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DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Science Training for Secondary School Teachers at Argonne National Laboratory - 2019

In continued support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project RAS/0/079, with its stated goal to educate 1 million students on the topic of nuclear science by 2021, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) hosted its second two-week nuclear science and technology training course for secondary school teachers in October 2019. A modified course format was adopted based on experience from the first course held at Argonne in 2018, along with similar project workshops held across the world. The results of the course, in terms of both technical knowledge retention and teaching capabilities, demonstrated the benefits of the revised approach.

Grabaskas, David↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Validation of ORIGEN for VVER-440 Spent Fuel with Application to Fork Detector Safeguards Measurements

The US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) are collaborating with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland to assess spent fuel verification methods for potential application to measurements at the planned spent fuel encapsulation plant and geological repository prior to final disposal in Finland. The fork detector (FDET) used to measure the neutron and gamma radiation from a given spent fuel assembly is an existing technology widely used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom for the safeguards verification of spent fuel operator declaration. Recently, an FDET data analysis software, referred to as the ORIGEN module, was developed and incorporated into the IAEA/Euratom Integrated Review and Analysis Program. This module uses the ORIGEN burnup code to calculate the nuclide concentrations and the neutron and gamma source terms in the spent fuel based on operator declarations. Then, to predict the expected FDET signals for a given fuel assembly, the module combines the source terms calculated by ORIGEN with FDET response functions that were pre-generated using MCNP models. The inspector can compare the calculated signals to the measured values in real time to identify possible anomalies in fuel assembly’s operator declaration, integrity, or measurement. In this work, the capability of the ORIGEN module was extended from application to typical light water reactor fuels to use for VVER-440 assembly types. The accuracy of ORIGEN for this type of fuel assembly calculations was assessed by comparing calculated nuclide concentrations against destructive assay measurements for VVER-440 spent fuel. The performance of the ORIGEN module for FDET safeguards verification in routine inspections was assessed using FDET measurement data for 13 spent VVER-440 assemblies that were measured at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant in Finland, by comparing the calculated signals to the measured quantities. The results show that the calculated FDET neutron and gamma detector signals are generally within 12% of the measurements except for one assembly. Thus, these results are applicable to future safeguards verification in the planned Finland encapsulation plant, such as for passive neutron albedo reactivity safeguards measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

HTGR Simulation Methods & International Collaborations

ART-GCR “Methods” activity is split between Experimental Validation data from the ANL NSTF and OSU HTTF (next three presentations). HTGR core simulation (this presentation). International collaboration within OECD Generation-IV (Gen-IV) and USA/Japan bi-lateral agreements (this presentation) HTGR Simulation Methods No new NE-52 funding for HTGR Methods support in FY20; ~$200K FY19 carry-over funds only. Consists of international code-to-code benchmarks (IAEA CRP on HTGR UAM and OECD/NEA MHTGR-350) and refinement of a few-group Pebble Bed Reactor (PBR) cross section (XS) generation methodology. Funding will be requested in FY21 to produce the final reports for the two benchmarks and continue the development of the PBR XS generation methodology. Additional (non-ART) HTGR-related support work at INL NEAMS: HTR-Application work package at INL Create a benchmark for the pebble shuffling and depletion algorithms being developed for NEAMS Griffin code. iFOA award with X-Energy: Develop independent Monte Carlo model of Xe-100 design. Independent design confirmatory analysis of Xe-100 design using NEAMS tools Griffin and Pronghorn. Support X-Energy design team to use their own legacy design tools (VSOP99 and MGT). Support NEAMS Griffin and Pronghorn development team for the iFOA needs (received $50K additional funding for required development).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Considerations when Implementing Shift Work in Nuclear Operations

