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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Simulations of Criticality Control Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers are being considered for the disposal of defense-related nuclear waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). At WIPP, these containers would be placed in underground disposal rooms, which will naturally close and compact the containers closer to one another over several centuries. This report details simulations to predict the final container configuration as an input to nuclear criticality assessments. Each container was discretely modeled, including the plywood and stainless steel pipe inside the 55-gallon drum, in order to capture its complex mechanical behavior. Although these high-fidelity simulations were computationally intensive, several different material models were considered in an attempt to reasonably bound the horizontal and vertical compaction percentages. When exceptionally strong materials were used for the containers, the horizontal and vertical closure respectively stabilized at 43:9 % and 93:7 %. At the other extreme, when the containers completely degraded and the clay seams between the salt layers were glued, the horizontal and vertical closure reached respective final values of 48:6 % and 100 %.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Passive filtration of air egressing from nuclear containment

A nuclear reactor includes a reactor core comprising fissile material disposed in a reactor pressure vessel. A radiological containment contains the nuclear reactor. A containment compartment contains the radiological containment. A heat sink includes a chimney configured to develop an upward-flowing draft in response to heated fluid flowing into a lower portion of the chimney. A fluid conduit is arranged to receive fluid from the containment compartment and to discharge into the chimney. A filter may be provided, with the fluid conduit including a first fluid conduit arranged to receive fluid from the containment compartment and to discharge into an inlet of the filter, and a second fluid conduit arranged to receive fluid from an outlet of the filter and to discharge into the chimney. As the draft is developed passively, there is no need for a blower or pump configured to move fluid through the fluid conduit.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for CAU 577 Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, NNSS, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 577, “Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells,” includes five low-level waste cells at the Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site where buried waste received from Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., was subsequently determined to contain chromium that exceeded the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure regulatory limit, which would require the waste to carry hazardous waste code D007. CAU 577 was created to satisfy the requirements of the Settlement Agreement (SA) executed between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) on April 25, 2019 (NDEP 2019). The SA required that the chromium-containing waste received from NFS would be addressed following the closure process laid out in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO process ensures proper closure of the chromium-containing waste and documentation of that closure through FFACO-type documents. The following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs) were closed, and their closure was documented in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030, dated September 2021 (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] Environmental Management [EM] Nevada Program 2021a): • CAS 05-21-02, Waste Disposal Cell 12 • CAS 05-21-03, Waste Disposal Cell 15 • CAS 05-21-04, Waste Disposal Cell 17 Closure of the following CAS was previously documented in the Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 577: Area 5 Chromium Containing Waste Disposal Cells, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, DOE/EMNV--0030-ADD, dated September 2022 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022): • CAS 05-21-05, Waste Disposal Cell 20 This second addendum to the Closure Report documents the closure activities that have occurred for CAS 05-21-06, Waste Disposal Cell 21. This is the last CAS in CAU 577. The final waste shipment was placed in the waste disposal cell on November 21, 2022. Following this, closure activities began on November 28, 2022, and were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b). The following closure activities were performed: • Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover • Installing two subsidence monuments and vadose zone monitoring equipment • Seeding the cover with a mixture of native plant species • Installing four concrete monuments on the corners of the cover and placing two use restriction (UR) warning signs on each monument These activities fulfill applicable federal and state regulations for closure of CAS 05-21-06 and minimize potential future exposure pathways to buried waste. Completed closure activities are also consistent with closure of the nine historical Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) units included in Section 10.2.2 of the RCRA Permit that governs hazardous waste management activities at the Nevada National Security Site (Permit NEV HW0101) (NDEP 2023). UR documentation for this CAS is included in Appendix B of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 577 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021b), and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. In accordance with paragraph 5D of the SA, a request to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring of CAU 577 was included with the permit application for RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 that was submitted in January 2022 (NNSA/NFO 2022). The request included the post-closure requirements for the three CASs that had been closed at the time of submittal of the application as well as requirements that would be implemented upon future approval of closure of the remaining two CASs. All CAU 577 post-closure monitoring requirements have been captured in the April 4, 2023, Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit (NDEP 2023). As the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 has been revised since the submittal of the original CAU 577 Closure Report (DOE EM Nevada Program 2021a) and Addendum 1 (DOE EM Nevada Program 2022), the post-closure requirements in this Addendum 2 report do not align with the previous documents. Specific changes resulting from the issuance of Revision 7 of the RCRA Permit are discussed in Section 5.2 of this report. The requirements in this report are consistent with the current permit (NDEP 2023) and supersede all requirements listed in the CAU 577 Closure Report and Addendum 1. All CAU 577 post-closure requirements should be conducted in accordance with the version of the RCRA Permit that is current at the time of the activities being performed. The DOE EM Nevada Program is requesting a Notice of Completion from NDEP for closure of CAU 577. Although CAU 577 is not a legacy site, the FFACO process is being followed to ensure proper closure of the chromium-containing waste. Therefore, transfer of CAU 577 from Appendix III of the FFACO to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, is requested, as all closure activities have been completed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Evaluation of Pad 18 Spent Mercury Gold Trap Stainless Steel Container Failure

