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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 289 records · Page 16
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

Causal Analysis of The Uncontrolled Moderator In The HFEF Main Cell

On 11/07/2012 while investigating the cause of defects in neutron radiography film at HFEF, oil was discovered near the elevator shaft located at the 4M location within the Main Cell. Subsequent investigation identified oil (untracked moderator) in several locations ofthe HFEF Main Cell. Initial analysis determined that oil leaking from a 1M shielding window had leaked past a compensatory containment system resulting in a thin layer of oil found in several locations on the main cell floor. The result of this condition is uncontrolled moderator in moderator controlled zones, which is a violation of Criticality Hazard Control Statements (CHCS) for HFEF.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2014

SOLIDS PRECIPITATION EVENT IN MCU CAUSAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SOLIDS RECOVERY TEAM

A process upset occurred in the Modular Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) facility on April 6th, 2014. During recovery efforts, a significant amount of solids were found in the Salt Solution Feed Tank (SSFT), Salt Solution Receipt Tanks (SSRTs), two extraction contactors, and scrub contactors. The solids were identified by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) as primarily sodium oxalate and sodium alumina silicate (NAS) with the presence of some aluminum hydroxide. NAS solids have been present in the SSFT since simulant runs during cold chemical startup of MCU in 2007, and have not hindered operations since that time. During the process upset in April 2014, the oxalate solids partially blocked the aqueous outlet of the extraction contactors, causing salt solution to exit through the contactor organic outlet to the scrub contactors with the organic phase. This salt solution overwhelmed the scrub contactors and passed with the organic phase to the strip section of MCU. The partially reversed flow of salt solution resulted in a Strip Effluent (SE) stream that was high in Isopar™ L, pH and sodium. The primary cause of the excessive solids accumulation in the SSRTs and SSFT at MCU is attributed to an increase in the frequency of oxalic acid cleaning of the 512-S primary filter. Agitation in the SSRTs at MCU in response to cold weather likely provided the primary mechanism to transfer the solids to the contactors. Sources of the sodium oxalate solids are attributed to the oxalic acid cleaning solution used to clean the primary filter at the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) filtration at 512-S, as well as precipitation from the salt batch feed, which is at or near oxalate saturation. The Solids Recovery Team was formed to determine the cause of the solids formation and develop recommendations to prevent or mitigate this event in the future. A total of 53 recommendations were generated. These recommendations were organized into 4 focus areas: • Improve understanding of oxalate equilibrium and kinetics in salt solutions • Reduction/elimination of oxalic acid cleaning in 512-S • Flowsheet optimization • Improving diagnostic capability The recommendations implemented prior to resumption of MCU operations provide a risk mitigation or detection function through additional sampling and observation. The longer term recommendations provide a framework to increase the basic process knowledge of both oxalate chemistry and filtration behavior and then facilitate decisions that improve the salt flowsheet as a system.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Causal Analysis For Occurrence Report: OR NA-SS-SNL-2000-2015-0005 Unexpected Type of Failure of Thermal Battery

On 6/26/2015 at approximately 1445 in 894/136, a pulse thermal battery (approximately the size of a commercial size C cell) experienced an unexpected failure following an electrical performance test that is routinely conducted on thermal batteries. A dedicated tester for this operation was used and it ran the test until the nominal 28-volt output of the battery had dropped to 5 volts, usually indicative of the battery being spent and safe enough to move. The failure occurred while a test operator was transferring the battery from the testing primary containment box to another primary containment box within the same room; initial indications are that the battery experienced an over-pressurization failure which led to the battery's base plate being expelled and the operator receiving a non-recordable injury (bruising to the palm of the hand) from the pressure of the expulsion. The operator was wearing the prescribed PPE (safety glasses and high temperature glove) and was handling the battery appropriately with an open, flat hand. Pictures of the scene are below.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2018

Causal Analysis Report for NA-SS-SNL-8000-2018-0002 Electrical shock: Wind Turbine Nacelle Lubbock TX

