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At least 271 records · Page 15

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

Presented are a number of important experiences gained and lessons learned from the collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re-Configurable Testbed) project. Both space agencies worked on the CoNNeCT Project to design, assemble, test, integrate, and launch a communications testbed facility mounted onto the International Space Station (ISS) truss. At the 2012 RAMS, two papers about CoNNeCT were presented: one on Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight system. In addition to the logistics challenges present when two organizations are on the opposite side of the world, there is also a language barrier. The language barrier encompasses not only the different alphabet, it encompasses the social interactions; these were addressed by techniques presented in the paper. The differences in interpretation and application of Spaceflight Requirements will be discussed in this paper. Although many, but definitely not all, of JAXA's Spaceflight Requirements were inspired by NASA, there were significant and critically important differences in how they were interpreted and applied. This paper intends to summarize which practices worked and which did not for an international collaborative effort so that future missions may benefit from our experiences. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to facilitate international understanding, communication, and coordination were successful and warrant discussion as lessons learned.

Fernandez, Rene↗

Lessons Learned from the Kepler Mission and Space Telescope Management

This paper presents lessons learned over the course of several space telescope mission and instrument developments spanning two decades. These projects involved astronomical telescopes developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and were designed to further our understanding of the Universe. It is hoped that the lessons drawn from these experiences may be of use to future mission developers.

GALEX↗

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program Lessons Learned

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the COTS Program. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

COTS↗

Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from Solar Array Structures and Mechanisms Deployment

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Engineering Directorate at LaRC. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Solar Array Structures↗

Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned

The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.

Thermal Design↗

Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope Using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned

The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.

WFIRST↗

Thermal Design, Tvac Testing, and Lessons Learned for Critical GSE of ATLAS and the ICESat-2 Mission

This presentation describes the thermal design of the three main of optical components which comprise the Bench Checkout Equipment (BCE) for the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument, which is flying on the ICESat-2 mission. Thermal vacuum testing of these components is also described in this presentation, as well as a few lessons learned. These BCE components serve as critical GSE for the mission; their purpose is to verify ATLAS is performing well. It has been said that, in one light, the BCE is the most important part of ATLAS, since, without it, ATLAS cannot be aligned properly or its performance verified before flight. Therefore, careful attention was paid to the BCEs thermal design, development, and component-level Tvac testing prior to its use in instrument-level and spacecraft-level Tvac tests with ATLAS. This presentation describes that thermal design, development, and testing, as well as a few lessons learned.

Thermal ATLAS BCE↗

Cleared for Launch - Lessons Learned from the OSIRIS-REx System Requirements Verification Program

Requirements verification of a large flight system is a challenge. It is especially challenging for engineers taking on their first role in space systems engineering. This paper describes our approach to verification of the Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) system requirements. It also captures lessons learned along the way from developing systems engineers embroiled in this process. We begin with an overview of the mission and science objectives as well as the project requirements verification program strategy. A description of the requirements flow down is presented including our implementation for managing the thousands of program and element level requirements and associated verification data. We discuss both successes and methods to improve the managing of this data across multiple organizational interfaces. Our approach to verifying system requirements at multiple levels of assembly is presented using examples from our work at instrument, spacecraft, and ground segment levels. We include a discussion of system end-to-end testing limitations and their impacts to the verification program. Finally, we describe lessons learned that are applicable to all emerging space systems engineers using our unique perspectives across multiple organizations of a large NASA program.

Requirements Verification↗

Orbiter Water Dump Nozzles Redesign Lessons Learned

Hank Rotter, NASA Technical Fellow for Environmental Control and Life Support System, will provide the causes and lessons learned for the two Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump icicles that formed on the side of the Orbiter. He will present the root causes and the criticality of these icicles, along with the redesign of the water dump nozzles and lessons learned during the redesign phase.

