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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 271 records · Page 15
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2011

External Tank Program - Legacy of Success

The largest single element of Space Shuttle is the External Tank (ET), which serves as the structural backbone of the vehicle during ascent and provides liquid propellants to the Orbiter s three Main Engines. The ET absorbs most of the seven million pounds of thrust exerted by the Solid Rocket Boosters and Main Engines. The design evolved through several block changes, reducing weight each time. Because the tank flies to orbital velocity with the Space Shuttle Orbiter, minimization of weight is mandatory, to maximize payload performance. The initial configuration, the standard weight tank, weighed 76,000 pounds and was an aluminum 2219 structure. The light weight tank weighed 66,000 pounds and flew 86 missions. The super light weight tank weighed 58,500 pounds and was primarily an aluminum-lithium structure. The final configuration and low weight enabled system level performance sufficient for assembly of the International Space Station in a high inclination orbit, vital for international cooperation. Another significant challenge was the minimization of ice formation on the cryogenic tanks. This was essential due to the system configuration and the choice of ceramic thermal protection system materials on the Orbiter. Ice would have been a major debris hazard. Spray on foam insulation materials served multiple functions including thermal insulation, conditioning of cryogenic propellants, and thermal protection for the tank structure during ascent and entry. The tank is large, and unique manufacturing facilities, tooling, and handling, and transportation operations were developed. Weld processes and tooling evolved with the design as it matured through several block changes. Non Destructive Evaluation methods were used to assure integrity of welds and thermal protection system materials. The aluminum-lithium alloy was used near the end of the program and weld processes and weld repair techniques had to be refined. Development and implementation of friction stir welding was a substantial technology development incorporated during the Program. Automated thermal protection system application processes were developed for the majority of the tank surface. Material obsolescence was an issue throughout the multi-decade program. Process controls were implemented to assure cleanliness in the production environment, to control contaminants, and to preclude corrosion. Each tank was accepted via rigorous inspections, including non-destructive evaluation techniques, proof testing, and all systems testing. In the post STS-107 era, the project focused on ascent debris risk reduction. This was accomplished via stringent process controls, post flight assessment using substantially improved imagery, and selective redesigns. These efforts were supported with a number of test programs to simulate combined environments. The debris risk was reduced by two orders of magnitude. During this time a major natural disaster was overcome when hurricane Katrina damaged the manufacturing facility. Numerous lessons from these efforts, the manufacturing and material processing issues, the key design features, and evolution of the design will be discussed.

Pilet, Jeffery C.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Trade Study of Multiple Thruster Options for the Mars Airplane Concept

A trade study was performed at NASA Langley Research Center under the Planetary Airplane Risk Reduction (PARR) project (2004-2005) to examine the option of using multiple, smaller thrusters in place of a single large thruster on the Mars airplane concept with the goal to reduce overall cost, schedule, and technical risk. The 5-lbf (22N) thruster is a common reaction control thruster on many satellites. Thousands of these types of thrusters have been built and flown on numerous programs, including MILSTAR and Intelsat VI. This study has examined the use of three 22N thrusters for the Mars airplane propulsion system and compared the results to those of the baseline single thruster system.

Kuhl, Christopher A.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2020

Electromagnetic Compatibility Test and Analysis Campaign of NASA's Mars 2020 Rover Final Submission

NASA's Mars 2020 Perseverance Rover—with a launch window opening July 2020, and landing expected February 2021—has mission objectives to look for evidence of habitability, seek biosignatures of past life, collect and cache samples for possible future return to Earth, and prepare for future human missions to Mars. The Rover platform is similar to the previous Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) “Curiosity” rover that landed in 2012 but contains a new suite of scientific instruments and upgrades to existing functionality: seven new and/or upgraded scientific payloads, an upgraded arm and sampling system, and a Helicopter demonstration. These changes—along with new efficiency goals to operate more Rover subsystems concurrently and thus collect more science—presented new electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) challenges. In this paper, we will describe the campaign to ensure Mars 2020 mission success from an electromagnetic environment perspective: 1) confirming existing MSL heritage subsystems and EMC requirements were compatible with the new Mars 2020 mission objectives, 2) engaging with engineers and scientists early in the project to identify and evaluate risks before hardware assembly and performing ambitious risk reduction tests, 3) undertaking a comprehensive subsystem qualification test program based on tailored MIL-STD-461F requirements, occasionally leading to redesign, 4) synthesizing the data collected to perform detailed analyses toward the goal of making risk-informed decisions at a system level. The spacecraft successfully completed all three planned system level tests, demonstrating self-compatibility with minimal impact to operations from electromagn

