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At least 271 records · Page 15

Upgrades at the NASA Langley Research Center National Transonic Facility

Several projects have been completed or are nearing completion at the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) National Transonic Facility (NTF). The addition of a Model Flow-Control/Propulsion Simulation test capability to the NTF provides a unique, transonic, high-Reynolds number test capability that is well suited for research in propulsion airframe integration studies, circulation control high-lift concepts, powered lift, and cruise separation flow control. A 1992 vintage Facility Automation System (FAS) that performs the control functions for tunnel pressure, temperature, Mach number, model position, safety interlock and supervisory controls was replaced using current, commercially available components. This FAS upgrade also involved a design study for the replacement of the facility Mach measurement system and the development of a software-based simulation model of NTF processes and control systems. The FAS upgrades were validated by a post upgrade verification wind tunnel test. The data acquisition system (DAS) upgrade project involves the design, purchase, build, integration, installation and verification of a new DAS by replacing several early 1990's vintage computer systems with state of the art hardware/software. This paper provides an update on the progress made in these efforts. See reference 1.

Paryz, Roman W.↗

Model-Based Verification and Validation of Spacecraft Avionics

Verification and Validation (V&V) at JPL is traditionally performed on flight or flight-like hardware running flight software. For some time, the complexity of avionics has increased exponentially while the time allocated for system integration and associated V&V testing has remained fixed. There is an increasing need to perform comprehensive system level V&V using modeling and simulation, and to use scarce hardware testing time to validate models; the norm for thermal and structural V&V for some time. Our approach extends model-based V&V to electronics and software through functional and structural models implemented in SysML. We develop component models of electronics and software that are validated by comparison with test results from actual equipment. The models are then simulated enabling a more complete set of test cases than possible on flight hardware. SysML simulations provide access and control of internal nodes that may not be available in physical systems. This is particularly helpful in testing fault protection behaviors when injecting faults is either not possible or potentially damaging to the hardware. We can also model both hardware and software behaviors in SysML, which allows us to simulate hardware and software interactions. With an integrated model and simulation capability we can evaluate the hardware and software interactions and identify problems sooner. The primary missing piece is validating SysML model correctness against hardware; this experiment demonstrated such an approach is possible.

MBV&V↗

Visual Odometry Thinking While Driving for the Curiosity Mars Rover's Three-Year Test Campaign: Impact of Evolving Constraints on Verification and Validation

Over the first 9 years of the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Curiosity rover's surface mission, more than 87\% of its driving has been performed using Visual Odometry (VO). The benefits of using VO during driving are that it minimizes rover position uncertainty and can be used to monitor wheel slip, halting a drive if excessive wheel slip is occurring. The VO implementation on board Curiosity acquires and processes VO images in between drive steps while the rover is stationary. A VO Thinking While Driving (VTWD) flight software capability has been developed which enables the processing of VO images during rover driving, increasing the distance Curiosity can drive with VO in a given time period up to as much as 1.75x total distance. Verification and Validation (V\&V) of the capability has been challenging due to impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic and unavailability of the JPL Mars Yard outdoor test site. The VTWD V\&V test procedures were modified to use a small indoor space with Mars-like terrain. This paper describes the 3 year V\&V effort under challenging conditions to approve the VTWD capability for use on the Curiosity rover.

Rankin, Arturo↗

Reducing software security risk through an integrated approach research initiative model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol

This document discusses the verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication protocol as a demonstration of the Model Based Verification (MBV) portion of the verification instrument set being developed under the Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach research initiative. Code Q of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) funds this project. The NASA Goddard Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) facility manages this research program at the NASA agency level and the Assurance Technology Program Office (ATPO) manages the research locally at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California institute of Technology) where the research is being carried out.

software security↗

IV&V Planning & Execution Initiative

Independent verification and validation (IV&V) is a systems engineering discipline which seeks to provide confidence that mission-critical software-dependent systems will operate safely and achieve all mission objectives. In order to optimize application of IV&V resources, it is necessary to identify specific assurance objectives that are most likely to reveal difficulty and therefore to increase confidence. Software assurance literature deals predominantly with the code itself. However, our experience is that the most significant software-related issues are discovered via analysis of other system artifacts such as operations concepts, requirements and design. Consequently, it is desirable to, when assessing risk and defining assurance objectives, consider all facets of the software system architecture. We describe in this presentation progress and lessons learned from an IV&V capability development initiative to enhance the IV&V project planning process using all available architecture information.

