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At least 289 records · Page 16

Regulatory Risk Reduction for Advanced Reactor Technologies: FY 2017 Framework Modernization Proposals and Status

The regulatory framework governing the licensing of commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. developed over recent decades with a strong emphasis towards assessing large light water reactor (LWR) safety. However, recent shifts in energy market needs and priorities has brought new and different types of nuclear technologies into consideration for applications that include but are not limited to electric power generation. In order to realize the benefits in efficiency, reliability and safety that advanced (non-LWR) can potentially offer, efforts are needed to modernize the existing regulatory framework to make technical licensing requirements more compatible with radically new nuclear technologies. To serve the needs of the energy market, this update should be performed on a schedule conducive to deployments projected to begin as early as 2025. Beginning in 2016, an initiative was launched to amend the U.S. nuclear power reactor licensing framework by making the technical requirements contained therein more generically compatible with non LWR technology. The Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) was established as an industry-led team of subject matter experts managed by Southern Company Services and supported through a cost sharing arrangement with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Technical and programmatic coordination for the effort was also provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the Licensing Department of the Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Program located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and others.

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A Framework to Assess Advanced Reactor Spent Fuel Management Facility Deployment

Previous planning and prioritization for LWR SNF management investigated the risks and uncertainties of deploying facilities such as consolidated interim storage [1, 2, 3, 4]. As part of that work, activities and milestones were collected into success precedence diagrams that charted a path to achieving facility deployment [1]. In that framework, activities are any research, development, design, or decision required to achieve an intermediate goal; milestones are activity endpoints and mark the completion of deliverables. Milestones can be thought of as achievements required to reach the final goal of facility deployment; activities are the means by which milestones are accomplished. In planning, activities and milestones are compiled into comprehensive flow charts that visualize the steps necessary for deployment. This framework has been used to quantify risks, timelines, and costs of deploying SNF management facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Reactor Technology Development

This fact sheet provides a brief description of advanced rector technologies—noting what they are and current Energy Department programs that support their development.

Source record↗

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

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Attack Surface Analysis of the Digital Twins interface with Advanced Sensor and Instrumentation Interfaces: Cyber Threat Assessment and Attack Demonstration for Digital Twins in Advanced Reactor Architectures

A digital twin is a virtual representation of a physical system or object using real-time data that can predict and analyze how the system or object performs. This relatively new technology can be applied to the field of nuclear power generation, to aid in the design and development of new nuclear power plants and reduce operation costs using predictive maintenance and other data analytical methods. While there are already companies utilizing simulation software to train operators and technicians in the nuclear industry, some are now transitioning to utilizing their existing technology, software, and methods to develop digital twin solutions for the next generation of nuclear power plants, offering their services to utilities and government organizations around the world.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Report on Assessment of Advanced Reactor Fuel Performance

Three activities have been performed in FY 2019 to support the Advanced Fuel Cycle Campaign, which include assessment of annular fuel performance in an ultra-high burnup sodium-cooled reactor (SFR), modeling of annular fuel behavior during a transient scenario, and feasibility of a sustainable closed fuel cycle utilizing melt-refining process. Annular fuel performance parameters, including temperature profile, swelling strain, and cumulative damage fraction (CDF), in a 3000 MWt Sustainable Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SSFR) were assessed using the BISON fuel performance code. The SSFR is once-through ultra-long-life core based on a 34-batch fuel management scheme with 1.5-year cycle length. The fuel residence time in the SSFR is 51 years and the average discharged burnup is about 30%. Annular fuel has potential to irradiate for ultra-high burnup without major fuel-cladding mechanical interaction. This feature is achieved by using a low smeared density (~55%). In the SSFR design, however, 75% smeared density and a thick fuel pin were preferred to maintain criticality for 51 years. Due to the high smeared density and thick fuel pin configuration, the annular fuel was predicted to suffer premature cladding failure before reaching the discharge burnup of the SSFR. The current fuel creep model predicts a prominent creep strain due to gravity over the half-century irradiation, which may significantly affect the evolution of CDF. Thus, in order to use the annular fuel in an ultra-high burnup core such as the SSFR, a low smeared density and thin annular fuel is strongly recommended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Methodology for the Integration of a Mechanistic Source Term Analysis in a Probabilistic Framework for Advanced Reactors

