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NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗
NASA NTRS2014

TPSAS-NF1676L-18905-DND

Aircraft loss of control is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational classes. Aircraft loss-of-control (LOC) accidents are highly complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or (more often) in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents. This presentation will define LOC as a dynamics and control problem, summarize LOC accident analysis results, and discuss current NASA research that supports a holistic approach for significantly reducing aircraft LOC accidents for current and future aircraft. The approach includes onboard systems technologies for LOC prevention and recovery, as well as a parallel effort for their validation. The onboard systems technologies provide improved situational awareness, guidance, and control under realistic LOC hazards, and include: hazards effects detection and mitigation; upset detection, prevention and recovery; and multiple hazards mitigation. Validation technologies include analytical, simulation, and experimental methods, tools and testbeds as well as the development of a comprehensive set of realistic LOC test scenarios. Future research directions will also be discussed.

Christine Belcastro↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

On the Use of Resilience Models as Digital Twins for Operational Support and In time Decision Making

Human error is a major contributor to accidents and performance losses in complex engineered systems. If one examines these human error caused failures further, a specific cause, the lack of situation awareness, has dominated as a major cause of human errors that instigate latent or catastrophic failures in complex systems. Studies of aviation accidents involving major air carriers revealed that situation awareness was the root cause of around 90% of accidents involving pilot error. Another study explored offshore drilling accidents involving human error and found that 40% of accidents were directly attributed to the loss of situation awareness. Studies of human errors in other domains such as nuclear power, air traffic control, process industry, and advanced driving show that loss of SA was a root cause in a majority of the events. Situation awareness-related failures are not only common but also costly and fatal (e.g., Bhopal Gas Leak, Air France 447 Flight Crash). Thus, the concept of situation awareness has emerged as an important construct in human factors, resulting in numerous models and measurement methods to aid in promoting appropriate levels of situation awareness.

Lukman Irshad↗
NASA NTRS1977

Helicopter sling load accident/incident survey: 1968 - 1974

During the period considered a mean of eleven accidents per year occurred and a mean of eleven persons were killed or seriously injured per year. Forty-one percent of the accidents occurred during hover, and 63 percent of the accidents had pilot error listed as a cause/factor. Many accidents involved pilots losing control of the helicopter or allowing a collision with obstructions to occur. There was a mean of 58 incidents each year and 51 percent of these occurred during cruise.

Shaughnessy, J. D.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Research requirements to improve safety of civil helicopters

Helicopter and fixed-wing accident data were reviewed and major accident causal factors were established. The impact of accidents on insurance rates was examined and the differences in fixed-wing and helicopter accident costs discussed. The state of the art in civil helicopter safety was compared to military helicopters. Goals were established based on incorporation of known technology and achievable improvements that require development, as well as administrative-type changes such as the impact of improved operational planning, training, and human factors effects. Specific R and D recommendations are provided with an estimation of the payoffs, timing, and development costs.

Waters, K. T.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Civil helicopter wire strike assessment study. Volume 1: Findings and recommendations

Approximately 208 civil helicopter wire strike accidents for a ten year period 1970 to 1979 are analyzed. It is found that 83% of the wire strikes occurred during bright clear weather. Analysis of the accidents is organized under pilot, environment, and machine factors. Methods to reduce the wire strike accident rate are discussed, including detection/warning devices, identification of wire locations prior to flight, wire cutting devices, and implementation of training programs. The benefits to be gained by implementing accident avoidance methods are estimated to be fully justified by reduction in injury and death and reduction of aircraft damage and loss.

Tuomela, C. H.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Study of aircraft crashworthiness for fire protection

Impact-survivable postcrash fire accidents were surveyed. The data base developed includes foreign and domestic accidents involving airlines and jet aircraft. The emphasis was placed on domestic accidents, airlines, and jet aircraft due principally to availability of information. Only transport category aircraft in commercial service designed under FAR Part 25 were considered. A matrix was prepared to show the relationships between the accident characteristics and the fire fatalities. Typical postcrash fire scenaries were identified. Safety concepts were developed for three engineering categories: cabin interiors - cabin subsystems; power plant - engines and fuel systems; and structural mechanics - primary and secondary structures. The parameters identified for concept evaluation are cost, effectiveness, and societal concerns. Three concepts were selected for design definition and cost and effectiveness analysis: improved fire-resistant seat materials; anti-misting kerosene; and additional cabin emergency exits.

