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On May 2, 2019, a subcontractor to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) inadvertently breached a sealed Cs-137 source while attempting to remove the source for disposition as part of a United States (US) government-sponsored program. The source breach resulted in contamination of personnel, the building, and a release of material to the local environment.
The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Spent Fuel & Waste Disposition (SFWD) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). A high priority for SFWST disposal R&D is disposal system modeling (Sassani et al. 2021). The SFWST Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) work package is charged with developing a disposal system modeling and analysis capability for evaluating generic disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. This report describes fiscal year (FY) 2022 advances of the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) performance assessment (PA) development groups of the SFWST Campaign. The common mission of these groups is to develop a geologic disposal system modeling capability for nuclear waste that can be used to assess probabilistically the performance of generic disposal options and generic sites. The modeling capability under development is called GDSA Framework (pa.sandia.gov). GDSA Framework is a coordinated set of codes and databases designed for probabilistically simulating the release and transport of disposed radionuclides from a repository to the biosphere for post-closure performance assessment. Primary components of GDSA Framework include PFLOTRAN to simulate the major features, events, and processes (FEPs) over time, Dakota to propagate uncertainty and analyze sensitivities, meshing codes to define the domain, and various other software for rendering properties, processing data, and visualizing results.
This report describes the FY21 status of international collaboration regarding geologic disposal research in the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) Campaign. Since 2012, in an effort coordinated by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, SFWD has advanced active collaboration with several international geologic disposal programs across the world. Such collaboration has allowed the SFWD Campaign to benefit from a deep knowledge base in regards to alternative repository environments developed over decades and has provided a framework for active peer-to-peer research participation in international groups which conduct, analyze, and model performance-relevant processes. Via international collaboration, the SFWD Campaign also benefits from substantial international investments in research facilities (such as underground research laboratory testing and modeling) and achieves cost savings via joint funding of expensive field experiments. To date, SFWD’s International Disposal R&D Program has established formal collaboration agreements with multiple international initiatives and various international partners, and national lab scientists associated with SFWD have conducted a large number of specific collaborative R&D activities that align well with its R&D priorities.
The Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation & Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) is a software tool that integrates a used nuclear fuel (UNF) or spent nuclear fuel (SNF) relational database and key analysis capabilities to simplify and automate numerous UNF management and fuel cycle–related activities. UNF-ST&DARDS is being developed for the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition program. UNF-ST&DARDS provides an integrated framework that uses advanced modeling and simulation to predict the behavior of SNF over the timescales associated with permanent disposal in a geologic repository. After leaving the spent fuel pool, SNF is transferred to dry storage in a dual-purpose canister (DPC). DPCs are considered “dual purpose” because they are designed for both storage and transportation, removing the need to transfer the fuel to a separate transportation cask. However, much research has been conducted investigating the feasibility of directly disposing of DPCs in geologic repositories. Direct disposal of DPCs could reduce worker exposure during repackaging, reducing the amount of low-level waste from the discarded DPCs and potentially saving billions of dollars. Therefore, direct disposal of as-loaded DPCs is desirable if it can be done safely.
The goal of this project was to study the applicability of specific innovative instrumentation techniques for assessing parameters needed for safe small modular reactor operation and safeguarding of nuclear material. Small modular reactor core designs are currently being developed to provide energy more effectively and efficiently than in the past because they can be built as modules at fabrication sites and then transported to a power-producing facility. However, these modules and/or the final core will often be sealed and not accessible again until disposal. Instead of instruments that access the core directly, during and after operation, to monitor flux/dose and structural integrity, as current power plants use, new sensors need to be designed that can be built into the reactor initially to determine operating history, structural integrity through operation of the system, and nuclear material accountancy after shutdown and before disposition of the core. Embedded sensors already exist that can provide neutron flux, gamma dose, and temperatures, but techniques to expand upon these for assessing structural health and material inventory in the system over time need to be developed. Structural health assessments include the detection and imaging of cracks in the components that could eventually cause radioactive fission products to be released.
The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.
Chlorination of the zirconium in spent fuel cladding has been identified as a significant means of Zr recovery and purification, enabling a 25% (wt.) or greater reduction in waste requiring geologic disposition. Several chlorinating agents have been identified over the last few years, including gases and liquids. In particular, the interactions of sulfur-chloride solvents with zirconium may allow the separation of zirconium from uranium with the selective formation of ZrCl 4 . This report reviews what is known about reactions between chlorinating agents, uranium metal and oxide, Zircaloy and its alloying elements, and fission plus activation products. Plans for testing the feasibility of applying advanced chlorination methods developed for zirconium recycling to the front end of the recycling of spent nuclear fuel are also included.
Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. These sealed canisters are intended for extened (>50 year) dry storage). The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 ATR elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water from the surface. As testing to the effectiveness of the drying procedure is still underway, this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In previous modeling efforts, the G-value for the production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers was assumed to be in argon environments as measured by Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution. Previous experimental testing showed differences in the hydrogen generated based on the gaseous environment. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values are 28% and 58% higher than values for argon. In addition, a change to the modeling of the oxyhydroxide radiolysis has been made from previous reports. This change assumes the dependency of the dose rate on the overall reaction rate is applied to the total weight of the sample, rather than to just the weight of the oxyhydroxide layer. This decreases the dependency of the radiolytic reaction on the thickness of the oxyhydroxide layer. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, assuming the chemi-/physio- sorbed water have been fully removed, the internal canister pressure increases to 1.61 atm over a 50 year period, with a hydrogen mole percentage of 21%. As in previous modeling, any oxygen present is in negligible amounts (<1 ppt). If a small amount residual air is present, nitric acid can form up to 1300 ppm. For a scenario with high fuel decay heat, the model shows internal pressure increasing to 2.1 atm, with 39.3 mole percentage of hydrogen. In a scenario where significant chemi-/physio- sorbed water is present within the corrosion layer, the nominal scenario shows a pressure increase to 2.54 atm, with 21.1 mole percent hydrogen. The high decay heat case shows a pressure increase to 3.18 atm with 39.9 mole percent hydrogen.
A pathway for road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ANSF) fuel dictates storage within helium backfilled sealed DOE standard canisters. The typical packaging configuration for the 15-foot DOE canisters places 10 advance test reactor (ATR) elements within a Type 1a basket, and three baskets are loaded within each DOE canister. During in-reactor operations and cooling pond storage conditions, oxyhydroxide layers form on the surface of the aluminum clad fuel. These layers produce hydrogen gas over time due to the fuel’s radiation field. As part of the packing procedure, the ATR fuel should be dried to remove any residual physio-/chemi- sorbed water bound to the surface. The results of this modeling will include results at fully saturated and fully dried conditions. In addition, fuels that are currently stored at the Savannah River Site were also studied for their potential for hydrogen and pressure build up. These two additional fuels modeled were the Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel, which is packaged in the same configuration as the ATR, but with a 10-foot-tall DOE standard canister. This was selected due to its relatively high decay heat compared to other DOE-managed ASNF. The second additional fuel studied with the modeling effort was the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel. This fuel is modeled as two separate DOE canisters with the inner and outer annulus split for storage. The HFIR was selected for study due to its high aluminum cladding surface area. In the associated experimental work, Task 2 - Oxyhydroxide Layer Radiolytic Gas Generation Resolution, additional tests were completed in a helium environment, and updated G-values for the radiolytic production of hydrogen from the oxyhydroxide layers were provided. These values were 2.92 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 50% relative humidity and 4.12 ×10 -4 µmol/J at 100% relative humidity. These values are lower than the value for Argon that was used in prior modeling results. In addition, prior modeling results have been completed with the G-value applied to just the mass of the corrosion layer, and this has been updated to apply the G-value for hydrogen generation to the full mass of the fuel. These two effects combine to show much smaller pressure and hydrogen build up for the sealed canister model. For a nominal scenario of stored ATR fuel, after 50 years the model results give a 1.36 atm total pressure, 7% mole percent hydrogen, for the upper decay heat, 1.51 atm total pressure, 16% mole percent hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel 2.6 atm total pressure, 15% mole percent hydrogen. For the MURR nominal case, the model results give 1.34 atm and 6% hydrogen, for upper decay heat this gives 1.41 atm total pressure with 10.8 % hydrogen, and for upper decay heat with undried fuel, this gives 2.38 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen. The nominal scenario for HFIR fuel gives 1.39 atm total pressure with 9.9% hydrogen, the upper decay heat case gives 1.43 atm with 12.1% hydrogen, and the upper decay heat with undried fuel gives 2.17 atm total pressure with 11.9% hydrogen. These results confirm the ATR scenario bounds the other intact ASNF modeled here. No case modeled yields significant oxygen, and the lower decay heat cases for all fuels modeled have hydrogen concentrations that are under the 4% flammability limit after 50 years of storage. In addition, the modeled pressures for all cases are all significantly below the 500-psi limit for the DOE standard sealed canister.
Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. These models have coupled the temperature conditions to both the gas phase radiolysis chemistry and the surface chemistry associated with the oxyhydroxide layer. The previous iteration of the model utilized constant G-values for the hydrogen generation a 50-year period. This new iteration of the model utilizes new experimental data to update the hydrogen generation rate, as well as increase the simulated time to a 200-year period. Given the half-life assumed for the primary Cs-137 isotope responsible for gamma radiation in the ATR spent fuel, the 200-year period decreases the decay heat and dose rate of the spent fuel by a factor of 100, which combined with the updated chemistry substantially decreases new hydrogen generation. Continued experimental work has identified trends for aluminum surrogate samples with oxyhydroxide layers for tests done at higher dose rates. At low initial doses a fast generation rate of hydrogen occurs which starts to roll over to a lower generation as the total dose applied increase. A small-scale chemical model was built to replicate as mini-canister surrogate system at SRNL as well as for the smaller capsule tests performed at INL. A variety of chemical models to capture this effect were tested, and a back reaction of H radical absorbing onto the surface, or inhibition of the reaction by significant H 2 cover gas were both able to fit both the mini-canister and the small capsule test data. Both kinetic fits were used to generate data from the new 200-year simulation. As additional experiments continue, the kinetic fits may be adjusted to adapt to new data. However, updated data shows that hydrogen atmosphere has little effect on actual generation data, so the model was reverted to use a star-stepped G-value for low-dose and high-dose regions. For the undried fuel case, the three models differ significantly with an end concentration of 1% for back reaction, 4.2% for inhibition, and 13.1% for constant G-value for the nominal scenario. For the dried fuel case, the nominal cases showed end concentrations of 0.23% for back reaction, 1.9% for inhibition, and 4.2% for const G-value for the nominal scenario. For the constant G-value case that is less conservative than the other two, the pressure for undried fuel increases to 1.94 atm over 200 years for the nominal case and 2.11 atm for the high decay heat case. The total hydrogen concentration after 200 years is 4.92% for the low decay heat case and 27.4% for the high decay heat case for undried fuel and is 1.4% and 9.6% for low and high decay heat fuel for the dried fuel case. If small amount of residual air is present, the potential for nitric acid formation of 595, 1568, and 2816 ppm for the lower, nominal, and upper fuel decay heat can occur. At long-term timeframes no significant shift in major species present occurs, so no appreciable amount of oxygen is present in the system. The continued rate of hydrogen generation in the canister occurs at an increase of 0.04% by mole over the final 10 years. Increasing the model range out to 1000 years continues to drop the hydrogen generation rate through decreasing dose rate.
Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. A demonstration case for these DOE sealed canisters will be eventually performed with a one-third scale mockup that has been instrumented with thermocouples and gas concentration probes. This study seeks to model the planned canister for validation of the previously developed model, such that confidence in its long-term prediction can be increased. The deployment of the instrumented lid for online monitoring in intended for a period of 10+ years based on previous monitoring of commercial fuel storage; however, the model is still run for the previously used 50-year storage periods. This case is modeled with a G-value using a bi-linear function such that it decreases at higher dose rates to be consistent with experiments. Validation efforts of the model would likely revolve around the results for the 1st year, so the results of this timeframe are also highlighted. For dried fuel of the nominal decay heat (18W), the predicted hydrogen concentration is 0.19% after 1 year, 0.91% after 10 years, and 2.8% after 50 years, with a maximum pressure of 1.26 atm. Consistent with previous modeling, the decay heat of the fuel is the main factor that influences the results. For undried fuel in pure helium, the hydrogen concentration ranges from 0.23 to 1.2% after 1 year, 1.25-6.2% after 10 years and 8.8 to 18.84% after 50 years. For dried fuel in pure helium the hydrogen concentration ranges from 0.06% to 0.34% after 1 year, 0.35-2.11% after 10 years and 0.95 to 6.6% after 50 years. While long-term results in the presence of residual air are mostly the same, early reactions with O 2 can delay significant production of H 2 until it is consumed to form more water vapor, lowering the range to 0.14 to 1.0% after 1 year. The maximum absolute pressure that is reached across any scenario is 2.06 atm. In the event of residual air, the presence of nitric acid is possible in the range of 18-131 ppm after 1 year, 174-1180 ppm after 10 years, and 586-3500 ppm after 50 years. As long as the fuel is sufficiently dried, or of nominal decay heat, a 4% lower flammability limit of hydrogen will not be reached within a 10-year monitoring period.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Project Management Office (PMO) is planning to execute a construction project at the Small Firearms Training Facility within LLNL's Experimental Test Site, Site 300 (S300). The proposed project will include extensive dirt work from a removal of a berm, the installation of a cinder block wall, and the replacement of a canopy and a fence with an access gate. This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) outlines the procedures to collect environmental samples for the management and/or disposition of excess soil generated from the project site and geotechnical samples for building pad and pavement designs. This SAP has been prepared and is organized to be consistent with LLNL's Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) (LLNL, 2021), as well as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Data Quality Objectives (DQO) programs (EPA, 2006).