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) and Argonne National Laboratory are currently engaged in a joint effort to modernize and develop probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques for advanced non-light water reactors. At a high level, the primary outcome of this project will be the development of next-generation PRA methodologies that will enable risk-informed prioritization of safety- and reliability-focused research and development, while also identifying gaps that may be resolved through additional research. A subset of this effort is the development of PRA methodologies to conduct a mechanistic source term (MST) analysis for event sequences that could result in the release of radionuclides. The MST analysis seeks to realistically model and assess the transport, retention, and release of radionuclides from the reactor to the environment. The MST methods developed during this project seek to satisfy the requirements of the Mechanistic Source Term element of the ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard. The MST methodology consists of separate analysis approaches for risk-significant and non-risk significant event sequences that may result in the release of radionuclides from the reactor. For risk-significant event sequences, the methodology focuses on a detailed assessment, using mechanistic models, of radionuclide release from the fuel, transport through and release from the primary system, transport in the containment, and finally release to the environment. The analysis approach for non-risk significant event sequences examines the possibility of large radionuclide releases due to events such as re-criticality or the complete loss of radionuclide barriers. This paper provides details on the MST methodology, including the interface between the MST analysis and other elements of the PRA, and provides a simplified example MST calculation for a sodium fast reactor.

Grabaskas, Dave↗

Investigating Wireless Quantum Key Distribution for Advanced Reactor Communications

Remote operation of small modular reactor (SMR) facilities is an appealing prospect for streamlined operation costs, safety concerns, and user convenience. The ability to guarantee security of communication channels between offsite users and nuclear reactor facilities is critical to enabling remote operations, given the sensitive nature of reactor state data. This report proposes a configuration implementing quantum key distribution (QKD) and advanced encryption standard (AES) protocols to establish secure reactor data feeds. The model outlined, which utilizes the Argonne-developed SeQUeNCe software package and custom MATLAB code, determines free-space channel losses for microwave-band communications in a variety of weather conditions and simulates QKD via ground-satellite links. This report demonstrates the feasibility of repeatable, real-time key generation and distribution for this configuration towards enabling secure wireless reactor communications.

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Challenges in the Development of High Temperature Reactors

Advanced reactor designs offer potentially significant improvements over currently operating light water reactors including improved fuel utilization, increased efficiency, higher temperature operation (enabling a new suite of non-electric industrial process heat applications), and increased safety. As with most technologies, these potential performance improvements come with a variety of challenges to bringing advanced designs to the marketplace. There are technical challenges in material selection and thermal hydraulic and power conversion design that arise particularly for higher temperature, long life operation (possibly >60 years). The process of licensing a new reactor design is also daunting, requiring significant data collection for model verification and validation to provide confidence in safety margins associated with operating a new reactor design under normal and off-normal conditions. This paper focuses on the key technical challenges associated with two proposed advanced reactor concepts: the helium gas cooled Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) and the molten salt cooled Advanced High Temperature Reactor (AHTR).

