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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Simulations of Pipe Overpack Container Compaction at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is an operating geologic repository in southeastern New Mexico for transuranic (TRU) waste from nuclear defense activities. Past nuclear criticality concerns have generally been low at the WIPP due to the low initial concentration of fissile material and the natural tendency of fissile solute to disperse during fluid transport in porous media (Rechard et al. 2000). On the other hand, the list of acceptable WIPP waste types has expanded over the years to include Criticality Control Overpack (CCO) containers and Pipe Overpack (POP) containers. Containers bound for WIPP are bundled together in hexagon shaped 7-packs (six containers surround one container in the center). Two 7-packs are often combined into a TRUPACT-II package for a total of 14 containers. Most TRUPACT-II packages are restricted to a maximum fissile mass equivalent to plutonium (FMEP) between 0.1 and 0.38 kg, but a CCO TRUPACT-II package and a POP TRUPACT-II package are respectively permitted to have 5.32 kg and 2.80 kg FMEP (see Section 3 of US DOE (2013)). Consequently, CCO container criticality after emplacement at the WIPP was evaluated in Saylor and Scaglione (2018), and Oak Ridge National Laboratories is currently at work on POP container criticality analyses.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

SMR Containment Cable and Electrical Penetration Assembly System

GAIN Project CRADA Number NFE-21-08839, entitled “SMR Containment Cable and EPA System” was initiated by the partnership of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Engineered Solutions Group (ESG) to test an ESG-designed Electrical Penetration Assembly and Containment Cabling System Qualified for not only SMR technologies, but also Advanced Reactors design. An Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) is a component used to allow electrical power and signal conductors as well as optical fiber through the nuclear reactor’s containment structure while maintaining a pressure barrier. The EPA ensures the containment's integrity both during the normal operation and also accident conditions by providing a sealed passage for power and signals. This project was undertaken to fill the equipment gap of EPA and Cabling Systems that require much more severe environmental requirements than legacy plant applications present due to their smaller containment volumes that result in high energy densities compared to legacy designs. This high energy density results in severe accident environments and also more severe normal operating conditions.This document describes cost effective approaches to qualify a unique EPA for Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technologies as legacy LWR EPA technologies will likely have inherent material performance insufficiencies. The DBA profiles for SMRs (and some Advanced Reactor Technologies) are more severe than the legacy qualification requirements making the design of the qualification testing system challenging as the temperatures and pressures can approach the limits permitted by ASME Pressure Vessel Code, as well as accident temperatures exceeding the capability of polymeric gaskets and dielectrics. Small Modular Reactors are designed to have, as the name suggests, modularity which implies sized for factory fabrication and subsequent assembly at the power plant site. SMR containment is much smaller than a legacy Light Water Reactor containment. The containment walls are likely to be comprised of stainless steel. Qualifying Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) through these steel vessels are of interest in this work. Methods are presented here that discuss critical safety and cost effectiveness for these SMR EPA’s test systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2000

NEA Multi-Chamber Sample Return Container with Hermetic Sealing

A sample return container is being developed by Honeybee Robotics to receive samples from a derivative of the Champollion/ST4 Sample Acquisition and Transfer Mechanism or other samplers such as the 'Touch and Go' Surface Sampler (TGSS), and then hermetically seal the samples for a sample return mission. The container is enclosed in a phase change material (PCM) chamber to prevent phase change during return and re-entry to earth. This container is designed to operate passively with no motors and actuators. Using the rotation axis of the TGSS sampler for interfacing, transferring and sealing samples, the container consumes no electrical power and therefore minimizes sample temperature change. The circular container houses multiple isolated canisters, which will be sealed individually for samples acquired from different sites or depths. The TGSS based sampler indexes each canister to the sample transfer position, below the index interface for sample transfer. After sample transfer is completed, the sampler indexes a seal carrier, which lines up seals with the openings of the canisters. The sampler moves to the sealing interface and seals the sample canisters one by one. The sealing interface can be designed to work with C-seals, knife edge seals and cup seals. This sample return container is being developed by Honeybee Robotics in collaboration with the JPL Exploration Technology program. A breadboard system of the sample return container has been recently completed and tested. Additional information is contained in the original extended abstract.

Rafeek, Shaheed↗
NASA NTRS2007

Separation and Sealing of a Sample Container Using Brazing

A special double-wall container and a process for utilizing the container are being developed to enable (1) acquisition of a sample of material in a dirty environment that may include a biological and/or chemical hazard; (2) sealing a lid onto the inner part of the container to hermetically enclose the sample; (3) separating the resulting hermetic container from the dirty environment; and (4) bringing that hermetic container, without any biological or chemical contamination of its outer surface, into a clean environment. The process is denoted S(exp 3)B (separation, seaming, and sealing using brazing) because sealing of the sample into the hermetic container, separating the container from the dirty environment, and bringing the container with a clean outer surface into the clean environment are all accomplished simultaneously with a brazing operation.

