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Aspects of Assessment of Packages with Wood Filled Impact Limiters during Fire Tests - 17191

Packages for the transport of radioactive material are often equipped with impact limiters consisting of wood, encapsulated by steel sheets. These impact limiters shall ensure that the transport casks meet the mechanical and thermal IAEA regulatory test requirements. According to the accident conditions of transport it is mandatory to expose the specimens to a cumulative effect by mechanical and thermal impacts. The mechanical tests consist of a free drop from 9 m onto a flat unyielding target and a 1 m drop onto a puncture bar. After damage caused by mechanical test sequences the package has to withstand a severe fire scenario. Corresponding to the IAEA advisory material it is required that the impact attitudes for the 9 m drop test and for the puncture test have to be such as to produce maximum damage, taking into account the thermal test. Moreover, any damage, which would give rise to increased radiation or loss of containment or affect the confinement system after the thermal test, should be considered. During and following the thermal test, the specimen shall not be artificially cooled and any combustion of materials of the package shall be permitted to proceed naturally. Different works from the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and BAM show that additional energy supply from a pre-damaged impact limiter to the cask could occur. This effect should be considered within the safety assessment of the containment. Thermal effects at the closure system of the cask, which might result in an elevated activity release, have to be excluded. BAM conducted small scale tests with wood filled metal buckets showing continuing combustion processes during the cooling down phase. These test results are presented. As not much is known about smouldering processes in wood filled impact limiters, it is highly complex to define pre-damage of impact limiters, which are conservative, regarding the maximum damaging energy flow from the impact limiter to the containment system. More research has to be done to develop models to examine the effects of smouldering impact limiters on the containment of packages for the transport of radioactive material. Aspects of assessment and its difficulties are shown. BAM as a competent authority for the approval of transport casks for radioactive material in Germany operates the test facilities to examine the issue of mechanical damage, combustion and heat transfer for such kind of package systems. For this purpose, the knowledge from real drop tests with casks of a mass partly over 100 tons was transferred to a test application. A thermal test will take place with a wood filled test specimen with a diameter of about 2.3 meters. The aim is to understand the phenomena of smouldering under the consideration of relevant regulatory boundary conditions. The process of smouldering is described with regard to the requirements in the thermal assessment of safety of packages for the transport of radioactive material. Requirements concerning the pre-damage of packages for the maximum damage of impact limiters are discussed. Parameters influencing the smouldering process are identified. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decontamination and Decommissioning Program of a Radiopharmaceuticals Production Facility - 17103

On May 2012, Best Medical Belgium (BMB) S.A., a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products located on the nuclear site of Fleurus, was declared bankrupt. According to the Belgian law, ONDRAF/NIRAS (Belgian Radioactive Waste Management Agency) was entrusted with the clean-up and the decommissioning operations of the former BMB facilities, nowadays known as 'ONDRAF/NIRAS Site Fleurus' (ONSF). In June 2015, ONSF launched a Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) program, for which Tractebel supports the definition of the clean-up and decommissioning strategies; the drafting of the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) and License Application for decommissioning; and the follow-up of the clean-up and upcoming D and D works on site. Four nuclear buildings are part of the clean-up and D and D activities. One of them, Building 14 (B14), represents the most challenging task with the clean-up of highly contaminated areas and their further decommissioning up to greenfield. Beside its two cyclotrons successively used for the production of radioisotopes, this building features hot cells and glove boxes used for the purification of radioisotopes and the conditioning of the final pharmaceutical product. The present paper aims at presenting the development of the D and D program in terms of modifications of existing facilities to allow carrying out the clean-up and D and D activities and the management of dismantled radioactive materials in a safe, efficient and cost-effective way as well as in terms of strategic options to be developed for the FDP. To support the clean-up and D and D activities, several workshops have been designed in order to treat radioactive materials removed from the building rooms. Those workshops feature an input buffer storage area, a common output buffer storage area and installations for the treatment of radioactive materials and waste (handling devices, cutting means, decontamination means, free release measurements means, etc.). Some modifications to the existing auxiliary systems will be required in order to dispose of appropriate systems to operate those workshops in a safe way. Activated concrete structures will constitute the most important part of radioactive materials that will arise from the decommissioning activities. To limit the total decommissioning costs, and especially the costs associated to radioactive waste management, two strategies have been developed in order to manage a part of activated concrete as candidate for free release with a certain decay period or as candidate for conventional landfill. Both strategies will have to be further detailed and discussed with the competent Authorities to ensure they can actually be implemented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Neutronics Analysis for ITER Diagnostic Generic Upper Port Plug