A Sandia National Laboratories Member of the Workforce (MOW) experienced contact with electrical energy while performing work on an oil filter pump electrical system in the al wind turbine nacelle at Sandia National Laboratories Scaled Wind Turbine Facility (SWiFT). The Department of Energy (DOE) Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Scaled Wind Farm Technology (SWiFT) facility does research and development (R&D) work in collaboration with Texas Tech University. The SWiFT facility includes three turbines for performing wind plant and turbine technology research in support of DOE's Wind Energy Technology Office. The current work ongoing at the site is primarily related to commissioning the three turbines to support ongoing DOE customer needs and requests. It was during the performance of commissioning tests of the hydraulic systems in the a1 turbine that a Sandia MOW experienced contact with electrical energy. There were multiple root and contributing causes that ultimately resulted in the electrical energy contact. These causes are summarized and aligned to their corrective actions in the corrective action plan table provided in Section 7(c). The purpose of this narrative section is to provide additional information and context

17 WIND ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2018

Causal Analysis Report for "Demolition of Historic and Yet-to-be-Determined Radar Towers at TTR Without Completing Required NEPA Process"

Two radar towers at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Contraves Towers 22-00 and 12-00, were torn down prior to completion of the required National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, (NTESS) submission of the NEPA checklist triggered a Sandia Field Office (SFO) review of the proposed work scope and was to include a required consultation between SFO and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) to assess any adverse effect(s) on historic properties or contributing element(s) to a historic district and, if so, determine a resolution. Following the consultation, SFO provides approval/denial of the proposed work detailed on the submitted NEPA checklist. Contraves Tower 22-00 is a historic structure, as formally determined by the SFO in consultation with the SHPO. The historical eligibility of Contraves Tower 12-00 is yet to be determined. On February 13, 2018, NTESS notified SFO that Contraves Tower 22-00 at TTR was torn down in May 2017 prior to completion of the required the NEPA process, including consultation with the SHPO. NTESS submitted two NEPA checklists to SFO in 2016 for the removal of several structures no longer required by NTESS. The first NEPA checklist listed three historic structures (one of which was Contraves Tower 22-00) and SFO determination on whether consultation with the SHPO is necessary as well as approval/denial of the NEPA checklist is pending. The second NEPA checklist listed five non-historic structures, one of which was Contraves Tower 12-00. SFO approved the NEPA checklist covering non historic structures except for the Contraves Tower 12-00, as the Contraves Tower 12-00 requires further consultation with the SHPO by SFO. Only after completion of the consultation would SFO determine approval/denial on the remaining property cited within the NEPA checklist. In late January 2018, NTESS personnel discovered that Contraves Tower 22-00 was no longer listed in the Facility Information Management System (FIMS). Upon further investigation, NTESS personnel verified that the Contraves Tower 22-00 had been removed in May 2017. During the initial extent of condition, it was discovered that Contraves Tower 12-00 had also been torn down in May 2017 as part of this same destruction and demolition (D&D) activity. Both Contraves Towers 22-00 and 12-00) had been torn down prior to completion of the NEPA process, including consultation with the SHPO.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2016

HERMES Shield Door Event Causal Analysis

Description Of Event: On June, 28, 2016, the HERMES III accelerator (TA-IV, Building 970) operations team began preparing for the third test shot of the day. Prior to the shot, operations personnel conducted the required pre-shot clearance and lock-up process. Following the shot, an operator and RCT re-entered the controlled area to perform post-shot clearance activities and found the shield door in the open position. All other control measures (interlocks and other access controls) were in place during this event and there was no personnel exposure. The test cell shield door is a six-inch thick steel door; it's principal function is to privide shielding, however, it also serves as a pedestrian entrance into the test cell. The shield door is located on the north side of the test cell and, aside from distance, is a primary control to mitigate personnel exposure to ionizing radiation.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Occurrence Causal Analysis Report: Inadvertent Reaction During the Pressuring of Energetic Material

On June 30, 2020, an inadvertent reaction occurred during pressing of the energetic material pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN). The location of the event was the energetic component Rapid Prototype Facility (RPF), where similar operations performed on a variety of energetic materials are routinely provided for customers throughout Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). A background on pressing of energetic materials is provided to enhance clarity in the description of the event. This background includes a description of the equipment, materials, and tooling present during the event.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2018

