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After Action Report - CUP-2 Comparative Sample Analysis Meeting - Kazakhstan September 2016

Representatives from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) visited the Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) to discuss the results and conclusions of a joint sample analysis (CUP-2 uranium ore concentrate) between LLNL, INP and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) (Fig. 1). The U.S. delegation also met with the newly-appointed Director-General of the INP (S. Sakhiyev) who expressed his continued support for this collaboration. On the last day of the visit, the delegation toured the new medical isotope production facilities (which is expected to begin operation in a few months), as well as INP’s Nuclear Security Training Center (co-funded by DOE, the Defense Threat Reduction Initiative (DTRA) and the Kazakhstan government). Construction of the Nuclear Security Training Center is expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Development of the Experimental Setup Dedicated for Alpha, Gamma and Electron Spectroscopy of Heavy Nuclei at FLNR JINR

Various types of reactions and identification techniques were applied in the investigation of formation cross sections and decay properties of transuranium elements. The fusion--evaporation reactions with heavy targets, recoil--separation techniques and identification of nuclei by the parent--daughter generic coincidences with the known daughter-nuclei after implantation into position--sensitive detectors were the most successful tools for production and identification of the heaviest elements known presently. This technique may be further improved and presently it may be very promising for the identification of new elements, search for new isotopes and measurement of new decay data for the known nuclei.At the Flerov Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions (JINR, Dubna), investigations of the complete fusion reactions leading to the synthesis of heavy and superheavy nuclei with the use of heavy ion beams from a powerful U400 cyclotron have been an important part of the experimental program. It is planned to upgrade U400 cyclotron of the FLNR, to deliver beams with higher intensities and smooth variation of energies.New experimental set up, the velocity filter, is now developing for synthesis and studies of the decay properties of heavy nuclei. At the focal plane of the separator GABRIELA set up (alpha,beta,gamma detectors array) will be installed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A Study of 3He detectors for Active Interrogation

3He proportional counters have long been used as neutron detectors for both passive and active detection of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). The optimal configuration of these detectors as far as gas pressure, amount of moderating material, and size are concerned is highly dependent on what neutron signatures are being used to detect and identify SNM. We present here a parametric study of the neutron capture response of 3He detectors, based on Monte Carlo simulations using the MCNPX radiation transport code. The neutron capture response of the detectors has been modeled as a function of time after an incident neutron pulse.

3He↗

The MIREDO Facility in Novi Sad

The MIREDO (Muon Induced Rare Event Dynamic Observatory) spectrometer system will be mainly devoted for the study of cosmic muon induced nuclear reactions. The system will be developed around the 100% nominal efficiency ultra low-background HPGe spectrometer. Our previous detection system enabled only the detection of secondary muon induced events mostly from the interaction of cosmic muons with the shielding materials. The improved geometry of the MIREDO scintillation detection system will enable the direct measurement of the cross section of the muon induced reactions with the sample material.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Maritime Interdiction Operations Small Craft Detection

The Naval Postgraduate School has been conducting Tactical Network Topology (TNT) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) experiments with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) since early in 2005. In this work, we are investigating cutting edge technology to evaluate use of networks, advanced sensors and collaborative technology for globally-supported maritime interdiction operations. Some examples of our research include communications in harsh environments, between moving ships at sea; small boat drive-by radiation detection; network-centric collaboration with global partners; situational awareness; prototype sensors & biometric instruments. Since 2006, we have studied the concept of using a small vessel with fixed radiation sensors to do initial searches for illicit radioactive materials. In our work, we continue to evaluate concepts of operation for small boat monitoring. For example, in San Francisco Bay we established a simulated choke point using two RHIBs. Each RHIB had a large sodium iodide radiation sensor on board, mounted on the side nearest to the passing potential target boats. Once detections were made, notification over the network prompted a chase RHIB also equipped with a radiation sensor to further investigate the potential target. We have also used an unmanned surface vessel (USV) carrying a radiation sensor to perform the initial discovery. The USV was controlled remotely and to drive by boats in different configurations. The potential target vessels were arranged in a line, as a choke point and randomly spaced in the water. Search plans were problematic when weather, waves and drift complicated the ability to stay in one place. A further challenge is to both detect and identify the radioactive materials during the drive-by. Our radiation detection system, ARAM, Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor, is able to detect, alarm and quickly identify plausible radionuclides in real time. We have performed a number of experiments to better understand parameters of vessel speed, time, shielding, and distance in this complex three-dimensional space. At the NMIOTC in September 2009, we employed a dual detector portal followed by a chase. In this event, the challenge was to maintain communications after a lapse. When the chase went past the line-of sight reach of the Tactical Operational Center's (TOC) antenna, with interference from a fortress island in Suda Bay, Wave Relay extended the network for continued observation. Sodium iodide radiation detectors were mounted on two Hellenic Navy SEAL fast boats. After making the detection one of the portal boats maintained line-of sight while the other pursued the target vessel. Network access via Wave Relay antennas was maintained until the conclusion of the chase scenario. Progress has been made in the detection of radioactive materials in the maritime environment. The progression of the TNT MIO experiments has demonstrated the potential of the hardware to solve the problems encountered in this physically challenging environment. There continue to be interesting opportunities for research and development. These experiments provide a variety of platforms and motivated participants to perform real-world testing as solutions are made available.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation (Presentation)

