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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Saltstone Facility Operating Experience with Mega-Vault Disposal Units - 19497

The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) has been treating low-level waste aqueous salt solution at the Savannah River Site (SRS) since 1990. Salt solutions are transferred from a large-volume, underground storage tank via underground waste transfer line into the SPF. The waste is received into one of two receipt tanks and then transferred to a twin-shaft mixer where dry feeds are introduced to create a fresh grout slurry. The grout exits the mixer into a hold tank, which has a residence time of approximately two minutes. The slurry is then pumped via peristaltic pump through a grout transfer line to one of several disposal units in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). The transfer line length varies from 0.4 km to 0.8 km depending on disposal location. With the salt disposal mission at SRS accelerating via the operation of the Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (MCU) facility and the anticipated startup of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), it is important that the SPF and SDF operate with minimal outage time and maximum facility availability. To this end, the design of the newest disposal units has incorporated the benefits of commercially available cylindrical concrete tank design on a very large scale to maximize economies of scale. This new design has been placed into radioactive service and the initial operational data will be compared with previous disposal operations along with an overview of how disposal unit design has significantly evolved since the initial construction in the early 1990's. Additionally, several processing facility modifications have either been implemented or developed in recent years to improve operating reliability and ensure facility availability once the SWPF becomes the primary waste generator providing feed for the SPF. These modifications, the issues driving their development, and an assessment of their effectiveness will also be discussed. (author)

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DOE OSTI2019

Path of Disposal for Hazardous and Non-hazardous Waste from Cradle to Grave

Hazardous waste is a threat to human health and the environment and must be managed and disposed of properly. A Solid Waste is defined as any material (solid, liquid, containerized gas) which has been discarded, abandoned (no longer needed), or recycled. The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) is a law that creates the framework for the proper management of solid waste. Under RCRA, EPA has developed a program which ensures hazardous waste is managed safely from the moment it is generated to its final disposal (cradle-to-grave)2. To educate about how waste is handled at the Savannah River Research Campus (SRRC) under RCRA, the path it takes from point of generation (cradle) to disposal (grave), and the responsibilities of every person involved in the process. Researcher or other laboratory personnel that generates waste as a result of their work Responsibilities: - Fill out inventory log sheet and corresponding container sheet which includes the constituents of the waste; - Properly label waste container with SAA/WSA ID no., generator's name, what it is, the hazards, and date; - Place waste in designated waste storage area. Laboratory Custodian Responsibilities: - Ensures waste is handled and stored properly; - Ensures inventory is updated; - Ensures all container sheets are completed; - Ensures only authorized personal have access to waste storage areas. Environmental Compliance Authority Responsibilities: - Develops waste procedures; - Provide waste training; - Inspects for improperly handled waste; - Establishes or closes waste storage areas as needed; - Determines if waste can be recycled; - Determines if waste is RCRA hazardous: Is it U or P listed? - Unused commercial chemical products; Is it F listed - Spent solvents; Is it characteristic? - Flammable/Oxidizer, Corrosive, Reactive, Toxic; - Weighs waste to ensure laboratory has not exceeded its monthly or total storage limits; - Maintains waste records; - Determines how waste should be disposed: Trash - Nonhazardous solids; Drain - Nonhazardous Liquids; Labpack; - Prepares waste for shipment with Vendor and Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel. Packages, Transports, and Treats Hazardous Waste Responsibilities: - Must be EPA permitted and approved by the Department of Energy - Picks up hazardous waste for transport to a treatment, storage or disposal facility depending on waste disposal requirements - Must meet all Department of Transportation regulations for transporting hazardous waste - Dispose of waste according to RCRA regulations. Due to the potential risks to human health and the environment, waste must be handled safely through the chain of possession from cradle to grave. To ensure proper handling, there are many safety checks as required by RCRA and DOT regulations. This includes proper labeling, inventory, and characterization to ensure all hazards are known, inspections by the Custodian, ECA, and the state regulator (SCDHEC), and transportation verifications and manifesting. One of the best ways to reduce the risks that waste presents is to minimize or eliminate the creation of waste. This can be accomplished through source reduction which includes: Inventory control, material substitution, process modification, improved housekeeping, and preventative maintenance and recycling.