Causal Analysis Report for Thunder Range Block VIII Test - Management Concern

From July 24th -27th, 2018, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) was conducting a series of explosive tests (referred to as Block VIII Tests) at Thunder Range. Thunder Range is an explosive testing range located on Kirtland Air Force Base and operated by SNL. The testing occurred on Range 7, a fragmentation range that is authorized for activities up to a maximum of 2,000 pounds net explosive weight (NEW). The maximum NEW for the Block VIII tests was 114 lbs. The specific management concern is that although the Thunder Range team identified controls to provide protection for essential personnel, those controls were not adequately evaluated before testing occurred. There were several controls in place at Thunder Range when the block VW test was executed. Engineered controls including Fire Control Point (FCP) placement, FCP structure design, and administrative controls involving communications. These controls were in place but not thoroughly evaluated for adequacy in meeting requirements related to sound pressure and fragments before the test was executed. Compliance with the remaining requirements was achieved. The lack of evaluation did not result in harm to personnel, equipment, or structures but was deemed as an opportunity to further understand how compliance with DOE-STD-1212-2012 could be better achieved with defensible evidence. The information provided in the remainder of this report discusses these controls and the deficiencies that contributed to this management concern.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2018

NA-SS-SN L-5000-2018-0005 858EL Arsenic Release Above Permit Level (Causal Analysis Report)

On November 28, 2018 at approximately 4:17pm the arsenic monitor in the Acid Waste Neutralization (AWN) room located in 858N was registering a concentration above the permit level of 51ppb as stated in ABCWUA Permit 2069G Daily Composite Limit. 100ml samples had been drawn from the waste stream at - 6pm November 28, 2018. The samples were analyzed, results received on November 29, 2018 confirmed an arsenic concentration above the permit level.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deep Analysis Net with Causal Embedding for Coal-fired Power Plant Fault Detection and Diagnosis (DANCE4CFDD)

Fault detection and diagnosis is critical to power plant operation to ensure attaining high reliability while reducing operation cost. As more renewable power is introduced to the power grid, traditional fossil power plants take on the extra burden of excessive load cycling to compensate the generation variability from renewable power. Such load cycling will pose more reliability challenges to power plant operation. There are a number of challenges faced by today’s asset health management system in coal- fired (or gas) power plants: 1) high-dimensional nonlinear interaction among multiple time series measurements; 2) high measurement variance induced by operational conditions/modes; 3) variation among asset types and plant configurations; and 4) a small number of faulty events to learn from. To cope with these challenges, today’s fielded asset health management systems rely heavily on manual efforts from domain experts and hand-crafted features or rules based on domain knowledge. Despite its role in plant reliability, such a practice is costly and hinders its scalability and sustainability, particularly when a plant undergoes modifications. The objective of this project is to develop a novel end-to-end AI learning system that is trainable (i.e., the AI representation of a complex system behavior can be directly learned from properly labeled data) for accurate fault detection and root cause analysis. The ability to create a fault detection model directly from time series could alleviate the efforts associated with today’s asset management solution development. In the course of this project, we have achieved the following: Created an AI model development environment incorporating state-of-the-art neural network architectures for rapid model development and evaluation; Developed novel learning strategies for training of fault detection model; Developed special-purpose neural network architecture embedded with variable association graph aiming for better interpretability; Developed a learning strategy to leverage a small number of faulty events for enhanced fault detection capability; Conducted detailed experimental study based on public benchmark datasets and demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed solution; and Validated the developed system with data from both a coal-fired plant boiler dynamic simulation model and real-world coal-fired power plant covering multiple asset and fault types. Overall, the project attained a technology readiness level of TRL 5 from TRL 2 at the beginning of the project.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Using Systems Theoretic Process Analysis and Causal Analysis to Map and Manage Organizational Information to Enable Digitalization and Information Automation

The overarching goal of this Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program–supported research and development project is to provide planning tools and comprehensive guidance to utilities considering or undertaking full nuclear plant modernization. The results of this research will provide the nuclear industry with a comprehensive and usable solution, including guidance, lessons learned, methods, and planning tools. This research is currently working to provide guidance on digitalization and information automation to enable the evolution of data to information, insight, and action—thereby allowing utilities to operate safely and cost-competitively with all other electrical generation sources. Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program researchers have also recently started investigating how human and technology integration principles, information automation, and digitalization enable data evolution. These researchers are currently in the process of validating the use of System-Theoretic Process Analysis to define high-level safety constraints in the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s problem identification and resolution process (i.e., a plant compliance information gathering activity). The next step in this research, which is described in the following sections of this report, is to map out data evolution in a use case to identify inefficiencies in another aspect of plant compliance information gathering and communication activities—event investigations and root cause analyses.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