Bar-Cohen, Yoseph↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Containment Assurance Risk Framework of the Mars Sample Return Program

The Mars Sample Return campaign aims at bringing rock and atmospheric samples from Mars to Earth through a series of robotic missions. These missions would collect the samples being cached and deposited on Martian soil by the Perseverance rover, place them in a container, and launch them into Martian orbit for subsequent capture by an orbiter that would bring them back. Given there exists a non-zero probability that the samples contain biological material, precautions are being taken to design systems that would break the chain of contact between Mars and Earth. These include techniques such as sterilization of Martian particles, redundant containment vessels, and a robust reentry capsule capable of accurate landings without a parachute. Requirements exist that the probability of containment not assured of Martian-contaminated material into Earth’s biosphere be less than one in a million. To demonstrate compliance with this strict requirement, a statistical framework was developed to assess the likelihood of containment loss during each sample return phase and make a statement about the total combined mission probability of containment not assured. The work presented here describes this framework, which considers failure modes or fault conditions that can initiate failure sequences ultimately leading to containment not assured. Reliability estimates are generated from databases, design heritage, component specifications, or expert opinion in the form of probability density functions or point estimates and provided as inputs to the mathematical models that simulate the different failure sequences. The probabilistic outputs are then combined following the logic of several fault trees to compute the ultimate probability of containment not assured. Given the multidisciplinary nature of the problem and the different types of mathematical models used, the statistical tools needed for analysis are required to be computationally efficient. While standard Monte Carlo approaches are used for fast models, a multi-fidelity approach to rare event probabilities is proposed for expensive models. In this paradigm, inexpensive low-fidelity models are developed for computational acceleration purposes while the expensive high-fidelity model is kept in the loop to retain accuracy in the results. This work presents an example of end-to-end application of this framework highlighting the computational benefits of a multi-fidelity approach.

Giuseppe Cataldo↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of an Additively Manufactured Subscale Secondary Sealed Container for the NASA FROSTE Project

This presentation details the development of an additively manufactured (AM) subscale test article for the secondary sealed container (SSC) as part of the NASA FROSTE project. FROSTE is focused on the collection of regolith samples from shadowed regions of the Moon and the preservation of those samples at cryogenic temperatures for return to Earth. Our team was integrated into the FROSTE program to leverage innovative design approaches and additive manufacturing capabilities in support of a scalable development strategy, where the subscale configuration serves as the development path toward a full-scale SSC. Scalmalloy was selected as the primary material for all AM components due to its favorable strength-to-weight ratio, thermal conductivity, and demonstrated performance in aerospace applications. Its aluminum-based composition supports robust mechanical behavior at cryogenic temperatures while enabling efficient heat transfer and control of thermal gradients within the containment system. The SSC architecture consists of an outer container assembly that houses a phase change material (PCM) tank, which in turn contains primary containers holding the regolith. Thermal management relies on controlled conductive and radiative heat transfer, including a thermal connection assembly that interfaces the PCM tank to an external cryocooler via a thermal strap, and IMLI surrounding the PCM tank to inhibit radiative heat transfer. The outer container assembly incorporates sealing interfaces, thermal connection ports, and I/O feedthroughs, with PTFE spring seals used at critical interfaces to maintain containment integrity. The PCM tank is manufactured as a single monolithic Scalmalloy component and incorporates an integral lattice structure to minimize thermal gradients, internal channels for thermocouple routing, and interface features for thermal connection assembly integration. The tank is centrally suspended within the outer container using support rings, with G10 insulating components employed to inhibit thermal leaks. This work describes the design methodology, AM approach, and key considerations used to inform the design.

regolith↗
DOE OSTI2013

Smart container UWB sensor system for situational awareness of intrusion alarms

An in-container monitoring sensor system is based on an UWB radar intrusion detector positioned in a container and having a range gate set to the farthest wall of the container from the detector. Multipath reflections within the container make every point on or in the container appear to be at the range gate, allowing intrusion detection anywhere in the container. The system also includes other sensors to provide false alarm discrimination, and may include other sensors to monitor other parameters, e.g. radiation. The sensor system also includes a control subsystem for controlling system operation. Communications and information extraction capability may also be included. A method of detecting intrusion into a container uses UWB radar, and may also include false alarm discrimination. A secure container has an UWB based monitoring system

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2015

Method to produce water-soluble sugars from biomass using solvents containing lactones