This paper presents new results of neutronics analysis performed for the updated design of the ITER Diagnostic Generic Upper Port Plug (DGUPP). Such analysis is performed regularly during the development of the ITER Ports design. Neutronics analysis is an important step in support of the development of ITER components irradiated by 14 MeV neutrons generated in D-T fusion thermonuclear reactions. The neutrons are born in the ITER tokamak plasma chamber and then impinge on the surrounding blanket and port plugs, after that they diffuse through shielding material of vacuum vessel components or could stream through the diagnostic channels and assembly gaps far away from plasma up to the bio-shield and in a small amount beyond it. While ITER machine is in operation it is inaccessible, after the shut-down it is planned to provide personnel access to the Upper Port Inter-Space Structure (UP ISS) behind the Port Plug via the corridors. Neutrons activate the ITER materials and those radioactive materials emit decay gammas during the shut-down causing a Shut-Down Dose Rate (SDDR) field distributed all around the activated materials. Decay gammas could also stream through the void channels. That emphasizes the need for calculation of decay gamma transport in evaluations of SDDR, which is reflected in the use of transport - activation interface code described in Section of Computational Modelling. The assessment of radiation environment (fluxes and SDDR) at DGUPP was focused on the port back-side area of UP ISS, where personnel access is planned along the ISS maintenance corridors. Minimization of SDDR at the front part of the ISS maintenance corridors was the target value for optimization of the DGUPP shielding and analysis of related neutronics effects. Following the dose ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle, every possibility to reduce SDDR should be investigated, emphasizing the importance of this analysis. The challenges of such analysis are inextricably connected with the engineering complexity of the ITER machine, with integration of many diagnostics systems having channels and gaps inside the ITER ports. Those gaps result in radiation streaming and negatively affect the shielding performance of the port plugs. The computational complication is caused by the need to model precisely the ITER geometry and then to run deep penetrating radiation transport in the substantially heterogenic toroidal geometry of ITER large-size tokamak, with 30 m height and diameter of its bio-shield. The whole mass of Upper Port Plug (UPP) could be up to 25 tons and it must be very precisely positioned inside the port opening in blanket and Vacuum Vessel. Facing the engineering challenges for the assembly of DGUPP, there were proposed two Project Change Requests (PCRs) No. 439 and 709 concerning the design updates of UPP/blanket interface and its remote handling.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Evaluation of Potential Radionuclide Release and Transport for the Zion Nuclear Power Station Basement Fill End State: Conceptual Model Development and Sensitivity Analysis

ZionSolutions is in the process of decommissioning the Zion Nuclear Power Plant. The site contains two reactor Containment Buildings, a fuel building, an Auxiliary Building, and a Turbine Building that may be contaminated. The current decommissioning plan involves removing all above grade structures to a depth of 3 feet below grade. The remaining underground structures will be filled with clean concrete demolition debris (CCDD) that will not have detectable licensed radioactive material. However, the remaining structures will contain low amounts of residual licensed radioactive material. An important component of the decommissioning process is the demonstration that any remaining activity will not cause a hypothetical individual to receive a dose in excess of 25 mrem/y as specified in 10CFR 20 Subpart E. To demonstrate compliance with 10CFR 20 Subpart E requires modeling of the release and transport of radioactive material to a receptor. This involves characterization of the buildings on site to quantify the amount of residual radioactivity, modeling the release of radioactivity from the concrete and transport through the groundwater to a receptor well or nearby water body. At this point, exposure scenarios are postulated that have a future resident inhale, ingest, or be externally exposed to radiation resulting from the residual contamination. This typically involves using well water for drinking, irrigation, and growing crops.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Impact of the deployment schedule of fast breeding reactors in the frame of French act for nuclear materials and radioactive waste management