Rotter, Hank↗

CloudSat Anomaly and Return to the A-Train: Lessons Learned for Satellite Constellations

In April 2011, CloudSat suffered a severe battery anomaly, leaving the space-craft in emergency mode without the ability to command or maneuver the spacecraft. Before the team was able to recover spacecraft operability, CloudSat passed close to the Aqua satellite in the A-Train and then exited the A-Train. A new mode of operations, termed Daylight Only Operations (DO-Op) mode was developed to enable CloudSat to resume science operations in an orbit under the A-Train by November 2011, and in July 2012 CloudSat re-entered the A-Train. This paper describes challenges and lessons-learned during the anomaly, the exit from the A-Train and the return to the A-Train. These lessons-learned may ap-ply to other current and future satellite constellations in Earth orbit.

formation-flying↗

Lessons Learned from Optical Payload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS) Mission Operations

This paper provides an overview of Optical Payload for Lasercomm Science (OPALS) activities and lessons learned during mission operations. Activities described cover the periods of commissioning, prime, and extended mission operations, during which primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved for demonstrating space-to-ground optical communications. Lessons learned cover Mission Operations System topics in areas of: architecture verification and validation, staffing, mission support area, workstations, workstation tools, interfaces with support services, supporting ground stations, team training, procedures, flight software upgrades, post-processing tools, and public outreach.

Sindiy, Oleg V.↗

NASA Lessons Learned on Reusable and Expendable Launch Vehicle Operations and Their Application Towards DARPA's Experimental Spaceplane (XS-1) Program

Outline: Selected Historic Shuttle Operations Data; Shuttle Lessons Learned Recommendations for Lower Cost, Operationally Efficient Launch Vehicle Systems; Selected Expendable launch vehicle experiences; Past NASA Launch Vehicle Development Programs, Studies (1985 to present); Discussion: Suggested applications of NASA Lessons Learned to already-baselined contractor XS-1 Phase I concepts.

Reusable launch vehicle↗

Textile Material Lessons Learned During the Design and Qualification of the NASA Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System

The NASA Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) development and qualification testing was completed in September 2018. Over the course of the airdrop and ground testing campaign, the team benefited from the ability to design, test, and adjust the design based on observations and inspection results. While the design team used the best knowledge available and attempted to utilize best practices, a number of lessons were learned that should be documented for consideration by future designers. This paper describes these lessons learned including the use of textile reefing loops, the importance of performing joint tests, the impact of using bight sleeves on parachute deployment, and a surprising number of design changes required in the CPAS system after the decision was made to change the suspension line braid to save system mass.

Anderson, Brian P.↗

Cassini Spacecraft Attitude Control System: Flight Performance and Lessons Learned, 1997-2017

A sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft, Cassini/Huygens was launched on October 15, 1997. Since achieving orbit at Saturn in 2004, Cassini has collected science data throughout its four-year prime mission (2004–08), and has since been approved for first and second extended missions through September 2017. The Cassini Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) is perhaps the spacecraft subsystem that must satisfy the most mission and science pointing requirements. Since launch, the performance of the Cassini AACS design has been superb. All key mission and science requirements are met with significant margins. An overview of the flight performance of the Cassini attitude control system as well as AACS mission operation-centric lessons learned, from launch to 2017, are described by topics. Many of these lessons learned should be applicable to the safe operations of other interplanetary missions. Processes taken by the AACS operation team to guard against “human” errors are also outlined in this paper.

Lee, Allan Y.↗

Gary Johnson: Lessons Learned from 50+ Years in Human Spaceflight and Safety

Future spacecraft designers and managers need to be aware of problems, corrective actions, and the resulting lessons learned to avoid experiencing the same problems in new programs. Fewer and fewer people with firsthand experience of the design, test, and operations of past programs, such as Apollo, are available today to pass on their experience. This white paper, sponsored by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate Flight Safety Office (FSO), will discuss the major lessons I learned during my 50+ years (and counting) working in human spaceflight.

Johnson, Gary W.↗

Space Shuttle Cargo Integration Coupled Loads Analysis Lessons Learned

When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis(CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks,planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program used the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized CLA process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Space Shuttle Program and the payload developers to verify that the payloads were compatible with the flight loads environment and would not interact negatively with the vehicle. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process, which reduced cycle time and improved manifest flexibility. There were several issues which were never fully addressed, but work-arounds were developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what to do to avoid the same issues.

ERICA E. BRUNO↗

Space Shuttle Cargo Integration Coupled Loads Analysis Lessons Learned

When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis (CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks, planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program used the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized CLA process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Space Shuttle Program and the payload developers to verify that the payloads were compatible with the flight loads environment and would not interact negatively with the vehicle. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process, which reduced cycle time and improved manifest flexibility. There were several issues which were never fully addressed, but workarounds were developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what to do to avoid the same issues in the future.

Erica E. Bruno↗