Gamification of Cybersecurity for Workforce Development in Critical Infrastructure
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Cyber-Informed Engineering is a framework which allows engineers to build resiliency to the impacts of cyber attack into engineered systems starting in the early design phases. This article introduces the framework and provides a description of some of its principles and resources for learning more.
U.S. national security, prosperity, economy, and well-being require secure, flexible, and resilient Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing. The COVID-19 pandemic reaffirmed that the biomedical production value-chain is vulnerable to disruption and has been under attack from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. Current cyber defenses are inadequate, and the integrity of critical production systems and processes are inherently vulnerable to cyber-attacks, human error, and supply chain disruptions. The following chapter explores how a BioSecure Digital Twin will improve U.S. manufacturing resilience and preparedness to respond to these hazards by significantly improving monitoring, integrity, security, and agility of our manufacturing infrastructure and systems. The BioSecure Digital Twin combines a scalable manufacturing framework with a robust platform for monitoring and control to increase U.S. biopharma manufacturing resilience. Then, the chapter discusses some of the inherent vulnerabilities and challenges at the nexus of health and advanced manufacturing. Next, the chapter highlights that as the Pandemic evolves, we need agility and resilience to overcome significant obstacles. This section highlights an innovative application of Cyber Informed Engineering to developing and deploying a BioSecure Digital Twin to improve the resilience and security of the biopharma industrial supply chain and production processes. Finally, the chapter concludes with a process framework to complement the Digital Twin platform, called the Biopharma (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) OODA Loop Framework (BOLF), a four-step approach to decision-making outputs from the Digital Twin. The BOLF will help end users leverage twin technology by distilling the available information, focusing the data on context, and rapidly making the best decision while remaining cognizant of changes that can be made as more data becomes available.
A critical component of the Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) approach is the integrated security contained within its processing. This document describes how that security is designed and expected to be implemented by UUDEX Implementations (U-Implementations), including the UUDEX Server (U-Server) and UUDEX Clients (U-Clients). The UUDEX security hierarchy consists of three levels: 1. The UUDEX Instance (U-Instance) itself, which sits at the top of the hierarchy and contains the U-Server, the UUDEX Identity Authority (U-Identity Authority), and the UUDEX Administrator (U-Administrator) functions; 2. A group of one or more UUDEX Participants (U-Participants) that present “organizations” that participate in the U-Instance and contains the UUDEX Administrator Participant (U-U-Administrator Participant) function; 3. A group of one or more UUDEX Endpoints (U-Endpoints) that represent the individual UUDEX Publish Clients (U-Publish Client) responsible for supplying data to the U-Instance that is consumed by UUDEX Subscriber Clients (U-Subscriber Clients). U-Endpoints can be either autonomous devices that publish and subscribe data such as data exchange servers found in supervisory control and data acquisition and energy management systems, or they can be tied to users of applications that, for example, submit DOE OE-417 disturbance reports. U-Participants and U-Endpoints can be organized into UUDEX Groups (U-Groups). Any number of U-Participants or U-Endpoints can be members of a U-Group. A given U-Participant or U-Endpoint can be a member of multiple U-Groups, but a U-Group cannot contain other U-Groups. For example, a U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Transmission Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator, and another U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Generator Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator. U-Participants that are both Transmission Operators and Generator Operators would be members of both U-Groups. U-Participants, U-Endpoints, and U-Groups are used in the access control structures to provide access to individual UUDEX Subjects (U-Subjects). U-Groups are created by the U-Administrator and are managed by the U-Administrator or the designated U-Group Managers. U-Endpoints can be assigned UUDEX Roles (U-Roles) that can be used to further restrict access. U-Roles are assigned to individual U-Endpoints. For example, a U-Role of “Security Analyst” could be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish or subscribe security incident reports and vulnerability notifications, while a U-Role of “Transmission Planner” can be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish power system model updates. U-Role definitions are created by the U-Administrator, but the U-Roles are assigned to U-Endpoints by their respective UUDEX Participant Administrators (U-Participant Administrator). Because all information required to make security decisions is either included within the U-Endpoint’s X.509 digital certificate or stored in a datastore on the U-Server, all security decisions are performed and enforced within the U-Server. This reduces the complexity of the U-Client code and minimizes the chance for compromise of the integrity of the UUDEX security features.
The Biden Administration’s efforts to meet 100% clean electricity by 2035 and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 has created opportunities to rebuild American supply chains create new jobs, strengthen community engagement, and spur U.S. economic growth. DOE’s strategy for success in the transition to a clean energy economy hinges on building and maintaining technology supply chains that are advanced, secure, and resilient to cyber threats. As the energy sector grows increasingly globalized, complex, and digitized, the supply chain for digital components of energy systems – including software, virtual platforms and services, and data – is facing greater threats. Nearly all digital components of U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable to cyber supply chain instability, stemming from a variety of causes and shared among a broad set of interdependent stakeholders. Overall, supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.
This work demonstrates the functionality of the pressurizer using a fast-running three regions, non-equilibrium model and control programs of emulated PLCs. The state variables from an integrated model of primary loop in a representative PWR plant are communicated to the pressurizer’s emulated PLCs using a synchronized data transfer function. In turn, the PLCs communicate back instructions to the pressurizer model to adjust the pressure and water level to remain within preprogramed setpoints. Pressurizer model simultaneously solves the coupled mass and energy conservation equations in the saturated vapor and saturated and subcooled liquid regions using fixed step solver. Results demonstrate the response of the pressurizer model linked to an emulated pressure and water level PLCs in a simulated transient involving surge-in and surge-out events. The 50 ms response delay time for the emulated PLC insignificantly affects operation and predictions of the pressurizer model.
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Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are potential targets of cyberattacks and can prove deleterious for the safety of the NPPs. A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) provides a detailed list of the various components and their dependencies in software, which helps in vulnerability and risk assessment for cyber hygiene and situational awareness. For an NPP, the process of generating an accurate SBOM report can be complex due to the legacy systems and firmware binaries involved. While most current SBOM tools are focused more on modern internet technology software, this research provides insights and guidelines for an NPP to generate an accurate and efficient SBOM. Here, the paper proposes a new methodology to help NPPs categorize software and use appropriate tools to generate SBOMs for their digital I&C systems.
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This case study workbook provides a hypothetical project to support discussion and application of the principles for Cyber-Informed Engineering. Participants in the workshop are encouraged to use the workbook to capture insights and lessons learned. The provided attachment to this workbook contains the visuals for the hypothetical project scope and is used by participants as they capture insights and lessons learned. Though some elements of this scenario are provided for consideration, there are likely key facts which have been omitted or may be unclear. Participants are encouraged to make any needed assumptions about the project to enable application of the CIE principles. Though this project is based on real-world case studies, it is fictional.
The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.
This slide deck summarizes NREL's accomplishments for last three years under the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) project.
This presentation reviews worst case plant disasters and map a cyberattack scenario that would have a similar outcome.
This presentation describes NREL's AI strategy and it's work in Cyber-Informed Engineering.
This presentation is an overview of FEMP Resilient and Secure Infrastructure and Facilities. An educational and interactive workshop centered on resilient and secure federal infrastructure and facilities, with a focus on inverter-based resources at Federal sites, building automation systems, and Federal supply chains. This workshop will illustrate an all-hazards scenario and discuss how Federal agencies can be positioned to resist these real-world scenarios.
Electric grids around the world are undergoing rapid structural and operational change, making it more important than ever to understand evolving risks and improve grid resilience and security against natural and human disruptions. Through tailored technical assistance, NREL is working with partners to support the secure and resilient deployment of energy systems and address grid integration challenges.