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DOE OSTI2015

Analysis of the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14349

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls will ensure that all waste packages are sub-critical, and the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is prevented for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages begin to degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Therefore, the possibility for the evolution of conditions in a GDF to result in criticality requires assessment. RWM established the 'Likelihood of Criticality' research project to develop qualitative and quantitative arguments to demonstrate that criticality after closure of a GDF is unlikely. The project included consideration of the criticality safety of disposal concepts for intermediate and high level waste, spent fuel, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in different generic geological settings. The results are underpinned by the construction of post-closure criticality scenarios that have been evaluated using high-level judgments about scenario credibility as well as modelling of evolving conditions in a GDF. In the latter case, a probabilistic modelling approach has been undertaken to address uncertainty in the calculation of concentrations and masses of fissile material that could occur at potential accumulation sites. The potential for criticality has been judged based on comparisons of the calculated fissile masses with minimum values required for criticality at different locations in the barrier system. This paper explains the novel approach taken to evaluating the likelihood of criticality in a GDF based on the probabilistic modelling of waste package evolution and plutonium and uranium migration. The role of this research in RWM's work to demonstrate the criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper, which also draws on the results of a parallel research project that demonstrates that, even if a criticality were to occur, then its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2025

Presentation on the INL Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility FY-2024 Annual Summary Report

The abstract below is from the report INL/RPT-24-82600. The powerpoint presentation contains information taken from the report. This Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 annual summary report (ASR) documents the continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA), the composite analysis (CA), and associated operating disposal authorization statement (ODAS) technical basis documents for the Remote Handled Low Level Waste (RHLLW) Disposal Facility at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Annual review of the adequacy of the PA and CA for RHLLW Disposal Facility ensures that conclusions of the analyses remain valid in accordance with requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” In FY 2024, no significant operational changes or other activities occurred that would cause deviation from the assumptions in the PA and CA pertaining to disposal geometry, verification of waste characteristics, tracking disposal inventories against total limits, facility closure design, or institutional controls. Nineteen waste canister shipments were received at the RHLLW Disposal Facility, and all nineteen waste canisters were emplaced in disposal vaults.

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DOE OSTI2015

Development of a Universal Canister for Disposal of High-Level Waste in Deep Boreholes.

The mission of the United States Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Some of the wastes that must be managed have been identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock. In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister-based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfer, transportation, and disposal) could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. Development of specifications for the universal canister system will consider the regulatory requirements that apply to storage, transportation, and disposal of the capsules, as well as operational requirements and limits that could affect the design of the canister (e.g., deep borehole diameter). In addition, there are risks and technical challenges that need to be recognized and addressed as Universal Canister system specifications are developed. This paper provides an approach to developing specifications for such a canister system that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE’s Used Fuel Disposition Campaign's Deep Borehole Field Test and compatible with planned storage of potential borehole-candidate wastes.

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DOE OSTI2015

Development of understanding of disposability of high-heat-generating wastes in the UK - 15359

The inventory of radioactive wastes planned for geological disposal in the UK is diverse. This inventory includes a range of high-heat-generating wastes and potentially some other nuclear materials (some spent fuel, uranium and plutonium) that are subject to government policy decisions and therefore may be declared as wastes for geological disposal in the future. To ensure that safe disposal solutions can be developed, it will be necessary to understand the influence of this heat on engineered barrier systems for the range of generic disposal concepts being considered in the UK. Furthermore, waste producers need to develop packaging solutions for these materials that take account of any thermal constraints. For these reasons, RWM has established the High-heat-generating Wastes Project (Project Ankhiale), a dedicated project to enhance understanding of the factors affecting geological disposal of high-heat-generating wastes with a view to supporting future decision making and concept selection. The project has been established around a multi-disciplinary Integrated Project Team (IPT), comprising members of RWM, Amec Foster Wheeler and external experts, to provide a comprehensive approach across a range of technical disciplines. Phase 2 of the project, which comprises a series of specific technical activities, commenced in March 2013 and, since then, progress has been made across the following five broad categories: - Compilation of the inventory of UK high-heat-generating wastes;- Waste package performance work; - Development of a better understanding of thermal constraints for different buffer materials; - Exploration of the range of disposal parameters using a thermal dimensioning modelling tool; and - Concept engineering design work. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