In the frame of the French Act of June 28, 2006 on 'a sustainable management of nuclear materials and radioactive waste' EDF R and D assesses various research scenarios of transition between the actual French fleet and a Generation IV fleet with a closed fuel cycle where plutonium is multi-recycled. The basic scenarios simulate a deployment of 60 GWe of Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) in two steps: one third from 2040 to 2050 and the rest from 2080 to 2100 (scenarios 2040). These research scenarios assume that SFR technology will be ready for industrial deployment in 2040. One of the many sensitivity analyses that EDF, as a nuclear power plant operator, must evaluate is the impact of a delay of SFR technology in terms of uranium consumptions, plutonium needs and fuel cycle utilities gauging. The sensitivity scenarios use the same assumptions as scenarios 2040 but they simulate a different transition phase: SFRs are deployed in one step between 2080 and 2110 (scenarios 2080). As the French Act states to conduct research on minor actinides (MA) management, we studied different options for 2040 and 2080 scenarios: no MA transmutation, americium transmutation in heterogeneous mode based on americium Bearing Blankets (AmBB) in SFRs and all MA transmutation in heterogeneous mode based on MA Bearing Blankets (MABB). Moreover, we studied multiple parameters that could impact the deployment of these reactors (SFR load factor, increase of the use of MOX in Light Water Reactors, increase of the cooling time in spent nuclear fuel storage...). Each scenario has been computed with the EDF R and D fuel cycle simulation code TIRELIRE-STRATEGIE and optimized to meet various fuel cycle constraints such as using the reprocessing facility with long period of constant capacity, keeping the temporary stored mass of plutonium and MA under imposed limits, recycling older assemblies first... These research scenarios show that the transition from the current PWR fleet to an equivalent fleet of Generation IV SFR can follow different courses. The design of SFR-V2B that we used in our studies needs a high inventory of plutonium resulting in tension on this resource. Several options can be used in order to loosen this tension: our results lead to favour the use of axial breeding blanket in SFR. Load factor of upcoming reactors has to be regarded with attention as it has a high impact on plutonium resource for a given production of electricity. The deployment of SFRs beginning in 2080 instead of 2040 following the scenarios we described creates higher tensions on reprocessing capacity, separated plutonium storage and spent fuel storage. In the frame of the French Act, we studied minor actinides transmutation. The flux of MA in all fuel cycle plants is really high, which will lead to decay heat, a and neutron emission related problems. In terms of reduction of MA inventories, the deployment of MA transmutation cycle must not delay the installation of SFRs. The plutonium production in MABB and AmBB does not allow reducing the use of axial breeding blankets. The impact of MA or Am transmutation over the high level waste disposal is more important if the SFRs are deployed later. Transmutation option (americium or all MA) does not have a significant impact on the number of canister produced nor on its long-term thermal properties. (authors)

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A Data Processing Workflow for Fixed-wing Drone Based Radiation Mapping in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ) - 20119

April 2020 marks the 34. anniversary of the high-profile radiological release from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP). The release of radioactive material from reactor number four began on the 26 April 1986 and continued over a period of about 10 days, releasing approximately 1700 PBq of radioactive material (including 85 PBq of 137-Cs) into the environment. To this day, the accident remains the most significant release of radioactive material since civil nuclear power generation began. In the years since the accident, automated and remote radiation monitoring technologies have advanced significantly in their capabilities. One such example of this is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in radiation mapping investigations. In April 2019, a team of scientists from the University of Bristol showcased a novel radiation mapping system within the CEZ, specifically aiming to map radiation over a large portion of the area immediately surrounding the ChNPP. Over six days of data collection, the system flew a total distance of 583.8 km, covering an area of 14.6 sq.km with an exceptional spatial resolution (sub 20 m/pixel). The work presented herein outlines and explains the data processing procedure to convert the raw data into 137-Cs activity (kBq/sq.m) and cesium-equivalent dose-rate (CED) at 1 m above ground level (μSv/hr). A demonstration of the validity of the method is demonstrated through the successful reduction of the raw data into a single linear relationship between the measured {sup 137}Cs net peak intensity and the {sup 137}Cs activity. (authors)

