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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

Developing a Comprehensive Risk Assessment Framework for Geological Storage CO 2

The operational risks for CCS projects include: risks of capturing, compressing, transporting and injecting CO₂; risks of well blowouts; risk that CO 2 will leak into shallow aquifers and contaminate potable water; and risk that sequestered CO 2 will leak into the atmosphere. This report examines these risks by using information on the risks associated with analogue activities such as CO 2 based enhanced oil recovery (CO 2 -EOR), natural gas storage and acid gas disposal. We have developed a new analysis of pipeline risk based on Bayesian statistical analysis. Bayesian theory probabilities may describe states of partial knowledge, even perhaps those related to non-repeatable events. The Bayesian approach enables both utilizing existing data and at the same time having the capability to adsorb new information thus to lower uncertainty in our understanding of complex systems. Incident rates for both natural gas and CO 2 pipelines have been widely used in papers and reports on risk of CO 2 pipelines as proxies for the individual risk created by such pipelines. Published risk studies of CO 2 pipelines suggest that the individual risk associated with CO2 pipelines is between 10 -3 and 10 -4 , which reflects risk levels approaching those of mountain climbing, which many would find unacceptably high. This report concludes, based on a careful analysis of natural gas pipeline failures, suggests that the individual risk of CO 2 pipelines is likely in the range of 10-6 to 10-7, a risk range considered in the acceptable to negligible range in most countries. If, as is commonly thought, pipelines represent the highest risk component of CCS outside of the capture plant, then this conclusion suggests that most (if not all) previous quantitative- risk assessments of components of CCS may be orders of magnitude to high. The potential lethality of unexpected CO 2 releases from pipelines or wells are arguably the highest risk aspects of CO 2 enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR), carbon capture, and storage (CCS). Assertions in the CCS literature, that CO 2 levels of 10% for ten minutes, or 20 to 30% for a few minutes are lethal to humans, are not supported by the available evidence. The results of published experiments with animals exposed to CO 2 , from mice to monkeys, at both normal and depleted oxygen levels, suggest that lethal levels of CO 2 toxicity are in the range 50 to 60%. These experiments demonstrate that CO 2 does not kill by asphyxia, but rather is toxic at high concentrations. It is concluded that quantitative risk assessments of CCS have overestimated the risk of fatalities by using values of lethality a factor two to six lower than the values estimated in this paper. In many dispersion models of CO 2 releases from pipelines, no fatalities would be predicted if appropriate levels of lethality for CO 2 had been used in the analysis.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2014

Managing Research in a Risk World

The Office of Chief Medical Officer (OCHMO) owns all human health and performance risks managed by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). While the HSRB manages the risks, the Human Research Program (HRP) manages the research portion of the overall risk mitigation strategy for these risks. The HSRB manages risks according to a process that identifies and analyzes risks, plans risk mitigation and tracks and reviews the implementation of these strategies according to its decisions pertaining to the OCHMO risk posture. HRP manages risk research work using an architecture that describes evidence-based risks, gaps in our knowledge about characterizing or mitigating the risk, and the tasks needed to produce deliverables to fill the gaps and reduce the risk. A planning schedule reflecting expected research milestones is developed, and as deliverables and new evidence are generated, research progress is tracked via the Path to Risk Reduction (PRR) that reflects a risk's research plan for a design reference mission. HRP's risk research process closely interfaces with the HSRB risk management process. As research progresses, new deliverables and evidence are used by the HSRB in conjunction with other operational and non-research evidence to inform decisions pertaining to the likelihood and consequence of the risk and risk posture. Those decisions in turn guide forward work for research as it contributes to overall risk mitigation strategies. As HRP tracks its research work, it aligns its priorities by assessing the effectiveness of its contributions and maintaining specific core competencies that would be invaluable for future work for exploration missions.