DOC-WMF - A Generic Model for Assessment of Waste Disposal Facilities - 19278

Numerical models and computer codes play an important role in the safety assessment of nuclear waste disposal facilities, as well as in the regulatory review of proponents' safety assessments. An important part of a safety assessment is the radiation dose calculation. This paper presents a computer code called DOC-WMF for calculating radiation dose from nuclear waste disposal facilities. DOC-WMF is a generic code that could be used for dose calculations for deep geological or near surface disposal facilities of nuclear wastes. DOC-WMF is much faster than complicated 3-D numerical models in terms of computational speed since the model uses the commercial code GoldSim as the computation engine which is based on analytical solutions for contaminant transport. As a result, it enables a user to quickly assess the dose consequences of multiple options or scenarios for a nuclear waste disposal facility. DOC-WMF was adapted from, and an improvement to, the Scoping of Options and Analyzing Risk (SOAR) model developed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC). A key improvement over the SOAR model is that DOC-WMF allows the calculation of dose contributions from other pathways such as food ingestion and air inhalation in addition to the drinking water pathway which is the sole dose contribution considered in the SOAR model. DOC-WMF also allows for: the consideration of 55 radionuclides with option to add more if required; the choice of source release method; various pathways to the biosphere; and dose calculations including an extended array of exposure pathways. In addition, DOC-WMF can simulate more complex hydrogeological settings and waste forms than SOAR does. DOC-WMF was compared against known analytical solutions for verification. It was then applied to two test cases and the results were compared. The first was a hypothetical deep geological disposal repository. The second test case was a near-surface nuclear waste disposal facility. DOC-WMF independently modeled these two test cases and achieved similar results as the more complicated numerical models did. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Safety Classification and Design Rules for Structures, Systems and Components in a Near Surface Disposal Facility-Post Closure Phase - 19716

Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) is developing a Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) to be constructed at its Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) site. In general, a NSDF is a facility for radioactive waste disposal, under an engineered cover, located at or within a few meters of the earth's surface. The NSDF will establish a safe, local and permanent means for the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The NSDF is intended to dispose historic waste currently in interim storage as well as waste arising from building decommissioning and environmental remediation activities. The NSDF is to be composed of engineered containment mound, waste water treatment plant and other supporting facilities and infrastructures that are needed to preserve radioactive waste. The NSDF life cycle will comprise two distinct phases: pre closure and post closure. The pre closure phase involves construction, operation and closure activities. The post closure phase includes institutional control and post-institutional control to ensure long term safety and radiological acceptability of the disposal facility. As part of the evolving activities for the NSDF project, a process is developed in accordance with Canadian regulations and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) principles to classify systems that comprise NSDF for safe operation, long term safety of the disposal facility and the protection of workers, the public and the environment. This paper describes the methodology developed to classify Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) important to safety in post closure phase and determine their design rules. The design rules are the relevant codes, standards and proven engineering practices that should be applied, as appropriate, to the design of SSCs to meet the applicable design requirements. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2024

Enhancement of disposal efficiency for deep geological repositories based on three design factors - Decay heat optimization, increased thermal limit of the buffer and double-layer concept

This study investigates the enhancement of disposal efficiency for deep geological repositories (DGRs) based on three design factors: decay heat optimization, increased thermal limit of the buffer, and double-layer concept using coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical (THM) numerical simulations. Decay heat optimization is achieved by iteratively emplacing spent nuclear fuels having the maximum and minimum decay heat in a canister. Disposal areas can be reduced by 20 % to 40 % compared to the current reference disposal system in Korea (KRS+) in accordance with the combinations of the three design factors, alleviating challenges in site selection for the DGR. This study additionally identifies an optimal layer spacing of 500 m for the double-layer concept in the viewpoint of the buffer temperature, where thermal interaction between the upper and lower layers nearly disappears. However, determining the ultimate disposal and layer spacing requires engineering judgement, considering not only the thermal performance of the DGR but also various factors such as cost and difficulties of the construction and rock mass stability. DGRs designed with an increased thermal limit of the buffer poses a greater probability of rock mass failure around disposal tunnels and deposition holes due to elevated thermal stresses. Densely arranged heat sources for the DGRs with enhanced disposal efficiency lead to larger temperature increase even at the far-field scale, raising a possibility of thermally driven fracture shear activation with associated hydraulic, mechanical, and seismic changes.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project Code of Record (Revision 3)

The Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (LLW) Disposal Project addresses an anticipated shortfall in remote-handled LLW disposal capability following cessation of operations at the existing facility, which will continue until it is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). Development of a new onsite disposal facility will provide necessary remote-handled LLW disposal capability and will ensure continuity of operations that generate remote-handled LLW. This report documents the Code of Record for design of a new LLW disposal capability. The report is owned by the Design Authority, who can authorize revisions and exceptions. This report will be retained for the lifetime of the facility.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Linking RESRAD-OFFSITE and HYDROGEOCHEM Model for Performance Assessment of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility - 13429

Performance assessments are crucial steps for the long-term radiological safety requirements of low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility. How much concentration of radionuclides released from the near-field to biosphere and what radiation exposure levels of an individual can influence on the satisfactory performance of the LLW disposal facility and safety disposal environment. Performance assessment methodology for the radioactive waste disposal consists of the reactive transport modeling of safety-concerned radionuclides released from the near-field to the far-field, and the potential exposure pathways and the movements of radionuclides through the geosphere, biosphere and man of which the accompanying dose. Therefore, the integration of hydrogeochemical transport model and dose assessment code, HYDROGEOCHEM code and RESRAD family of codes is imperative. The RESRAD family of codes such as RESRAD-OFFSITE computer code can evaluate the radiological dose and excess cancer risk to an individual who is exposed while located within or outside the area of initial (primary) contamination. The HYDROGEOCHEM is a 3-D numerical model of fluid flow, thermal, hydrologic transport, and biogeochemical kinetic and equilibrium reactions in saturated and unsaturated media. The HYDROGEOCHEM model can also simulate the crucial geochemical mechanism, such as the effect of redox processes on the adsorption/desorption, hydrogeochemical influences on concrete degradation, adsorption/desorption of radionuclides (i.e., surface complexation model) between solid and liquid phase in geochemically dynamic environments. To investigate the safety assessment of LLW disposal facility, linking RESRAD-OFFSITE and HYDROGEOCHEM model can provide detailed tools of confidence in the protectiveness of the human health and environmental impact for safety assessment of LLW disposal facility. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

The Innovative Universal Separation Process (USEP) for Disposal of Mixed Liquid Waste Via Unconditional Clearance Approach - 17570

Historically, Mixed Liquid Waste (MLW) drums from Canadian nuclear facilities containing Tritium (H-3) and other radionuclides (alpha as well as beta/gamma emitting) were shipped to a licensed US facility for destruction via incineration. This option is relatively complex considering the logistics associated with cross-border shipments and the destruction costs (e.g. H-3 surcharge). Because of this, Kinectrics has developed a novel and flexible process for disposal of oily as well as other (solvents, aqueous etc.) MLW within Canada. This process avoids the need for cross-border shipments and significantly reduces the complexity as well as cost for waste disposal. An overview of the various approaches and activities undertaken by Kinectrics during the period 2009-2013 for successfully processing and disposing of several MLW drums (oils, solvents, aqueous and solids) was reported at the WM-2013 conference. One of the key approaches for management of both oily Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) as well as non-PCB MLW involves treatment of the mixed waste using various well-known unit operations such as filtration, treatment with commercial sorbents, and various proprietary treatment methods developed at Kinectrics. These approaches result in reduction of radionuclide activity levels to below the unconditional clearance criteria and allows disposal of the waste via incineration at a conventional chemical waste facility. A small amount of radioactive secondary waste (the captured radionuclides) is returned to the customer. This approach was successfully employed for processing several drums of PCB and non-PCB MLW. Kinectrics recently completed two projects involving processing for disposal of legacy oily and solvent MLW inventory for a Canadian nuclear customer. Waste treatment processes used previously for unconditional clearance of oily/solvent MLW were ineffective for treatment of these legacy waste drums. Some drums were particularly challenging to process since H-3 was chemically associated with the oil backbone. To address these challenges, Kinectrics developed the innovative Universal Separation (USEP) process for disposal of problematic MLW. This paper presents an overview of the USEP process, the latest results of drum scale (205 L) process demonstration work, and the design concept of a Mobile Processing Unit (MPU) for large scale batch (1500 L) processing of MLW employing the USEP process. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Cleaning up Hanford: A Deep Borehole Disposal Concept for the Cs/Sr Capsules - 16249