Risk↗

Is Structured Agile an Oxymoron? Tales from Implementing and Executing Agile in a US Government Environment

To paraphrase a famous quote, "No plan survives contact with the reality." Software (SW) development is often a classic example of this: whatever the plan was for a particular development, it often does not survive contact with technical realities, budget realities, program realities and schedule realities. Traditionally, SW development has followed a waterfall methodology with requirements being rigorously specified before the design, which was completed before the coding and unit testing started, which were in turn finished before validation and verification started. This model of SW engineering derives much from the HW engineering of large systems, and has been the standard methodology used in US government software acquisitions and systems for decades, with highly variable results. US Government SW requirements are built around Waterfall concepts, which assume that the plan will survive contact with reality, or at least that modifications to the plan are relatively small, and relatively few.Because of the inefficiencies and difficulties inherent in Waterfall, the commercial SW world started using a different SW development methodology called Agile more than 20 years ago. Agile believes that a plan should evolve and learn rapidly in response to the realities encountered. At its core, there are a few key elements of Agile:- A small team of people which is highly flexible and adaptive. The team collaborates and interoperates through sophisticated development architectures and release environments- An iterative, incremental development and release approach which is based upon the concept that knowledge comes from experience within the team, and that the team makes decisions based upon what it knows- A team culture which prizes transparency, inspection and adaptation. These values are necessary so that the team experience and decision making is transparent and responsive to the realities encountered during development and testingSo, how to use Agile in a US Government environment? GMSEC (Goddard Mission Services Evolution Center) develops satellite ground system software for NASA and other US Government agencies. The SW developed by the team contains a large code base of many applications used within satellite mission operations centers. It spans the full gamut of SW development types: from SW which is in a classic maintenance and sustainment mode, to new developments with a fairly well understood scope and approach, to new developments whose scope and approach are quite unclear and which require significant research and prototyping. Team members move between all of these different types of SW development. Waterfall was inadequate to the programmatic and technical needs of the team, as well as the various types of SW development being done. The software plan was not surviving contact with the technical and programmatic realities experienced by the team. To address this, the team started a small pilot project in 2016 to test the use of Agile within a small subset of the team for a new web services application. In early 2018, the use of Agile was expanded to the whole team and all the software, but we had to fulfill the NASA SW development requirements. And we needed to do this while still remaining true to the key Agile elements of transparency, inspection and adaption. In order to do this, the team worked very closely with the Software Process Improvement (SPI) team at NASA Goddard, as well as NASA engineering manageme

Beech, Theresa W.↗

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domaincomponent, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

Fault management↗

Software Development Technologies for Reactive, Real-Time, and Hybrid Systems

The research is directed towards the design and implementation of a comprehensive deductive environment for the development of high-assurance systems, especially reactive (concurrent, real-time, and hybrid) systems. Reactive systems maintain an ongoing interaction with their environment, and are among the most difficult to design and verify. The project aims to provide engineers with a wide variety of tools within a single, general, formal framework in which the tools will be most effective. The entire development process is considered, including the construction, transformation, validation, verification, debugging, and maintenance of computer systems. The goal is to automate the process as much as possible and reduce the errors that pervade hardware and software development.