Why is the insider a concern? There are many documented cases of nuclear material available for sale - there are more insider diversions than outsider attacks and more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Insider attributes are: have access, has authority, possesses knowledge, works with absence of timeline, can test system, and may act alone or support a team. Material control and accountability (MC&A) is an essential part of an integrated safeguards system. Objectives of MC&A are: (1) Ongoing confirmation of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in assigned locations; (2) Prompt investigation of anomalies that may indicate a loss of SNM; (3) Timely and localized detection of loss, diversion, or theft of a goal quantity; (4) Rapid assessment and response to detection alarms; and (5) Timely generation of information to aid in the recovery of SNM in the event of an actual loss, diversion, or theft from the purview of the MC&A system. Control and accountability of material, equipment, and data are essential to minimizing insider threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Improving the nuclear data base for non-proliferation and homeland security

Many of the technical advances in non-proliferation and homeland security require calculations of transport of neutrons and gamma-rays through materials. The nuclear data base on which these calculations are made must be of high quality in order for the calculated responses to be credible. At the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, three spallation neutron sources are being used to provide high-quality cross section and structure data with reactions induced by neutrons. Neutron transmission, neutron-induced fission and capture cross sections, neutron emission in fission, and gamma-ray production by neutrons are principal areas of research. Furthermore, these sources are also being used to validate calculations of the characterization and response of new detectors and detection techniques. Current research activities are summarized here.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

An integrated approach for determining plutonium mass in spent fuel assemblies with nondestructive assay

There are a variety of reasons for quantifying plutonium (Pu) in spent fuel. Below, five motivations are listed: (1) To verify the Pu content of spent fuel without depending on unverified information from the facility, as requested by the IAEA ('independent verification'). New spent fuel measurement techniques have the potential to allow the IAEA to recover continuity of knowledge and to better detect diversion. (2) To assure regulators that all of the nuclear material of interest leaving a nuclear facility actually arrives at another nuclear facility ('shipper/receiver'). Given the large stockpile of nuclear fuel at reactor sites around the world, it is clear that in the coming decades, spent fuel will need to be moved to either reprocessing facilities or storage sites. Safeguarding this transportation is of significant interest. (3) To quantify the Pu in spent fuel that is not considered 'self-protecting.' Fuel is considered self-protecting by some regulatory bodies when the dose that the fuel emits is above a given level. If the fuel is not self-protecting, then the Pu content of the fuel needs to be determined and the Pu mass recorded in the facility's accounting system. This subject area is of particular interest to facilities that have research-reactor spent fuel or old light-water reactor (LWR) fuel. It is also of interest to regulators considering changing the level at which fuel is considered self-protecting. (4) To determine the input accountability value at an electrochemical processing facility. It is not expected that an electrochemical reprocessing facility will have an input accountability tank, as is typical in an aqueous reprocessing facility. As such, one possible means of determining the input accountability value is to measure the Pu content in the spent fuel that arrives at the facility. (5) To fully understand the composition of the fuel in order to efficiently and safely pack spent fuel into a long-term repository. The NDA of spent fuel can be part of a system that cost-effectively meets the burnup credit needs of a repository. Behind each of these reasons is a regulatory structure with MC&A requirements. In the case of the IAEA, the accountable quantity is elemental plutonium. The material in spent fuel (fissile isotopes, fission products, etc.) emits signatures that provide information about the content and history of the fuel. A variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques are available to quantify these signatures. The effort presented in this paper is investigation of the capabilities of 12 NDA techniques. For these 12, none is conceptually capable of independently determining the Pu content in a spent fuel assembly while at the same time being able to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of rods. For this reason the authors are investigating the capability of 12 NDA techniques with the end goal of integrating a few techniques together into a system that is capable of measuring Pu mass in an assembly. The work described here is the beginning of what is anticipated to be a five year effort: (1) two years of modeling to select the best technologies, (2) one year fabricating instruments and (3) two years measuring spent fuel. This paper describes the first two years of this work. In order to cost effectively and robustly model the performance of the 12 NDA techniques, an 'assembly library' was created. The library contains the following: (a) A diverse range of PWR spent fuel assemblies (burnup, enrichment, cooling time) similar to that which exists in spent pools today and in the future. (b) Diversion scenarios that capture a range of possible rod removal options. (c) The spatial and isotopic detail needed to accurately quantify the capability of all the NDA techniques so as to enable integration. It is our intention to make this library available to other researchers in the field for inter-comparison purposes. The performance of each instrument will be quantified for the full assembly library for measurements in three different media: air, water and borated water. The 12 NDA techniques being researched are the following: Delayed Gamma, Delayed Neutrons, Differential Die-Away, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer, Neutron Multiplicity, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence, Passive Prompt Gamma, Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity, Self-integration Neutron Resonance Densitometry, Total Neutron (Gross Neutron), X-Ray Fluorescence, {sup 252}Cf Interrogation with Prompt Neutron Detection.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Gamma/neutron time-correlation for special nuclear material detection – Active stimulation of highly enriched uranium