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Qualification of System-Level Advanced Reactor Safety Analysis Software for Lead Systems: Final CRADA Report

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over forty-five years and represents a critical investment in safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy. Although SAS4A/SASSYS-1 was developed to support the analysis of any liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactor, it has primarily been utilized to design and analyze Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs). As a result, most of the qualification basis for SAS4A/SASSYS-1 has utilized sodium as a coolant and geometry descriptions that are prototypic of SFR configurations. In this project, which partnered with Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, the initial foundation for a qualification basis centered on prototypic pool-type lead-cooled systems has been established, where the end goal is to extend support for utilization of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 in Lead Fast Reactor (LFR) licensing or authorization. This project included three fundamental technical tasks: LFR V&V test suite development (Task 1); qualification support for LFRs (Task 2); and LFR modeling capabilities evaluation and improvement (Task 3)

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Pulsed Infrared Thermography Nondestructive Imaging of SiC-SiC f Composite Cladding Architectures; Understanding the Performance of SiC-SiC f Composite Cladding Architectures with Cr Coating in Normal Operating and Accident Conditions in LWRs and Advanced Reactors

SiC-SiC f composites, consisting of silicon carbide fibers embedded in a silicon carbide matrix, are advanced materials with high thermal conductivity, temperature stability, and resistance to radiation damage. Traditional methods for quality control of fabricated SiC-SiC f composites involve nondestructive evaluation (NDE) with X-ray computed tomography (XCT). However, XCT imaging of typical SiC-SiC f structures for cladding applications can involve several hours. In this project, we investigate an alternative approach to NDE of SiC-SiC f composites that involves rapid (on the order of seconds) imaging with Pulsed infrared thermography (PIT). PIT images of a planar SiC-SiC f specimen show the structure of the surface monolith layer and internal SiC f structures. The capability of PIT imaging in visualizing SiC f structures is qualitatively confirmed by observing similarity in the PIT and X-ray transmission images of the same specimen. Computer vision analysis of defects in the PIT image of the monolith was performed with thresholding followed by topological structural analysis that computed geometric descriptors, including major/minor axes of fitted ellipses, area, perimeter, Feret diameter, circularity, roundness, and solidity.

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The Fission Accelerated Steady State Test (FAST) -- A Revised Capsule Design for the Accelerated Testing of Advanced Reactor Fuels

In an effort to improve the development and testing of novel nuclear fuels, a detailed evaluation on reducing the size of fuel specimens for irradiation has been performed. Theoretically speaking, reducing the fuels diameter and incorporating an inner capsule while maintaining the original outside diameter of the experiment significantly reduces the experiment’s sensitivity to fabrication tolerances and drastically reduces the time necessary to reach a desired fuel burnup; both of which improve the cost and schedule associated with the fuel testing. Simulations of this reduced diameter, double encapsulated concept have been performed using Abaqus, MCNP, and ORIGEN. The results of the Abaqus simulations are beyond the scope of this summary and will not be presented herein. For results of these Abaqus simulations, see Beausoleil [2]. The models were tested using various parameters and design deviations which were then compared to the original Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC) designs. The results of these simulations confirmed that the introduction of a second capsule coupled to a reduction in the fuel pin diameter significantly reduces the experiment’s sensitivity to fabrication tolerances and reduces the time to reach a desired burnup by nearly an order of magnitude. The original AFC design requires approximately 11.7 years to reach 30 Atom % Heavy Metal (at% HM) burnup. A burnup of 30 at% HM can be reached in approximately 2.5 to 3.5 years (irradiation position dependent) with a fuel diameter ½ (~0.097 in. diameter) that of the original AFC design. An added benefit to the fuel pin diameter reduction is that more specimens can be irradiated in any given cycle. Essentially, significantly more specimens can be tested and incur more burnup over a given operating cycle relative to the AFC design. This allows the development of a large test matrix of samples with rapid throughput in ATR.

