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2015 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMs

This annual summary report presents results and conclusions of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) in support of the Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The report presents results and conclusions of the FY 2015 review and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the NNSS relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

2016 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada: Review of the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses

The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (National Security Technologies, LLC 2007a) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs), with the results submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan.The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PAs and CAs for federal fiscal year (FY) 2016. This annual summary report presents results and conclusions of the FY 2016 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs. Important developments in FY 2016 include the following: Development of a new Area 5 RWMS closure inventory estimate based on disposals through FY 2016, Evaluation of new or revised waste streams by special analysis, and Development and acceptance of version 4.200 of the Area 5 RWMS GoldSim PA/CA model. The Area 3 RWMS has been in inactive status since July 1, 2006, with the last shipment received in April 2006. The FY 2016 review of operations, facility design, closure plans, monitoring results, and R&D results for the Area 3 RWMS indicates no changes that would impact PA validity. The conclusion of the annual review is that all performance objectives can be met and the Area 3 RWMS PA remains valid. There is no need to revise the Area 3 RWMS PA. Review of Area 5 RWMS operations, design, closure plans, monitoring results, and R&D activities indicates that no significant changes have occurred. The FY 2016 PA results, generated with the Area 5 RWMS v4.200 GoldSim PA model, indicate that there continues to be a reasonable expectation of meeting all performance objectives. All results remain less than 50% of their performance objectives. The results and conclusions of the Area 5 RWMS PA are judged valid, and there is no need to the revise the PA. A review of changes potentially impacting the CAs indicates that no significant changes occurred in FY 2016. A new Corrective Action Unit (CAU), CAU 576, with corrective action sites near the Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS was identified in FY 2016. The sites are currently under investigation and not expected to be important sources for the CA. The continuing adequacy of the CAs was evaluated with the new models, and no significant changes that would alter the CAs’ results or conclusions were found. The revision of the Area 3 RWMS CA, which will include the Yucca Flat Underground Test Area (CAU 97) source, is scheduled for FY 2024, following the completion of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan. Inclusion of the Frenchman Flat Underground Test Area (CAU 98) source in the Area 5 RWMS CA is planned pending the completion of the CAU 98 Closure Report in FY 2017. Near-term R&D efforts will focus on continuing development of the PA, CA, and inventory models for the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs.

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Historical Scaling Performance from Laboratory to Full Scale for The Defense Waste Processing Facility's Chemical Process Cell

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is planning to modify the chemical processing flowsheet by replacing formic acid with glycolic acid in the Chemical Process Cell (CPC) Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME). The replacement of formic acid with glycolic acid virtually eliminates the CPC’s largest flammability hazards, catalytic hydrogen and ammonia.

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Activities to Establish Technical Confidence for HTGR Fuel Processing

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Jülicher Entsorgungsgesellschaft für Nuklearanlagen mbH (JEN) are partnering in the demonstration of a digestion technology for the processing of graphitebased nuclear fuels. The purpose of this partnership is to identify, demonstrate, and mature a technology for processing high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) fuel currently stored at the Jülich and Ahaus facilities in Germany. To enable a decision on receipt of the fuel by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the technology for dispositioning the fuel must achieve an acceptable level of technical maturity, what is referred to as “technical confidence.”

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Selection of Glasses in Support of the Sludge Batch 9 Sulfate Solubility Limit for Coupled Operation with the Salt Waste Processing Facility