A process to produce an aqueous solution of carbohydrates that contains C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6 sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5 sugar monomers, or any combination thereof is presented. The process includes the steps of reacting biomass or a biomass-derived reactant with a solvent system including a lactone and water, and an acid catalyst. The reaction yields a product mixture containing water-soluble C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6-sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5-sugar monomers, or any combination thereof. A solute is added to the product mixture to cause partitioning of the product mixture into an aqueous layer containing the carbohydrates and a substantially immiscible organic layer containing the lactone.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Method to produce water-soluble sugars from biomass using solvents containing lactones

A process to produce an aqueous solution of carbohydrates that contains C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6 sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5 sugar monomers, or any combination thereof is presented. The process includes the steps of reacting biomass or a biomass-derived reactant with a solvent system including a lactone and water, and an acid catalyst. The reaction yields a product mixture containing water-soluble C6-sugar-containing oligomers, C6-sugar monomers, C5-sugar-containing oligomers, C5-sugar monomers, or any combination thereof. A solute is added to the product mixture to cause partitioning of the product mixture into an aqueous layer containing the carbohydrates and a substantially immiscible organic layer containing the lactone.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Conformal core cooling and containment structure

A nuclear reactor includes a pressure vessel and a nuclear reactor core comprising fissile material disposed inside the pressure vessel at the bottom of the pressure vessel. A secondary core containment structure includes a containment basket comprising insulation with a maximum stable temperature of at least 2200K cladded by steel. The bottom of the pressure vessel and the nuclear reactor core are disposed inside the containment basket with the containment basket spaced apart from the bottom of the pressure vessel by a clearance gap. The containment basket may comprise zirconia insulation cladded by steel. In some embodiments the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel is no larger than one meter. The secondary core containment structure may further comprise conduits arranged to inject water into the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Conformal core cooling and containment structure

A nuclear reactor includes a pressure vessel and a nuclear reactor core comprising fissile material disposed inside the pressure vessel at the bottom of the pressure vessel. A secondary core containment structure includes a containment basket comprising insulation with a maximum stable temperature of at least 2200K cladded by steel. The bottom of the pressure vessel and the nuclear reactor core are disposed inside the containment basket with the containment basket spaced apart from the bottom of the pressure vessel by a clearance gap. The containment basket may comprise zirconia insulation cladded by steel. In some embodiments the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel is no larger than one meter. The secondary core containment structure may further comprise conduits arranged to inject water into the clearance gap between the containment basket and the bottom of the pressure vessel.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Development of the B-25 Low Level Radioactive Waste Container in Taiwan - 1900x

Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant will be permanently stopped its operation in the middle of 2019 and will be the first nuclear power plant stepping into the decommissioning phase in Taiwan. According to Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act, a nuclear facility must be dismantled in 25 years after being permanently ceased operation. In its decommissioning plan, the B -25 low level radioactive waste container was one of the proposed containers used for this decommissioning task. However, the B-25 waste container was not used or developed in Taiwan before. To meet this need, Institute of Nuclear Energy Research developed a new type of B-25 waste container and will apply to the authority for its usage license. This article provided the information of the low level radioactive waste containers have been approved in Taiwan and described the design specifications of the developed B-25 waste container. Besides, the numerical evaluation and test results were also included in this article. Based on the evaluation and test results, the developed B-25 waste container satisfied the requirements of the storage container and industrial package type 2. It is believed that the usage license would be granted soon after applying it to the authority. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

A study on computational fluid dynamics modeling of a refrigerated container for COVID-19 vaccine distribution with experimental validation

A key issue with the distribution of vaccines to prevent COVID-19 is the temperature level required during transport, storage, and distribution. Typical refrigerated transport containers can provide a temperature-controlled environment down to -30 °C. However, the Pfizer vaccine must be carefully transported and stored under a lower temperature between -80 °C and -60 °C. One way to provide the required temperature is to pack the vaccine vials into small packages containing dry ice. Dry ice sublimates from a solid to a gas, which limits the allowable transport duration. This can be mitigated by transporting in a -30 °C refrigerated container. Moreover, because the dry ice will sublimate and thereby release CO 2 gas into the transport container, monitoring the CO 2 concentration within the refrigerated container is also essential. In the present work, a 3D computational fluid dynamics model was developed based on a commercially available refrigerated container and validated with experimental data. The airflow, temperature distribution, and CO 2 concentration within the container were obtained from the simulations. The modeling results can provide guidance on preparing experimental setups, thus saving time and lowering cost, and also provide insight into safety precautions needed to avoid hazardous conditions associated with the release of CO 2 during vaccine distribution.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Containment Analysis Capability of UNF-ST&DARDS

The Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) methodology to perform automated containment analyses for potential transportation packages based on canister loading map information is described in this paper, and its capability is illustrated with example results. The allowable leakage rate is calculated with the procedures provided in ANSI N14.5-2014 and NUREG/CR-6487, which were adapted for containment analysis of a transportation package containing fuel assemblies with different nuclear characteristics (e.g., initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time) and clad integrity (intact or damaged). UNF-ST&DARDS applies different source term calculation methodologies for low-burnup fuel (LBF) (i.e., <45 GWd/tonne U) assemblies and high-burnup fuel (HBF) (i.e., ≥45 GWd/tonne U) assemblies. The LBF radionuclide activities are based on actual fuel assembly burnup, initial enrichment, and cooling time. Bounding radionuclide activities based on a fuel pellet burnup value of 65 GWd/tonne U and actual fuel assembly cooling time are used for HBF assemblies. The fraction of failed fuel rods and the release fractions for the contributors to releasable source terms recommended in NUREG-1617 are used in the containment analysis regardless of fuel assembly burnup. However, UNF-ST&DARDS supports different parameter values for LBF and HBF assemblies. Finally, the containment analysis methodology for as-loaded transportation packages is presented in detail, and the UNF-ST&DARDS containment analysis capability is illustrated with results for simulated transportation packages containing spent nuclear fuel canisters in dry storage at selected sites.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Water Resistant Container Technical Basis Document for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program

Criticality safety at TA-55 relies on nuclear material containers that are water resistant to prevent significant amounts of water from coming into contact with fissile material in the event of a fire that causes a breach of glovevbox confinement and subsequent fire water ingress. A “water tight container” is a container that will not allow more than 50ml of water ingress when fully submerged, except when under sufficient pressure to produce structural discontinuity. There are many types of containers, welded containers, hermetically sealed containers, filtered containers, etc.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Pressurizing Hagan and SAVY containers to 30-psig (air) to measure the release of analytical cerium oxide test powder

In response to an ESS surrounding the storage of sealed sources at TA-55, personnel from RP-SVS (Radiation Protection Services) and ORI-2 (Operational Readiness & Execution) were approached by ES-55 (Facility System Engineering) to provide technical testing of known nuclear material storage containers. Testing criteria were determined by SB-PF (Safety Basis for Plutonium Facilities). Tests were conducted in conjunction with multiple related projects at the Aerosol Sciences Laboratory (TA-03-0130-0103). An experimental system was quickly developed to deliver a pressure pulse (30-psig) that mimics a sealed source burst scenario. A series of twelve tests was conducted. Six tests were done with two different 5QT SAVY-4000 containers, where each SAVY filter-lid combination was subjected to three successive test insults. Three tests were done with a (0.375" diameter filter) 8Q.T Hagan container, and three tests with a (0.625" diameter filter) 8QT Hagan container. An unused, fresh container filter was used for each tested Hagan container, each receiving only one test insult per filter. Cerium oxide (CeO 2 ) powder was loaded (100 grams per test) into a nozzle in the tested Hagan and SAVY containers, and the nozzle was hard-plumbed to a ball valve and a pressure source. This system was installed into the Los Alamos RRFMC (Respirable Release Measurement Chamber), which is an integrated multipurpose aerosol wind tunnel that satisfies NQA-1 subpart 2.4 for R&D work. The ball valve was fitted with a mechanical linkage for operation from outside the wind tunnel. An aerodynamic particle sizer counted the particle concentrations and size distributions of released aerosol. Respirable aerosol released during the tests was measured and a correction factor for wind tunnel flowrate and internal duct deposition was applied.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Safety Standards for Fuel System and Fuel Container Integrity of Alternative Fuel Vehicles

There are two Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in place that specify requirements for integrity of the fuel system and fuel container on compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel vehicles. These are FMVSS Nos. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles,” and FMVSS No. 304, “CNG fuel container integrity.” At this time, no FMVSS are defined for the fuel system and fuel container integrity of propane and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles or fuel system integrity requirements for heavy-duty CNG vehicles on the road. However, there are voluntary industry design standards and best practices, as well as regulations defined in other countries. FMVSS No. 303 specifies requirements for the integrity of the CNG fuel system of light-duty vehicles and school buses, and FMVSS No. 304 specifies requirements for fuel container integrity on all CNG vehicles. FMVSS No. 304 applies to containers used for vehicle propulsion, whereas containers used to transport CNG and transportation of CNG containers are regulated by the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304 are performance-based standards to consistently test and validate equipment and are not design restrictive. Despite the increasing number of natural gas and propane medium- and heavy-duty vehicles on the road, there are no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements beyond light-duty and school buses for CNG vehicles and no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements for propane vehicles. NHTSA is researching fuel system safety for medium- and heavy-duty natural gas and propane vehicles to update FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304. NHTSA is also researching current best practices and standards for high pressure fuel tanks in motor vehicles as they may apply to FMVSS No. 304.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