on an effort to evaluate charged-particle cross sections in the resolved resonance region and produce evaluated nuclear data files for further processing and inclusion in evaluated data libraries. We discuss the open issues in R-matrix calculations as we extend to higher energies, such as dealing with the rapidly growing number of open channels and merging with the regime of smooth cross sections described by the statistical model, and present attempts to address these issues in neutron-induced reactions relevant to nuclear reactor applications.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2014

This Nevada Nuclear Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts.This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2014 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is responsible for the oversight of these ER projects, and the Sandia Field Office of NNSA (NNSA/SFO) has oversight of all other TTR and NTTR activities. NNSA/SFO produces the TTR annual environmental report, which is available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.Major Site Programs and Facilities NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. The six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for weapons experimentation and nuclear test readiness. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site (known as the T-1 Site), Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple missions. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic features, among others. The SBD process is unlikely to be broadly applied in the absence of formal requirements to do so, or compelling evidence of its value. Neither exists today. A formal instrument to require the application of SBD is needed and would vary according to both the national and regulatory environment. Several possible approaches to implementation of the requirements within the DOE framework are explored in this report. Finally, there are numerous barriers to the implementation of SBD, including the lack of a strong safeguards culture, intellectual property concerns, the sensitive nature of safeguards information, and the potentially divergent or conflicting interests of participants in the process. In terms of SBD implementation in the United States, there are no commercial nuclear facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Efforts to institutionalize SBD must address these issues. Specific work in FY09 could focus on the following: finalizing the proposed SBD process for use by DOE and performing a pilot application on a DOE project in the planning phase; developing regulatory options for mandating SBD; further development of safeguards-related design guidance, principles and requirements; development of a specific SBD process tailored to the NRC environment; and development of an engagement strategy for the IAEA and other international partners.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessment of Gamma-Ray-Spectra Analysis Method Utilizing the Fireworks Algorithm for Various Error Measures

The analysis of measured data plays a significant role in enhancing nuclear nonproliferation mainly by inferring the presence of patterns associated with special nuclear materials. Among various types of measurements, gamma-ray spectra is the widest utilized type of data in nonproliferation applications. In this paper, a method that employs the fireworks algorithm (FWA) for analyzing gamma-ray spectra aiming at detecting gamma signatures is presented. In particular, FWA is utilized to fit a set of known signatures to a measured spectrum by optimizing an objective function, where non-zero coefficients express the detected signatures. FWA is tested on a set of experimentally obtained measurements optimizing various objective functions—MSE, RMSE, Theil-2, MAE, MAPE, MAP—with results exhibiting its potential in providing highly accurate and precise signature detection. Finally and furthermore, FWA is benchmarked against genetic algorithms and multiple linear regression, showing its superiority over those algorithms regarding precision with respect to MAE, MAPE, and MAP measures.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modeling ionization and recombination from low energy nuclear recoils in liquid argon

Coherent neutrino-nucleus scattering (CNNS) is an as-yet undetected, flavor-independent neutrino interaction predicted by the Standard Model. CNNS is a flavor-blind interaction, which offers potential benefits for its use in nonproliferation (nuclear reactor monitoring) and astrophysics (supernova and solar neutrinos) applications. One challenge with detecting CNNS is the low energy deposition associated with a typical CNNS nuclear recoil. In addition, nuclear recoils are predicted to result in lower ionization yields than those produced by electron recoils of the same energy. This ratio of nuclear- and electron-induced ionization, known as the nuclear quenching factor, is unknown at energies typical for CNNS interactions in liquid xenon (LXe) and liquid argon (LAr), detector media being considered for CNNS detection. While there have been recent measurements [1] of the ionization yield from nuclear recoils in LAr, there is no universal model for nuclear quenching and ionization yield. For this reason, a Monte Carlo simulation has been developed to predict the ionization yield at sub-10 keV energies. The local ionization yield of a recoiling atom in the medium is calculated first. The ejected electrons are subsequently tracked in the electric field resulting from both the local electric charges and the externally applied drift field. The dependence of the ionization yield on the drift electric field is obtained by combining the calculated ionization yield for the initial collision cascade with the electron escape probability. An updated estimate of the CNNS signal expected in a LAr detector operated near a nuclear power reactor is presented.

CNNS↗

Thermoluminescence and optically stimulated luminescence response of Al 2 O 3 coatings deposited by mist-chemical vapor deposition

Aluminum oxide (Al 2 O 3 ) is a widely used ceramic material which can be applied as a protective coating on metallic structures to improve corrosion resistance and mechanical properties. Al 2 O 3 also has great potential as a functional thin film device in optoelectronics. When it is doped with carbon (Al 2 O 3 :C), this material system can serve as a reliable radiation dosimeter. The combination of optoelectronic, dosimetric, and protective properties demonstrated by Al 2 O 3 uniquely positions it for dual use applications in nuclear forensics, nonproliferation and safeguards, emergency response, retrospective dosimetry, and nondestructive inspection. Here, in this study, an innovative ultrasonic mist-chemical vapor deposition (Mist-CVD) system was used to deposit thin (nm level) Al 2 O 3 coatings on 304 stainless steel substrates. The single aliquot regeneration (SAR) and additive dose reconstruction techniques were then used to investigate the thermoluminescence (TL) and optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) response of the coated substrates to increasing doses of β irradiation. This study demonstrates that nm-thick Al 2 O 3 coatings hold promise as novel nano-dosimeters which could be leveraged for a series of applications such as nonproliferation and safeguards, retrospective dosimetry, and nondestructive inspection.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Detection of special nuclear material from delayed neutron emission induced by a dual-particle monoenergetic source