Gonzales, Edward C↗
NASA NTRS2020

Electromagnetic Compatibility Test and Analysis Campaign of NASA's Mars 2020 Rover

NASA's Mars 2020 Rover—with a launch window opening July 2020, and landing expected February 2021—has mission objectives to look for evidence of habitability, seek biosignatures of past life, collect and cache samples for possible future return to Earth, and prepare for future human missions. The Rover platform is similar to the previous Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) “Curiosity” rover that landed in 2012 but contains a new suite of scientific instruments and upgrades to existing functionality. The scientific payload includes a trio of chemical analysis tools (PIXL, SHERLOC, SuperCam), a ground penetrating radar (RIMFAX), an upgraded weather station (MEDA), upgraded high resolution camera (MastCam-Z), and an oxygen-producing experiment (MOXIE). These changes—along with new efficiency goals to operate more Rover subsystems concurrently and thus collect more science—presented new electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) challenges. In this paper, we will describe the campaign to ensure Mars 2020 mission success from an electromagnetic environment perspective: 1) confirming existing MSL heritage subsystems and EMC requirements were compatible with the new Mars 2020 mission objectives, 2) engaging with engineers and scientists early in the project to identify and evaluate risks before hardware assembly and performing ambitious risk reduction tests, 3) undertaking a comprehensive subsystem qualification test program based on tailored MIL-STD-461F requirements, occasionally leading to redesign, 4) synthesizing the data collected to perform detailed analyses toward the goal of making risk-informed decisions at a system level. The spacecraft has successfully completed all three planned system level tests, demonstrating self-compatibility with minimal impact to operations from electromagnetic interference in all mission phases.

Gonzales, Edward C↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human System Risk Communication: Directed Acyclic Graphs

- The Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for the management of a portfolio of 30 human system risks that NASA tracks and configuration manages to mitigate for future crewed exploration missions. - The HSRB has been exploring the concept of causal diagrams (in the form of Directed Acyclic Graphs or DAGs) as an approach to creating knowledge graphs for each risk to enable shared mental models of causal flow from spaceflight hazards to mission outcomes among HSRB Stakeholders. - These diagrams are intended to improve insight and communication of risk across the myriad subject matter experts and management interested in human system risk reduction. This includes program managers, systems engineers, and operators in addition to the Human Health and Performance Directorate. - The DAG project was intended to create the foundation for composition of the 30 baselined DAGs into a single risk network and software is being developed in parallel to enable this forward work.

directed acrylic graph↗
NASA NTRS2015

Sensitivity of Water Scarcity Events to ENSO-Driven Climate Variability at the Global Scale

Globally, freshwater shortage is one of the most dangerous risks for society. Changing hydro-climatic and socioeconomic conditions have aggravated water scarcity over the past decades. A wide range of studies show that water scarcity will intensify in the future, as a result of both increased consumptive water use and, in some regions, climate change. Although it is well-known that El Niño- Southern Oscillation (ENSO) affects patterns of precipitation and drought at global and regional scales, little attention has yet been paid to the impacts of climate variability on water scarcity conditions, despite its importance for adaptation planning. Therefore, we present the first global-scale sensitivity assessment of water scarcity to ENSO, the most dominant signal of climate variability. We show that over the time period 1961-2010, both water availability and water scarcity conditions are significantly correlated with ENSO-driven climate variability over a large proportion of the global land area (> 28.1 %); an area inhabited by more than 31.4% of the global population. We also found, however, that climate variability alone is often not enough to trigger the actual incidence of water scarcity events. The sensitivity of a region to water scarcity events, expressed in terms of land area or population exposed, is determined by both hydro-climatic and socioeconomic conditions. Currently, the population actually impacted by water scarcity events consists of 39.6% (CTA: consumption-to-availability ratio) and 41.1% (WCI: water crowding index) of the global population, whilst only 11.4% (CTA) and 15.9% (WCI) of the global population is at the same time living in areas sensitive to ENSO-driven climate variability. These results are contrasted, however, by differences in growth rates found under changing socioeconomic conditions, which are relatively high in regions exposed to water scarcity events. Given the correlations found between ENSO and water availability and scarcity conditions, and the relative developments of water scarcity impacts under changing socioeconomic conditions, we suggest that there is potential for ENSO-based adaptation and risk reduction that could be facilitated by more research on this emerging topic.

