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At least 289 records · Page 16

SUPPORT OF NEW COMPUTER HARDWARE AT LUCH'S MC&A SYSTEM: PROBLEMS AND A SOLUTION

Abstract Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 operating system is the only software product certified in Russia for using in MC&A systems. In the paper a solution for allowing the installation of this outdated operating system on new computers is discussed. The solution has been successfully tested and has been in use at Luch's network since March 2008. Furthermore, it is being recommended for other Russian enterprises for the same purpose. Introduction Typically, the software part of a nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) system consists of an operating system (OS), database management systems (DBMS), accounting program itself and database of nuclear materials. Russian regulations require the operating system and database for MC&A be certified for information security, and the whole system must pass an accreditation. Historically, the only certified operating system for MC&A still continues to be Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server/Workstation. Attempts to certify newer versions of Windows failed. Luch, like most other Russian sites, uses Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 and SQL Server 6.5. Luch's specialists have developed an application (LuchMAS) for accounting purposes. Starting from about 2004, some problems appeared in Luch's accounting system. They were related to the complexity of installing Windows NT 4.0 on new computers. At first, it was possible to solve the problem choosing computer equipment that is compatible with Windows NT 4.0 or selecting certain operating system settings. Over time, the problem worsened and now it is almost impossible to install Windows NT 4.0 on new computers. The reason is the lack of hardware drivers in the outdated operating system. The problem was serious enough that it could have affected the long-term sustainability of Luch's MC&A system if adequate alternate measures were not developed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the “human factor.” Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former “Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security” at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that “good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”1 Although eliminating the “human factor” is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

RF power recovery feedback circulator

A device and method for improving the efficiency of RF systems having a Reflective Load. In the preferred embodiment, Reflected Energy from a superconducting resonator of a particle accelerator is reintroduced to the resonator after the phase of the Reflected Energy is aligned with the phase of the Supply Energy from a RF Energy Source. In one embodiment, a Circulator is used to transfer Reflected Energy from the Reflective Load into a Phase Adjuster which aligns the phase of the Reflected Energy with that of the Supply Energy. The phase-aligned energy is then combined with the Supply Energy, and reintroduced into the Reflective Load. In systems having a constant phase shift, the Phase Adjuster may be designed to shift the phase of the Reflected Energy by a constant amount using a Phase Shifter. In systems having a variety (variable) phase shifts, a Phase Shifter controlled by a phase feedback loop comprising a Phase Detector and a Feedback Controller to account for the various phase shifts is preferable.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

System Effectiveness

An effective risk assessment system is needed to address the threat posed by an active or passive insider who, acting alone or in collusion, could attempt diversion or theft of nuclear material. It is critical that a nuclear facility conduct a thorough self-assessment of the material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system to evaluate system effectiveness. Self-assessment involves vulnerability analysis and performance testing of the MPC&A system. The process should lead to confirmation that mitigating features of the system effectively minimize the threat, or it could lead to the conclusion that system improvements or upgrades are necessary to achieve acceptable protection against the threat. Analysis of the MPC&A system is necessary to understand the limits and vulnerabilities of the system to internal threats. Self-assessment helps the facility be prepared to respond to internal threats and reduce the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear material. MSET is a self-assessment or inspection tool utilizing probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to calculate the system effectiveness of a nuclear facility's MPC&A system. MSET analyzes the effectiveness of an MPC&A system based on defined performance metrics for MPC&A functions based on U.S. and international best practices and regulations. A facility's MC&A system can be evaluated at a point in time and reevaluated after upgrades are implemented or after other system changes occur. The total system or specific subareas within the system can be evaluated. Areas of potential performance improvement or system upgrade can be assessed to determine where the most beneficial and cost-effective improvements should be made. Analyses of risk importance factors show that sustainability is essential for optimal performance. The analyses reveal where performance degradation has the greatest detrimental impact on total system risk and where performance improvements have the greatest reduction in system risk. The risk importance factors show the amount of risk reduction achievable with potential upgrades and the amount of risk reduction actually achieved after upgrades are completed. Applying the risk assessment tool gives support to budget prioritization by showing where budget support levels must be sustained for MC&A functions most important to risk. Results of the risk assessment are also useful in supporting funding justifications for system improvements that significantly reduce system risk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Sustainability of gamma-ray isotopics evaluation codes

