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256 records · Page 15
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2006

SpaceWire Protocol ID: What Does It Mean To You?

Spacewire is becoming a popular solution for satellite high-speed data buses because it is a simple standard that provides great flexibility for a wide range of system requirements. It is simple in packet format and protocol, allowing users to easily tailor their implementation for their specific application. Some of the attractive aspects of Spacewire that make it easy to implement also make it hard for future reuse. Protocol reuse is difficult because Spacewire does not have a defined mechanism to communicate with the higher layers of the protocol stack. This has forced users of Spacewire to define unique packet formats and define how these packets are to be processed. Each mission writes their own Interface Control Document (ICD) and tailors Spacewire for their specific requirements making reuse difficult. Part of the reason for this habit may be because engineers typically optimize designs for their own requirements in the absence of a standard. This is an inefficient use of project resources and costs more to develop missions. A new packet format for Spacewire has been defined as a solution for this problem. This new packet format is a compliment to the Spacewire standard that will support protocol development upon Spacewire. The new packet definition does not replace the current packet structure, i.e., does not make the standard obsolete, but merely extends the standard for those who want to develop protocols over Spacewire. The Spacewire packet is defined with the first part being the Destination Address, which may be one or more bytes. This is followed by the packet cargo, which is user defined. The cargo is truncated with an End-Of-Packet (EOP) marker. This packet structure offers low packet overhead and allows the user to define how the contents are to be formatted. It also provides for many different addressing schemes, which provide flexibility in the system. This packet flexibility is typically an attractive part of the Spacewire. The new extended packet format adds one new field to the packet that greatly enhances the capability of Spacewire. This new field called the Protocol Identifier (ID) is used to identify the packet contents and the associated processing for the packet. This feature along with the restriction in the packet format that uses the Protocol ID, allows a deterministic method of decoding packets that was not before possible. The first part of the packet is still the Destination Address, which still conforms to the original standard but with one restriction. The restriction is that the first byte seen at the destination by the user needs to be a logical address, independent of the addressing scheme used. The second field is defined as the Protocol ID, which is usually one byte in length. The packet cargo (user defined) follows the Protocol ID. After the packet cargo is the EOP, which defines the end of packet. The value of the Protocol ID is assigned by the Spacewire working group and the protocol description published for others to use. The development of Protocols for Spacewire is currently the area of greatest activity by the Spacewire working group. The first protocol definition by the working group has been completed and is now in the process of formal standardization. There are many other protocols in development for missions that have not yet received formal Protocol ID assignment, but even if the protocols are not formally assigned a value, this effort will provide synergism for future developments.

Rakow, Glenn↗
NASA NTRS2004

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗
DOE OSTI2023

Transforming microseismic clouds into near real-time visualization of the growing hydraulic fracture

SUMMARY Microseismic observations during unconventional reservoir stimulation are typically seen as a proxy for clusters of hydraulic fractures and the extent of the stimulated reservoir. Such straightforward interpretation is often misleading and fails to provide a physically reasonable image of the fracturing process. This paper demonstrates the application of a physics-based machine learning algorithm which enables a rapid and accurate fracture mapping from the microseismic data. Our training and validation data set relies on a history-matched geomechanical modelling workflow implemented in GEOS software for the Hydraulic Fracturing Test Site 1 (HFTS-1) project. For this study we augmented the simulated fracture growth through geostatistical modelling of induced seismicity, so that the synthetic microseismic catalogue matches the main statistical properties of the field observations. We formulated the problem of mapping the actual fracture in the clutter of events to parallel common video segmentation workflows: several past video frames (microseismic density snapshots) are passed through a deep convolutional network to classify whether a given voxel is associated with a fracture or intact rock. We found that for accurate fracture mapping, the network’s input and architecture must be augmented to incorporate the fluid injection parameters (pressure, rate, concentration of proppant, and location of the perforation within the cluster). The error rate for the network reached as little as 10 per cent of the fracture area, while a conventional microseismic interpretation approach yielded ∼300 per cent. Our approach also yields must faster predictions than conventional methods (minutes instead of weeks), and could enable engineers to make rapid decisions regarding engineering parameters (pumping rate, viscosity) in real time during stimulation.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2000

