Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Safety Case”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 271 records · Page 15

Progress of the Czech Republic Deep Geological Repository Program - 16255

The Czech Republic operates two NPPs with 6 pressurized water reactors. Czech state is fully responsible for the disposal of all radioactive waste including spent nuclear fuel and it provides the Radioactive Waste Repository Authority (SURAO) established in 1997. According to the RWM Policy a deep geological repository (DGR) considered to be the only feasible option for the final disposal of spent fuel. The State Policy set out important milestones for DGR development - the selection of candidate sites by 2020 and the selection of a final site by 2025. The final commissioning of a DGR is planned for 2065. The initial stages of DGR development involved the screening of geological conditions of the whole territory. Granites would provide the most suitable rock environment for DGR siting purposes. By the end of 2012 SURAO will have proposed 7 sites for the potential geological surveys and the first stage of site characterization work. Licenses for geological survey for this stage are in the force since October 2015. Main goal of RD and D programme is to support the siting programme for the selection of the candidate sites, to adapt a DGR design on suitable sites and to support the safety case. SURAO decided to enhance the extent of in-situ RD and D at a depth corresponding to that of the future DGR. In 2013 SURAO commenced the construction of the Bukov Underground Research Facility in the southern section of the Rozna uranium mine at a depth of 600 m below the surface in crystalline rock environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Managing Low-Level Waste at Dounreay - 16269

Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) is the site licence company responsible for the clean-up and demolition of Britain's former centre of fast reactor research and development. The Dounreay site requires facilities to dispose of up to 175,000 cubic metres of low level waste (LLW) that has been and will continue to be generated during the decommissioning and restoration of the site. In May 2014, construction of two new vaults for the disposal of LLW at Dounreay was completed, including the necessary roads, infrastructures and services, followed by an encapsulation plant in September 2014. The vaults are located immediately to the northeast of the Dounreay licensed site, on NDA-owned land. The facilities are for disposal of the solid LLW generated at Dounreay and the adjacent Vulcan site only. In 2004, following consultation with stakeholders and members of the public, Dounreay issued the 'Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) Report' on the management of Dounreay LLW. This report assessed potential management options for LLW against a range of criteria, including technical, environmental, cost, health and safety issues. The study was conducted in line with best practice and involved consultation with a range of people, including the local community and organisations with an interest in radioactive waste management. The recommendations and conclusions from the study provided the basis for the 'Dounreay Solid LLW Overall Strategy', which was published in March 2005. A fundamental component of this strategy was the development of new below-ground disposal vaults for LLW at Dounreay. Siting the vaults on land at Dounreay avoids any need to transport the LLW away from Dounreay on public roads. Disposal at Dounreay therefore satisfies the proximity principle of managing the waste at source. Disposal at Dounreay is also consistent with UK Government Policy on LLW management, the Scottish Government's Radioactive Waste Management Policy and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's (NDA's) strategy on management of LLW from the UK nuclear industry. A planning application was initially lodged with the Highland Council in June 2006. The period for the determination of this application was extended to allow the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) sufficient time to assess fully the supporting Environmental Safety Case (ESC). The planning application was re-activated in May 2008, and planning permission was granted by Highland Council in April 2009. The planning permission included 26 conditions on DSRL, covering a wide range of environmental issues such as construction noise/dust, traffic, visual impact and also a condition to develop a community fund aimed at socio-economic development of the area around the Dounreay site. After undertaking the necessary detailed design work, construction of the phase one vaults commenced in November 2011 by principal contractor, Graham Construction. Work was undertaken on both vaults simultaneously, excavating around 243,000 m{sup 3} of rock. When excavation was complete, steel reinforcement was placed and concrete poured to construct the floor slabs. This was followed by the construction of the reinforced walls and then the installation of the steel support structure and materials that form the roof. Mechanical and electrical installation then followed, in parallel with the construction of the vault apron, ramps and access roads. A pumping system and control building was also constructed to remove groundwater from around the vaults to allow the vaults to be kept dry while they are being filled with waste. A layer of excavated material, approximately 3 m thick, was placed across the existing ground surface between the vaults and the coast, to ensure the water table lies well below the new ground surface after closure of the vaults, and that any future trace contaminated groundwater flows out to the sea rather than to the soil zone. This layer is referred to in project documents as the 'enhanced geosphere'. After disposals are completed and the vaults are closed, this layer will be joined to the capping over the vaults so that the ensemble merges visually with the surrounding landscape. The original vegetation and soil mix will be returned as far as is practicable. An encapsulation plant has been constructed to fill the LLW containers with grout prior to disposal in the vault, similar to the process used at the national Low-Level Waste Repository facility (LLWR), near Drigg in Cumbria. The plant has the capacity to grout up to four containers per day. The grout fills voids in the container and helps provide chemical conditions in the vault that limit the release of radionuclides in the far future, after the vault has been penetrated by groundwater. On April 24 2015, active commissioning began at the Encapsulation Plant and LLW Vaults. Half-height ISO containers packed with low level waste are currently being filled with grout and disposed of in the LLW Vault. Also packaged Demolition Low Level Waste (DLLW) is being processed and disposed of in the Demolition Low Level Waste Vault. To date over 2500 packages of DLLW and 70 containers LLW have been disposed of. Completion of construction and the start of operating the Phase One vaults and encapsulation plant are fundamental to the successful and efficient decommissioning of the Dounreay site, upon which many millions of pounds of investment and hundreds of jobs rely.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Bradwell - The first UK Nuclear Site to Enter Care and Maintenance - 18152

