DOE OSTI2020
The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