Failure of the Pad 18 spent mercury gold trap stainless steel waste container is principally attributed to corrosion induced by degradation of plasticized polyvinyl chloride (pPVC) waste packaging material. Dehydrochlorination of pPVC polymer by thermal and/or radiolytic degradation is well-known to evolve HCl gas, which is highly corrosive to stainless steel and other metals in the presence of moisture. Degradation of the pPVC packaging material was likely caused by radiolysis in the presence of tritium gas within the waste container, though other degradation mechanisms (aging, thermo-oxidation, plasticizer migration) over 30 years storage may have contributed. Corrosion was also likely enhanced by the crevice in the container weld design, and may have been enhanced by the presence of tritiated water. Similar non-failed spent mercury gold trap waste containers did not show radiographic evidence of plastic packaging or trapped free liquid within the container. Therefore, those containers are not expected to exhibit similar failures. Halogenated polymers such as pPVC subject to degradation can evolve halide gases such as HCl, which is corrosive in the presence of moisture and can generate pressure in sealed systems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Model for Collaboration among Carriers to Reduce Empty Container Truck Trips

In recent years, intermodal transport has become an increasingly attractive alternative to freight shippers. However, the current intermodal freight transport is not as efficient as it could be. Oftentimes an empty container needs to be transported from the empty container depot to the shipper, and conversely, an empty container needs to be transported from the receiver to the empty container depot. These empty container movements decrease the freight carrier’s profit, as well as increase traffic congestion, decrease roadway safety, and add unnecessary emissions to the environment. To this end, our study evaluates a potential collaboration strategy to be used by carriers for domestic intermodal freight transport based on an optimization approach to reduce the number of empty container trips. A binary integer-linear programming model is developed to determine each freight carrier’s optimal schedule while minimizing its operating cost. The model ensures that the cost for each carrier with collaboration is less than or equal to its cost without collaboration. It also ensures that average savings from the collaboration are shared equally among all participating carriers. Additionally, two stochastic models are provided to account for uncertainty in truck travel times. The proposed collaboration strategy is tested using empirical data and is demonstrated to be effective in meeting all of the shipment constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2015

Testing and certification of the SAVY 4000 nuclear material container for DOT Type A liquid transport - 15636

Los Alamos National Laboratory has contracted with Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to perform testing and certification of the SAVY 4000 container for DOT Type A liquid transport. The container was originally designed to meet DOE M441.1-1 requirements for safe storage of nuclear material, and it is currently being used for storage at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Nevada National Security Site. The SAVY 4000 container is manufactured from 316L stainless steel in a range of sizes from 1 quart to 10 gallon capacity, it can be opened and closed easily by hand, it is sealed with a Viton{sup R} O-Ring, and the filter retains particulates and resists liquid water entry while allowing hydrogen gas to escape. Finite element analysis has been used to guide the development of a testing regime that includes a 30 foot drop, bar penetration, vibration, water spray and stacking for the 5 quart capacity container. The results of the tests will be compared with the finite element analysis to validate the model. The validated model is being used to extend the Type A certification to the other container sizes. This poster will describe the results of the Type A liquid testing, the finite element analysis, and the benefits of broadening the use and versatility of the container. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Polymer Lifetime in Plutonium Storage Containers - 18508

The plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory utilizes stainless steel containers for interim storage of plutonium compounds, metals, alloys, and process residues. Various polymer materials are used in these containers, including neoprene rubber gaskets, Viton O-rings, polytetrafluoroethylene membranes, and polyvinyl chloride bags. The DOE Manual, M441.1-1, requires storage containers to have a technically justified design life, and these polymer components play a key role in the determination of the overall design life for the containers. The capabilities at Los Alamos for monitoring degradation and estimating the design life of polymer materials used in plutonium storage containers will be described, along with the results of the lifetime determination studies for the polymer components used in SAVY-4000 and Hagan containers and some proposed alternatives. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Demonstration of Passive Phoretic Decontamination by Accident Simulation in a Scaled Reactor Containment

Reactor containment performance is a critical defense-in- depth barrier for the prevention of radioactive release in the event of a nuclear accident. One of the functions of the containment is to assist in the decontamination of aerosolized radioactive particles through both 'passive' or natural processes and 'active' or mechanical processes. Current United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidance (Reg. guide 1.183) allows the use of aerosol natural deposition correlations to quantify postaccident nuclear containment decontamination factors. Large Light Water Reactor (LLWR) correlations have previously been developed to quantify the contribution of natural phenomena to post-accident aerosol decontamination. Specific correlations must similarly be developed to support the safety analyses of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). For LLWR plants, decontamination is achieved 'actively' by mechanical systems such as containment sprays and 'passively' via natural phenomena such as gravitational settling, condensation, impaction, thermophoresis, diffusiophoresis and hygroscopic effects. Integrated pressurized water reactor (iPWR) SMR designs do not have containment sprays; therefore, they rely primarily on passive natural phenomena for decontamination in the integrated reactor vessel. Analytical studies and inferences from LLWR test data suggest that the smaller containment vessel volume to surface area ratio, coupled with the thermal hydraulic properties of iPWR plants, would significantly enhance decontamination factors for these smaller designs. The research aims to quantify the amount of decontamination from natural phenomena for the range of iPWR physical and thermal hydraulic characteristics. A preliminary assessment has shown that diffusiophoresis, thermophoresis and hygroscopic effects are the major areas with a research gap for iPWR plants; hence these areas are the foci of the research. These first-of-a-kind experiments will be described and preliminary analytical results will be presented that show the expected effects of SMR-specific correlations on passive decontamination of aerosolized radionuclides.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Influence of Emissions and Aqueous Processing on Particles Containing Black Carbon in a Polluted Urban Environment: Insights From a Soot Particle-Aerosol Mass Spectrometer

Inorganic and organic coatings on black carbon (BC) particles can enhance light absorption and affect atmospheric lifetimes of BC-containing particles and thus have significant implications for climate. To study the physical and chemical characteristics of atmospheric BC and BC-associated coatings, a soot particle-aerosol mass spectrometer was deployed during the winter of 2014–2015 in Fresno, a city located in the San Joaquin Valley of California, to selectively analyze BC-containing particles. Comparing soot particle-aerosol mass spectrometer measurements to those from the collocated single-particle soot photometer (SP2) and high-resolution aerosol mass spectrometer, we found that 17% of total submicrometer aerosol mass was associated with BC-containing particles, suggesting that a majority of the fine particles in Fresno contained no BC. Most BC-containing particles appeared to be associated with residential wood burning and vehicular traffic. These particles typically had a bulk-average mass ratio of coating to BC (R coat/rBC ) less than 2. However, during periods of persistent fog larger R coat/rBC values were observed, with the coatings primarily composed of secondary inorganic and organic components that likely resulted from aqueous-phase processing. Specifically, compared to periods with less fog, the BC coating increased in concentration and contained a larger fraction of nitrate and oxidized organic matter. The size distributions of BC and associated organic coating were generally centered around 300 nm in vacuum aerodynamic diameter. However, during foggy periods BC had an additional peak at ~400 nm and organics and nitrate displayed a prominent mode in the accumulation size range.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Predicting cost-effective carbon fiber precursors: Unraveling the functionalities of oxygen and nitrogen-containing groups during carbonization from ReaxFF simulations