A series of simulations and experiments were undertaken to explore and evaluate the potential for a novel new technique for fissile material detection and characterization, the timecorrelated pulse-height (TCPH) method, to be used concurrent with active stimulation of potential nuclear materials. In previous work TCPH has been established as a highly sensitive method for the detection and characterization of configurations of fissile material containing Plutonium in passive measurements. By actively stimulating fission with the introduction of an external radiation source, we have shown that TCPH is also an effective method of detecting and characterizing configurations of fissile material containing Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). The TCPH method is shown to be robust in the presence of the proper choice of external radiation source. An evaluation of potential interrogation sources is presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On-line separator for {gamma}-spectroscopic studies

We report about R and D of the new separator for spectroscopic studies which we plan to install at the beam of the modernized U400R FLNR cyclotron and which will allow to realize new possibilities of the JINR-IN2P3 collaboration project GABRIELA.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Experimental search for gamma-ray bursts from evaporating primordial black holes

The energy spectra and temporal characteristics of high-energy gamma-ray bursts from evaporating primordial black holes have been calculated using various evaporation models. The currently existing theoretical uncertainties in the shape of the evaporated photon spectrum are discussed. The data from the Andyrchy and Carpet-2 arrays of the Baksan Neutrino Observatory (Institute for Nuclear Research, Russian Academy of Sciences) obtained in the mode of detection of a single cosmic-ray component are used to search for cosmic gamma-ray bursts with a primary photon energy of about 8 GeV. New upper limits have been obtained for the number density of evaporating black holes in a local region of space with a characteristic size of {approx}10{sup -3} pc for various evaporation models.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Metrics for Developing an Endorsed Set of Radiographic Threat Surrogates for JINII/CAARS

