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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

A Flaw Stability Analysis for the Savannah River Site 3H High-Level-Waste Evaporator - 19548

The Savannah River Site (SRS) 3H high-level-waste Evaporator (242-25H) entered service in January 2000 and was discovered to be leaking in February 2016. It was robotically repaired and resumed operation in July 2018. During initial restart in December 2017, salt deposits were discovered on the evaporator's lower shell near welds, indicating two more small leak sites. The leak sites have an estimated hydraulic diameter of about 0.1 mm or less - about the diameter of a human hair. The estimated leak rates are about a factor of 10,000 smaller than the robotically repaired leak. An API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 fitness-for-service evaluation determined that if the leak sites are cracks, then they would need to be about 60 mm long (∼ 2 inches) to actively and catastrophically grow. Furthermore, a crack of this length would have been detected earlier since it would leak thousands of liters per day. The evaporator was designed with engineered features that minimize risks posed by these small leaks. The path-forward involves operating the evaporator in a deliberate manner with enhanced surveillance. The 3H Evaporator is key to SRS safely and timely reducing its 130 million liter liquid high-level-waste inventory, closing remaining waste tanks, and reducing associated risks to workers, the public, and the environment. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

ORNL Evaluation of Electrabel Safety Cases for Doel 3 / Tihange 2: Final Report

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) performed a detailed technical review of the 2015 Electrabel (EBL) Safety Cases prepared for the Belgium reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) at Doel 3 and Tihange 2 (D3/T2). The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) in Belgium commissioned ORNL to provide a thorough assessment of the existing safety margins against cracking of the RPVs due to the presence of almost laminar flaws found in each RPV. Initial efforts focused on surveying relevant literature that provided necessary background knowledge on the issues related to the quasilaminar flaws observed in D3/T2 reactors. Next, ORNL proceeded to develop an independent quantitative assessment of the entire flaw population in the two Belgian reactors according to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure, New York (1992 and 2004). That screening assessment of all EBL-characterized flaws in D3/T2 used ORNL tools, methodologies, and the ASME Code Case N-848, Alternative Characterization Rules for QuasiLaminar Flaws . Results and conclusions from the ORNL flaw acceptance assessments of D3/T2 were compared with those from the 2015 EBL Safety Cases. Specific findings of the ORNL evaluation of that part of the EBL structural integrity assessment focusing on stability of the flaw population subjected to primary design transients include the following: ORNL s analysis results were similar to those of EBL in that very few characterized flaws were found not compliant with the ASME (1992) acceptance criterion. ORNL s application of the more recent ASME Section XI (2004) produced only four noncompliant flaws, all due to LOCAs. The finding of a greater number of non-compliant flaws in the EBL screening assessment is due principally to a significantly more restrictive (conservative) criterion for flaw size acceptance used by EBL. ORNL s screening assessment results (obtained using an analysis methodology different from that of EBL) are interpreted herein as confirming the EBL screening results for D3/T2. ORNL s independent refined analysis demonstrated the EBL-characterized flaw 1660, which is non-compliant in the ORNL and EBL screening assessment, is rendered compliant when modeled as a more realistic individual quasi-laminar flaw using a 3-D XFEM analysis approach. ORNL s and EBL s refined analyses are in good agreement for the flaw 1660 close to the clad/base metal interface; ORNL is not persuaded that repeating this exercise for more than one non-compliant flaw is necessary to accept the EBL conclusions derived from the aggregate of EBL refined analysis results. ORNL General Conclusions Regarding the Structural Integrity Assessment (SIA) Conducted by EBL for D3/T2 Based on comparative evaluations of ORNL and EBL SIA analyses and on consideration of other results, ORNL is in agreement with the general conclusions reported by Electrabel in their RPV D3/T2 Technical Summary Note of April 14, 2015: More than 99 percent of flaws in D3/T2 meet the defined screening criterion, rendering them benign with respect to initiation in the event of a design transient. Refined analyses of non-compliant flaws from the screening assessment indicate that only 11 of the 16196 detected flaws have a critical reference-temperature material index (designated RTNDT) that implies the possibility of the initiation of cleavage fracture at some future time. For those 11 2 flaws, the calculated margin in RTNDT (a measure of acceptable embrittlement relative to end-ofservice-life conditions) is significant, being greater than 80 C. Fatigue crack growth is not a concern in the flaw-acceptability analyses. Primary stress re-evaluation confirms that the collapse pressure is more than 1.5 times the design pressure in the presence of defects detected in D3/T2. Sufficient conservatisms are built into the input data and into the different steps of the SIA; in some cases, those conservatisms are quantified and imply that additional margins exist in the SIA. Taken as a whole, the foregoing results and conclusions confirm the structural integrity of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 under all design transients with ample margin in the presence of the 16196 detected flaws.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Transfer Function Models and Sensitivity Analysis

In many situations, real or induced flaws such as tight cracks with known morphology cannot be manufactured in part configuration specimens or in real parts. Typically, fatigue cracks are manufactured in simple geometry specimens such as flat plates, dog-bone shaped flat or round specimens. If a nondestructive evaluation (NDE) technique is required to provide a reliably detectable target flaw size denoted as α_(90/95) for induced flaws in real part, then the direct method for qualifying the NDE procedure is to use the appropriate induced flaw specimens and perform probability of detection analysis using these flaws. This can be described as direct POD demonstration testing, which may follow guidelines of MIL-HDBK-1823. This paper considers a case, where induced flaws are not available in part configuration specimens. Therefore, a direct POD demonstration study cannot be undertaken. In such situation, general practice for NDE procedure qualification is to use artificial flaws in simple geometry and part configuration specimens, and induced flaws in the chosen simple geometry specimens. Signal response data is taken on all sets of artificial and induced flaws. NDE procedure testing on induced flaw in simple geometry specimen is called NDE demonstration testing here. A transfer function NDE procedure qualification method for forward case calculates predicted induced flaw size for demonstration using a chosen target flaw size. Another transfer function method for inverse case, calculates the target flaw size using a given demonstration flaw size. The transfer function analysis assumes relationship of artificial flaw signal responses in real parts and simple geometry specimens; and induced flaw responses in simple geometry specimens to induced flaws in real parts. The signal response transfer relationships model should be defined before transfer function models can be devised. Assuming that the signal response transfer relationships model is valid, forward and inverse case transfer function methods have been devised. Because of lack of signal response data from induced flaws in real part, 90/95% POD/confidence (P/C) cannot be demonstrated directly. However, the transfer function method may be assessed using simulation to evaluate whether the resulting target flaw size or demonstration flaw size provides adequate confidence to the assumed signal response transfer relationships model. Therefore, the transfer function approach is a risk assessment approach. Both the signal response transfer relationships model and the transfer function model are important in managing risk in results provided by the transfer function NDE technique qualification or assessment. The signal response transfer relationships model needs to be validated with empirical data and then transfer function model needs to be validated for desired P/C on case-by-case basis.

Nondestructive evaluation↗