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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Moon to Mars (M2M): Exploration Atmosphere

As humans leave the bounds of Earth to explore the lunar surface and beyond, crew will don extravehicular activity (EVA) suits to learn more about these extraterrestrial environments, establish sustained presence, and perform needed upgrades and maintenance to their space vehicle and habitation systems. Spacefaring vehicle and habitation design will need to support these EVA excursions while ensuring crew health and safety. A crucial technological design advancement towards this goal is the use of a lower pressure exploration atmosphere (EA) that enables high efficiency EVA, rather than the sea level atmosphere of 14.7 psia, 21% oxygen (O 2 ) found on the International Space Station, Shuttle, and most other Russian and Chinese space vehicles and stations. Early space vehicles (Mercury through Apollo Programs) used a 5 psia, 100% O 2 environment, which eliminated the need for pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols, simplified the life support system to a single gas, and saved structural mass. For longer duration missions (Skylab), a diluent gas was added, changing the atmosphere to 5 psia, 70-74% O 2 to prevent atelectasis while remaining normoxic. As in-flight science became a top priority, Shuttle and ISS atmospheres were chosen to operate at sea level allowing for simpler ground-based study control conditions. Consequently this led to long pre-EVA denitrogenation protocols involving up to 4 hours of O 2 prebreathe because the EVA suit still operated at a low pressure of 4.3 psid. To increase operational efficiency, the Shuttle was retroactively certified to operate using 10.2 psia, 26.5% O 2 , reducing O 2 prebreathe time to 40-75 min. Current plans for M2M habitats on the Lunar surface require EVA, thus EA recommendation became 8 psia and 32% O 2 but was revised to 8.2 psia and 34% O 2 to decrease hypoxia exposure. Unfortunately, the benefits of EA in support of safe and efficient EVAs comes with the challenge of fire management in a higher-than-normal O 2 % environment. Although known for decades, the recommended forward work to address fire management has only recently begun. Current flammability tests include examining material propagation and ignition sources as well as fire mitigation processes to better understand these properties for proposed new EA environments. Fire safety, DCS risk, and mission design all contribute to the multifaceted parameters of EA. Thus while it is clear that EA is required to achieve the goals of future exploratory space missions, final specifications are still being evaluated for optimizing crew health and safety.

space atmosphere↗

NASA NTRS1972

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 1: base nuclear system safety

The mission and terrestrial nuclear safety aspects of future long duration manned space missions in low earth orbit are discussed. Nuclear hazards of a typical low earth orbit Space Base mission (from natural sources and on-board nuclear hardware) have been identified and evaluated. Some of the principal nuclear safety design and procedural considerations involved in launch, orbital, and end of mission operations are presented. Areas of investigation include radiation interactions with the crew, subsystems, facilities, experiments, film, interfacing vehicles, nuclear hardware and the terrestrial populace. Results of the analysis indicate: (1) the natural space environment can be the dominant radiation source in a low earth orbit where reactors are effectively shielded, (2) with implementation of safety guidelines the reactor can present a low risk to the crew, support personnel, the terrestrial populace, flight hardware and the mission, (3) ten year missions are feasible without exceeding integrated radiation limits assigned to flight hardware, and (4) crew stay-times up to one year are feasible without storm shelter provisions.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1989

Space Shuttle Orbiter main propulsion system flight safety enhancement

The Space Shuttle main propulsion system, like other major elements of the vehicle, has been part of an ongoing program to enhance the flight safety of the Space Transportation System. This activity, inherent in the basic program since its inception, has continued as part of a renewed review of failure modes and effects pertaining to flight-critical functions. Selected components were further evaluated, their potential for impacting flight safety was defined, and then the necessity for changing their design and/or operational practices was determined. Major examples of such components are the 17-inch disconnect and gaseous oxygen flow control valve. This paper summarizes that activity and provides examples of critical processes and components that have been or are being modified to enhance flight safety.