Detection of unique signatures of special nuclear materials is critical for their interdiction in a variety of nuclear security and nonproliferation scenarios. We report on the observation of delayed neutrons from fission of uranium induced in dual-particle active interrogation based on the {sup 11}B(d,n γ){sup 12}C nuclear reaction. Majority of the fissions are attributed to fast fission induced by the incident quasi-monoenergetic neutrons. A Li-doped glass–polymer composite scintillation neutron detector, which displays excellent neutron/γ discrimination at low energies, was used in the measurements, along with a recoil-based liquid scintillation detector. Time-dependent buildup and decay of delayed neutron emission from {sup 238}U were measured between the interrogating beam pulses and after the interrogating beam was turned off, respectively. Characteristic buildup and decay time profiles were compared to the common parametrization into six delayed neutron groups, finding a good agreement between the measurement and nuclear data. This method is promising for detecting fissile and fissionable materials in cargo scanning applications and can be readily integrated with transmission radiography using low-energy nuclear reaction sources.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Training data selection for event classification in a highly variable environment

A problem of interest for nuclear nonproliferation is monitoring activities at nuclear facilities, where proliferation events may only take place a few times and often under variable conditions. Machine learning has revolutionized data analytics by enabling the use of measurable signatures to generate predictive models of facility operations. However, traditional methods for training these models require large, reliable data sets with labeled observations, a challenge for nonproliferation. Highly variable conditions further complicate this as events from training data may have occurred in conditions quite different from the event of interest. Our hypothesis is that when events occur in a highly variable environment, careful training data selection for each test event could outperform the standard approach of using all available training data. We developed a method to optimize training data selection for the given test event and applied it to predicting the power level of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In this study, the reactor startup exhibits variability between occurrences due to natural variability in environmental conditions and operational procedures. Using a combination of analysis techniques, a similitude assessment was performed on data collected from HFIR to isolate clusters that were optimal for training a predictive model. Concepts such as dynamic time warping and Jaccard similarity were used in conjunction with clustering analysis. In order to validate this approach, the model was trained on every combination of unique training events and the predictive performance was compared to the performance using a subset of the training data selected by isolated clusters found through the similitude assessment.

Iyer, A↗

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FOR 2010

This report was prepared in accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 231.1A, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting,' to present summary environmental data for the purpose of: (a) characterizing site's environmental management performance; (b) summarizing environmental occurrences and responses reported during the calendar year; (c) describing compliance status with respect to environmental standards and requirements; and (d) highlighting significant site programs and efforts. This report is the principal document that demonstrates compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, 'Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,' and is a key component of DOE's effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at Savannah River Site (SRS). SRS has four primary missions: (1) Environmental Management - Cleaning up the legacy of the Cold War efforts and preparing decommissioned facilities and areas for long-term stewardship; (2) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Support - Meeting the needs of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile through the tritium programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); (3) Nuclear Nonproliferation Support - Meeting the needs of the NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs by safely storing and dispositioning excess special nuclear materials; and (4) Research and Development - Supporting the application of science by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to meet the needs of SRS, the DOE complex, and other federal agencies During 2010, SRS worked to fulfill these missions and position the site for future operations. SRS continued to work with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to find and implement solutions and schedules for waste management and disposition. As part of its mission to clean up the Cold War legacy, SRS will continue to address the highest-risk waste management issues by safely storing and preparing liquid waste and nuclear materials for disposition, and by safely stabilizing any tank waste residues that remain on site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Model and Analytic Processes for Export License Assessments

This paper represents the Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) Simulations, Algorithms and Modeling (SAM) Program's first effort to identify and frame analytical methods and tools to aid export control professionals in effectively predicting proliferation intent; a complex, multi-step and multi-agency process. The report focuses on analytical modeling methodologies that alone, or combined, may improve the proliferation export control license approval process. It is a follow-up to an earlier paper describing information sources and environments related to international nuclear technology transfer. This report describes the decision criteria used to evaluate modeling techniques and tools to determine which approaches will be investigated during the final 2 years of the project. The report also details the motivation for why new modeling techniques and tools are needed. The analytical modeling methodologies will enable analysts to evaluate the information environment for relevance to detecting proliferation intent, with specific focus on assessing risks associated with transferring dual-use technologies. Dual-use technologies can be used in both weapons and commercial enterprises. A decision-framework was developed to evaluate which of the different analytical modeling methodologies would be most appropriate conditional on the uniqueness of the approach, data availability, laboratory capabilities, relevance to NA-22 and Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NA-24) research needs and the impact if successful. Modeling methodologies were divided into whether they could help micro-level assessments (e.g., help improve individual license assessments) or macro-level assessment. Macro-level assessment focuses on suppliers, technology, consumers, economies, and proliferation context. Macro-level assessment technologies scored higher in the area of uniqueness because less work has been done at the macro level. An approach to developing testable hypotheses for the macro-level assessment methodologies is provided. The outcome of this works suggests that we should develop a Bayes Net for micro-level analysis and continue to focus on Bayes Net, System Dynamics and Economic Input/Output models for assessing macro-level problems. Simultaneously, we need to develop metrics for assessing intent in export control, including the risks and consequences associated with all aspects of export control.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