Anton, W.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗
DOE OSTI2015

Needs for integrated risk assessment to support optimal environmental management decisions - 15455

Cleaning up legacy waste from 50 years of nuclear weapons production and energy research still remains a challenge for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE environmental management program is currently forecasted to run through at least late 2060's with an estimated liability of $204 billion. Risks to human health of workers and the public, the ecological system, and nuclear safety of cleanup activities continue to drive the cost of DOE's cleanup programs. Currently, these risks are generally assessed and managed independently of each other. Except for DOE self-regulated on-site disposal activities of low-level radioactive waste, risks to human health and the environment are generally under the purview of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and State regulatory agencies, while nuclear safety risks are regulated by DOE with oversight from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board where appropriate. When managing health and environmental risks, the individual regulatory authorities often use an area-by-area (or unit-by-unit), contaminant-by-contaminant (chemical-by-chemical or radionuclide-by-radionuclide) approach, focusing on a single medium (soil, water, or air), a single source (e.g., a burial ground or a processing facility), and a single receptor (e.g, a groundwater well or a creek). This level of segregation in risk evaluations by risk category, geographical location, and operational unit, as well as the corresponding separation of regulatory authorities poses a significant challenge to reaching an optimal decision in prioritizing and managing cleanup activities. This management challenge adds another layer of complexity to large-scale cleanup effort at complex sites such as the Hanford site in eastern Washington. Therefore, to support a scientifically sound, operationally robust decision making process, there is a need for an integrated, holistic approach to risk assessment that addresses the combined effects of all major contributing factors. Previous studies have pointed out the need for integrated risk assessments that address multi-contaminant, multimedia, multi-pathway exposures, for the purposes of evaluating risks to human health and the environment. We believe that a comprehensive risk assessment should also take into nuclear safety risks that are associated with handling of nuclear material either retrieved from burial sites or to be decommissioned from nuclear facilities. Recent efforts, such as the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP)-led Hanford site-wide independent risk review that will categorize all types of risks at the Hanford site and the DOE complex-wide risk review mandated by the Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act ('Omnibus bill'), are beginning to more comprehensively address this need. This paper provides a categorization of various types of risks present at typical DOE sites, reviews the current risk assessment and management practices, and discusses the needs for integrating nuclear safety into performance and risk assessments for optimal cleanup decisions. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Definition and Validation of “Favorable High-Risk Prostate Cancer”: Implications for Personalizing Treatment of Radiation-Managed Patients

Purpose: To define and validate a classification of favorable high-risk prostate cancer that could be used to personalize therapy, given that consensus guidelines recommend similar treatments for all radiation-managed patients with high-risk disease. Methods and Materials: We studied 3618 patients with cT1-T3aN0M0 high-risk or unfavorable intermediate-risk prostate adenocarcinoma treated with radiation at a single institution between 1997 and 2013. Favorable high-risk was defined as T1c disease with either Gleason 4 + 4 = 8 and prostate-specific antigen <10 ng/mL or Gleason 6 and prostate-specific antigen >20 ng/mL. Competing risks regression was used to determine differences in the risk of prostate cancer–specific mortality (PCSM) after controlling for baseline factors and treatment. Our results were validated in a cohort of 13,275 patients using the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER)-Medicare linked database. Results: Patients with favorable high-risk disease had significantly better PCSM than other men with high-risk disease (adjusted hazard ratio [AHR] 0.42, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.18-0.996, P=.049) and similar PCSM as men with unfavorable intermediate-risk disease (AHR 1.17, 95% CI 0.50-2.75, P=.710). We observed very similar results within the SEER-Medicare cohort (favorable high-risk vs other high-risk: AHR 0.21, 95% CI 0.11-0.41, P<.001; favorable high-risk vs unfavorable intermediate-risk: AHR 0.67, 95% CI 0.33-1.36, P=.268). Conclusions: Patients with favorable high-risk prostate cancer have significantly better PCSM than other patients with high-risk disease and similar PCSM as those with unfavorable intermediate-risk disease, who are typically treated with shorter-course androgen deprivation therapy. This new classification system may allow for personalization of treatment within high-risk disease, such as consideration of shorter-course androgen deprivation therapy for favorable high-risk disease.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Disaster risk and artificial intelligence: A framework to characterize conceptual synergies and future opportunities