Cota, Phillip E.↗

NASA NTRS2025

South Pole Lunar Lighting Studies for Driving Exploration on the Lunar Surface

NASA’s Artemis lunar missions will face new exploration challenges due to inherently low sun angles in the lunar south pole region. Whereas the Apollo missions were afforded sunlight for approximately 8 to 50-degrees above the horizon, sunlight for the next lunar missions will only be 1 to 2-degrees about the horizon. With this low angle, long shadows and high contrasts of light and dark areas will be faced by the crew and remote teleop operators while exploring the lunar surface. With this in mind, NASA developed an integrated virtual Lighting and Navigation Simulation to understand these challenges. Two studies have been conducted in this Lunar South Pole environment to evaluate the effects of natural and artificial lighting on driving and navigating a lunar rover across the surface. Early NASA studies, such as this, are used to aid in developing techniques and explore concepts of operations to promote mission success and crew safety. In the Phase One development evaluation, six astronauts were teleported to ten different lighting conditions. For each location, drivers were to drive to an imaginary target approximately 200-meters straight ahead and provide subjective feedback on their ability to drive under the given lighting conditions. Phase Two, a more operational study, four astronauts and a remote operator tested five different Artemis lunar mission scenarios. Results indicated sun direction at such low angles, especially when driving a high speed, can severely impact the crew’s ability to safely drive the rover. In the up-sun situation, with the sun directly in the driver’s eyes and compounded long shadows, the consistent preference among drivers was to initiate a tacking strategy of approximately +/- 20 to 30-degrees to improve visibility. This maneuver does require more time and rover energetics. Conversely, driving down-sun required the crew to tack as well to avoid the shadow of rover blocking the terrain. Less appreciated is how the surrounding landscape is lit. Traveling into shadowed areas, especially while facing a lit terrain beyond the shadowed area, drivers enter at their own risk due to pupil contraction making artificial lights useless. Additionally, the constant transitioning between dark and light areas are mentally taxing to the crew and natural navigational references such as the stars are invisible and therefore unusable. Slope and depth magnitude are very difficult hazards to judge when approaching a shadowed crater. This naturally leads to slower driving speeds than originally anticipated. As for observing scientifically interesting features, assessing them accurately varies greatly by the lighting condition. In most cases, the task can be completed, but the strategy is to use the sun to one’s advantage. Crew workload distribution in the cockpit for driving operations was split amongst crew. The driver primarily focused attention on visual terrain (80%) but referenced displays approximately 20% of the time, while the co-pilot/navigator generally provided directional cues to the driver. These natural lighting conditions present significant challenges for safe rover operations; however, early studies having given investigators a “first-look” into understanding of how operating on the South Lunar Pole can be accomplished.

LTv↗

NASA NTRS1997

Teamwork in the Terminal Area: Organizational Issues and Solutions

Dynamic growth and technology advances in commercial aviation have turned the terminal area into a complex, multi-organization workplace which requires the smooth coordination of many operational teams. In addition to pilots, cabin crew, air traffic controllers, and dispatch (who nominally work together throughout a flight), surface operations additionally involve local, ground and ramp controllers, ramp agents, maintenance, dozens of service contractors, and any number of teams who are responsible for airport operations. Under abnormal or emergency conditions, even more teams become actively involved. In order to accommodate growth and to meet productivity and safety challenges, numerous changes are being made in surface operations. Unfortunately, it is often the case that changes in technologies, organizational roles, procedures, and training are developed and implemented in isolated and piecemeal fashion without regard to cross organizational impact. Thus, there is a need for evaluation methodologies which assure integrated system safety for all organizations. Such methodologies should aid the understanding of how organizations work together and how changes in one domain affects the next. In this study, we develop one approach toward addressing these organizational issues. Examples of surface operations in abnormal situations are examined in regard to their impact on personnel in the terminal area. Timelines are given for the responses to incidents, along with the necessary communication links, the specific roles that members of terminal teams have, and any overlapping responsibilities. Suggestions to improve cross-operational teamwork are given. Methods of graphic representation are explored, both in regards to human links and access to information. The outcome of such an approach should enhance the understanding which is critical for resolving organizational conflicts and maximizing system effectiveness.

Parke, Bonny K.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Autonomous Flight Safety System September 27, 2005, Aircraft Test

This report describes the first aircraft test of the Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS). The test was conducted on September 27, 2005, near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) using a privately-owned single-engine plane and evaluated the performance of several basic flight safety rules using real-time data onboard a moving aerial vehicle. This test follows the first road test of AFSS conducted in February 2005 at KSC. AFSS is a joint KSC and Wallops Flight Facility (WEF) project that is in its third phase of development. AFSS is an independent subsystem intended for use with Expendable Launch Vehicles that uses tracking data from redundant onboard sensors to autonomously make flight termination decisions using software-based rules implemented on redundant flight processors. The goals of this project are to increase capabilities by allowing launches from locations that do not have or cannot afford extensive ground-based range safety assets, to decrease range costs, and to decrease reaction time for special situations. The mission rules are configured for each operation by the responsible Range Safety authorities and can be loosely categorized in four major categories: Parameter Threshold Violations, Physical Boundary Violations present position and instantaneous impact point (TIP), Gate Rules static and dynamic, and a Green-Time Rule. Examples of each of these rules were evaluated during this aircraft test.