Many domestic and international nuclear facilities have processes that require personnel to work on some type of shift. Shift work has many different schedules such as night, morning, swing, and rotating shift. Some common shifts are DuPont, Pitman, and Panama. There are many psychological and physiological impacts to a person working shifts. These impacts can affect work performance, safety, and security within an organization. A well-established nuclear organization relies on a strong security culture that implements a trustworthiness or reliability program. The IAEA defines this type of program as individuals meeting the highest standards of reliability, trustworthiness, and physical and mental suitability. Psychological and physiological impacts that apply to a Trustworthiness Program are reliability (an individual’s ability to adhere to security and safety rules and regulations) and physical and mental suitability. If shift work isn’t properly implemented in Facility Operations, then several issues or human factors can arise. An employee that suffers from a poorly designed shift, gets overworked, or doesn’t have the proper rest period implemented, may suffer from shift work disorder, acute fatigue, or cumulative fatigue. Introducing fatigue into Facility Operations can have severe consequences to security, safety, production, and cost. Another challenge of shiftwork within a facility is laziness and complacency. Creating an atmosphere where the employee is willing to admit fatigue to his or her supervisor is a challenge. It is up to the organization to do the needed research on shift work and to implement the best shift for their facility and personnel.

Stockwell, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2020

Actinide Mixing Optimization Solver

The Actinide Mixing Optimization Solver (AMOS) is a set of programs written in MATLAB that computes theoretical mixes of different uranium, plutonium, thorium, and other actinide materials given a list of isotopic reference materials. Constraints are applied depending on the desired product and a mixture is computed to meet the specified requirements. The optimal mixture consists of a product that uses the lowest possible number of initial actinide materials and has the lowest cost. AMOS is currently applied to particular reference material requests from the sponsoring agency (NNSA) on behalf of the IAEA.

Baldwin, Aaron Taylor↗
DOE OSTI2021

AMS / BARC Joint Survey Addendum Technical Report

This report details the data analysis results from data collected during the September-October 2019 joint survey series between the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS) asset, and the Government of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). This joint survey series took place at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), areas of public land in Southern Nevada, and at the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) Large Area Calibration Pads (LACP) at the Grand Junction Regional Airport in Grand Junction, CO. The data detailed in this report were gathered at the LACP. More details regarding the setup of these surveys and personnel involvement can be found in the AMS / BARC Joint Survey Summary Report. The data from the LACP collected by AMS are consistent with past data collection campaigns at the LACP. The AMS Bell 412 (B412) helicopter, equipped with both the standard AMS thallium-doped sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) 2"x4"x16" 12-detector system and a subset of the BARC Aerial Gamma Spectroscopy System (AGSS) consisting of two independent 3"x3"cylindrical NaI(Tl) detectors, measured each of the five calibration pads for a minimum of 10 minutes. After the helicopter measurements, a pressurized ion chamber (PIC) was used to directly measure radiation exposure rates on each of the pads for a period 5 minutes. The geophysical calibration procedure published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Erdi-Krausz et al. 2003) was used to determine the spectral stripping sensitivity matrix for naturally occurring radiological material (NORM). The sensitivity matrix is consistent with the AMS long term average. Additionally, the PIC data was used to calibrate the AMS system for exposure rate. The results of the exposure rate analysis are also consistent with AMS long-term averages.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

MARS 2020 Contingency Planning Overview

Case study on contingency planning for the MARS 2020 rover launch. Intended as part of a training for international consequence management personnel for IAEA and/or NATO-sponsored training classes. Funded through NA-81

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Analysis of PNAR Spent Fuel Safeguards Measurements using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module

This paper summarizes the analysis of the Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) measurements using the ORIGEN data analysis module for 23 boiling water reactor spent fuel assemblies that were performed in Finland under an international collaboration on spent fuel safeguards verification methods. PNAR is part of the proposed integrated nondestructive system to be used for safeguards verifications at the planned Finnish encapsulation facility. Besides measuring passive neutron and gamma emission rates from an assembly like a Fork detector, PNAR also measures the PNAR ratio, which is expected to correlate with the fissile content in the assembly. The emission rates and PNAR ratio can be used to verify the operator declarations and the fissile content of an assembly, respectively. The analysis was performed using the ORIGEN Data Analysis Module, which was originally developed for predicting Fork detector neutron and gamma signals for spent fuel measurements and has been integrated into the Integrated Review and Analysis Package developed by Euratom and the IAEA. The Module includes the ORIGEN burnup analysis code and integrates detector response functions pre-generated using MCNP to predict detector signals in several seconds per assembly. In this study, new response functions specific to PNAR measurements were generated for ORIGEN Module. The study also analyzes impacts of using detailed fuel design and operation information vs. standard safeguards information on results calculated by ORIGEN Module. Using detailed information reduced the standard deviation of relative differences between calculated and measured neutron count rates among the 23 assemblies from ~10% to ~4%. The results obtained using standard safeguards information for these PNAR measurements were similar to those obtained for the Fork detector. A clear trend was found between the calculated net neutron multiplications and the measured PNAR ratios of the 23 assemblies. This paper describes how ORIGEN Module calculates the expected PNAR neutron and gamma signals and PNAR ratio and how they compare with corresponding measured values.