Extended (> 50 years) dry storage is being evaluated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposition of ~ 18 metric tons of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF). Transition of the current ASNF inventory into dry storage—using the standard DOE canister—necessitates a rigorous, predictive understanding of the long-term physical and chemical factors that may influence the integrity of the proposed storage canister, including radiolytic molecular hydrogen (H 2 ) generation. Current model predictions employ initial radiolytic yields of H 2 , the values of which change as the cladding’s H 2 -precursor inventory is depleted and H 2 itself becomes progressively more involved in radiolytic and surface dissociation processes. Consequently, the absorbed radiation dose that this steady-state H 2 yield corresponds to is essential for the evaluation and improvement of model predictions. Here, we report our findings on the long-term generation of H 2 from the gamma irradiation (≤ 36 MGy) of corroded AA1100 and AA6061 coupons in helium environments at ambient temperature and ~ 50% RH. Our findings show that AA1100 systems reached steady-state by ~ 36 MGy, while higher doses were necessary for AA6061 systems. This discrepancy was attributed to the AA6061 coupons developing a thicker corrosion layer that led to the trapping of H 2 and its precursors, and potentially additional chemistries, ultimately delaying the depletion of H 2 precursors and the system’s “roll over” point. Further, current model predictions—based on previous AA1100 data—do not show steady-state attainment until above 120 MGy, which is not the case for the AA1100 data collected here. Consequently, the new alloy dependent data presented here are important for the continued improvement of predictive computer models for evaluating the feasibility of extended storage of ASNF in helium backfilled canisters.
The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program increases processing of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in H-Canyon to accelerate the closure of L Basin. The dissolved SNF will be dispositioned to Sludge Batches that will be processing in the Defense Waste Processing Facility and converted to glass. The fissile glass loading directly impacts the amount of glass canisters made. This memorandum provides an estimated maximum quantity of total fissile expected to be transferred to a Sludge Batch to support increasing the fissile glass loading and thus reducing the number of canisters created across the lifetime of the ABD mission.
Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL’s) Project Management Office (PMO) is planning to install an underground electrical duct bank at the 3200 block of the Livermore Site (project). The proposed project will include a new electrical substation and feeders, demolition and replacement of the U328C utility building with a new structure to the west, re-routing of utilities, and update of the parking lot. This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) outlines the procedures to collect and evaluate environmental samples for disposition of the excavated soil during the project and geotechnical samples for pavement design. This SAP has been prepared and is organized to be consistent with LLNL's Soils Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) (LLNL, 2022), as well as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Data Quality Objectives (DQO) process (EPA, 2006). In addition to the environmental samples, geotechnical samples will be collected by Consolidated Engineering Laboratories (CEL) on behalf of PMO. Geotechnical samples will be collected from a dedicated geotechnical boring location or co-located with environmental samples. Collection and evaluation of the geotechnical samples is determined by CEL and is therefore not discussed in this SAP.
This report summarizes the FY2022-23 work performed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) on sibling pins that are part of the High Burnup (HBU) Spent Fuel Data Project. The project is funded by the US Department of Energy’s Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Office, which is part of the Office of Nuclear Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition Office.
This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 2 Milestone M2SF-23OR010201024, “FY22 Report on ORNL Sibling Rod Testing Results,” within work package SF-23OR01020102 and is an update to the work reported in M2SF-22OR010201047, M2SF-21OR010201032, M2SF-19ORO010201026, and M2SF 19OR010201028. As a part of the DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin (LT) Zirc-4, ZIRLO ® , and M5 ® . Appendix B provides detailed information regarding defueling activities, metallographic imaging and measurements, and total cladding hydrogen measurements.