Simpson, James C.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Space Station based options for orbiter docking/berthing

Conceptual efforts to develop a Space Station based system for docking and/or berthing the NSTS Orbiter are described. Past docking and berthing systems are reviewed, the general requirements and options for mating the Orbiter and Space Station are discussed, and the rationale for locating the system on the Station is established. One class of Station-based system is developed in several variations and evaluated with respect to weight distribution, loads, safety, reliability, viewing, and maintainability. An evolutionary presentation of the variations provides insight into the development process and the problems encountered. An overall evaluation of the Station-based variations compared to an optimized Orbiter-based system demonstrates the potential benefits of this approach as well as the issues that must be resolved to realize the benefits.

Hoover, Daniel J.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Low temperature testing of Li-SOCl2 cells

The performance and safety characteristics Li-SOCl2 cells were evaluated at -40 C. Tests were conducted on cells of several defferent designs to determine the influence of cell design on performance and safety. The cells exhibited low operating voltages, poor voltage regulation, and low capacity at -40 C. The performance of the cells was found to be critically dependent on the cell design. No safety problems were observed during discharge to 2.0 V under constant current and constant load operating conditions. Cells subjected to prolonged periods of continuous drain at constant-load did not vent/rupture upon warm-up. Cells subjected to prolonged reversal were found to be potentially hazardous. Microcalorimetry and electrochemical impedance spectroscopy studies performed on the cells suggested that those containing a catalyst may exhibit poor shelf life.

Subbarao, S.↗

NASA NTRS2000

Shuttle Upgrade Using 5-Segment Booster (FSB)

In support of NASA's continuing effort to improve the over-all safety and reliability of the Shuttle system- a 5-segment booster (FSB) has been identified as an approach to satisfy that overall objective. To assess the feasibility of a 5-segment booster approach, NASA issued a feasibility study contract to evaluate the potential of a 5-segment booster to improve the overall capability of the Shuttle system, especially evaluating the potential to increase the system reliability and safety. In order to effectively evaluate the feasibility of the 5-segment concept, a four-member contractor team was established under the direction of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC provided the overall program oversight and integration as well as program contractual management. The contractor team consisted of Thiokol, Boeing North American Huntington Beach (BNA), Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) and United Space Alliance (USA) and their subcontractor bd Systems (Control Dynamics Division, Huntsville, AL). United Space Alliance included the former members of United Space Booster Incorporated (USBI) who managed the booster element portion of the current Shuttle solid rocket boosters. Thiokol was responsible for the overall integration and coordination of the contractor team across all of the booster elements. They were also responsible for all of the motor modification evaluations. Boeing North American (BNA) was responsible for all systems integration analyses, generation of loads and environments. and performance and abort mode capabilities. Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) was responsible for evaluating the impacts of any changes to the booster on the external tank (ET), and evaluating any design changes on the external tank necessary to accommodate the FSB. USA. including the former USBI contingent. was responsible for evaluating any modifications to facilities at the launch site as well as any booster component design modifications.

Sauvageau, Donald R.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Johnson Space Center's Risk and Reliability Analysis Group 2008 Annual Report

The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate s Risk and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis. The fundamental goal of this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decisionmakers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating systems as well as with any future systems. The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields. This group includes JSC S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR. The Analysis Group s experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace experience specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation Programs. The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information to the group when performing various analysis tasks. The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community. Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. The Analysis Section s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program requirements. During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments. Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decisionmaking processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. Two of the more significant tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP. These two activities, along with the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this report. This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs for the CxP's Lunar Sortie and ISS missions.

Valentine, Mark↗

NASA NTRS2000

Realistic Radio Communications in Pilot Simulator Training

Simulators used for total training and evaluation of airline pilots must satisfy stringent criteria in order to assure their adequacy for training and checking maneuvers. Air traffic control and company radio communications simulation, however, may still be left to role-play by the already taxed instructor/evaluators in spite of their central importance in every aspect of the flight environment. The underlying premise of this research is that providing a realistic radio communications environment would increase safety by enhancing pilot training and evaluation. This report summarizes the first-year efforts of assessing the requirement and feasibility of simulating radio communications automatically. A review of the training and crew resource/task management literature showed both practical and theoretical support for the need for realistic radio communications simulation. A survey of 29 instructor/evaluators from 14 airlines revealed that radio communications are mainly role-played by the instructor/evaluators. This increases instructor/evaluators' own workload while unrealistically lowering pilot communications load compared to actual operations, with a concomitant loss in training/evaluation effectiveness. A technology review searching for an automated means of providing radio communications to and from aircraft with minimal human effort showed that while promising, the technology is still immature. Further research and the need for establishing a proof-of-concept are also discussed.