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Radiological Exposure Devices (RED) Technical Basis for Threat Profile

Facilities that manufacture, store or transport significant quantities of radiological material must protect against the risk posed by sabotage events. Much of the analysis of this type of event has been focused on the threat from a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or "dirty bomb" scenario, in which a malicious assailant would, by explosives or other means, loft a significant quantity of radioactive material into a plume that would expose and contaminate people and property. Although the consequences in cost and psychological terror would be severe, no intentional RDD terrorism events are on record. Conversely, incidents in which a victim or victims were maliciously exposed to a Radiological Exposure Device (RED), without dispersal of radioactive material, are well documented. This paper represents a technical basis for the threat profile related to the risk of nefarious use of an RED, including assailant and material characterization. Radioactive materials of concern are detailed in Appendix A.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Reuse of Material Containing Natural Radionuclides - 12444

Disposal of and use of wastes containing natural radioactive material (NORM) or technologically enhanced natural radioactive material (TENORM) with excessive natural background as a building material is very important in the supervision body activity. At the present time, the residents of Octyabrsky village are under resettlement. This village is located just near the Priargunsky mining and chemical combine (Ltd. 'PPGHO'), one of the oldest uranium mines in our country. The vacated wooden houses in the village are demolished and partly used as a building material. To address the issue of potential radiation hazard of the wooden beams originating from demolition of houses in Octyabrsky village, the contents of the natural radionuclides (K-40, Th-232, Ra-226, U- 238) are being determined in samples of the wooden beams of houses. The NORM contents in the wooden house samples are higher, on average, than their content in the reference sample of the fresh wood shavings, but the range of values is rather large. According to the classification of waste containing the natural radionuclides, its evaluation is based on the effective specific activity. At the effective specific activity lower 1.5 kBq/kg and gamma dose rate lower 70 μR/h, the material is not considered as waste and can be used in building by 1 - 3 classes depending upon A{sub eff} value. At 1.5 kBq/kg < A{sub eff} ≤ 4 kBq/kg (4 class), the wooden beams might be used for the purpose of the industrial building, if sum of ratios between the radionuclide specific activity and its specific activity of minimum significance is lower than unit. The material classified as the waste containing the natural radionuclides has A{sub eff} higher 1.5 kBq /kg, and its usage for the purpose of house-building and road construction is forbidden. As for the ash classification and its future usage, such usage is unreasonable, because, according to the provided material, more than 50% of ash samples are considered as radioactive waste containing natural radionuclides. All materials originated from demolition of houses in Octyabrsky village are subjected to the obligatory radiation control. The decision to use the wooden beams shall enter into force after agreement with the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision bodies. Conclusions: 1 - The wooden beam originated from the house demolition in Octyabrsky village might be used as the construction material only in case of compliance with the requirements of the regulatory documents, as well as under approval of the authorities responsible for the state sanitary and epidemiological supervision in this area. 2 - The industrial control is introduced to verify the compliance with the current regulations. 3 - The material originated from the house demolition might be used only if such usage does not cause increasing radiation exposure to the public. (authors)

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Nuclear Forensics for Irradiated Materials using Kernel Regression Models