Cominsky, A.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Comments on the problem of turbulence in aviation

The problem of turbulence since the beginning of aviation is traced. The problem was not cured by high altitude flight and was acerbated by the downbursts associated with thunderstorms. The accidents that occurred during the period 1982 to 1984 are listed. From this is extracted the weather related accidents. Turbulence accounts for 24% of the accidents involving large commercial carriers and 54% of the weather related accidents. In spite of all the efforts to improve the forecasting and detection of turbulence, the problem is still a large one.

Mclean, James C., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Pre-flight risk assessment in Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopters

The Emergency Medical Service (EMS) industry has been the subject of several television and newspaper articles (Harvey and Jensen, 1987) which emphasized the negative aspects, (e.g., fatalities and high accident rates), rather than the life saving services performed. Until recently, the accident rate of the EMS industry has been five times as high as that of other civil helicopters. This high accident rate has been coupled with the dramatic rise in the number of programs. The industry has built from a single service at its inception in 1972, to over 180 in 1987 (Spray, 1987), to the point that 93 percent of the contiguous U.S. is now covered by some type of EMS service. These factors prompted the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to study the accidents that occurred between May 11, 1978 and December 3, 1986 (NTSB, 1988). The NTSB report concluded that 'Sound pilot judgment is central to safe flight operations.' They further stated that '... factors unique to EMS helicopter operations--such as the influence of the mission itself, program competition, and EMS program management perspectives--can drastically influence pilot judgment during the EMS mission.' One of the most difficult decisions that a pilot must make is whether to accept or decline a mission. A pre-flight risk assessment system (SAFE) was developed at NASA-Ames Research Center for civil EMS operations to aid pilots in making this decision objectively. The ability of the SAFE system to predict mission risk profiles was tested at an EMS facility. The results of this field study demonstrated that the usefulness of SAFE was highly dependent on the type of mission flown. SAFE is now being modified so that it can 'learn' with each mission flown. For example, after flying a mission to a particular site, an EMS pilot would input information about this mission into the system, such as new buildings, wires, or approach procedures. Then, the next time a pilot flew a similar mission or one to the same area, this additional information would be taken into account in computing a risk assessment.

Shively, R. J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Soviet space nuclear reactor incidents - Perception versus reality

Since the Soviet Union reportedly began flying nuclear power sources in 1965 it has had four publicly known accidents involving space reactors, two publicly known accidents involving radioisotope power sources and one close call with a space reactor (Cosmos 1900). The reactor accidents, particularly Cosmos 954 and Cosmos 1402, indicated that the Soviets had adopted burnup as their reentry philosophy which is consistent with the U.S. philosophy from the 1960s and 1970s. While quantitative risk analyses have shown that the Soviet accidents have not posed a serious risk to the world's population, concerns still remain about Soviet space nuclear safety practices.

Bennett, Gary L.↗
NASA NTRS1999

An Experimental and Numerical Study of Icing Effects on the Performance and Controllability of a Twin Engine Aircraft

In September 1997 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) requested assistance from the NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) Icing Branch in the investigation of an aircraft accident that was suspected of being caused by ice contamination. In response to the request NASA agreed to perform an experimental and computational study. The main activities that NASA performed were LERC Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) testing to define ice shapes and 2-D Navier-Stokes analysis to determine the performance degradation that those ice shapes would have caused. An IRT test was conducted in January 1998. Most conditions for the test were based upon raw and derived data from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) recovered from the accident and upon the current understanding of the Meteorological conditions near the accident. Using a two-dimensional Navier-Stokes code, the flow field and resultant lift and drag were calculated for the wing section with various ice shapes accreted in the IRT test. Before the final calculations could be performed extensive examinations of geometry smoothing and turbulence were conducted. The most significant finding of this effort is that several of the five-minute ice accretions generated in the IRT were found by the Navier-Stokes analysis to produce severe lift and drag degradation. The information generated by this study suggests a possible scenario for the kind of control upset recorded in the accident. Secondary findings were that the ice shapes accreted in the IRT were mostly limited to the protected pneumatic boot region of the wing and that during testing, activation of the pneumatic boots cleared most of the ice.