Manna, Zohar↗

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain/component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IV&V enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

IV&V↗

A formal approach to validation and verification for knowledge-based control systems

As control systems become more complex in response to desires for greater system flexibility, performance and reliability, the promise is held out that artificial intelligence might provide the means for building such systems. An obstacle to the use of symbolic processing constructs in this domain is the need for verification and validation (V and V) of the systems. Techniques currently in use do not seem appropriate for knowledge-based software. An outline of a formal approach to V and V for knowledge-based control systems is presented.

Castore, Glen↗

Lessons Learned from Optical Payload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS) Mission Operations

This paper provides an overview of Optical Payload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS) activities and lessons learned during mission operations. Activities described cover the periods of commissioning, prime, and extended mission operations, during which primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved for demonstrating space-to-ground optical communications. Lessons learned cover Mission Operations System topics in areas of: architecture verification and validation, staffing, mission support area, workstations, workstation tools, interfaces with support services, supporting ground stations, team training, procedures, flight software upgrades, post-processing tools, and public outreach.

Sindiy, Oleg V.↗

From Formal Requirements to Highly Assured Software for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Operational requirements of safety-critical systems are often written in restricted specification logics. These restricted logics are amenable to automated analysis techniques such as model-checking, but are not rich enough to express complex requirements of unmanned systems. This short paper advocates for the use of expressive logics, such as higher-order logic, to specify the complex operational requirements and safety properties of unmanned systems. These rich logics are less amenable to automation and, hence, require the use of interactive theorem proving techniques. However, these logics support the formal verification of complex requirements such as those involving the physical environment. Moreover, these logics enable validation techniques that increase con dence in the correctness of numerically intensive software. These features result in highly-assured software that may be easier to certify. The feasibility of this approach is illustrated with examples drawn for NASA's unmanned aircraft systems.

Munoz, Cesar↗

Simulating High Energy Dynamic Impact of IM7/PEKK Continuous Fiber Laminated Thermoplastic Composite using Open Hole Coupon Experiments

The use of advanced thermoplastic composites (TPC) for structural applications in the aerospace and automotive industries has grown increasingly popular due to their high performance, high manufactured part output, and sustainability. Enhancing verification simulations of the progressive failure in TPCs at the coupon scale is needed to better validate advanced composite material models at larger length scales, such as element level panels. MAT_213, a tabulated composite material model, has been applied to simulate high velocity dynamic impact (HEDI) and is integrated in the LS-DYNA explicit finite element (FE) software. Previous efforts using MAT_213 have calibrated HEDI simulated failures with experimental data. Traditionally simulations have relied on a structured mesh to represent quasi-isotropic panels. For this study, a continuous fiber unidirectional tape, IM7/PEKK, was analyzed through a series of verification studies of notched laminate coupons, then validation analyses of quasi-isotropic panels under HEDI were compared with experimental data. Experiments using unidirectional TPC were performed to obtain tabulated stress vs strain curves using Digital Image Correlation (DIC) for input into MAT_213. Next, notched coupon experiments were used as an intermediate step to calibrate the damage and failure behavior in MAT_213. Lastly, investigations into differences between HEDI simulations using a fiber aligned mesh were compared with experimental failure patterns and damage sizes. The use of experimentally generated material behavior along with selective mesh layout improved HEDI predictions with minimal material parameter calibration.