Magnox Ltd, a Cavendish Fluor company, is currently decommissioning twelve nuclear sites on behalf of the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Ten of these sites are former Power Stations; the other two are closed Research and Development facilities. An overall strategy for decommissioning the Magnox sites has been agreed between Magnox and the NDA. For all but one of these sites the decommissioning strategy involves an extended quiescent period, known as Care and Maintenance (C and M), during which remaining radiological hazards reduce naturally through radioactive decay. After this quiescent period the sites will be restored to an agreed end state through further decommissioning and clearance work. Sites in C and M will not be permanently manned. They will be passively safe such that prompt action will not be required in response to an alarm or fault. Preparing a nuclear site for C and M involves several inter-related strands of work including definition of the intended physical configuration of the site during C and M (the C and M entry state), establishing a safety case to support that configuration, carrying out the physical works needed to deliver the C and M entry state, preparing arrangements and a team to manage the site during C and M and consolidating the knowledge and information needed to support C and M and final clearance of the site. To enter C and M there needs to be a carefully controlled transition of site, personnel and management system into the agreed C and M configuration. Bradwell, a site on the east coast of England, was selected as part of the overall decommissioning strategy for 'early' entry into C and M; Bradwell is scheduled to enter C and M in late 2018, several years in advance of the next scheduled site, with the intent of carrying learning forward from Bradwell to the subsequent sites. Bradwell is now in the final stages of preparation for C and M. Decommissioning commenced on completion of defueling in 2005. A clearly defined C and M entry state was established early in decommissioning and, through interaction with Regulators and internal and external stakeholders, developed as a shared target, thus providing certainty to the scope of the overall decommissioning project. The site has subsequently been systematically decommissioned to meet this target C and M entry state. All legacy waste has been retrieved and packaged into robust disposal containers, the reactor buildings have a new weather envelope, and much of the site is empty space with concrete hardstanding where facilities used to exist and bare rooms where plant used to operate. The remaining radiological and environmental hazards are not significant. During C and M, which is anticipated to last for 70 years, Bradwell will be managed remotely without the requirement for personnel to be present on site, with the possible exception of an ongoing security presence when the site first enters C and M. In terms of UK decommissioning, many of the projects undertaken at Bradwell were first of a kind. The company operates under a programmed organisational and delivery model, which will enable innovation and learning from Bradwell to be carried forward across the whole Magnox fleet. In addition to decommissioning tools and techniques, processes to manage decommissioning, optimise the C and M entry state to reduce the burden on the UK taxpayer and to transition a site into C and M have been developed. This, in addition to taking people from Bradwell and seeding them into Magnox and the broader UK nuclear industry, should help to provide long term cost savings and delivery efficiencies across the entire NDA estate. This paper describes the journey of Bradwell Site through decommissioning and into C and M, highlighting the innovation and challenges that have contributed to the success of delivering the first UK nuclear site into Care and Maintenance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Overview of Kinectrics' Experience in Characterization of Low and Intermediate Level Waste (L and ILW) - 19144