Thermocapillary Flow and Aggregation of Bubbles on a Solid Wall

During the electrolytic evolution of oxygen bubbles forming on a vertically oriented transparent tin oxide electrode, bubbles were found to be mutually attractive. The mechanism of the aggregation had never been explained satisfactorily until Guelcher et al. attributed it to thermocapillary flow. The gradient of surface tension of the liquid at the bubble's surface, which was established because of reaction heat and ohmic heat loss at the electrode wall, drives flow of the liquid adjacent to each bubble; the bubble "pumps" fluid along its surface away from the wall. Fluid flows toward the bubble to conserve mass and entrains nearby bubbles in the flow pattern. The same logic would apply when two bubbles of equal size are adjacent to each other on a warm wall. Each bubble drives thermocapillary flow and hence entrains the other in its flow pattern, which drives the aggregation. Our objective here is to perform experiments where the temperature gradient at the wall is well known and controlled. The theory can be quantitatively tested by studying aggregation of bubble pairs of equal size, and by varying system parameters such as temperature gradient, bubble size and fluid viscosity. The results are then compared with the theory in a quantitatively rigorous manner. We demonstrate that the theory without adjustable parameters is capable of quantitatively modeling the rate of aggregation of two bubbles. The equations governing the thermocapillary flow around a single stationary bubble on a heated or cooled wall in a semi-infinite domain were solved. Both Reynolds number and Marangoni number were much less than unity. The critical result is that liquid in the vicinity of a warm wall flows toward a stationary collector bubble. Consequently the thermocapillary flow around the stationary bubble entrains another bubble toward itself. The bubbles undergo hindered translation parallel to the wall with velocity U while the fluid flow field is described with u. Two velocities were equated by using a wall hindrance parameter q: U = qu [1] which shows the velocity of bubble is proportional to the entraining velocity. The hindrance parameter q can experimentally be measured independently. q can also be calculated by solving the equations of motion for a bubble translating parallel to a solid wall. The experimental cell is cylindrical with an ID of 10 cm and consists of a 1 cm deep main cell filled with silicone oil and flanked by two thermal reservoirs. The upper thermal reservoir was heated and the lower thermal reservoir was cooled so that the bubbles aggregate. Two types of silicone oil (eta = 0.02 and 0.50 Pa s) were used. Two equal sized air bubbles were injected into the cell with a syringe. The center-to-center distance of bubbles was observed through a microscope. Bubble radius ranged from 0.40 mm to 0.65 mm and the temperature gradients along with the cell ranged from 1400 to 5000 K/m. The bubbles aggregated when heat flows from the wall to the fluid. The velocities of bubbles were in the range of 1 - 10 microns/s. The separation r decreased more quickly when the temperature gradient was higher, bubble size was larger, and the oil viscosity was lower. r decreased more rapidly as the bubbles approached each other. Dimensionless time was arbitrarily set to be zero when the dimensionless center-to-center distance between the bubbles was 4. All the bubble trajectories fall onto one line, especially in the range of dimensionless distance from 4 to 3. This means the relative movement of the bubble pair is proportional to the temperature gradient and bubble size and it is inversely proportional to the viscosity of the oil. This result strongly suggests that the thermocapillary flow-based aggregation mechanism is correct. A value of q can be estimated by fitting the scaled data to Eq. [1]. A best fit value of q was obtained as q = 0.26 with a standard deviation of 0.03. Independent experimental results for q for a 0.5 mm radius bubble, give values of q in the range 0.11 to 0.23. The value of q obtained from solving the equations of motion reveals q has values in the range 0.23 - 0.30. Since the full scale of possible values of q is zero to one, the maximum deviation of independently determined values of q from the best fit value was 15% of this full scale. Thus reasonable quantitative agreement between theory and experiment has been obtained.

Kasumi, Hiroki↗