Polymer matrix composites↗

SEDS1 mission software verification using a signal simulator

The first flight of the Small Expendable Deployer System (SEDS1) is schedule to fly as the secondary payload of a Delta 2 in March, 1993. The objective of the SEDS1 mission is to collect data to validate the concept of tethered satellite systems and to verify computer simulations used to predict their behavior. SEDS1 will deploy a 50 lb. instrumented satellite as an end mass using a 20 km tether. Langley Research Center is providing the end mass instrumentation, while the Marshall Space Flight Center is designing and building the deployer. The objective of the experiment is to test the SEDS design concept by demonstrating that the system will satisfactorily deploy the full 20 km tether without stopping prematurely, come to a smooth stop on the application of a brake, and cut the tether at the proper time after it swings to the local vertical. Also, SEDS1 will collect data which will be used to test the accuracy of tether dynamics models used to stimulate this type of deployment. The experiment will last about 1.5 hours and complete approximately 1.5 orbits. Radar tracking of the Delta II and end mass is planned. In addition, the SEDS1 on-board computer will continuously record, store, and transmit mission data over the Delta II S-band telemetry system. The Data System will count tether windings as the tether unwinds, log the times of each turn and other mission events, monitor tether tension, and record the temperature of system components. A summary of the measurements taken during the SEDS1 are shown. The Data System will also control the tether brake and cutter mechanisms. Preliminary versions of two major sections of the flight software, the data telemetry modules and the data collection modules, were developed and tested under the 1990 NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program. To facilitate the debugging of these software modules, a prototype SEDS Data System was programmed to simulate turn count signals. During the 1991 summer program, the concept of simulating signals produced by the SEDS electronics systems and circuits was expanded and more precisely defined. During the 1992 summer program, the SEDS signal simulator was programmed to test the requirements of the SEDS Mission software, and this simulator will be used in the formal verification of the SEDS Mission Software. The formal test procedures specification was written which incorporates the use of the signal simulator to test the SEDS Mission Software and which incorporates procedures for testing the other major component of the SEDS software, the Monitor Software.

Pierson, William E.↗

NASA software documentation standard software engineering program

The NASA Software Documentation Standard (hereinafter referred to as Standard) can be applied to the documentation of all NASA software. This Standard is limited to documentation format and content requirements. It does not mandate specific management, engineering, or assurance standards or techniques. This Standard defines the format and content of documentation for software acquisition, development, and sustaining engineering. Format requirements address where information shall be recorded and content requirements address what information shall be recorded. This Standard provides a framework to allow consistency of documentation across NASA and visibility into the completeness of project documentation. This basic framework consists of four major sections (or volumes). The Management Plan contains all planning and business aspects of a software project, including engineering and assurance planning. The Product Specification contains all technical engineering information, including software requirements and design. The Assurance and Test Procedures contains all technical assurance information, including Test, Quality Assurance (QA), and Verification and Validation (V&V). The Management, Engineering, and Assurance Reports is the library and/or listing of all project reports.

Source record↗

NASA Software Documentation Standard

The NASA Software Documentation Standard (hereinafter referred to as "Standard") is designed to support the documentation of all software developed for NASA; its goal is to provide a framework and model for recording the essential information needed throughout the development life cycle and maintenance of a software system. The NASA Software Documentation Standard can be applied to the documentation of all NASA software. The Standard is limited to documentation format and content requirements. It does not mandate specific management, engineering, or assurance standards or techniques. This Standard defines the format and content of documentation for software acquisition, development, and sustaining engineering. Format requirements address where information shall be recorded and content requirements address what information shall be recorded. This Standard provides a framework to allow consistency of documentation across NASA and visibility into the completeness of project documentation. The basic framework consists of four major sections (or volumes). The Management Plan contains all planning and business aspects of a software project, including engineering and assurance planning. The Product Specification contains all technical engineering information, including software requirements and design. The Assurance and Test Procedures contains all technical assurance information, including Test, Quality Assurance (QA), and Verification and Validation (V&V). The Management, Engineering, and Assurance Reports is the library and/or listing of all project reports.

Source record↗

Survey of NASA V and V Processes/Methods

The purpose of this report is to describe current NASA Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques and to explain how these techniques are applicable to 2nd Generation RLV Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) software. It also contains recommendations for special V&V requirements for IVHM. This report is divided into the following three sections: 1) Survey - Current NASA V&V Processes/Methods; 2) Applicability of NASA V&V to 2nd Generation RLV IVHM; and 3) Special 2nd Generation RLV IVHM V&V Requirements.

Pecheur, Charles↗