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At least 271 records · Page 15

DOE-NE LWRS Integrated Program Plan - Physical Security Pathway

Domestic nuclear power is facing increased financial pressures from a variety of areas and there is pressure on these utilities to reduce their cost of operation. Currently, about 20%-30% of all on-site personnel are related to physical security. The LWRS Program recognized that R&D related to physical security could play a role in providing nuclear utilities technical and staffing efficiency options to meet their physical security commitments, but utilities often lack the technical basis or the ability to create the technical basis to realize or implement these efficiencies; towards this end, the LWRS Program created the Physical Security Pathway in September 2019. The pathway performs R&D to develop methods, tools, and technologies to optimize and modernize a nuclear power facility’s security posture. The pathway will: (1) conduct research on risk-informed techniques for physical security that account for a dynamic adversary; (2) apply advanced modeling and simulation tools to better inform physical-security scenarios and reduce uncertainties in force-on-force modeling; (3) assess benefits from proposed enhancements and novel mitigation strategies and explore changes to best practices, guides, or regulation to enable modernization; and (4) enhance and provide the technical basis for stakeholders to employ new security methods, tools, and technologies.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Simple, Secure, Internet Delivery of MOOSE-based Applications

Application packaging and distribution are the final steps for delivering software to end-users; both are frequently neglected when creating scientific software. Commercial businesses rely on electronic distribution systems that have rendered disk drives obsolete. Still, national laboratories continue to rely heavily on removable media to distribute and limit access to controlled applications. With increasing concerns of unauthorized copying of sensitive applications, a modern distribution system that utilizes cryptographically secure communication and authentication protocols has been developed. This new distribution system will secure the chain of custody for nuclear software while simultaneously simplifying access to these tools. This report summarizes four primary advancements made toward the secure distribution of Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS)-developed, Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based applications: application installation, package distribution, automated package building, and distribution of documentation. NEAMS is currently developing more than ten separate applications based on the open-source MOOSE Framework. Distribution of these applications has primarily been accomplished by distributing source code, with end-users compiling the applications themselves. This work created a mechanism where MOOSE applications can be installed in a similar way to any other software. This allows both administrators and end-users simplified access to runnable executables. With this new installation capability, it was then possible to rethink distribution. A new, secure capability for delivering MOOSE-based applications over the internet has been created. This system requires unique cryptographic tokens for authentication, greatly securing the custody chain for software. Once granted access, installation of any NEAMS code can be accomplished with these terminal commands: "conda install ncrc" "ncrc install ncrc-bison." After these two commands (and authenticating) the BISON application will be securely down- loaded from Idaho National Laboratory (INL)’s servers, installed, and ready to use. To enable this new distribution capability to be successful, the open-source Continuous Integration, Verification, Enhancement, and Testing (CIVET) Continuous Integration (CI) capability was augmented to add Continuous Delivery (CD). CD enables the automated building and packaging of MOOSE-based applications as they are modified by development teams, ensuring that our customers can obtain up-to-date versions of the software at any time. The need for instruction on how to use these applications was addressed through modifications to the MOOSE documentation system. The MooseDocs capability, which enables robust documentation of MOOSE-based applications, has been extended to allow both for the installation of documentation and the packaging of documentation with installed applications. Together, these enhancements form the core of a new, secure distribution mechanism for nuclear simulation tools. In concert with the Nuclear Computational Resource Center (NCRC), NEAMS- developed applications will now be straightforward to obtain securely.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) – Security and Administration: Cybersecurity of Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) Research and Development

A critical component of the Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) approach is the integrated security contained within its processing. This document describes how that security is designed and expected to be implemented by UUDEX Implementations (U-Implementations), including the UUDEX Server (U-Server) and UUDEX Clients (U-Clients). The UUDEX security hierarchy consists of three levels: 1. The UUDEX Instance (U-Instance) itself, which sits at the top of the hierarchy and contains the U-Server, the UUDEX Identity Authority (U-Identity Authority), and the UUDEX Administrator (U-Administrator) functions; 2. A group of one or more UUDEX Participants (U-Participants) that present “organizations” that participate in the U-Instance and contains the UUDEX Administrator Participant (U-U-Administrator Participant) function; 3. A group of one or more UUDEX Endpoints (U-Endpoints) that represent the individual UUDEX Publish Clients (U-Publish Client) responsible for supplying data to the U-Instance that is consumed by UUDEX Subscriber Clients (U-Subscriber Clients). U-Endpoints can be either autonomous devices that publish and subscribe data such as data exchange servers found in supervisory control and data acquisition and energy management systems, or they can be tied to users of applications that, for example, submit DOE OE-417 disturbance reports. U-Participants and U-Endpoints can be organized into UUDEX Groups (U-Groups). Any number of U-Participants or U-Endpoints can be members of a U-Group. A given U-Participant or U-Endpoint can be a member of multiple U-Groups, but a U-Group cannot contain other U-Groups. For example, a U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Transmission Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator, and another U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Generator Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator. U-Participants that are both Transmission Operators and Generator Operators would be members of both U-Groups. U-Participants, U-Endpoints, and U-Groups are used in the access control structures to provide access to individual UUDEX Subjects (U-Subjects). U-Groups are created by the U-Administrator and are managed by the U-Administrator or the designated U-Group Managers. U-Endpoints can be assigned UUDEX Roles (U-Roles) that can be used to further restrict access. U-Roles are assigned to individual U-Endpoints. For example, a U-Role of “Security Analyst” could be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish or subscribe security incident reports and vulnerability notifications, while a U-Role of “Transmission Planner” can be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish power system model updates. U-Role definitions are created by the U-Administrator, but the U-Roles are assigned to U-Endpoints by their respective UUDEX Participant Administrators (U-Participant Administrator). Because all information required to make security decisions is either included within the U-Endpoint’s X.509 digital certificate or stored in a datastore on the U-Server, all security decisions are performed and enforced within the U-Server. This reduces the complexity of the U-Client code and minimizes the chance for compromise of the integrity of the UUDEX security features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Information Security and Integrity Systems