CAARS (Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System) is developing x-ray dual energy and x-ray backscatter methods to automatically detect materials that are greater than Z=72 (hafnium). This works well for simple geometry materials, where most of the radiographic path is through one material. However, this is usually not the case. Instead, the radiographic path includes many materials of different lengths. Single energy can be used to compute {mu}y{sub l} which is related to areal density (mass per unit area) while dual energy yields more information. This report describes a set of metrics suitable and sufficient for characterizing the appearance of assemblies as detected by x-ray radiographic imaging systems, such as those being tested by Joint Integrated Non-Intrusive Inspection (JINII) or developed under CAARS. These metrics will be simulated both for threat assemblies and surrogate threat assemblies (such as are found in Roney et al. 2007) using geometrical and compositional information of the assemblies. The imaging systems are intended to distinguish assemblies containing high-Z material from those containing low-Z material, regardless of thickness, density, or compounds and mixtures. The systems in question operate on the principle of comparing images obtained by using two different x-ray end-point energies--so-called 'dual energy' imaging systems. At the direction of the DHS JINII sponsor, this report does not cover metrics that implement scattering, in the form of either forward-scattered radiation or high-Z detection systems operating on the principle of backscatter detection. Such methods and effects will be covered in a later report. The metrics described here are to be used to compare assemblies and not x-ray radiography systems. We intend to use these metrics to determine whether two assemblies do or do not look the same. We are tasked to develop a set of assemblies whose appearance using this class of detection systems is indistinguishable from the real threats. To check such an indistinguishability, we must define metrics that are broad enough to cover systems of different source spectra and detector spectral response; in other words, the best metrics should capture physical properties of the assemblies and not the source and detectors employed. In fact, one requirement for the metrics is that, as the detection circumstances change, the similarity or difference of the metrics of two assemblies should be maintained. This report describes the set of two simple 'dual energy' metrics that we have selected. A second report (Wurtz, et al. 2009) goes on to demonstrate several characteristics of the metrics, including how sensitive they are (or are not) to changes in the detection systems, shielding, etc.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Geologic Assessment of the Damage Zone from the Second Test at Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N)

The National Center for Nuclear Security, established by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), is conducting a series of explosive tests at the Nevada National Security Site that are designed to increase the understanding of certain basic physical phenomena associated with underground explosions. These tests will aid in developing technologies that might be used to detect underground nuclear explosions in support of verification activities for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The initial project is a series of explosive tests, known collectively as the Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N), being conducted in granitic rocks. The SPE-N test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves. The results will help advance the seismic monitoring capability of the United States by improving the predictive capability of physics-based modeling of explosive phenomena. The first SPE N (SPE-N-1) test was conducted in May 2011, using 100 kg of explosives at the depth of 54.9 m in the U 15n source hole. SPE-N-2 was conducted in October 2011, using 1,000 kg of explosives at the depth of 45.7 m in the same source hole. The SPE-N-3 test was conducted in the same source hole in July 2012, using the same amount and type of explosive as for SPE-N-2, and at the same depth as SPE-N-2, within the damage zone created by the SPE-N-2 explosion to investigate damage effects on seismic wave propagation. Following the SPE-N-2 shot and prior to the SPE-N-3 shot, the core hole U-15n#10 was drilled at an angle from the surface to intercept the SPE-N-2 shot point location to obtain information necessary to characterize the damage zone. The objective was to determine the position of the damage zone near the shot point, at least on the northeast, where the core hole penetrated it, and obtain information on the properties of the damaged medium. Geologic characterization of the post-SPE-N-2 core hole included geophysical logging, a directional survey, and geologic description of the core to document visual evidence of damage. Selected core samples were provided to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for measurement of physical and mechanical properties. A video was also run in the source hole after it was cleaned out. A significant natural fault zone was encountered in the angle core hole between 5.7 and 7.5 m from the shot point. However, several of the fractures observed in the core hole are interpreted as having been caused by the explosion. The fractures are characterized by a “fresh,” mechanically broken look, with uncoated and very irregular surfaces. They tend to terminate against natural fractures and have orientations that differ from the previously defined natural fracture sets; they are common starting at about 5.4 m from the shot point. Within about 3.3 m of the shot point to the end of the recovered core at 1.6 m from the shot point, some of the core samples are softer and lighter in color, but do not appear to be weathered. It is thought this could be indicative of the presence of distributed microfracturing.

SPE, Source Physics Experiment, geology↗

Neural Network Based State of Health Diagnostics for an Automated Radioxenon Sampler/Analyzer

Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are used to determine the state-of-health (SOH) of the Automated Radioxenon Analyzer/Sampler (ARSA). ARSA is a gas collection and analysis system used for non-proliferation monitoring in detecting radioxenon released during nuclear tests. SOH diagnostics are important for automated, unmanned sensing systems so that remote detection and identification of problems can be made without onsite staff. Both recurrent and feed-forward ANNs are presented. The recurrent ANN is trained to predict sensor values based on current valve states, which control air flow, so that with only valve states the normal SOH sensor values can be predicted. Deviation between modeled value and actual is an indication of a potential problem. The feed-forward ANN acts as a nonlinear version of principal components analysis (PCA) and is trained to replicate the normal SOH sensor values. Because of ARSA’s complexity, this nonlinear PCA is better able to capture the relationships among the sensors than standard linear PCA and is applicable to both sensor validation and recognizing off-normal operating conditions. Both models provide valuable information to detect impending malfunctions before they occur to avoid unscheduled shutdown. Finally, the ability of ANN methods to predict the system state is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Proposal to Develop Neutrino Diagnostics for Nuclear Weapons Tests