Burki-Cohen, Judith↗

NASA NTRS2010

Problem Reporting Taxonomy and Data Preparation Tool Evaluation

A member of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Systems Engineering Office (SEO) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) requested a SEO-managed activity to perform a gap analysis on the proposed NASA Standard 0006, "Common NASA Taxonomy for Problem Reporting, Analysis, and Resolution", and to create an input filter and set of instructions for using the data-mining/data-cleansing tool TechOasis1 with Space Shuttle Program (SSP) problem reporting data. The work that achieved these objectives and deployment of TechOasis are discussed in this report.

Beil, Robert J.↗

NASA NTRS2004

SUV Rollover Test

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) approached NASA to evaluate vehicle rollover resistance using the High Capacity Centrifuge Facility. Testing was planned for six different sport utility vehicles. Previous methods for simulating the rollover conditions were considered to be not indicative of the true driving conditions. A more realistic gradual application of side loading could be achieved by using a centrifuge facility. A unique load measuring lower support system was designed to measure tire loading on the inboard tires and to indicate tire liftoff. This lower support system was designed to more closely emulate the actual rollover conditions. Additional design features were provided to mitigate potential safety hazards.

Chambers, William V.↗

NASA NTRS2023

In-time Safety Management Capabilities for Wildland Fire Management Aircraft Operations - A Gap Assessment

This study assesses the in-time safety management services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)being investigated by NASA’s System Wide Safety (SWS) project to determine applicability to the project’s planned safety demonstrator (SD-1) for wildland fire management. The purpose of this work is to evaluate how effectively existing SFCs address the different hazards presented by a safety demonstrator operating in a wildland fire management scenario. This will help inform decision makers which SFCs would provide the most cost-effective solutions to fill the hazard gaps for further research. Hazards for the safety demonstrator wildland fire management scenario were collated, and the SFCs were evaluated for each hazard based on how applicable and effective the unmodified SFCs are at addressing the hazard. The SFCs are also evaluated for the gap type that needs to be addressed to improve the SFC effectiveness for the given hazard. The key finding of this assessment is that all the existing SFCs require at least some research and development to adapt to the safety demonstrator. No single SFC fully addresses any of the safety demonstrator operation hazards. The result of this study will be used to determine the performance of current SFCs and suggest strategies to adapt existing SFCs or add new SFCs.

Patricia Revolinsky↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) collects, analyzes, and distributes de-identified safety information provided through confidentially submitted reports from frontline aviation personnel. Since its inception in 1976, the ASRS has collected over 900,000 reports and has never breached the identity of the people sharing their information about events or safety issues. From this volume of data, the ASRS has released over 5,500 aviation safety alerts concerning potential hazards and safety concerns. The ASRS processes these reports, evaluates the information, and provides de-identified report information through the online ASRS Database at http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov. The NASA ASRS is also a founding member of the International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) group which is a collection of other national aviation reporting systems throughout the world. The ASRS model has also been replicated for application to improving safety in railroad, medical, fire fighting, and other domains. This presentation \vill discuss confidential, voluntary, and non-punitive reporting systems and their advantages in providing information for safety improvements.

Connell, Linda↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During an In-Flight Airspeed Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport fatal accidents. Yet a well-trained and well-qualified crew is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral component of the entire commercial aviation system. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as an independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions and responses while dealing with an in-flight airspeed failure. Accident statistics often cite flight crew error (Baker, 2001) as the primary contributor in accidents and incidents in transport category aircraft. However, the Air Line Pilots Association (2011) suggests "a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of the aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system." This is generally acknowledged but cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how or how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggest crews handle failures on a daily basis and Aviation Safety Action Program data generally supports this assertion, even if the data is not released to the public. However without hard evidence, the contribution and means by which pilots achieve safety of flight is difficult to define. Thus, ways to improve the human ability to contribute or overcome deficiencies are ill-defined.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗

NASA NTRS1973

A Full-Scale Fire Program to Evaluate New Furnishings and Textile Materials Developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The plans for the present series of full-scale experimental fires were initiated at the suggestion of NASA following the presentation of a film and discussion illustrating Battelle-Columbus' recent work in fire research. That film showed bedroom-type fires carried out as a part of a program to determine the influence of the cyclic characteristics of real fires under limited ventilation on the burning and pyrolysis properties of the room furnishings. A new series of fires was suggested by NASA designed to show the performance of new fire resistant and fire retardant materials by providing comparative fire and smoldering environmental conditions. More recently, the goal for the new series of fires was written in a meeting with NASA personnel and others at Battelle on May 3 and 4, 1972. The goal was as follows: To establish the need for special materials of improved fire safety in domiciliary settings of public concern, and to assess, in a professionally acceptable manner, the potential of materials arising from the new space-age technology for this purpose. It was anticipated that some new materials arising from the space-age technology and not yet available through conventional commercial channels might provide significant improvements in fire safety if the best of the commercially available materials showed important shortcomings in this area. It was the intent of this program to assess the benefits that could accrue from the use of these new materials. Fire safety is a matter requiring the evaluation of a number of factors. For example, fire resistance and fire spread, visibility during the fire, toxicity of evolved gases, and the fire-fighting problem that is created must be evaluated before the relative hazard can be assessed. The plan of the program provided for sampling and instrumentation to evaluate these factors, consistent with the goal of technological utilization that has been specified. Arrangements were made with the Columbus Fire Department to use an existing six-story concrete building', designed and used as a fire training tower, as the site for the experimental fires. The visual evidence provided by TV and photographic coverage of the four experimental room fires showed clearly that the rooms responded very differently to a common ignition condition. In particular: (1) The Typical room, furnished from conventional retail sources, ignited easily and burned rapidly so that after 8 minutes the contents of the room were nearly destroyed. (2) The Improved room, furnished with materials selected as being among the best commercially available, showed substantial improvement over the Typical room in that there was slower fire spread. However, the relatively complete destruction of the room contents that resulted, and the large amounts of smoke, made it clear that substantial further improvements were needed. This fire was stopped after 29 minutes. (3) The Space-age room, furnished completely with new materials that were not yet commercially available, did not ignite under the common ignition condition and soon demonstrated the substantial improvement in fire resistance available for those components close to the ignition source. A second and larger ignition arrangement showed that this room can burn, but the difficulty with which this was brought about confirmed the improved fire resistance available with use of these materials. (4) The Mixed room ensemble, furnished with 'materials identical to the Typical room except for the substitution of the bed from the Space-age room, illustrated the improvement in control of fire spread available by careful placement of fire materials in the important paths of fire development of an otherwise ordinary room. The most significant hazards at early times in each fire were due to the rapid rise in heat flux and the abrupt obscuration of vision by smoke. The most consistent toxicity hazard was due to CO and its importance would depend on the ability of the occupant to survive the initial heat and smoke menace which characterized each fire room. Other gases and vapors were shown to reach hazardous levels in certain fire rooms and, again, their significance to an occupant, would relate to the times in which such hazards occurred, and probably to the synergistic nature of the hazard arising from mixtures of such gases. Fire retardant items in the room are caused to pyrolyze by the heat of burning from other items in the room and so contribute to combustible and toxic vapor accumulations, even though they may not have entered into the burning process. This effect of a mixture of combustible materials to produce burning and pyrolysis not characteristic of any one item individually we have chosen to call the "ensemble effect". Further full-scale fire trials may be expected to show the significant changes that control the burning and pyrolytic processes and in that event a programmed fire chamber should be developed to yield realistic laboratory results.

Hillenbrand, L. J.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Nuclear thermal propulsion transportation systems for lunar/Mars exploration

Nuclear thermal propulsion technology development is underway at NASA and DoE for Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) missions to Mars, with initial near-earth flights to validate flight readiness. Several reactor concepts are being considered for these missions, and important selection criteria will be evaluated before final selection of a system. These criteria include: safety and reliability, technical risk, cost, and performance, in that order. Of the concepts evaluated to date, the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Applications (NERVA) derivative (NDR) is the only concept that has demonstrated full power, life, and performance in actual reactor tests. Other concepts will require significant design work and must demonstrate proof-of-concept. Technical risk, and hence, development cost should therefore be lowest for the concept, and the NDR concept is currently being considered for the initial SEI missions. As lighter weight, higher performance systems are developed and validated, including appropriate safety and astronaut-rating requirements, they will be considered to support future SEI application. A space transportation system using a modular nuclear thermal rocket (NTR) system for lunar and Mars missions is expected to result in significant life cycle cost savings. Finally, several key issues remain for NTR's, including public acceptance and operational issues. Nonetheless, NTR's are believed to be the 'next generation' of space propulsion systems - the key to space exploration.

Clark, John S.↗