For Sludge Batches 3 through 8, the sulfate (SO 4 2- )solubility limit for the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) has been determined by laboratory-scale crucible testing. In preparation for Sludge Batch 9 (SB9) processing, a comparison demonstrated that minor compositional differences existed between the Sludge Batch 8 (SB8)-Frit 803 and SB9-Frit 803 glass composition regions for sludge-only and coupled operations with the Actinide Removal Process (ARP) and Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU). Thus, no experimental testing was necessary and the SB8 SO 4 2- limit of 0.65 wt.% was recommended for SB9 processing. This previous SB9 assessment did not address coupled processing with streams from the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), which is anticipated to start operations in November 2019. These high activity streams will include monosodium titanate (MST) and sludge solids from the Sludge Solids Receipt Tank (SSRT) as well as Cs-containing strip effluent (SE). The incorporation of these SWPF streams is expected to reach TiO 2 concentrations in glass greater than 2 wt.% based on single and double MST strike scenarios. In support of coupled operation with SWPF, the DWPF Product Composition Control System was revised and allows a TiO 2 concentration of up to 6 wt.% (minus measurement uncertainty) in glass. For the SB8-Frit 803 SO 4 2- solubility study, the maximum TiO 2 concentration evaluated was 0.94 wt.%. Since the influence of increased TiO 2 on the retention of SO 4 2- in the SB9 glass region is unknown, a test matrix of ten glass compositions has been proposed to determine whether the 0.65 wt.% SO 4 2- limit is still appropriate for SB9 coupled operation with SWPF. This report documents the development of a test matrix that will support this study.

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Simulation of DWPF Chemical Process Cell Using a Reaction Calorimeter

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) converts liquid radioactive waste into glass using a Sludge Receipt Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) in addition to other processes. The SRAT and SME processes can be simulated on a small-scale using the Mettler-Toledo Reaction Calorimeter (RC1). This equipment is able to automate the execution and monitoring of experiments involving nonradioactive chemical simulants.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Retained Hydrogen Literature Study for DWPF

During Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operation in the Slurry Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and the Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME), hydrogen is primarily produced by radiolysis and catalytic generation. The hydrogen is released from the sludge by agitation and removed from the vapor space by purging with air. Upon loss of agitation, the hydrogen begins accumulating in the sludge, and releases rapidly upon the resumption of agitation. If enough hydrogen accumulated in the sludge, and released rapidly upon the start of agitation, the hydrogen concentration in the vapor space could exceed the lower flammability limit (4 vol %). Savannah River Remediation (SRR) currently manages the risk for retained hydrogen in the DWPF vessels by implementing a Retained Hydrogen Program. The program primarily relies on the timely operation of vessel agitators to ensure that the retained hydrogen eruptions that could lead to flammable vapor spaces do not occur. The current program relies on conservative assumptions concerning gas release and retention (e.g., instantaneous release, conservative hydrogen bubble fraction, no release during quiescent periods) to develop allowable vessel quiescent times (Q-times). SRR would like to relax the conservative assumptions to the Retained Hydrogen Program and allow the Retained Hydrogen Program to extend past Sludge Batch 9. Relaxing the assumptions could potentially allow longer Q-times during agitator stoppages. SRR requested Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) personnel to perform a literature study to extract industry data pertaining to retained hydrogen and apply it to the DWPF process. The authors conducted a review of the technical literature, including work from the Savannah River Site (SRS), SRNL, the Hanford site, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and the Sellafield site to identify literature describing the retention and release of gases with non-Newtonian slurries. The study was undertaken with the knowledge that SRS wastes are unique which makes using non-SRS data challenging. The literature search focused on the following topics: Mixing or blend time in Newtonian and non-Newtonian fluids, Quiescent release of gas from an unagitated non-Newtonian fluid, Release of gas from an agitated non-Newtonian fluid, and Changes in fluid rheology as a function of settling time.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Impact of Permanganate Oxidation of Glycolate on Corrosion of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Recycle Collection Tank (RCT), Transfer-line and Waste Tank Materials of Construction (MoC)