Artificial intelligence (AI) methods have revolutionized and redefined the landscape of data analysis in business, healthcare, and technology. These methods have innovated the applied mathematics, computer science, and engineering fields and are showing considerable potential for risk science, especially in the disaster risk domain. The disaster risk field has yet to define itself as a necessary application domain for AI implementation by defining how to responsibly balance AI and disaster risk. (1) How is AI being used for disaster risk applications; and how are these applications addressing the principles and assumptions of risk science, (2) What are the benefits of AI being used for risk applications; and what are the benefits of applying risk principles and assumptions for AI-based applications, (3) What are the synergies between AI and risk science applications, and (4) What are the characteristics of effective use of fundamental risk principles and assumptions for AI-based applications? This study develops and disseminates an online survey questionnaire that leverages expertise from risk and AI professionals to identify the most important characteristics related to AI and risk, then presents a framework for gauging how AI and disaster risk can be balanced. This study is the first to develop a classification system for applying risk principles for AI-based applications. This classification contributes to understanding of AI and risk by exploring how AI can be used to manage risk, how AI methods introduce new or additional risk, and whether fundamental risk principles and assumptions are sufficient for AI-based applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

National and subnational mortality and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) attributable to 17 occupational risk factors in Iran, 1990–2015

Highlights: • Mortality and morbidity from 17 occupational risks in Iran, 1990–2015 were estimated. • During 1990–2015, national DALYs from occupational risks increased by 65%. • During 1990–2015, the share of women in the attributable DALYs rose from 13% to 20%. • Proportion of YLLs in national DALYs due to occupational risks in 2015 was 23%. • Spatial inequality in the attributable DALY rate decreased from 1990 to 2015. We estimated age-sex specific and cause-specific mortality, years of life lost due to premature mortality (YLLs), years lived with disability (YLDs) and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) attributable to 17 individual occupational risks in Iran at the national and subnational levels in 1990–2015 based on the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015 (GBD 2015). The burden of disease attributable to occupational risk factors was calculated using the comparative risk assessment methodology based on 10 outcomes and 21 risk-outcome pairs. The temporal changes in the attributable burden of disease were decomposed into the contribution of population growth, population ageing, risk-deleted DALY rate, and risk exposure. National DALYs attributable to occupational risks at the national level in 1990, 2005, and 2015 were 138,210 (95% uncertainty interval 64,429–223,028), 193,243 (91,645–310,281), and 228,310 (106,782–371,709), respectively indicating a total increase of 65% (65–67) during the study period. Between 1990 and 2015, the share of the attributable DALYs for women rose by 55% (51–58) from 13% (12–14) to 20% (19–21). The proportion of YLLs in national DALYs attributable to occupational risks during the study period slightly decreased from 24% in 1990 to 23% in 2015. The five occupational risks with the highest contributions in the national attributable DALYs in 2015 were ergonomic factors (107,490), noise (52,122), exposure to particulate matter, gases, and fumes (26,847), asthmagens (19,347), and exposure to asbestos (7842). From 1990 to 2015, the increase in total DALYs attributable to occupational carcinogens (112%) was higher than that for other occupational risks. During the study period, changes in risk deleted DALY rate and risk exposure led to decreases in total DALYs attributable to occupational risks by 14% and 30%, respectively. Based on the Gini coefficient, spatial inequality in DALY rate attributable to occupational risks at the provincial level decreased during 1990–2015. A comprehensive plan for management of exposure to occupational risks, especially occupational carcinogens can cause an important effect for control of the increasing trend of occupational health losses.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

Gastrointestinal stromal tumor risk classification: spectral CT quantitative parameters

Purpose: To examine the value of spectral CT quantitative parameters in gastrointestinal stromal tumor (GIST) risk classification. Materials and methods: This retrospective study was approved by the institutional review board. The requirement for informed consent was signed. The authors evaluated 86 patients (30 high risk, 22 medium risk, 28 low risk, and 6 very low risk; mean age: 59 years [range 19–83 years]) with pathologically confirmed GIST who underwent plain and triple-phase contrast-enhanced CT with spectral CT imaging mode from March 2015 through September 2017, with manual follow-up. Quantitative parameters including the CT value of 70 keV monochromatic images, the slope of spectral curves, and the normalized iodine concentration (NIC) and water (iodine) concentrations were measured and calculated, and conducted a power analysis of the above data. Results: (1) The CT values at 70 keV of the high-risk group were higher than the intermediate and low groups in each of the enhanced phases (P ≤ 0.001), no significant differences in the intermediate-risk and low-risk groups were noted (P = 0.874, 0.871, 0.831, respectively). (2) The slope of the spectral curve of the high-risk group was higher than those of the intermediate and low groups in each of the enhanced phases (P ≤ 0.001), and there were no significant differences between the intermediate- and low-risk groups (P = 0.069, 0.466, 0.840, respectively). (3) The NIC of the high-risk group significantly differed from the lower risk groups (P ≤ 0.001). There was also no significant difference observed between the intermediate- and low-risk groups (P = 0.671, 0.457, 0.833, respectively). (4) The power analysis results show that only the low-risk group with delay period is 0.530, the rest groups are all greater than 0.999. Conclusion: Dual-energy spectral CT with quantitative analysis may help to increase the accuracy in differentiating the pathological risk classification of GIST between high risk and non-high risk, preoperatively. There were limitations for distinguishing the intermediate- and low-risk groups.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Age at exposure and attained age variations of cancer risk in the Japanese A-bomb and radiotherapy cohorts