Reehorst, A.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Satellite Broadcast of Graphical Weather Data Flight Tested

NASA Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field's aviation Weather Information Communications (WINCOMM) and NASA Langley Research Center's Aviation Weather Information (AWIN) programs collaborated in a flight test and evaluation of a worldwide weather data-link capability using satellites. This successful flight testing moves NASA closer to its goal of developing advanced communications and information technologies to enable high-quality and timely dissemination of aviation weather information to all relevant users on the aviation information network. Recognized as a major contributing factor in aviation accidents and incidents, weather contributes directly or indirectly to nearly 80 percent of fatal general aviation (small private aircraft) accidents. In 1997, the Aeronautics Safety Investment Strategy Team s weather team produced a prioritized list of investment areas under weather accident prevention. Weather data dissemination is the most critical and highest ranked priority on the list. NASA's Aviation Safety Program founded the Aviation Weather Information initiative to focus efforts on significantly reducing the number of weather-related aviation fatalities. Access to accurate and timely weather data could contribute to a major reduction of weather-related incidents and accidents. However, a cost-effective solution has eluded most general aviation pilots because of the high cost of onboard weather radar equipment. Rockwell Collins, through a contract with NASA and in cooperation with WorldSpace Corporation, successfully completed ground and flight testing of a receiver and antenna in Johannesburg, South Africa. This NASA/Rockwell Collins project is an evaluation of worldwide weather data-link capability using transmissions from the Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services (S DARS) AfriStar satellite. Owned and operated by WorldSpace, AfriStar is a geostationary satellite that broadcasts commercial digital audio services to stationary and mobile platforms. S DARS satellites are the most powerful communications satellites produced to date, allowing users to receive signals using simple, low-cost patch antennas instead of more expensive, beam-steered antenna arrays. Engineers connected an inexpensive, commercially available radio receiver to a laptop computer and an antenna designed and built by Rockwell Collins, enabling them to receive WorldSpace signals from the AfriStar satellite during flight tests. WorldSpace broadcast their composite color graphical weather data files, which were multiplexed with normal audio streams, to the flat patch antenna mounted on a single-engine aircraft. The aircraft was equipped with a modified commercial S-DARS receiver, a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) receiver, and a laptop computer with color display. Continuous data reception occurred during normal aircraft maneuvers performed throughout takeoff, cruise, and landing operations. In addition, engineers monitored receiver power levels during steep turns and banks. In most instances, the receiver was able to maintain acceptable power levels during all phases of flight and to obtain weather data with little or with the successful completion of ground and flight testing of a receiver and antenna in Johannesburg, South Africa, the team has started to prepare for experiments using highspeed aircraft in areas of the world with limited access to timely weather data. NASA plans to provide a more advanced antenna design and consultation support. This successful test of real-time aviation-related weather data is a positive step toward solving communications-specific issues associated with the dissemination of weather data directly to the cockpit.

Mallasch, Paul G.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Dynamics Modeling and Simulation of Large Transport Airplanes in Upset Conditions

As part of NASA's Aviation Safety and Security Program, research has been in progress to develop aerodynamic modeling methods for simulations that accurately predict the flight dynamics characteristics of large transport airplanes in upset conditions. The motivation for this research stems from the recognition that simulation is a vital tool for addressing loss-of-control accidents, including applications to pilot training, accident reconstruction, and advanced control system analysis. The ultimate goal of this effort is to contribute to the reduction of the fatal accident rate due to loss-of-control. Research activities have involved accident analyses, wind tunnel testing, and piloted simulation. Results have shown that significant improvements in simulation fidelity for upset conditions, compared to current training simulations, can be achieved using state-of-the-art wind tunnel testing and aerodynamic modeling methods. This paper provides a summary of research completed to date and includes discussion on key technical results, lessons learned, and future research needs.