Viewgraphs from the Information Security and Integrity Systems seminar held at the University of Houston-Clear Lake on May 15-16, 1990 are presented. A tutorial on computer security is presented. The goals of this tutorial are the following: to review security requirements imposed by government and by common sense; to examine risk analysis methods to help keep sight of forest while in trees; to discuss the current hot topic of viruses (which will stay hot); to examine network security, now and in the next year to 30 years; to give a brief overview of encryption; to review protection methods in operating systems; to review database security problems; to review the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book); to comment on formal verification methods; to consider new approaches (like intrusion detection and biometrics); to review the old, low tech, and still good solutions; and to give pointers to the literature and to where to get help. Other topics covered include security in software applications and development; risk management; trust: formal methods and associated techniques; secure distributed operating system and verification; trusted Ada; a conceptual model for supporting a B3+ dynamic multilevel security and integrity in the Ada runtime environment; and information intelligence sciences.

Source record↗

Security for Multimedia Space Data Distribution over the Internet

Distribution of interactive multimedia to remote investigators will be required for high quality science on the International Space Station (ISS). The Internet with the World Wide Web (WWW) and the JAVA environment are a good match for distribution of data, video and voice to remote science centers. Utilizing the "open" Internet in a secure manner is the major hurdle in making use of this cost effective, off-the-shelf, universal resource. This paper examines the major security threats to an Internet distribution system for payload data and the mitigation of these threats. A proposed security environment for the Space Station Biological Research Facility (SSBRP) is presented with a short description of the tools that have been implemented or planned. Formulating and implementing a security policy, firewalls, host hardware and software security are also discussed in this paper. Security is a vast topic and this paper can only give an overview of important issues. This paper postulates that a structured approach is required and stresses that security must be built into a network from the start. Ignoring security issues or putting them off until late in the development cycle can be disastrous.

Stone, Thom↗

Security Management and Safeguards Office

The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are in a safe environment.

Bewley, Nathaniel M.↗

CORBASec Used to Secure Distributed Aerospace Propulsion Simulations

The NASA Glenn Research Center and its industry partners are developing a Common Object Request Broker (CORBA) Security (CORBASec) test bed to secure their distributed aerospace propulsion simulations. Glenn has been working with its aerospace propulsion industry partners to deploy the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) object-based technology. NPSS is a program focused on reducing the cost and time in developing aerospace propulsion engines. It was developed by Glenn and is being managed by the NASA Ames Research Center as the lead center reporting directly to NASA Headquarters' Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Glenn is an active domain member of the Object Management Group: an open membership, not-for-profit consortium that produces and manages computer industry specifications (i.e., CORBA) for interoperable enterprise applications. When NPSS is deployed, it will assemble a distributed aerospace propulsion simulation scenario from proprietary analytical CORBA servers and execute them with security afforded by the CORBASec implementation. The NPSS CORBASec test bed was initially developed with the TPBroker Security Service product (Hitachi Computer Products (America), Inc., Waltham, MA) using the Object Request Broker (ORB), which is based on the TPBroker Basic Object Adaptor, and using NPSS software across different firewall products. The test bed has been migrated to the Portable Object Adaptor architecture using the Hitachi Security Service product based on the VisiBroker 4.x ORB (Borland, Scotts Valley, CA) and on the Orbix 2000 ORB (Dublin, Ireland, with U.S. headquarters in Waltham, MA). Glenn, GE Aircraft Engines, and Pratt & Whitney Aircraft are the initial industry partners contributing to the NPSS CORBASec test bed. The test bed uses Security SecurID (RSA Security Inc., Bedford, MA) two-factor token-based authentication together with Hitachi Security Service digital-certificate-based authentication to validate the various NPSS users. The test bed is expected to demonstrate NPSS CORBASec-specific policy functionality, confirm adequate performance, and validate the required Internet configuration in a distributed collaborative aerospace propulsion environment.