Purpose: Phenomenological risk models for radiation-induced cancer are frequently applied to estimate the risk of radiation-induced cancers at radiotherapy doses. Such models often include the effect modification, of the main risk to radiation dose response, by age at exposure and attained age. The aim of this paper is to compare the patterns in risk effect modification by age, between models obtained from the Japanese atomic-bomb (A-bomb) survivor data and models for cancer risks previously reported for radiotherapy patients. Patterns in risk effect modification by age from the epidemiological studies of radiotherapy patients were also used to refine and extend the risk effect modification by age obtained from the A-bomb survivor data, so that more universal models can be presented here. Methods: Simple log-linear and power functions of age for the risk effect modification applied in models of the A-bomb survivor data are compared to risks from epidemiological studies of second cancers after radiotherapy. These functions of age were also refined and fitted to radiotherapy risks. The resulting age models provide a refined and extended functional dependence of risk with age at exposure and attained age especially beyond 40 and 65 yr, respectively, and provide a better representation than the currently available simple age functions. Results: It was found that the A-bomb models predict risk similarly to the outcomes of testicular cancer survivors. The survivors of Hodgkin’s disease show steeper variations of risk with both age at exposure and attained age. The extended models predict solid cancer risk increase as a function of age at exposure beyond 40 yr and the risk decrease as a function of attained age beyond 65 yr better than the simple models. Conclusions: The standard functions for risk effect modification by age, based on the A-bomb survivor data, predict second cancer risk in radiotherapy patients for ages at exposure prior to 40 yr and attained ages before 55 yr reasonably well. However, for larger ages, the refined and extended models can be applied to predict the risk as a function of age.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2014

Assessing the Risk of Crew Injury Due to Dynamic Loads During Spaceflight

Spaceflight requires tremendous amounts of energy to achieve Earth orbit and to attain escape velocity for interplanetary missions. Although the majority of the energy is managed in such a way as to limit the accelerations on the crew, several mission phases may result in crew exposure to dynamic loads. In the automotive industry, risk of serious injury can be tolerated because the probability of a crash is remote each time a person enters a vehicle, resulting in a low total risk of injury. For spaceflight, the level of acceptable injury risk must be lower to achieve a low total risk of injury because the dynamic loads are expected on each flight. To mitigate the risk of injury due to dynamic loads, the NASA Human Research Program has developed a research plan to inform the knowledge gaps and develop relevant tools for assessing injury risk. The risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be further subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic risk factors. Extrinsic risk factors include the vehicle dynamic profile, seat and restraint design, and spacesuit design. Human tolerance to loads varies considerably depending on the direction, amplitude, and rise-time of acceleration therefore the orientation of the body to the dynamic vector is critical to determining crew risk of injury. Although a particular vehicle dynamic profile may be safe for a particular design, the seat, restraint, and suit designs can affect the risk of injury due to localized effects. In addition, characteristics intrinsic to the crewmember may also contribute to the risk of injury, such as crewmember sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight, and each astronaut may have a different risk profile because of these factors. The purpose of the research plan is to address any knowledge gaps in the risk factors to mitigate injury risk. Methods for assessing injury risk have been well documented in other analogous industries and include human volunteer testing, human exposure to dynamic environments, post-mortem human subject (PMHS) testing, animal testing, anthropomorphic test devices (ATD), dynamic models of the human, numerical models of ATDs, and numerical models of the human. Each has inherent strengths and limitations. For example, human volunteer testing is advantageous because a population can be selected that is similar to the astronaut corps; however, because of the inherent ethical limitations, only sub-injurious conditions can be tested. PMHSs can be tested in a variety of conditions including injurious levels, but the responses are not completely analogous to living human subjects. In addition, it is exceedingly difficult to select a PMHS population that is similar to the astronaut corps. ATDs are currently widely used in the automotive industry and military because they are highly repeatable and durable. Unfortunately, because they are mechanical models of the human body, the biofidelity of the responses are limited to dynamic conditions used to validate the ATD. Numerical models of the ATD, in addition to the strengths and limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional limitations for ATDs, are easy to use for a variety of designs before a design is fabricated, but also have additional uncertainty. Dynamic models are simple and easy to use, but do not account for localized effects of the seat and suit. Finally, numerical models of the human have the potential to have the most advantages; however, the current models are not validated for the conditions expected during spaceflight. To properly assess spaceflight conditions with numerical human models, human data would be needed to optimize the model responses for those conditions. Using the appropriate assessment method with the knowledge gained for each risk factor, an appropriate approach for mitigating the risk of injury due to dynamic loads can be developed ensuring crew safety in future NASA vehicles.