Blends of polyacrylonitrile (PAN) and poly(p-phenylene-2,6-benzobisoxazole) (PBO) as precursors may offer an opportunity to reduce the cost of carbon fiber (CF) production. The all-carbon ring formations and volatile gas production during the heating and carbonization for 9 PAN/PBO blend precursors with varying mixing ratios are studied via the ReaxFF reactive molecular dynamics simulations. Evolutions of oxygen-containing (O-containing) and nitrogen-containing (N-containing) groups are detailed, in order to reveal the reaction mechanisms of the O and N-based CF precursors. Particularly, the O-containing groups are identified to be more efficient for initiating the carbonization, whereas N-containing groups are far longer retained in the graphitic materials and play a key role in capturing and converting carbon radical species into the graphitic networks. Additionally, the PAN/PBO blend precursor with a mole ratio of 1:1 is compared with the pre-oxidized PAN, PAN, and PBO. As a result, it is found that the PAN/PBO blends could be a promising alternative for the cost-effective PAN-based CF precursors, since they can decrease the cost of the CF production by means of: (a) eliminating the pre-oxidation process, (b) having considerable all-carbon ring formations within a short period, and (c) having a relatively fast conversion rate, reaching 95% 6-membered carbon ring formation.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

The HPC Container Experience on the Summit Supercomputer

Containers are seeing widespread use in the world of High Performance Computing, with many HPC Centers either providing their own containerization solution or adopting existing ones like Singularity and Apptainer. The demand for containerization options come from users who want to take advantage of the portability and reproducibility containers can provide, as well as being able to build and use applications that are only distributed in container form or are otherwise unsuited to natively run in an HPC environment. The users served by the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility are no exception. We go over the past and current containerization offerings at the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility, mainly focusing on the Summit supercomputer. We arrive at using a combination of Podman and Singularity to allow users to build and run containers directly on Summit, without requiring external resources or hardware for any step of the process. We look at a couple of projects running on Summit that greatly benefited from being able to use containers on Summit. And we compare benchmarks running natively and in containers on Summit at different scales, observing minimal performance difference and consistent behavior across all tests.

Abraham, Subil↗
DOE OSTI2018

Thermal dissipation studies and Pu238/Li source simulation (MCNP) of the K2 containers (COWS)

The six K2 containers (COWS) have been proposed to be shipped to WIPP in the configuration depicted in Figure 1. Currently, the containers reside in the water bath storage and have not been opened since LANL received them. The K2 containers containing the mound scrap material each have their own unique dose rate and thermal loading. 3 The properties of each container are listed below in Table 1. The problem with loading the K2 container into the proposed configuration is the thermal load the package will experience. Each component within the package has a thermal working limit that should not be exceeded. 2 However, the package must also maintain enough shielding to lower the measured dose rate at the surface of the drum to be accepted by WIPP. Testing the current configuration through simulation LANL can prove heat will not compromise any components and dose can be reduced to a safe configuration.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Coupon Container Pressure Test

A total of six containers were tested to verify the Maximum Allowed Working Pressure (MAWP) rating of 100 psi. Three Inner Container Pressure Test Assemblies (1006759387-AA) and three Outer Container Pressure Test Assemblies (1006729168-AA) were tested. The container serial numbering is the drawing number followed by the serial number (i.e.,1006759387-###). The test procedure was performed as follows: 1. Pressurize to 50 psi and hold for 5 minutes. 2. Increase pressure to 100 psi and hold for 5 minutes. 3. Increase pressure to 150 psi and hold for a minimum of 20 minutes. A container is considered to pass if the pressure drops less than 1% at the end of the 20 minutes. All six containers passed the test.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Using containers to speed up development, to run integration tests and to teach about distributed systems

GlideinWMS is a workload manager provisioning resources for many experiments including CMS and DUNE. The software is distributed both as native packages and specialized production containers. Following an approach used in other communities like web development we built our workspaces, system-like containers to ease development and testing. Developers can change the source tree or check out a different branch and quickly reconfigure the services to see the effect of their changes. In this paper, we’ll talk about what differentiates workspaces from other containers. We’ll describe our base system composed of three containers. A one-node cluster including a compute element and a batch system. A GlideinWMS Factory controlling pilot jobs. And a scheduler and Frontend, to submit jobs and provision resources. Additional containers can be used for optional components. This system can easily run on a laptop and we’ll share our evaluation of different container runtimes, with an eye for ease of use and performance. Finally, we’ll talk about our experience as developers and with students. The GlideinWMS workspaces are easily integrated with IDEs like VS Code, simplifying debugging and allowing development and testing of the system also when offline. They simplified the training and onboarding of new team members and Summer interns. And they were useful in workshops where students could have first-hand experience with the mechanisms and components that, in production, run millions of jobs.