Kinectrics has over two decades of experience in physico-chemical and radiological characterization of L and ILW generated from the operation and refurbishment of nuclear reactors owned by Ontario Power Generation (OPG). This characterization is required to develop an inventory and also to support the safety case, as well as licensing, of OPG's waste management facilities including its planned Deep Geological Repository (DGR) for Low and Intermediate Level Waste (L and ILW). The typical waste matrices characterized include reactor artefacts, non-processable, compactable, incinerable, ash, assorted resin, filters, and sludge. The objective of this paper is to present an overview of the characterization work undertaken over the years and further elaborate on some recent activities pertaining to characterization of a select subset of L and ILW streams such as pressure tubes, feeder pipes, bulk non-processable and active liquid waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development and Demonstration of Monitoring Strategies and Technologies -Modern2020 Project - 19317

The Modern2020 project aims at providing the means for developing and implementing an effective and efficient repository operational monitoring program, taking into account the requirements of specific national programs. The work allows advanced national radioactive waste disposal programs to design monitoring systems suitable for deployment when repositories start operating in the next decade and supports less developed programs and other stakeholders by illustrating how the national context can be taken into account in designing dedicated monitoring programs tailored to their national needs. The work has been established to understand what should be monitored within the frame of the wider safety cases and to provide methodology on how monitoring information can be used to support decision-making and to plan for responding to monitoring results. Several developments on innovative repository monitoring techniques (wireless data transmission, alternative power supply sources, new sensors, geophysical methods) has been done from the proof of feasibility stage to the technology development and demonstration phase. Innovative technical solutions facilitate the integration and flexibility of required monitoring components to ease the final implementation and adaptation of the monitoring system. Full-scale in-situ demonstrations of innovative monitoring techniques were done in way to evaluate the performance of the state-of-the-art, the innovative techniques and their comparison with conventional ones. Finally, we will introduce the experiences of the local public stakeholders that have been involved in the Modern2020 project by focusing on the participation in practice of the Belgian, French, Finnish and Swedish local stakeholders, This paper provides an overview of the European Commission Horizon2020 Modern2020 project's main goals and progress to date. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Development of an Experimental Approach for Thermal Testing in Bedded Salt - 19431

Safe and permanent isolation of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW) is an integral component of the cradle-to-grave philosophy of radioactive waste management. Out of the multitude of rock types considered for the permanent deep disposal of nuclear waste (tuff, shale, granite, clay, and salt), salt has received significant interest particularly because of the advantage offered by salt as an impermeable and dry medium with self-sealing properties. The concept of HLW disposal in salt has been investigated through several testing campaigns in the U.S. and in Germany. Serval knowledge gaps still exist in our understanding of how brine is generated and how it transports under heat generating conditions. These knowledge gaps limit our ability to build a robust safety case for the disposal of heat generating waste in salt. The current manuscript reports on efforts performed to develop a field-testing campaign to study brine and water vapor migration in heated salt. The paper summarizes initial work done in a phased thermal testing program in bedded salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Carlsbad, New Mexico. The testing to date has been focused on existing boreholes and is being used to 'shakedown' the process for implementation of a more refined testing program that will be implemented in freshly drilled boreholes planned for FY2019. We designed and deployed a heater assembly that consisted of a packer, borehole deformation gauge, heater block, a network of thermocouples, and a pressure transducer setup to measure in situ temperature and pressure. The assembly was deployed in an existing borehole and several heating and cooling experiments were performed to test the performance of the different instruments fielded. We report on the results obtained for brine generation as a function of time and heating and cooling cycles and temperature evolution in the rock salt. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Natural and Engineered Features Supporting Environmental Performance of Idaho National Laboratory's Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility - 19436