Blaser, Tammy M.↗

Secure ADS-B authentication system and method

A secure system for authenticating the identity of ADS-B systems, including: an authenticator, including a unique id generator and a transmitter transmitting the unique id to one or more ADS-B transmitters; one or more ADS-B transmitters, including a receiver receiving the unique id, one or more secure processing stages merging the unique id with the ADS-B transmitter's identification, data and secret key and generating a secure code identification and a transmitter transmitting a response containing the secure code and ADSB transmitter's data to the authenticator; the authenticator including means for independently determining each ADS-B transmitter's secret key, a receiver receiving each ADS-B transmitter's response, one or more secure processing stages merging the unique id, ADS-B transmitter's identification and data and generating a secure code, and comparison processing comparing the authenticator-generated secure code and the ADS-B transmitter-generated secure code and providing an authentication signal based on the comparison result.

Viggiano, Marc J↗

DSS Security Assessment

The Discovery and Synchronization service (DSS) has implemented some reasonable technical controls that help improve security and there are very few technical findings. The use of Docker and Kubernetes helps simplify the deployment process, and the DSS uses mutual TLS (mTLS) to connect. Much of the security risk across the DSS is a factor of its nature, a distributed environment that relies on all members to secure their parts correctly. As such, the DSS team should attempt to emphasize security controls that reduce complexity for securing entities’ Cockroach DB (CRDB) instances properly and improve coordination among DSS members for things like security patching, incident response, detecting, and removing bad actors. The DSS team must recognize that operating a DSS instance securely will require a combination of technical and procedural controls. Each DSS entity must configure their instance properly and follow standard operating procedures to ensure that the DSS service is secure.

threat modeling↗

Apparatus and method supporting wireless access to multiple security layers in an industrial control and automation system or other system

A method includes receiving a message at a first wireless node. The first wireless node is associated with a first wired network, and the first wired network is associated with a first security layer. The method also includes transmitting the message over the first wired network when at least one destination of the message is located in the first security layer. The method further includes wirelessly transmitting the message for delivery to a second wireless node when at least one destination of the message is located in a second security layer. The second wireless node is associated with a second wired network, and the second wired network is associated with the second security layer. The first and second security layers may be associated with different security paradigms and/or different security domains. Also, the message could be associated with destinations in the first and second security layers.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Secure key storage and distribution

This disclosure describes a distributed, fault-tolerant security system that enables the secure storage and distribution of private keys. In one implementation, the security system includes a plurality of computing resources that independently store private keys provided by publishers and encrypted using a single security system public key. To protect against malicious activity, the security system private key necessary to decrypt the publication private keys is not stored at any of the computing resources. Rather portions, or shares of the security system private key are stored at each of the computing resources within the security system and multiple security systems must communicate and share partial decryptions in order to decrypt the stored private key.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Regulatory Design for Transport Security Regulations of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

A cornerstone within a nuclear security regime of a country is a legislative and regulatory framework that both regulates the individuals using radioactive and nuclear materials, but also regulates the regulators for their commitments under International Law. When drafting nuclear law and regulations, both technical and legal expertise is needed to ensure the regulation meets the technical requirements for security, but also is legally enforceable within a country’s jurisdiction. While the Primary Nuclear Law, or Enabling Act provides establishes the Competent Authority and responsibilities for nuclear security, regulatory development is where the proverbial, rubber meets the road for requirements. The regulations provide instruction for inspections, authorizations, and managed activities, such as use storage, and transport. Transport Security regulatory development for radioactive and nuclear material is complex because the regulation maybe multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal, and involve multiple stakeholders. Development of transport security regulations requires coordination with other ministerial stakeholders, transport operators, and alignment to international treaties and conventions outside the nuclear domain. This paper provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with regulatory development for transport security regulations for nuclear and other radioactive materials in transport. The paper will briefly identify key stakeholders, international law involved, and current efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting Member States in regulatory development. While active in that regulations are necessary for a robust nuclear security regime, regulatory development is more a slow-burn than an active activity in nuclear security.