Ilas, Germina↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Security Interface Considerations for Regaining Control of Discovered Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Recognizing that regaining control of orphan radioactive and nuclear material is challenging, the international community has developed requirements and guidance to support countries in addressing the problem. However, limited guidance is available on the practical nuclear security related issues that arise when nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC) is encountered and efforts are undertaken to regain control. For example, the IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-19, “National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources”, provides recommendations on a methodology for establishing a national strategy for regaining control of orphan sources. However, except for Pu239 in radioactive sources, nuclear material is outside the scope of this safety guide, and practical safety and security measures below the level of national strategy are not discussed adequately.This paper discusses the interfaces between the stakeholder groups and the responsibilities of each when encountering common scenarios that deal with MORC transitioning to regulatory control. The stakeholders include but are not limited to individuals who encounter MORC, and providers of formal and informal transport systems, and traditional and ad hoc storage solutions. This paper explores practical legal, financial, and institutional issues that hinder implementation of required safety and security practices. This paper also offers strategies that can be implemented on the individual, organizational, national, and international level to regain control of MORC.

Shannon, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2021

Enabling Computation on Sensitive Data in International Safeguards with Privacy-Preserving Encryption Techniques

Privacy-preserving machine learning is a field of study that explores how to protect and preserve the privacy of sensitive data while allowing the data to be used by machine learning algorithms. This field has had substantial industry investment due to heightened concerns about privacy in the technology industry, with a focus in two broad application areas: financial services and healthcare. Numerous privacy-preserving methods have also been proposed for international safeguards, but they have been difficult to enact because the data they require is con- sidered sensitive or proprietary by the nuclear facility operator. This work examines how current privacy-preserving approaches might be used to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use that data to contribute to a safeguards conclusion about a state while giving nuclear operators confidence that their sensitive data is adequately protected. This paper begins by exploring several broad categories of privacy-preserving techniques including homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, secure enclaves, and zero-knowledge proofs. Then we discuss some of the security considerations related to using these methods, potential use cases, and a conceptual system design for applying privacy-preserving methods in international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

2021 ROMANIA TRANSPORT SECURITY TABLE-TOP EXERCISE (TTX) – LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

During the period of 15-18 March 2021, the IAEA conducted a national workshop addressing the security of radioactive material in transport. The workshop was jointly hosted by the Romanian regulatory authority and the General Inspectorate of Romanian Gendarmerie. The workshop assisted Romania in improving its capability to evaluate the ability of response forces to counter a malicious act against radioactive material in transport. The event consisted of briefings, exercises, a demonstration of transport security equipment, and a transport security table-top exercise (TTX). The workshop was conducted in a virtual-hybrid format in such a way as to meet the COVID-19 related requirements in compliance with Romania’s guidelines. This paper provides an overview of the workshop’s activities, lessons-learned, and good practices related to the transport security TTX exercises.

Maican, Catalin↗
DOE OSTI2022

Case Study: Hybridizing Nuclear Energy Systems in the U.S.