Somers, J. T.↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Refinement and Exploration

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a technical basis to support effective, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. A risk assessment-informed framework was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk informed capability to quantitatively estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for safety-related DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing risk informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of safety-related DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals, the LWRS-developed framework provides a means to address relevant technical issues by: (1) defining a risk informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade that integrates hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying risk informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Adding diversity within a system or components is the primary means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases system complexity and may not address all sources of systematic failures. Optimization of diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the proposed framework provides: (a) A best-estimate, risk informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, focusing on software CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; (b) A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems; (c) Technical bases and risk informed insights to assist users address the risk informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs; and (d) A risk informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The research and development efforts of this project in FY 2023 are focused on refining current methods on software CCF modeling and estimation and exploring additional innovative approaches to risk assessment of DI&C systems to enable a more comprehensive and complete assessment of various safety-related DI&C design architectures. The primary audience of this report are DI&C designers, engineers, and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) practitioners. This includes stakeholders, such as the nuclear utilities and regulators who consider the deployment and upgrade of DI&C systems, DI&C software developers and reviewers, and cybersecurity specialists. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the methodology, not for the evaluation of an actual digital control system. Results are obtained based on limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Crash Risks Evaluation of Urban Expressways: A Case Study in Shanghai

We report that proactive traffic safety management systems can reduce crashes by identifying crash precursors, evaluating real-time crash risks, and implementing suitable interventions. The basic prerequisite for developing such a system is to propose a reliable crash risk evaluation model that takes real-time traffic flow data as input. Previous studies have primarily focused on real-time crash prediction using some statistical or machine-learning methods. However, further quantitative evaluation and classification of crash risks have been ignored. In this study, we conduct a systematic crash risk evaluation workflow, including crash risk prediction, crash risk quantification, and crash risk classification. Specifically, the crash risk prediction using an extended logit model is proposed, from which CAS, CSD, UAS, DAS, DTV are identified to be contributing factors of crash risks. Then a crash risk quantification model based on the parameter evaluation of the extended logit model is developed. The crash risks of urban expressways and their spatial-temporal evolution trends are quantified. Finally, the crash risks are classified into high crash risk level, moderate crash risk level, and low crash risk level by the k-means cluster algorithm. Then the threshold boundaries of different crash risk levels are determined. The research results provide a proactive guidance for traffic safety management of urban expressways.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An editorial to the Special Issue on “Severe climate Risks”