The ultimate purpose of nuclear forensics is to locate the origin of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control used in nuclear security events such as classical forensics. For this purpose, some specific characteristics of interdicted materials (referred to as 'signatures') should be defined to compare the known sample database. In some cases, involved with irradiated material, the signatures could be specific amount of fission product inventory depending on reactor operational histories such as reactor type, initial enrichment, burn up rate of nuclear fuel and cooling period after irradiation in the reactor. In order to make inference model for irradiated material for nuclear forensics, we suggested 3 ways as follows; (i) analyzing ORIGEN produced nuclear substances for the fission product inventory, (ii) classifying the range of reactor type, (iii) predicting the operational history from the fission product inventory. In terms of nuclear substance analysis, the construction of spent fuel database has been internationally carried out since ITWG (Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group) was established in 1995. However, enough sample data cannot be obtained in Korea to determine reactor type and operational histories because analyzing nuclear substances have been limited due to the international regulation. Thus, this study does not mention how to obtain mass or ratios of nuclides for the spent fuel. We just have generated simulation sample data as a fission product inventory using ORIGEN to construct spent fuel database. When unidentified radioactive materials are discovered, it is assumed that mass or ratios of the nuclides are analyzed by certain methods which are available in Korea as well as other countries. Then, a reactor type is determined, and finally, regression model can locate the origin or source of the radioactive materials by inferring operational histories using the fission product inventory. There are some studies on the classification of reactor type using statistical methods. As a part of predicting the operational history, this paper focuses on the development of spent fuel inference algorithm for nuclear forensics to estimate reactor operational histories that reflect characteristics of a reactor from the fission product inventory. The spent fuel inference algorithm for nuclear forensics has been developed on the basis of Kernel Regression (KR) which can conditionally generate the estimated output data by giving weight depending on geometric distance between sample data and input data. Also the KR which comprises Auto-Associative KR and Inferential KR have some benefits that can estimate only using data without assumption for specific physical model and re-learning process. Auto-associative KR (AAKR) was used to sort out outliers of input data and Inferential KR (IKR) was carried out to predict the operational histories for spent fuel. All of regression algorithms were performed in R programming tool. From the validation of both AAKR and IKR, it is expected that kernel regression has enough accuracy to be applied to nuclear forensics for spent fuel. Once the nuclear substance is measured to fill the fission product inventory with a certain reactor type, this kernel regression algorithm would predict the operational histories of spent fuel with high accuracy. Finally, this information is expected to be useful to find the origin of irradiated materials. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Implications of DOE O 1027 Guidance on Rad-NESHAP Programs

This presentation is for the national Radionuclide NESHAP meeting, an embedded topic of the 2012 Health Physics Society Annual Meeting in Sacramento, CA. The Radionuclide NESHAP program is responsible for measuring and reporting the amount of airborne radioactive material released from DOE facilities. The issue at hand is recent guidance put forth by the Department of Energy regarding threshold limits for Category 3 and Category 2 nuclear facilities. Updates to calculation methods have resulted in increased amounts of radioactive material allowed in inventory for facilities before they reach levels which require them to be categorized as a Category 2 or 3 nuclear facility. With larger radioactive material inventories, there may be a corresponding increase in overall facility emissions. This can have permitting and monitoring impacts for DOE sites, as well as political ramifications with citizen organizations. This presentation is intended to raise awareness of the new guidance and associated issues, and to stimulate discussion among DOE Radionuclide NESHAP representatives.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Impact of different standard type A7A drum closure-ring practices on gasket contraction and bolt closure distance - 15621

The Department of Energy, the Savannah River National Laboratory, several manufacturers of specification drums, and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) are collaborating in the development of a guidance document for DOE contractors and vendors who wish to qualify containers to DOT 7A Type A requirements. Currently, the effort is focused on DOT 7A Type A 208-liter (55-gallons) drums with a standard 12-gauge bolted closure ring. The U.S. requirements, contained in Title 49, Part 178.350 'Specification 7A; general packaging, Type A specifies a competent authority review of the packaging is not required for the transport of (Class 7) radioactive material containing less than Type A quantities of radioactive material. For Type AF drums, a 4 ft. regulatory free drop must be performed, such that the drum 'suffers maximum damage.' Although the actual orientation is not defined by the specification, recent studies suggest that maximum damage would result from a shallow angle top impact, where kinetic energy is transferred to the lid, ultimately causing heavy damage to the lid, or even worse, causing the lid to come off. Since each vendor develops closure recommendations/procedures for the drums they manufacture, key parameters applied to drums during closing vary based on vendor. As part of the initial phase of the collaboration, the impact of the closure variants on the ability of the drum to suffer maximum damage is investigated. Specifically, closure testing is performed varying: 1) the amount of torque applied to the closure ring bolt; and, 2) stress relief protocol, including: a) weight of hammer; and, b) orientation that the hammer hits the closure ring. After closure, the amount of drum lid gasket contraction and the distance that the closure bolt moves through the closure ring is measured. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Impact of Different Standard Type A7A Drum Closure-Ring Practices on Gasket Contraction and Bolt Closure Distance– 15621