Fialkoff, Marc↗

SUSTAINING NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIMES THROUGH CONTINUOUS LEARNING EXPERIENCES

As Member States plan, implement, and ultimately sustain their nuclear security regimes, human resource development supporting these regimes are paramount. Human resource development broadly includes programs addressing education, training, and knowledge management. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Implementing Guide, Sustaining a Nuclear Security Regime, highlights the importance of national-level support for assigning resources that help ensure States are able to develop and retain sufficient human resources in the short, medium, and long term. Determining the resources needed to support education, training, and knowledge management is not an easy task, and knowledge management is a practice often overlooked when States plan for and allocate human resources for a nuclear security regime. The paper highlights the importance of implementing knowledge management practices as part of sustaining a nuclear security regime. Given the availability of secure web-based knowledge management tools, a nuclear security human resource development program should not depend solely on direct human interactions. To that end, the paper will offer an approach for planning and implementing a knowledge management system by using the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Knowledge Management Website as a case study. This example offers useful lessons learned for States considering or actively developing their own nuclear security knowledge management efforts and human resource development.

Tremonte, Matthew M.↗

Synergies Between Nuclear Security and Critical Infrastructure: National Legal and Regulatory Frameworks

Nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities are part of a nation's critical infrastructure assets. Key cross-sector interdependencies, in relation to energy, transportation systems, communications, emergency services, water, information technologies and others, result in inevitable synergies between legal frameworks for the security of nuclear facilities and legal frameworks for the protection of critical infrastructure. The protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage and other malicious acts is paramount in ensuring energy security and thus ensuring uninterrupted energy supply. The protection of other sectors, such as uninterrupted communications, secure water supply, and others, supports a safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. Some countries rely on broader critical infrastructure frameworks to impose security requirements on nuclear facilities, or to achieve robust cybersecurity systems. This paper will analyze the interdependencies and synergies between the legal and regulatory frameworks for critical infrastructure protection and nuclear facilities' security by comparing various national frameworks. The paper will also propose modalities to leverage the best practices and requirements from each framework towards energy security goals and stronger national nuclear security regimes.

Man, Madalina-Anca↗

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

Cyber / Physical Security Vulnerability Assessment Integration

Abstract Both physical protection and cyber security domains offer solutions for the discovery of vulnerabilities through the use of various assessment processes and software tools. Each vulnerability assessment (VA) methodology provides the ability to identify and categorize vulnerabilities, and quantifies the risks within their own areas of expertise. Neither approach fully represents the true potential security risk to a site and/or a facility, nor comprehensively assesses the overall security posture. The technical approach to solving this problem was to identify methodologies and processes that blend the physical and cyber security assessments, and develop tools to accurately quantify the unaccounted for risk. SMEs from both the physical and the cyber security domains developed the blending methodologies, and cross trained each other on the various aspects of the physical and cyber security assessment processes. A local critical infrastructure entity volunteered to host a proof of concept physical/cyber security assessment, and the lessons learned have been leveraged by this effort. The four potential modes of attack an adversary can use in approaching a target are; Physical Only Attack, Cyber Only Attack, Physical Enabled Cyber Attack, and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack. The Physical Only and the Cyber Only pathway analysis are two of the most widely analyzed attack modes. The pathway from an off-site location to the desired target location is dissected to ensure adversarial activity can be detected and neutralized by the protection strategy, prior to completion of a predefined task. This methodology typically explores a one way attack from the public space (or common area) inward towards the target. The Physical Enabled Cyber Attack and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack are much more intricate. Both scenarios involve beginning in one domain to affect change in the other, then backing outward to take advantage of the reduced system effectiveness, before penetrating further into the defenses. The proper identification and assessment of the overlapping areas (and interaction between these areas) in the VA process is necessary to accurately assess the true risk.

Vulnerability Analysis, Risk Analysis, Cyber Secur↗

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

Secure Data Transfer Guidance for Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

This document was developed to provide guidance for the implementation of secure data transfer in a complex computational infrastructure representative of the electric power and oil and natural gas enterprises and the control systems they implement. For the past 20 years the cyber security community has focused on preventative measures intended to keep systems secure by providing a hard outer shell that is difficult to penetrate. Over time, the hard exterior, soft interior focus changed to focus on defense-in-depth adding multiple layers of protection, introducing intrusion detection systems, more effective incident response and cleanup, and many other security measures. Despite much larger expenditures and more layers of defense, successful attacks have only increased in number and severity. Consequently, it is time to re-focus the conventional approach to cyber security. While it is still important to implement measures to keep intruders out, a new protection paradigm is warranted that is aimed at discovering attempted or real compromises as early as possible. Put simply, organizations should take as fact that they have been, are now, or will be compromised. These compromises may be intended to steal information for financial gain as in the theft of intellectual property or credentials that lead to the theft of financial resources, or to lie silent until instructed to cause physical or electronic damage and/or denial of services. This change in outlook has been recently confirmed by the National Security Agency [19]. The discovery of attempted and actual compromises requires an increased focus on monitoring events by manual and/or automated log monitoring, detecting unauthorized changes to a system's hardware and/or software, detecting intrusions, and/or discovering the exfiltration of sensitive information and/or attempts to send inappropriate commands to ICS/SCADA (Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.

03 NATURAL GAS↗