The history of this Special Issue (https://www.sciencedirect.com/special-issue/10JD7LNJNQ0) indirectly dates back to the early 1990s, when the signature of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change kicked-off an international political process based on one overarching and foundational principle: to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” at the global level. More than three decades later, such a principle remains central, though complementary aims made their way through the climate negotiation process, such as the importance of ensuring equity and justice, to give just one example here. Scientific knowledge also considerably progressed and we know more about the range of risks that climate change imposes and will continue to impose to the biosphere and humankind, worldwide and at all territorial levels. It is also clear that societal responses to these risks —“climate adaptation” as we know it— are increasingly happening, but definitely not at the pace of climate risk trends (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021, Erisken et al., 2021, Olazabal and Ruiz De Gopegui, 2021, Magnan et al., 2023a, Reckien et al., 2023, UNEP, 2023). As a result, concerns have emerged over the recent years in both the scientific and policy arenas around the idea that societies may not be able to address all climate risks, and that limits to adaptation and induced residual risks need to be considered more seriously. Such concerns further highlight the continuing importance of the imperative to minimise dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, at any scale. But what does “dangerous interference” mean? How can we decide that we are entering the “dangerous” space, compared to a broader range of climate risks that would qualify as problematic but not necessarily “dangerous”? Who should make such a decision? Which conditions drive risk severity over time, including in the future? And what would be the environmental, economic, social and cultural implications of prioritising some climate risks over others? The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was a pioneer in addressing such questions through the development of the “Key Risks” framing that describes those climate risks having the potential to become dangerous or “severe” over the course of this century (Schellnhuber et al., 2006, Schneider et al., 2007, Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). The Fifth and Sixth assessment cycles (AR5 and AR6) went a step further by identifying about 120 Key Risks across regions and sectors, and clustering them into 8 “Representative Key Risks” covering a range of geographical systems (low-lying coasts, and to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems), sectors (critical infrastructure, living standards, human health, food security, and water security) and human dimensions (peace and mobility) (Oppenheimer et al., 2014, O’Neill et al., 2022). This Special Issue was born of the efforts of a range of authors, during the development of the IPCC AR6 main Assessment Report between 2019 and 2022, to characterise Key Risks and Representative Key Risks, and advance knowledge on what shapes “severe climate risks” conceptually as well as in the real-world. The series of papers forming this Special Issue is not intended to cover the topic exhaustively, but rather to give readers an overview through the following narrative: defining “severe climate risks” is highly challenging (Magnan et al., 2023b), but knowledge is expanding on the driving climate hazards (Tebaldi et al., 2023) and their implications on geographical systems, sectors and human dimensions, using here food security (Mirzabaev et al., 2023), human mobility (Gilmore et al., 2024) and peace (Buhaug et al., 2023) as illustrative examples. The overall intention is to support especially decision-makers, whatever the scale or sector considered, in asking severity-driven questions to identify sector- and context-specific “priority” risks from climate change.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2014

Risk Evaluation for CO 2 Geosequestration in the Knox Supergroup, Illinois Basin (Final Report)

This report describes a process and provides seed information for identifying and evaluating risks pertinent to a hypothetical carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) capture and sequestration (CCS) project. In the envisioned project, the target sequestration reservoir rock is the Potosi Formation of the Knox Supergroup. The Potosi is identified as a potential target formation because (1) at least locally, it contains vuggy to cavernous layers that have very high porosity, and (2) it is present in areas where the deeper Mt. Simon Sandstone (a known potential reservoir unit) is absent or nonporous. The key report content is discussed in Section 3.3, which describes two lists of Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs) that should be considered during the design stage of such a project. These lists primarily highlight risk elements particular to the establishment of the Potosi as the target formation in general. The lists are consciously incomplete with respect to risk elements that would be relevant for essentially all CCS projects regardless of location or geology. In addition, other risk elements specific to a particular future project site would have to be identified. Sources for the FEPs and scenarios listed here include the iconic Quintessa FEPs list developed for the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas (IEAGHG) Programme; previous risk evaluation projects executed by Schlumberger Carbon Services; and new input solicited from experts currently working on aspects of CCS in the Knox geology. The projects used as sources of risk information are primarily those that have targeted carbonate reservoir rocks similar in age, stratigraphy, and mineralogy to the Knox-Potosi. Risks of using the Potosi Formation as the target sequestration reservoir for a CCS project include uncertainties about the levels of porosity and permeability of that rock unit; the lateral consistency and continuity of those properties; and the ability of the project team to identify suitable (i.e., persistently porous and permeable) injection depths within the overall formation. Less direct implications include the vertical position of the Potosi within the rock column and the absence of a laterally extensive shale caprock immediately overlying the Potosi. Based on modeling work done partly in association with this risk report, risks that should also be evaluated include the ability of available methods to predict and track the development of a CO 2 plume as it migrates away from the injection point(s). The geologic and hydrodynamic uncertainties present risks that are compounded at the stage of acquiring necessary drilling and injection permits. It is anticipated that, in the future, a regional geologic study or CO 2 -emitter request may identify a small specific area as a prospective CCS project site. At that point, the FEPs lists provided in this report should be evaluated by experts for their relative levels of risk. A procedure for this evaluation is provided. The higher-risk FEPs should then be used to write project-specific scenarios that may themselves be evaluated for risk. Then, actions to reduce and to manage risk can be described and undertaken. The FEPs lists provided as Appendix 2 should not be considered complete, as potentially the most important risks are ones that have not yet been thought of. But these lists are intended to include the most important risk elements pertinent to a Potosi-target CCS project, and they provide a good starting point for diligent risk identification, evaluation, and management.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Risk Assessment and Management Workflow—An Example of the Southwest Regional Partnership