The Hanford site in Washington State is possibly the most radioactive-contaminated site in the USA presenting a major environmental problem requiring urgent clean-up. Sealed capsules containing halides of strontium (Sr) and cesium (Cs) account for over a third of the total radioactivity. Interim storage for a period of 10-half-lives is an unappealing option since many of the capsules contain Cs-135, which has a half-life of 2.3 million years, and the dose received from the shorter-lived isotopes would remain dangerously high for several generations. Deep geological disposal of the capsules would be a safer solution. We discuss a new and revised conceptual model for disposal of the entire Hanford capsule inventory in a single deep geological borehole with a diameter that could be as little as 31 cm. The concept involves placing thirty capsules inside a steel-disposal container. Holes up to this size are regularly drilled to depths much greater than 5 km by the hydrocarbon industry and are well within current drilling capabilities. Numerical modeling work demonstrates the feasibility of the conceptual model. In particular we examine the thermal envelope generated as a function of time enabling decisions to be made on possible fillings for the borehole annulus. Variations on the disposal concept include disposing different combinations of capsules to control the heat output and thus the temperature rise. The results lend support to a comment attributed to Secretary Moniz that the Hanford capsules could be the world's first HLW to be disposed of in a deep borehole. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Role of Human Intrusion in Decision-Making for Radioactive Waste Disposal - Results of the IAEA HIDRA Project - 16287

Disposal of radioactive waste aims to protect people and the environment from the potential hazards of the materials by removing the wastes from the human environment. This approach is considered desirable to dispersal of the waste in the environment. However, the waste becomes concentrated in one location, which poses potential hazards should the waste become disturbed at a future date. For radioactive waste, it is generally expected that in preparing safety cases for such disposal facilities, the possibility of the wastes being inadvertently disturbed at some point in the future and the potential consequences of such an intrusion need to be considered. Potential inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) has a role in the decision-making and the safety case throughout the lifecycle of a disposal facility. In 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally initiated a project entitled 'Human Intrusion in the Context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste' (HIDRA) to provide insights regarding the role of IHI for these decisions and to provide a common framework for consideration of IHI as part of development of a safety case for a disposal facility. HIDRA was implemented with a series of annual plenary meetings involving participants from more than 20 countries organised into three working groups. The working groups addressed: societal factors, stylised scenarios, and protective measures. The project resulted in a general approach with specific suggestions for consideration of IHI during the lifecycle of a disposal facility. From a general perspective, it was emphasized that IHI is a contributing factor to the safety case, but does not outweigh considerations related to safety of operations and long-term performance for the normal evolution of the facility. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Large Cask, Small Building, AREVA's Safe MLLW Disposal Solution Despite Facility Limitations - 16295

In order to begin decommissioning of a 1950's research reactor, Class C Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW) had to be removed from the facility and disposed of. The AREVA TN RAM cask, designed and licensed for shipping Type B waste packages, was chosen as the most appropriate shipping solution. Due to the building layout, crane capacity and pool size, the standard TN RAM cask loading process could not be utilized. Unique solutions and approaches had to be developed to complete the project. AREVA designed a smaller liner insert that would house the four MLLW components in a single waste package to solve the problems related to crane capacity and physical pool dimensions. AREVA also designed and fabricated a shield bell to provide radiation shielding while moving the liner insert from the reactor pool to the cask that was staged adjacent to the reactor pool. The AREVA team worked with the disposal facility to cover requirements for disposal of Class B MLLW. This included designing spacers filled with inert material to fulfill the requirement for maximum 10% void space in the waste package. This disposal method for Class C waste met the requirements of macro-encapsulation. Therefore, no additional treatment action was required when disposing of Class C MLLW. AREVA's solution provides a model for disposing MLLW requiring macro-encapsulation in a single waste package. This solution also provides a model for how to adapt large shipping casks and liners to smaller aging commercial, DOE or research facilities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Sealed Source Security Challenges and Solutions: The Impact of Increased Commercial Disposal Access - 16557