The Idaho National Laboratory's (INL's) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated at the INL site in support of the US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. The facility has been designed to receive legacy RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW to be received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated materials; ion exchange resins used to purify cooling and canal water; and activated metal components generated during reactor core change outs and Naval spent fuel management; and nuclear R and D. Disposal of INL's RH LLW poses unique disposal challenges due to high radiation levels (contact rates up to 600 Sv/hr [60,000 Rem/hr]) that require remote handling and adequate shielding for transportation and disposal. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, including the all-pathways dose, air pathway dose, inadvertent intruder doses, and radon emissions limits. This paper presents an overview of natural and engineered design features that support the safety case and enhance the environmental performance of the facility. These features include location selection, use of reinforced pre-cast concrete vaults; a robust hydraulic drainage system; use of steel waste canisters for waste disposal; the facility monitoring system; facility layout; and crediting waste forms. The facility performance assessment (PA) developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, credits each of these protective features. Releases from waste forms disposed of at this facility are limited by corrosion of the steel waste canisters which will ultimately allow contact with infiltrating water followed by transport of radionuclides from the vault system. The steel waste canisters were credited for their ability to limit water contact with the waste based on the demonstrated ability of the reinforced pre-caste concrete vaults to provide long-term structural protection of the steel waste canisters. Verification of hydraulic and concrete performance was conducted through laboratory data, field infiltration tests supported by a robust monitoring system, and numerical modeling. Releases into the vault system from activated metals are based on site-specific corrosion data. Radionuclide transport from the vault system from all waste forms is based on site-specific climatological, hydrologic, and stratigraphic data. At INL, the groundwater pathway historically and appropriately has received the most attention. By crediting aspects of the natural system, the engineered vault system, and the waste, estimated radiologic doses via the groundwater pathway are minimal. Air pathway doses were reduced by differentially crediting corrosion of aluminum and stainless steel activated metals resulting in the pathway being screened out of the PA. Groundwater and inadvertent intruder doses were reduced through selective facility layout. This paper provides an overview of the system-wide protective features incorporated into the facility design along with an extensive reference list to supporting technical papers and analyses that provide data and interpretation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Borehole Disposal: Update on the Science, Technology, and Potentially Suitable Radioactive Wastes - 20170

A recent Special Issue of the Energies Journal on Deep Borehole Disposal of Nuclear Waste has delivered a timely update on the science and technology of borehole disposal and the types of radioactive wastes it could potentially accommodate. The Special Issue papers discuss (i) circumstances under which a national waste management programme might wish to consider deep borehole disposal [1], (ii) a status report of deep borehole disposal options in Germany [2], (iii) the use of deep horizontal drill-holes in sedimentary, metamorphic or igneous rocks for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste [3], (iv) the analysis of corrosion performance of engineered barrier systems [4], (v) a review of the potential cementing systems suitable for deep borehole disposal [5], (vi) the thermal evolution around heat-generating waste for a wide range of material properties and disposal configurations [6], (vii) a geochemical analysis of deep brines focussed on fluid-rock interactions [7], (viii) post-closure performance assessment calculations for deep borehole disposal of Cs/Sr capsules [8], and (ix) an example safety case for deep borehole disposal of nuclear wastes [9]. This paper provides an overview of the main findings from these publications and highlights some of the technological and scientific challenges that need to be overcome when developing a deep borehole disposal concept. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

New Beginnings: Optimising Waste and End-state at UK Nuclear Sites to Enable Environmental Permit surrender (the GRR) - 20193