In November 2005, the international workshop 'Gamma Evaluation Codes for Plutonium and Uranium Isotope Abundance Measurements by High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry: Current Status and Future Challenges' was held in Karlsruhe, Germany. Some of the main issues discussed during the November 2005 meeting were related to concerns voiced by international inspectorate authorities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) about the standardization and sustainability of gamma-ray isotopic analysis codes that are commonly used during safeguards inspections. A follow-up international workshop was conducted in Oak Ridge, TN in 2008. This workshop was in response to needs expressed by the international safeguards community during the Karlsruhe meeting and recommendations made under Action Sheet 14; a cooperative effort between the U. S. Department of Energy and ABACC. The purpose of the Oak Ridge workshop was to bring code developers and end users together to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the codes; to discuss mechanisms to ensure these codes are sustained and quality tested; and to ensure updates or revisions are performed in a controlled manner. During an Action Sheet 14 meeting held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in which the IAEA and EURATOM participated as observers, and in subsequent meetings of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), all parties agreed that the regional working group initially established under the DOE/ABACC cooperation should be expanded to an international working group. The purpose of the international working group is to provide a forum to exchange information, discuss technical developments, and validate and test the various codes. However, progress to formally establish the working has been slowed by a lack of dedicated funding and competing priorities within the various international organizations. Recently, the ESARDA Nondestructive Assay Working Group established a dedicated website for the International Working Group on Gamma Spectrometry Techniques (1 WG-GST). In this paper, we will explore specific steps that should be taken to strengthen this working group's ability to affect development of a common testing platform and address concerns regarding applicability, sustainability and version control for these important codes.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Human reliability-based MC&A models for detecting insider theft.

Material control and accounting (MC&A) safeguards operations that track and account for critical assets at nuclear facilities provide a key protection approach for defeating insider adversaries. These activities, however, have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the probabilistic path analysis methods that are used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site's physical protection (security) system (PPS). MC&A activities have many similar characteristics to operator procedures performed in a nuclear power plant (NPP) to check for anomalous conditions. This work applies human reliability analysis (HRA) methods and models for human performance of NPP operations to develop detection probabilities for MC&A activities. This has enabled the development of an extended probabilistic path analysis methodology in which MC&A protections can be combined with traditional sensor data in the calculation of PPS effectiveness. The extended path analysis methodology provides an integrated evaluation of a safeguards and security system that addresses its effectiveness for attacks by both outside and inside adversaries.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working Group. The working group participants were tasked with providing recommendations for facility operators and designers, while promoting the IAEA's objectives of: (1) avoiding costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear facilities and (2) providing for more effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains at SNL for software and hardware testing. This paper will describe the capabilities of the new surveillance system, application and requirements, and the design approach.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International Nuclear Security

This presentation discusses: (1) Definitions of international nuclear security; (2) What degree of security do we have now; (3) Limitations of a nuclear security strategy focused on national lock-downs of fissile materials and weapons; (4) What do current trends say about the future; and (5) How can nuclear security be strengthened? Nuclear security can be strengthened by: (1) More accurate baseline inventories; (2) Better physical protection, control and accounting; (3) Effective personnel reliability programs; (4) Minimize weapons-usable materials and consolidate to fewer locations; (5) Consider local threat environment when siting facilities; (6) Implement pledges made in the NSS process; and (7) More robust interdiction, emergency response and special operations capabilities. International cooperation is desirable, but not always possible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Validation of the MCNPX-PoliMi Code to Design a Fast-Neutron Multiplicity Counter

Many safeguards measurement systems used at nuclear facilities, both domestically and internationally, rely on He-3 detectors and well established mathematical equations to interpret coincidence and multiplicity-type measurements for verifying quantities of special nuclear material. Due to resource shortages alternatives to these existing He-3 based systems are being sought. Work is also underway to broaden the capabilities of these types of measurement systems in order to improve current multiplicity analysis techniques. As a part of a Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technology (MPACT) project within the U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Technology Program we are designing a fast-neutron multiplicity counter with organic liquid scintillators to quantify important quantities such as plutonium mass. We are also examining the potential benefits of using fast-neutron detectors for multiplicity analysis of advanced fuels in comparison with He-3 detectors and testing the performance of such designs. The designs are being developed and optimized using the MCNPX-PoliMi transport code to study detector response. In the full paper, we will discuss validation measurements used to justify the use of the MCNPX-PoliMi code paired with the MPPost multiplicity routine to design a fast neutron multiplicity counter with liquid scintillators. This multiplicity counter will be designed with the end goal of safeguarding advanced nuclear fuels. With improved timing qualities associated with liquid scintillation detectors, we can design a system that is less limited by nuclear materials of high activities. Initial testing of the designed system with nuclear fuels will take place at Idaho National Laboratory in a later stage of this collaboration.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Materials Management Program at the NNSS