risk↗
NASA NTRS2010

From Paper to Production: An Update on NASA's Upper Stage Engine for Exploration

The NASA/industry team responsible for developing the J-2X Upper Stage Engine for the Constellation Program's Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles has made significant progress toward moving the design from paper to production during the past year. The J-2X exemplifies the Constellation goal of using proven technology and experience from more than 50 years of United States spaceflight experience and seeking where possible to employ common hardware in the Ares I crew launch vehicle and the Ares V cargo launch vehicle. The J-2X will power the Ares I upper stage to place the Orion crew vehicle in orbit. For the Ares V, the J-2X will place the Earth departure stage (EDS) and lunar lander in orbit and later re-start to send the Orion and lander to the Moon. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR) is under contract to develop and produce the engine, leveraging its flight-proven LH2/LOX, gas generator cycle J-2 and RS-68 engine capabilities, recent experience with the X-33 aerospike XRS-2200 engine, and development knowledge of the J-2S tap-off cycle engine. The J-2X employs a gas generator operating cycle designed to produce 294,000 pounds of thrust in primary operating mode for the Ares I and Ares V ascent phases. It also has a secondary mode, during which it operates at 80 percent thrust by altering its mixture ratio to perform the TLI burn for the Ares V lunar sortie and lunar cargo missions. The J-2X development philosophy is based on proven hardware, an aggressive development schedule, and early risk reduction. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and PWR began development of the J-2X in June 2006. The government/industry team of more than 600 people within NASA and PWR successfully completed the Critical Design Review (CDR) in November 2008, following extensive risk mitigation testing. The team is working toward a first flight of the J-2X on the Orion 1 mission in 2014. This paper will discuss the J-2X development background and provide top-level information on design and testing to date. Details will be provided on overcoming challenges such as gas generator instability, turbine blade life, and nozzle extension selection and materials.

Kynard, Mike↗
NASA NTRS2011

From Paper to Production to Test: An Update on NASA's J-2X Engine for Exploration

The NASA/industry team responsible for developing the J-2X upper stage engine for the Space Launch System (SLS) Program has made significant progress toward moving beyond the design phase and into production, assembly, and test of development hardware. The J-2X engine exemplifies the SLS Program goal of using proven technology and experience from more than 50 years of United States spaceflight experience combined with modern manufacturing processes and approaches. It will power the second stage of the fully evolved SLS Program launch vehicle that will enable a return to human exploration of space beyond low earth orbit. Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR) is under contract to develop and produce the engine, leveraging its flight-proven LH2/LOX, gas generator cycle J-2 and RS-68 engine capabilities, recent experience with the X-33 aerospike XRS-2200 engine, and development knowledge of the J-2S tap-off cycle engine. The J- 2X employs a gas generator operating cycle designed to produce 294,000 pounds of vacuum thrust in primary operating mode with its full nozzle extension. With a truncated nozzle extension suitable to support engine clustering on the stage, the nominal vacuum thrust level in primary mode is 285,000 pounds. It also has a secondary mode, during which it operates at 80 percent thrust by altering its mixture ratio. The J-2X development philosophy is based on proven hardware, an aggressive development schedule, and early risk reduction. NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and PWR began development of the J-2X in June 2006. The government/industry team of more than 600 people within NASA and PWR successfully completed the Critical Design Review (CDR) in November 2008, following extensive risk mitigation testing. Assembly of the first development engine was completed in May 2011 and the first engine test was conducted at the NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC), test stand A2, on 14 July 2011. Testing of the first development engine will continue through the autumn of 2011, be paused for test stand modifications to the passive diffuser, and then restart in the spring of 2012. This testing will be followed by specialized powerpack testing intended to examine the design and operating margins of the engine turbomachinery. The development plan beyond this point leads through more system-level, engine testing of several samples, analytical model validation activities, functional and performance verification, and then ultimate certification to support human spaceflight. This paper will discuss the J-2X development background, provide top-level information on design and development planning, and will explore some of the development challenges and mitigation activities pursued to date.