The decommissioning of nuclear sites involves the management of large volumes of radioactive waste, other conventional waste, and the clean-up of land and groundwater contamination. In the UK, the disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear sites is regulated by the Environment Agency (England), Natural Resources Wales (Wales) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Scotland). All three environment agencies seek to make sure that the generation and disposal of radioactive waste is optimised: ensuring impacts to people are 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA). With a large proportion of UK nuclear sites embarking on decommissioning, the environment agencies have collaboratively developed new guidance: the 'Management of radioactive waste from the decommissioning of nuclear sites: Guidance on the Requirements for Release from radioactive substances regulation' (referred to as the GRR)[1]. The environment agencies worked in liaison with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the UK nuclear safety regulator, and the UK government body responsible, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Prior to finalising the guidance, a 12 month trial was completed at three of the NDA's nuclear sites, enabling the environment agencies to test their draft GRR guidance against 'real world scenarios' and the challenge of incorporating its requirements into decommissioning plans. Experience gained during the trial was incorporated into the current version of the GRR, published in July 2018. The GRR represents the 'new beginning' of this paper's title because for the first time, the UK environmental regulators have expressed in detail their requirements for surrender of environmental permits for nuclear sites. The GRR provides a framework for a UK nuclear site to plan, assess and justify its management of radioactive waste and deliver through decommissioning, an optimal, environmentally safe and sustainable end-state. This paper will describe the requirements and technical standards within the GRR, the establishment of defensible clean-up criteria and the production of a Waste Management Plan (WMP), supported by a Site-Wide Environmental Safety Case (SWESC). It will describe the experience gleaned by operators and regulators during the trial and it will highlight current work by regulators to implement the new approach proportionately. Finally, this paper will look forward and outline planned amendments to legislation in the UK affecting nuclear sites that should enable the full benefits of the GRR to be realised in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Long-term Storage of ILW: Building Stores with the Appropriate Environmental Controls - 20294

In the UK, containers for the storage and disposal of intermediate level radioactive waste (ILW) typically use stainless steel due to its excellent mechanical properties and corrosion resistance. The period of interim storage before a disposal facility is available, however, is longer than available engineering experience with stainless steels in relevant environmental conditions. Additionally, after disposal the ability of ILW containers to withstand further periods of exposure to the environment is expected to provide substantial benefits to the operation of a disposal facility and the safety case underpinning its closure. For these reasons, although there have been no instances of failure of stainless steels in indoor storage conditions, a focused R and D programme has been carried out to identify the environmental envelope over which the material does not significantly degrade. In this study we summarise experimental and modelling studies carried out over the last decade to build a solid mechanistic understanding of the corrosion behaviour of stainless steels in indoor atmospheric conditions. We then identify suitable environmental regimes to minimise the risk of degradation processes and explore approaches to monitoring the storage conditions to gain confidence in the long-term performance of the system. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Storage and concentration of plutonium and uranium solutions in LES 401 hot cell (ATALANTE) - criticality safety considerations - 14414

ATALANTE, located in Marcoule, is one of the main nuclear facilities of the French CEA (Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission). The LES 401 hot cell was built in the 1980's and, since then, has been operating only with low masses of fissile material. As part of the management optimization for purified Uranium and Plutonium solutions ('Fin U Pu' Project), the new functions provided in LES 401 are now expected to be the following: - Reception of Uranium and Plutonium solutions, - Concentration of these solutions, - Storage of the concentrates and distillates. From the criticality safety point of view, the equipment was originally designed in safe geometry for Plutonium Nitrate, considering only a 2.5 cm -thick water reflector. However, the new criticality safety case had to take into account the following points: - Reception of not only Plutonium solutions, but also highly enriched Uranium solutions, - Considering flood risk as a possible contingency, - Considering precipitation as a possible contingency. These more conservative assumptions have meant introducing a mass limit for the cell, in addition to the geometry control mode. For the equipment containing very low concentrations of fissile material in normal operation, it was necessary, using the double contingency principle, to take a concentration limit into account in the specific situation of water flooding the cell. Finally, given the mass and geometry control mode, it was necessary to perform all the calculations with both fissile media (Plutonium and Uranium), as it was found that depending on the selected mass, geometry, and reflection conditions, the most penalizing media is not always the same. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SCM overview & the EBR-II shutdown heat removal tests validation.