This case study was presented at the ICTP-IAEA VIRTUAL Course on Nuclear-Renewable Integrated Energy Systems: Phenomenology, Research and Development. It provides preliminary results on an analysis of hybridizing the two nuclear power plants owned by Xcel Energy and located in Minnesota. The analysis extends previous analyses that provided only price-taker results. Those assume adjusting the generation sold to the grid does not impact locational marginal electricity prices nor do they estimate impacts on the total net cost to serve the load. This presentation summarizes the new technique that was developed to both optimize the size and operations of the hybridized system and the resulting impacts on the grid when it is operated optimally.

ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Single-Use Destructive Assay for Uranium Hexafluoride Sampling

Sampling uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for the determination of enrichments by destructive analysis (DA) is a critical component in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s layered safeguards approach for uranium processing facilities. Typically, gram-quantity UF6 samples are collected during inspections and stored under tag-and-seal until transportation to an off-site analytical laboratory. The shipping times can be long, and evolving restrictions on radioactive/corrosive materials shipments may increasingly limit the IAEA’s ability to transport UF6 samples easily. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed a low-cost UF6 sampling technology called Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) that addresses these challenges, as well as provides DA sample geometries that can be tailored for different analytical methods, including potential on-site analyses. The SUDA samplers, along with a unique holder, are designed for direct attachment to existing taps at uranium processing facilities, allowing gaseous UF6 to come into direct contact with a zeolite film. The SUDA technology features the ability to capture uranium in a more easily shipped and handled form as the solid, more stable, and relatively less hazardous hydrated uranyl fluoride (UO2F2•nH2O), which is formed through the controlled hydrolysis of UF6. We have recently simulated uranium collection under enrichment plant sampling conditions to further improve our understanding of SUDA sampling. Presented here is our recent work on measuring the relationship between sampling conditions and uranium collection, which includes control of the uranium-mass-to-zeolite ratio and assessing variable UF6 gas and sampling parameters that can affect collection using the SUDA sampler.

Pope, Timothy R.↗
DOE OSTI2023

US Participation in Valahia 2023

In response to invitation to participate in the Valahia, Romania 2023 Full Field Exercise in October, 2023, host country is requesting exercise objectives and resource needs from the US Aerial Measuring System participants. This document is to illustrate to the IAEA 3rd Consultancy Workshop meeting on Marc 6-7, 2023 (virtually) what will be expected from AMS at the exercise.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Modeling of the AGR 3/4 PIE Experiments

TRISO Fuel Accident Scenarios Transport of Fission Products (FP) through modern nuclear-grade graphites is not well established The AGR 3/4 experimental results need to be modeled to extract FP transport characteristics A finite element model using graphite diffusivities from IAEA TECDOC-978 is compared against measured results

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Direct analysis of cotton swipes for uranium and plutonium isotopic determination by microextraction-ICP-MS

The determination of uranium and plutonium isotopic abundance on environmental samples collected by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors is vital for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and material under the international nuclear safeguards regime. Current analytical protocols require time-consuming sample preparation steps prior to subsequent measurement by inorganic mass spectrometry (MS). Recent efforts from this laboratory have focused on developing sample preparation methods for faster analysis, potentially allowing higher sample throughput[1]. Alternative methods including microextraction sampling in conjunction with inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) have been recently explored. This methodology, microextraction-ICP-MS, was developed such that uranium and plutonium could be extracted from the swipe surface and directed into the ICP-MS for an in-situ measurement, eliminating the need for swipe ashing and digestion. A commercial off-the-shelf microextraction system was customized with an automated movable XY stage that can be programmed to save sampling locations, allowing for automated rapid sampling of swipe surfaces. Additional efforts have focused on the utilization of collision cell technology to the microextraction ICP-MS method. This would eliminate the need for lengthy column chemistry procedures to purify separated uranium and plutonium fractions before analysis. Here, the extracted U/Pu analyte is measured by reacting the uranium ions with CO2 in the collision cell of an ICP-MS, shifting the uranium to UO+, which will not interfere with the plutonium isotopic determination. The developed method utilizing collision cell – ICP-MS technology has demonstrated the ability to measure plutonium isotope ratios in the presence of high uranium concentration on the transient signal from the microextraction system utilizing certified reference materials from JRC-Geel and the New Brunswick Laboratory Program Office.

Bradley, Veronica↗