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Effects of an Advanced Reactor’s Design, Use of Automation, and Mission on Human Operators

The roles, functions, and tasks of the human operator in existing light water nuclear power plants (NPPs) are based on sound nuclear and human factors engineering (HFE) principles, are well defined by the plant’s conduct of operations, and have been validated by years of operating experience. However, advanced NPPs whose engineering designs differ from existing light-water reactors (LWRs) will impose changes on the roles, functions, and tasks of the human operators. The plans to increase the use of automation, reduce staffing levels, and add to the mission of these advanced NPPs will also affect the operator’s roles, functions, and tasks. We assert that these factors, which do not appear to have received a lot of attention by the design engineers of advanced NPPs relative to the attention given to conceptual design of these reactors, can have significant risk implications for the operators and overall plant safety if not mitigated appropriately. This paper presents a high-level analysis of a specific advanced NPP and how its engineered design, its plan to use greater levels of automation, and its expanded mission have risk significant implications on operator performance and overall plant safety.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Summary of the Advanced Reactor Design Criteria (ARDC) Phase 2 Activities

This report provides an end-of-year summary reflecting the progress and status of proposed regulatory design criteria for advanced non-LWR designs in accordance with the Level 3 milestone in M3AT-15IN2001017 in work package AT-15IN200101. These criteria have been designated as ARDC, and they provide guidance to future applicants for addressing the GDC that are currently applied specifically to LWR designs. The report provides a summary of Phase 2 activities related to the various tasks associated with ARDC development and the subsequent development of example adaptations of ARDC for Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) and modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) designs.

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Assessing Risk and Driving Risk Mitigation for First-of-a-Kind Advanced Reactors

Planning and decision making amidst programmatic and technological risks represent significant challenges for projects. This presentation addresses the four step risk-assessment process needed to determine clear path forward to mature needed technology and design, license, and construct advanced nuclear power plants, which have never been built before, including Small Modular Reactors. This four step process has been carefully applied to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. STEP 1 - Risk Identification Risks are identified, collected, and categorized as technical risks, programmatic risks, and project risks, each of which result in cost and schedule impacts if realized. These include risks arising from the use of technologies not previously demonstrated in a relevant application. These risks include normal and accident scenarios which the SMR could experience including events that cause the disablement of engineered safety features (typically documented in Phenomena Identification Ranking Tables (PIRT) as produced with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and design needs which must be addressed to further detail the design. Product - Project Risk Register contained in a database with sorting, presentation, rollup, risk work off functionality similar to the NGNP Risk Management System . STEP 2 - Risk Quantification The risks contained in the risk register are then scored for probability of occurrence and severity of consequence, if realized. Here the scoring methodology is established and the basis for the scoring is well documented. Product - Quantified project risk register with documented basis for scoring. STEP 3 - Risk Handling Strategy Risks are mitigated by applying a systematic approach to maturing the technology through Research and Development, modeling, test, and design. A Technology Readiness Assessment is performed to determine baseline Technology Readiness Levels (TRL). Tasks needed to mature the technology are developed and documented in a roadmap. Product - Risk Handling Strategy. STEP 4 - Residual Risk Work off The risk handling strategy is entered into the Project Risk Allocation Tool (PRAT) to analyze each task for its ability to reduce risk. The result is risk-informed task prioritization. The risk handling strategy is captured in the Risk Management System, a relational database that provides conventional database utility, including data maintenance, archiving, configuration control, and query ability. The tool's Hierarchy Tree allows visualization and analyses of complex relationships between risks, risk mitigation tasks, design needs, and PIRTs. Product - Project Risk Allocation Tool and Risk Management System which depict project plan to reduce risk and current progress in doing so.

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Advanced Reactor Safety Program – Stakeholder Interaction and Feedback

In the Spring of 2013, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) began discussions with industry stakeholders on how to upgrade our safety analysis capabilities. The focus of these improvements would primarily be on advanced safety analysis capabilities that could help the nuclear industry analyze, understand, and better predict complex safety problems. The current environment in the DOE complex is such that recent successes in high performance computer modeling and simulation could lead the nuclear industry to benefit from these advances, as long as an effort to translate these advances into realistic applications is made. Upgrading the nuclear industry modeling analysis capabilities is a significant effort that would require participation and coordination from all industry segments: research, engineering, vendors, and operations. We focus here on interactions with industry stakeholders to develop sound advanced safety analysis applications propositions that could have a positive impact on industry long term operation, hence advancing the state of nuclear safety.

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