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site, was established in 1951 mainly for weapons testing; because special nuclear materials (SNM) were expended during the tests, a nuclear material management program was not required. That changed in December 2004 with the receipt of Category I SNM for purposes other than weapons testing. At that time, Material Control and Accountability and Nuclear Material Management were a joint laboratory (Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore) effort with nuclear material management being performed at the laboratories. That changed in March 2006 when the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office appointed sole responsibility to the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). Since 2006 the basic nuclear material management work was completed by a combination of M&O employees and subcontractors, but a true Nuclear Material Management (NMM) Program was not determined to be necessary until recently. With expanding missions and more nuclear material (NM) coming to the NNSS, it became imperative to have an organization to manage these materials; therefore, an NMM Manager was officially appointed by NSTec in 2012. In June 2011 a Gap Analysis and white paper was completed by a subcontractor; this presentation will include highlights from those documents along with our plans to resolve the “gaps” and stand up a functional and compliant NMM Program at the NNSS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Comparison of Holdup Measurement Techniques

The measurement of uranium holdup, the residual material left in process equipment such as pipes or ducts, is an integral element of material control and accountability. Not only are the measurements important for accountability, they are also important for criticality safety. The goal in measuring holdup is to quantify the amount of material in the pipes to verify that all material is accounted for (inventory in [inventory out + holdup] = 0) and to ensure that the amount of material heldup is not a criticality risk. There are a number of ways to measure holdup in process equipment; however, this paper will evaluate only two methods (i.e., Holdup Measurement System 4 (HMS-4) and In Situ Object Counting Software (ISOCS)) for specific measurement scenarios. The comparison will use measurements of well-known reference materials in various configurations and will examine the results, uncertainties, repeatability, time required, portability, and cost of each system.

Lousteau, Angela L↗

TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Multi-Isotope Process Monitor: Multivariate Analysis of Gamma Spectra

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). The time delay between sampling and subsequent DA provides a potential opportunity to divert the material out of the appropriate chemical stream. Leveraging new on-line nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for MC&A verification at such facilities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. Recent efforts have been made to explore the basic limits of using multivariate analysis techniques on gamma-ray spectra. This paper will provide an overview of the methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technology.

Orton, Christopher R.↗

International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

education↗

MPACT FY2011 Advanced Time-Correlated Measurement Research at INL

Simulations and experiments have been carried out to investigate advanced time-correlated measurement methods for characterizing and assaying nuclear material for safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle. These activities are part of a project studying advanced instrumentation techniques in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Research and Development program and its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program. For fiscal year 2011 work focused on examining the practical experimental aspects of using a time-tagged, associated-particle electronic neutron generator for interrogating low-enrichment uranium in combination with steady-state interrogation using a moderated 241Am-Li neutron source. Simulation work for the project involved the use of the MCNP-PoliMi Monte Carlo simulation tool to determine the relative strength and the time-of-flight energy spectra of different sample materials under irradiation. Work also took place to develop a post-processor parser code to extract comparable data from the MCNP5&6 codes. Experiments took place using a commercial deuterium-tritium associated-particle electronic neutron generator to irradiate a number of uranium-bearing material samples. Time-correlated measurements of neutron and photon signatures of these measurements were made using five liquid scintillator detectors in a novel array, using high-speed waveform digitizers for data collection. This report summarizes the experiments that took place in FY2011, presents preliminary analyses that have been carried out to date for a subpart of these experiments, and describes future activities planned in this area. The report also describes support Idaho National Laboratory gave to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2011 to facilitate 2-dimensional imagery of mixed-oxide fuel pins for safeguards applications as a part of the MPACT program.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