Several recent developments have transformed the sealed source disposal landscape in the United States in ways unimaginable just a few years ago, including the initiation of operations at the first new commercial LLRW facility to open in the United States in decades; publication by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of revised commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal guidance; and the development and certification by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) of new transportation package designs for high-activity sources/devices. These developments will likely enable LLRW generators to dispose of risk-significant radioactive sealed sources that for decades have been without a commercial disposal pathway. However, challenges remain with regard to ensuring that these new commercial disposal pathways are effective, and that sealed source licensees take advantage of the new options in a timely manner. These challenges include costs related to both transportation and disposal that are likely much higher than most generators expected when they purchased their sources. DOE/NNSA is actively engaged with Federal, State, regional, private sector partners to address these challenges, including measures to encourage financial planning for end-of-life management of radioactive sealed sources. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Issues and Challenges for the Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste in the UK - 16597

The latest UK radioactive waste inventory describes the UK as having roughly 4.5 million m{sup 3} of solid radioactive waste - waste that either exists now or which will arise in future. This quantity excludes the potential waste that could be generated from the final site clearance of nuclear sites, estimated to be at least 3 times the current inventory volume. Most solid radioactive waste (by volume) is managed in the near-surface, at the national Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) or in other appropriately permitted landfill sites. The UK has yet to develop solutions for the final disposal of Higher Activity Radioactive Waste (HAW) but has established arrangements for packaging of waste now for storage while maximising the probability that these packages will be disposable once a solution is provided. Irrespective of the final disposal solution, the principles that govern the safe management of solid radioactive waste are common across the UK. Recent experience in the UK, including from the review of the environmental safety case for the LLWR, identified a number of issues relevant to solid waste disposal which are pertinent to other existing Low Activity Radioactive Waste (LAW) disposal sites as well as the development of safety cases for HAW disposal facilities. These issues include: scoping the extent of 'wastes' included in any assessment (e.g. whether to include the 'package' as well as its contents); the importance of understanding the waste heterogeneity; non-radioactive characteristics of waste, and understanding of external factors such as climate and landscape change. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Free-standing Liquids in a Resin Disposal Container - How Unidentified Legacy Issues and Decisions Can Affect Current Radwaste Processing Activities - 16605

On Monday, October 27, 2014 a radwaste and transportation specialist was informed that a condensate filter demineralizer (CFD) radwaste disposal container exceeded the radioactive waste disposal facility free-standing liquid requirement for acceptance for disposal (limit is 0.5% of waste volume or 5.6 gallons); 8.5 gallons was measured). As a result, on October 28, the plant was informed that our disposal site use permit was suspended, pending a point-of-origin inspection by the agreement state regulatory authority. This paper details the investigation conducted to identify causes, especially legacy issues one may not necessarily identify, and documents corrective actions taken to assure similar issues are not repeated. Actions taken to prevent recurrence have been successful. The five containers shipped, including 14-033, were verified dewatered and dried to comply with the disposal facility waste acceptance criteria. Although discoloration is viewed in the dewatering sight glass, milky color has not been viewed and the dewatering process has continued. Isolation of the lowest set of dewatering filter laterals for use at the end of the dewatering process has worked well and use of the dewatering verification filters has provided evidence that each CRF resin liner was successfully dewatered and dried. To date, 37 CFD liners have been successfully dewatered, dried, verified, transported to the disposal facility, and buried without incident. If similar issues are encountered, you should keep an open mind regarding causes including, but not limited to discussions with your vendor and conduct a search of past procedure revisions to gain additional insight regarding program/procedure changes and how they could have an effect on issues, which occur today.

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