This paper summarizes the risk assessment and management workflow developed and applied to the Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration (SWP) Phase III Demonstration Project. The risk assessment and management workflow consists of six primary tasks, including management planning, identification, qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis, response planning, and monitoring. Within the workflow, the SWP assembled and iteratively updated a risk registry that identifies risks for all major activities of the project. Risk elements were ranked with respect to the potential impact to the project and the likelihood of occurrence. Both qualitative and quantitative risk analyses were performed. To graphically depict the interactions among risk elements and help building risk scenarios, process influence diagrams were used to represent the interactions. The SWP employed quantitative methods of risk analysis including Response Surface Method (RSM), Polynomial Chaos Expansion (PCE), and the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) toolset. The SWP also developed risk response planning and performed risk control and monitoring to prevent the risks from affecting the project and ensure the effectiveness of risk management. As part of risk control and monitoring, existing and new risks have been tracked and the response plan was subsequently evaluated. Findings and lessons learned from the SWP’s risk assessment and management efforts will provide valuable information for other commercial geological CO2 storage projects.

Lee, Si-Yong↗
NASA NTRS1997

Alternative Perspectives on Risk

The goal of the commercial air transport system is to provide air transportation to the flying public at an acceptable cost with minimal risk. in an ideal situation these three goals would support each other. In fact, it is sometimes the case that the goals conflict: getting passengers to their destinations on time may conflict with fixing a minor mechanical malfunction that may or may not impact safety; flying a route that will avoid turbulence, thereby providing passengers with a more comfortable ride, may consume more fuel; managing traffic density may mean aircraft are delayed or must use an approach that will result in a long taxi to their gates, costing time and fuel. Various players in the system--pilots, dispatchers, controllers, as well as managers in the airline carriers and traffic management system--make decisions every day that involve trade-offs of benefits and costs. The prospect of revisions in the air traffic management system, with shifts in responsibilities from controllers to users, including airline operations center personnel and pilots, means that individuals may be performing either new jobs or old jobs under new guidance. It will be essential to know how the various players (a) perceive the risks and benefits associated with the decisions they will make under the old and new control structures, and (b) how much risk they are willing to accept in making decisions. Risk is here defined as the probability and magnitude of negative events (after Slovic, 1987). Of primary interest are risks associated with traffic, weather, and operational factors such as schedule, fuel consumption, and passenger service. Previous research has documented differences between groups in perceptions of risks associated with both everyday and aviation related situations. Risk perception varies as a function of familiarity with the situation, degree to which one is potentially affected by the risk, the level of control one has over the situation, and one's level of experience and responsibility in the situation. In our presentation we will consider several factors that may influence differences in risk perception, risk tolerance and risk management among the three major categories of participants in the aviation system (pilots, dispatchers, and controllers). Primary factors that may affect risk attitudes (the collective term we will use for the three components of risk) include: expertise or job-specific knowledge or training, personal involvement or vulnerability to consequences, goals, time horizon (imminence of consequences), span of control and type of control, and information or technology support. These will be considered in the context of five different types of risk (physical threat, economic, social, legal, and ethical). A study designed to study differences between pilots and controllers in their perceptions and responses to traffic risks under the present and a user-preferred control situation will be described. Future studies involving dispatchers' risk perceptions regarding various types of risk will be discussed.

Davison, Jeannie↗