Kynard, Michael↗
DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS2004

Uncertainties in estimates of the risks of late effects from space radiation

Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Using the linear-additivity model for radiation risks, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain an estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including a deep space outpost and Mars missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative metrics, e.g., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well-defined confidence limits. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of COSPAR.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS2002

Uncertainties in Estimates of the Risks of Late Effects from Space Radiation

The health risks faced by astronauts from space radiation include cancer, cataracts, hereditary effects, and non-cancer morbidity and mortality risks related to the diseases of the old age. Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Within the linear-additivity model, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain a Maximum Likelihood estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including ISS, lunar station, deep space outpost, and Mar's missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time, and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative objective's, i.e., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits.

Cucinotta, F. A.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Systemic Risk

Systemic risk is the name given to impacts that spread within and across systems and sectors (e.g. ecosystems, health, infrastructure and the food sector) via the movements of people, goods, capital and information within and across boundaries (e.g. regions, countries and continents). The spread of these impacts can lead to potentially existential consequences and system collapse across a range of time horizons. Globalization contributes to systemic risk affecting people worldwide. The impacts of climate change or COVID-19 show how the challenges of addressing systemic risk go beyond conventional risk management and governance. Critical system interdependencies, amplified by underlying vulnerabilities, highlight that there is a growing need to better understand cascading impacts, systemic risks and the possible political (governance) and societal responses. This includes improving our understanding of the root causes of systemic risk, both biophysical and socio-economic, and related information needs. Addressing contemporary challenges in terms of systemic risk requires integrating different systems perspectives and fostering system thinking, while implementing key intergovernmental agendas, such as the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sustainable Development Goals.

systemic risk↗
DOE OSTI2024

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Geothermal District Heating in the United States: 2021 Update

As of 2021, there are 23 geothermal district heating (GDH) systems in the United States. Most are over 30 years old. This paper presents an overview of GDH development in the United States and the performance of GDH systems over time. Calculations of the estimated levelized cost of heat (LCOH) for existing U.S. GDH systems were made using NREL's GEOPHIRES tool. Estimated LCOH for existing U.S. GDH systems ranges from $15 to $105/MWhth. This paper explores other factors in GDH development such as resource and system size, capacity factor, and the role of policy. U.S. GDH utilization and deployment are compared to worldwide trends. Results show that the market for GDH in the United States has been weak over the past 40 years due to the combination of inexpensive fossil fuel alternatives (mostly natural gas), lack of incentives focused on heating/cooling, and other factors. Future opportunities for increased GDH deployment in the United States related to increased demand for low-carbon heating and cooling solutions (driven by decarbonization goals in the residential, commercial and industrial heating/cooling sectors, and particularly aggressive ones on college campuses) are outlined. Lastly, this paper identifies policy mechanisms that have been implemented in other countries to incentivize GDH (such as financial incentives targeting GDH, geothermal risk reduction mechanisms, carbon prices benefiting low-carbon heat production, and others).

geothermal district heating↗
NASA NTRS2012

Initial Results from the GeoSTAR-II Laboratory Demonstration

The Geostationary Synthetic Thinned Aperture Radiometer (GeoSTAR) team recently concluded its second Earth Science Technology Office (ESTO) IIP-07, "GeoSTAR technology development and risk reduction for PATH". The major accomplishments during this project at JPL were:1) Demonstrate performance and scalability of the 183 GHz receivers 2) Local oscillator phasing architecture and technology 3) Subarray design validation including feedhorns, manifolds and alignment 4) System demonstration of signal distribution topology and measurements. Significant progress has been made to retiring risk of the various subsystems.

synthetic aperture radiometry↗