A nuclear weapon test would be a prolific source of neutrinos in a relatively short time window (<1 s). These neutrinos could be easily detected at distances of 10s of meters or more by detector technology that has been developed for studying neutrino interactions from nuclear reactors. Such a concept was already proposed at LANL in the 50’s but was finally reject for a more controlled experiment at a nuclear reactor – this latter method went on to win the 1995 Nobel prize in physics for the detection of the neutrino. However, times have changed and revisiting this concept could have new unappreciated applications.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Neutron Detection Gamma Ray Sensitivity Criteria

The shortage of 3He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security and safeguards applications. Any new detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: (1) it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and (2) it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level, while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. It is the purpose of this paper to define measureable gamma ray sensitivity criteria for neutron detectors. Quantitative requirements are specified for: intrinsic gamma ray detection efficiency and gamma ray absolute rejection. The ratio GARRn is defined, and it is proposed that the requirement for neutron detection be 0.9 < GARRn < 1.1 at a 10 mR/h exposure rate. An example of results from a 3He based neutron detector are provided showing that this technology can meet the stated requirements. Results from tests of some alternative technologies are also reported.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Geologic Assessment of the Damage Zone from the Second Test at Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N)

The National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS), established by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, is conducting a series of explosive tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS; formerly the Nevada Test Site) that are designed to increase the understanding of certain basic physical phenomena associated with underground explosions. These tests will aid in developing technologies that might be used to detect underground nuclear explosions in support of verification activities for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The initial NCNS project is a series of explosive tests, known collectively as the Source Physics Experiment at the NNSS (SPE-N), being conducted in granitic rocks at the Climax stock in northern Yucca Flat. The SPE-N test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves. The data will be used to improve the predictive capability of calculational models for detecting and characterizing underground explosions. The first SPE-N test (SPE-N-1) was a “calibration” shot conducted in May 2011, using 100 kilograms (kg) of explosives at the depth of 54.9 meters (m) (180 feet [ft]) in the U-15n source hole. SPE-N-2 was conducted in October 2011, using 1,000 kg of explosives at the depth of 45.7 m (150 ft) in the same source hole. Following the SPE-N-2 test, the core hole U-15n#10 was drilled at an angle from the surface to intercept the SPE-N-2 shot point location to obtain information necessary to characterize the damage zone. The desire was to determine the position of the damage zone near the shot point, at least on the northeast side, where the core hole penetrated it. The three-dimensional shape and symmetry of the damage zone are unknown at this time. Rather than spherical in shape, the dimensions of the damage zone could be influenced by the natural fracture sets in the vicinity. Geologic characterization of the borehole included geophysical logging, a directional survey, and geologic description of the core to document visual evidence of damage. Selected core samples were provided to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for laboratory tests (to be reported by SNL). A significant natural fault zone was encountered in the U-15n#10 angle core hole between the drilled depths of 149 and 155 ft (straight-line distance or range station [RS] from the shot point of 7.5 to 5.7 m). However, several of the fractures observed in the U-15n#10 hole are interpreted as having been caused by the explosion. These fractures are characterized by a “fresh,” mechanically broken look, with uncoated and very irregular surfaces. They tend to terminate against natural fractures and have orientations that differ from the previously defined natural fracture sets. The most distant fracture from the shot point that could be interpreted as having been caused by the explosion was seen at approximately RS 10.0 m. No other possibly explosion-induced fractures are apparent above the fault, but are common starting at RS 5.4 m, which is below the fault. It is unknown how the fault zone might have affected the propagation of seismic waves or how the materials in the fault zone (altered granite, breccia, gouge) were affected by the explosion. From RS 3.3 m to the end of the recovered core at RS 1.6 m, some of the core samples are softer and lighter in color, but do not appear to be weathered. It is thought this could be indicative of the presence of distributed microfracturing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