The Department of Energy, the Savannah River National Laboratory, several manufacturers of specification drums, and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) are collaborating in the development of a guidance document for DOE contractors and vendors who wish to qualify containers to DOT 7A Type A requirements. Currently, the effort is focused on DOT 7A Type A 208-liter (55-gallons) drums with a standard 12-gauge bolted closure ring. The U.S. requirements, contained in Title 49, Part 178.350 “Specification 7A; general packaging, Type A specifies a competent authority review of the packaging is not required for the transport of (Class 7) radioactive material containing less than Type A quantities of radioactive material. For Type AF drums, a 4 ft. regulatory free drop must be performed, such that the drum “suffers maximum damage.” Although the actual orientation is not defined by the specification, recent studies suggest that maximum damage would result from a shallow angle top impact, where kinetic energy is transferred to the lid, ultimately causing heavy damage to the lid, or even worse, causing the lid to come off. Since each vendor develops closure recommendations/procedures for the drums they manufacture, key parameters applied to drums during closing vary based on vendor. As part of the initial phase of the collaboration, the impact of the closure variants on the ability of the drum to suffer maximum damage is investigated. Specifically, closure testing is performed varying: 1) the amount of torque applied to the closure ring bolt; and, 2) stress relief protocol, including: a) weight of hammer; and, b) orientation that the hammer hits the closure ring. After closure, the amount of drum lid gasket contraction and the distance that the closure bolt moves through the closure ring is measured.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Radiation Safety of Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are used in a wide variety of occupational settings and under differing regulatory/licensing structures. The definition of a sealed radioactive source varies between US regulatory authorities and standard-setting organizations. Potential problems with sealed sources cover a range of risks and impacts. The loss of control of high activity sealed sources can result in very high or even fatal doses to members of the public who come in contact with them. Sources that are not adequately sealed, and that fail, can cause spread of contamination and potential intake of radioactive material. There is also the possibility that sealed sources may be (or threatened to be) used for terrorist purposes and disruptive opportunities. Until fairly recently, generally-licensed sealed sources and devices received little, if any, regulatory oversight, and were often forgotten, lost or unaccounted for. Nonetheless, generally licensed devices can contain fairly significant quantities of radioactive material and there is some potential for exposure if a device is treated in a way that it was never designed. Industrial radiographers use and handle high activity and/or high-dose rate sealed sources in the field with a high degree of independence and minimal regulatory oversight. Failure to follow operational procedures and properly handle radiography sources can and has resulted in serious injuries and death. Industrial radiographers have experienced a disproportionately large fraction of incidents that result in unintended exposure to radiation. Sources do not have to contain significant quantities of radioactive material to cause problems in the event of their failure. A loss of integrity can cause the spread of contamination and potential exposure to workers and members of the public. The NCRP has previously provided recommendations on select aspects of sealed source programs. Future efforts to provide recommendations for sealed source programs are discussed.

radioactive material↗

Complete Documentation of Applicable Regulations and Regulatory Authority for Transportation

This report fulfills the M4 milestone M4MR-20PN0303023, “Complete Documentation of Applicable Regulations and Regulatory Authority for Transportation. Microreactors are very small nuclear reactors with a power output of 20MWe or less and are designed to be factory-built, modular in nature, and highly portable. The objective of this report is to identify and document applicable regulations, the appropriate regulatory authority, and the associated framework for microreactor transport. Sections 2 and 3 of this report summarize U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and NRC regulations related to the transportation of Class 7 (radioactive) materials. These sections concentrate on the transport of fissile material packages and Type B packages, which would be most applicable to the transport of a microreactor before and after irradiation. Section 4 summarizes DOE hazardous and radioactive material transportation regulations. Section 5 summarizes U.S. Coast Guard regulations related to the transport of radioactive material. Section 6 discusses state requirements for the permitting of oversize and/or overweight truck shipments. Section 7 presents detailed schedules of requirements for transporting fissile material packages and Type B packages based on NRC and DOT regulations. The schedules are presented in a two-column format, the right column is the regulatory requirement and the left column is the citation of the regulation in which the requirement is found.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Second Line of Defense Program, Secondary Screening Operations Field Data Collection