Pronghorn is an engineering-scale, coarse-mesh, thermal-hydraulics tool for supporting reactor-core simulations of advanced nuclear reactors. Most of the current efforts in Pronghorn have been devoted in developing porous finite-volume capabilities and adapting closure correlations for coarse-mesh thermal-hydraulics modeling. However, for liquid-metal reactors (LMRs) with wire-wrapped fuel pin assemblies, a pin-level thermal-hydraulic resolution is required for most safety case studies (pin rupture, channel blockage, etc.). For this purpose, a new Subchannel application is developed in MOOSE, which affords the required flow field resolution, while still preserving an engineering-scale approach. This new solver can be natively coupled to Pronghorn and other MOOSE objects to enable full-core, multi-physics, multi-scale engineering studies. This presentation presents the main features of the SCM code and demonstrates a validation case based on the EBR-II SHRT tests.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Effect of ionizing radiation on PuO2 and surrogate oxide materials under storage conditions

The stockpile of plutonium separated from used nuclear fuel amounts to many 100s of tonnes. The majority of this plutonium is stored as PuO2 powder packaged in multi-can containers. The conditions during the packaging of reprocessed PuO2 for long term storage are closely controlled to limit water uptake as radiolytic decomposition of any adsorbed water will lead to the formation of both a potentially flammable atmosphere containing molecular hydrogen as well as reactive oxygen species which may be incorporated into the oxide phase. Consequently, the safety case for the long-term storage of PuO2 requires a complete understanding of the fundamental physical, chemical and materials degradation processes occurring at the water-oxide interface inside the storage canisters. This study investigates the effect of ionizing radiation on PuO2 and various surrogate oxides under atmospheres potentially encountered in storage canisters.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technology Solutions Case Study: Combustion Safety Simplified Test Protocol

Combustions safety is an important step in the process of upgrading homes for energy efficiency. There are several approaches used by field practitioners, but researchers have indicated that the test procedures in use are complex to implement and provide too many false positives. Field failures often mean that the house is not upgraded until after remediation or not at all, if not include in the program. In this report the PARR and NorthernSTAR DOE Building America Teams provide a simplified test procedure that is easier to implement and should produce fewer false positives.

Building America↗

Building America Case Study: Combustion Safety Simplified Test Protocol, Chicago Illinois, and Minneapolis, Minnesota

"9Combustion safety is an important step in the process of upgrading homes for energy efficiency. There are several approaches used by field practitioners, but researchers have indicated that the test procedures in use are complex to implement and provide too many false positives. Field failures often mean that the house is not upgraded until after remediation or not at all, if not include in the program. In this report the PARR and NorthernSTAR DOE Building America Teams provide a simplified test procedure that is easier to implement and should produce fewer false positives. A survey of state weatherization agencies on combustion safety issues, details of a field data collection instrumentation package, summary of data collected over seven months, data analysis and results are included. The project provides several key results. State weatherization agencies do not generally track combustion safety failures, the data from those that do suggest that there is little actual evidence that combustion safety failures due to spillage from non-dryer exhaust are common and that only a very small number of homes are subject to the failures. The project team collected field data on 11 houses in 2015. Of these homes, two houses that demonstrated prolonged and excessive spillage were also the only two with venting systems out of compliance with the National Fuel Gas Code. The remaining homes experienced spillage that only occasionally extended beyond the first minute of operation. Combustion zone depressurization, outdoor temperature, and operation of individual fans all provide statistically significant predictors of spillage.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

42 ENGINEERING↗