Mambelli, Marco↗
DOE OSTI2025

Full Submersion Water Testing of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers

SAVY-4000 (SAVY) containers are the primary container used at Technical Area (TA) TA-55 plutonium facility for the prevention of water ingress to mitigate against a criticality event. The basis for water resistance of these containers has long been attributed to the Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) membrane that is assembled on the outermost surface of the filter assembly. On August 22nd a test of a container used inside of a glovebox was performed that brought into question this long-standing-basis. This test was performed by inverting a SAVY-lid onto a specialized piece of equipment for evaluating the integrity of the PTFE membrane. During the test water was observed passing through the filter indicating that the filter membrane was no longer preventing the ingress of water through the filter. The assumption after making this observation was that alpha-particles were rapidly degrading the membrane creating a leak path through the underlying aluminosilicate media (Fiberfrax®). The apparatus used was designed to only test the lid rather than the entire SAVY assembly. A test plan, PA-PLAN-01921, was developed to investigate whether a fully assembled container with a fully degraded PTFE membrane would be capable of meeting the criteria defined in PA-RD-1009 of not allowing more than 200 ml of water to enter the container with a water column of 6-inches applied over a 2-hour period. This report provides the results of the testing performed against PA-PLAN-01921.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

ALARA Review for Venting of Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWCs) at TA-54

This project will vent headspace hydrogen and oxygen from specialized high-pressure storage vessels called flanged tritium waste containers (FTWCs). There are four of these containers located in Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL’s) Technical Area 54 (TA-54), Building 1028. This building is in the southwest corner of LANL’s Material Disposal Area G. The vented headspace gas is expected to contain tritium in the form of water vapor, elemental hydrogen or a combination of both. The venting operation is expected to take place in 2025. There will be a series of operational readiness reviews prior to venting activities commencing. The FTWCs at TA-54 contain tritium-contaminated metal parts and molecular sieve media, which is a pebble-like material used to absorb water vapor from the air. This molecular sieve media inside the FTWCs is contained in metal canisters, along with some loose media material in bags. Over time, tritiated water vapor that had been adsorbed onto the media can become liberated into the FTWC headspace gas. Radiolysis can cause separation of the water vapor into its hydrogen and oxygen components, resulting in the potentially hazardous gas mixture within the FTWC. LANL has determined that continued tritium storage in these containers can pose an unsafe condition due to possible hydrogen and oxygen gas buildup within the FTWCs with a potential for explosion if sparks are generated within the FTWCs. To mitigate this hazard, the FTWCs will be stabilized by venting them in-place to remove hazardous gases.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

3013 Baseline Inner Container Report: Description, Imaging, and Analysis

This report presents consolidated findings from three microscopy studies of baseline Bagless Transfer Containers (BTCs), which are the inner containers used in DOE Standard 3013-compliant plutonium storage packages. The studies were conducted by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and DNV, a subcontractor specializing in corrosion science. The baseline BTCs examined had not been exposed to corrosive environments, serving as control samples for comparison with destructively examined (DE) containers. Additionally, the Background section provides an overview of the BTC design, including manufacturing methods, material properties, and container configurations that may influence corrosion behavior. The primary objective of the LANL and SRNL studies was to establish reference characteristics of BTCs to distinguish manufacturing artifacts from corrosion-induced features observed in DE containers. Both laboratories used advanced microscopy techniques, including Wide Area Microscopy (WAMS), Laser Confocal Microscopy (LCM), Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), and Focused Ion Beam (FIB), to reveal that most surface anomalies were shallow and attributable to flow-forming processes, not corrosion. Subsurface impurities, identified as non-metallic inclusions, were also observed. DNV’s investigation focused on characterizing the mechanical and chemical properties of the BTC material to support crack growth modeling. Their findings indicate higher hardness and strength but reduced ductility—consistent with flow-formed 304L stainless steel and a higher-than-expected martensite content, in contrast to manufacturer claims. Ongoing and future studies, including Electron Backscatter Diffraction (EBSD), aim to further understand the microstructural factors influencing crack initiation and propagation. The combined studies provide a crucial baseline for distinguishing corrosion effects in DE containers, contributing to the safe and reliable long-term storage of plutonium-bearing materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