Secondary screening is a key component of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program’s capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The primary detection system—the radiation portal monitor—makes alarm decisions based on gross counts of gamma and neutron radiation; it is able to provide little other information regarding what may have caused an elevated radiation level. Conducting a proper secondary screening with an instrument capable of identifying radioisotopes is the only way to determine what radioactive material is present—most importantly if it is a threat material. Only by knowing the radioactive material can a prudent decision be made with regard to disposition and response—and can the mistaken release of a threat be avoided.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NORM in Building Materials: A Case Study in Releasing and Disposing of Building Debris within the DOE System - 18123

In 2013, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum 2013-02, clarifying its 'Freeze the Footprint' policy. Memorandum 2013-02 requires that all federal agencies maintain or reduce their total square footage, within each subsequent year, from a FY2012 baseline. Memorandum 2013-02 also requires that total square footage remain constant with respect to the type/intended use of a building. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), this means that new construction cannot occur without demolition of equivalent (both in type and square footage) building(s). Since 2013, decommissioning and demolition of aging, unused facilities at LANL has increased. In 2016, the TA16-280 building complex was scheduled for demolition. TA16-280 is a former high explosives (HE) processing facility that consists of six buildings connected to each other via weatherproof walkways. It was constructed in the 1950's and has been subsequently used for HE shipping, receiving, and storage. Interviews with radiation protection staff suggest that some of the buildings within the complex may have been used to store depleted uranium metal parts in a non-dispersible form. It is LANL policy to conduct decommissioning surveys for radioactive materials when building history cannot confirm that a structure is radiologically non-impacted. LANL follows the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) process to develop its surveys and clear structures from radiological control. After clearance, a structure may be dispositioned as non-regulated waste, at a significant cost savings compared to regulated disposition pathways such as low-level waste. MARSAME measurements conducted in the 16-280 complex were elevated compared to reference measurements of surrogate materials, and a majority of the survey units failed to pass indistinguishable from background (IFB), which is LANL's unregulated clearance criteria. Further measurements conducted both in situ and in the laboratory indicated the presence of naturally-occurring thorium in several building materials including: poured concrete, the glaze atop ceramic blast tiles, and the porcelain enamel on the exterior of blast-proof ceiling lamps. Other than naturally-occurring thorium, there were no elevated radionuclide concentrations detected in building materials. It should be noted that there was no history of thorium use in the 16-280 complex, and the material in question was in all cases fixed to and within the building materials in question. Except in certain specific cases, such material is exempt from regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [3], as amended, and is therefore exempt from regulation under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, and agreement state regulatory frameworks. Despite this regulatory exemption, disposition of material from the 16-280 complex proved to be challenging, principally because local industrial landfills stipulate 'No radioactive material' in their Waste Acceptance Criteria. This disconnect between what is regulated and what is disposable creates a situation where some DOE sites find it easier to disposition property as Low Level Waste in lieu of pursuing a non-regulated disposition pathway. This presentation will explore the specifics of the 16-280 decommissioning project as well as the implications of the release/disposition disconnect for naturally occurring radioactive material and project planning at LANL. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

EVALUATION OF TROQUE VS CLOSURE BOLT PRELOAD FOR A TYPICAL CONTAINMENT VESSEL UNDER SERVICE CONDITIONS

Radioactive material package containment vessels typically employ bolted closures of various configurations. Closure bolts must retain the lid of a package and must maintain required seal loads, while subjected to internal pressure, impact loads and vibration. The need for insuring that the specified preload is achieved in closure bolts for radioactive materials packagings has been a continual subject of concern for both designers and regulatory reviewers. The extensive literature on threaded fasteners provides sound guidance on design and torque specification for closure bolts. The literature also shows the uncertainty associated with use of torque to establish preload is typically between 10 and 35%. These studies have been performed under controlled, laboratory conditions. The ability to insure required preload in normal service is, consequently, an important question. The study described here investigated the relationship between indicated torque and resulting bolt load for a typical radioactive materials package closure using methods available under normal service conditions.

42 ENGINEERING↗