Foster, John V.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Evaluating Failures and Near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

There have been a number of studies done in the past drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. Generally, the systemic causes and proximate causes for fatal events have both been examined in considerable detail. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents and failures that narrowly missed being fatal could be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Additionally, review of risk factors for upcoming or future programs will often look at trending statistics, generally focusing on failure/success statistics. Unfortunately, doing so can give a skewed or misleading view of past reliability or a reliability that cannot be presumed to apply to a new program. One reason for this might be that failure/success criteria aren't the same across programs, but also that apparent success can hide systemic faults that, under other circumstances, can be fatal to a program with different parameters. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure and provide very misleading data if it is not examined in detail. This is particularly true for a manned space program where failure/success includes more than making a particular orbit. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. Even more importantly, a thorough understanding of these near miss events can identify conditions that prevented fatalities. Those conditions may be key to a programs reliability, but, without insight to the repercussions if such conditions were not in place, their importance may not be readily clear. As programs mature and political and fiscal responsibilities come to the fore, often there is considerable incentive to eliminate unnecessary conservatism, design margin, redundancy, operational support, testing, training, or safety oversight. An evaluation that demonstrates how these features and capabilities averted disaster can ensure processes that saved lives or missions are not discarded without appropriate review and understanding. Close examination of accidents that almost were can also highlight differences in design from one program to another, either justifying reliability comparisons or negating them. It can also provide considerable insight into how those saving factors were developed and implemented so that similar methods can be used to ensure appropriate life-saving and mission saving factors can be developed, even for a dissimilar space program. The lessons are appropriate for seasoned manned space programs and agencies, but crucial for untried agencies and organizations that are interested in sending man into space. The large body of publicly available near miss and accident data available provide invaluable insight into programmatic, technical, and even political issues that can be addressed before they impact safety. In this paper, we examine a number of these near misses and accidents and steps a program, agency, or potential spacefaring company might take to improve their chances of success and avoid mission or safety disasters using this data.

Barr, Stephanie↗
NASA NTRS2012

Software Programs Derive Measurements from Photographs

Even under the most unfortunate circumstances, NASA continues on a path of innovation. After the Space Shuttle Columbia reentered the atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it experienced a catastrophic failure, and the entire crew and vehicle were lost. For the two weeks prior to the accident, Columbia STS-107 was on a mission to perform physical, life, and space sciences research in the unique environment of microgravity. Following the accident, the remaining shuttles - Endeavor, Atlantis, and Discovery - were grounded, and an intense investigation ensued. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board spent nearly 7 months examining the cause of the accident and determining what would ensure a safe return to flight. To this end, investigators performed an extensive review down five analytic paths: aerodynamic, thermodynamic, sensor data timeline, debris reconstruction, and imaging. As part of the evaluation of all the available imagery from Columbia's ascent, orbit, and entry, investigators needed a new method for analyzing still video images to determine the size of the material that fell from Columbia, as well as the distance that the material traveled. John Lane, a scientist at Kennedy Space Center, devised a software program to calculate the unknown dimension of the material in the images, and soon after the investigation was complete, continued to enhance the technology. Eventually, the program that assisted in the Columbia investigation became available for licensing.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2012

Loss of Control Prevention and Recovery: Onboard Guidance, Control, and Systems Technologies

Loss of control (LOC) is one of the largest contributors to fatal aircraft accidents worldwide. LOC accidents are complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or (more often) in combination. These LOC hazards include vehicle impairment conditions, external disturbances; vehicle upset conditions, and inappropriate crew actions or responses. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents. NASA previously defined a comprehensive research and technology development approach for reducing LOC accidents and an associated integrated system concept. Onboard technologies for improved situation awareness, guidance, and control for LOC prevention and recovery are needed as part of this approach. Such systems should include: LOC hazards effects detection and mitigation; upset detection, prevention and recovery; and mitigation of combined hazards. NASA is conducting research in each of these areas. This paper provides an overview of this research, including the near-term LOC focus and associated analysis, as well as preliminary flight system architecture.

Belcastro, Christine M.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗
NASA NTRS2013

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