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is evaluating the use of glycolic acid to replace formic acid as an alternate reductant for the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at Savannah River Site (SRS). The replacement is aimed at reducing facility hazards, improving pH stability and rheological control, and lowering off gas production. Glycolate, which is the product that may remain, can also be carried downstream to High-Level Waste and Low-Level Waste facilities. Complete oxidation of glycolate and other organic species from the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) may be necessary to minimize thermolytic hydrogen generation that can cause flammability issues. The glycolate oxidation may be performed in the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT). The RCT heel would be adjusted with sodium hydroxide to maintain the solution caustic and sodium nitrite as corrosion inhibitor prior to the addition of condensate that can be from the contents of the Slurry Mix Evaporator Condensate Tank (SMECT) or Offgas Condensate Tank (OGCT). The RCT tank collects the waste to be transferred via the Low Point Pump Pit – Recycle Pump Tank (LPPP-RPT) through a jacketed transfer-line to the Tank Farm facility. Scoping studies were performed to evaluate an oxidizing agent and sodium permanganate was selected as the best option for glycolate destruction. Testing was recommended to determine the impact on the Materials of Construction (MoC) due to the addition of sodium permanganate. The targeted concentration of sodium permanganate used equated to a 7:1 molar permanganate to glycolate ratio (nominally 0.002 M permanganate). However, to conservatively maximize the permanganate corrosivity, in some cases no glycolate was added.

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Antifoam Development for Eliminating Flammability Hazards and Decreasing Cycle Time in the Defense Waste Processing Facility

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested to develop a new antifoam control method for the Defense Waste Processing Facility’s (DWPF) Chemical Process Cell (CPC). SRNL completed testing of both chemical and nonchemical foam controls. The nonchemical foam controls were either ineffective (or worse, created more foam) or impractical (a water spray can control foam, but excessive water is needed). As a result, the focus of this study was on finding a superwetter or commercial antifoam for controlling foam. Thirty potential antifoams were tested as part of this study. A series of tests were developed to help screen out ineffective alternatives including: 1. Spreading testing of superspreaders, 2. Foam column testing with physical simulants, 3. Boiling testing with physical and chemical simulants, 4. Days-only Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) process simulations with sludge (containing noble metals and mercury), Precipitate Reactor Feed Tank (PRFT), and Slurry Mix Evaporator Feed Tank (SEFT) simulants in the RC1 Reaction Calorimeter (purchased for antifoam testing), and 5. Around-the-clock SRAT and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) process simulations with sludge(containing noble metals and mercury), PRFT, and SEFT simulants in the RC1 Reaction Calorimeter. Evonik Surfynol® MD20, a commercially available defoamer, was relatively effective in controlling foam, while remaining chemically stable in SRAT and SME processing across the pH range of 4 to 13. No degradation products were detected in the offgas, in the condensate or in the SRAT and SME products. In nitric-glycolic acid flowsheet testing, 250 mg/kg Evonik Surfynol® MD20 was needed for foam control compared to 1,625 mg/kg for Antifoam 747, DWPF’s current antifoam. In nitric-formic acid flowsheet testing, 1,125 mg/kg of Evonik Surfynol® MD20 was needed to control foam throughout the SRAT and SME cycles. The commercially available superspreader Momentive™ Y-17112 was even more effective than Evonik Surfynol® MD20 as both a defoamer and an antifoam. Not only was the foam destroyed upon addition but also was less persistent between additions. It was the most effective antifoam in testing using both the nitric-glycolic acid flowsheet and the nitric-formic acid flowsheet. In nitric-glycolic acid flowsheet testing, only 100 mg/kg Momentive™ Y-17112 was needed to control foam throughout the SRAT and SME cycles. In nitric-formic acid flowsheet testing, 300 mg/kg Momentive™ Y-17112 was needed to control foam throughout the SRAT and SME cycles. Momentive™ Y-17112 is also resistant to hydrolysis as demonstrated by its chemical stability in SRAT and SME processing across the pH range of 4 to 13 and lack of degradation products in offgas or condensate. Both candidates were effective as potential replacements for Antifoam 747, with Y-17112 demonstrating superior foam control. During nitric-glycolic flowsheet testing 50% less antifoam was needed when using Momentive™ Y-17112 compared to MD20. During nitric-formic flowsheet testing 75% less antifoam was needed when using Momentive™ Y-17112 compared to MD20. Foam remediated with Momentive™ Y-17112 was less persistent throughout testing. In addition, no degradation products were detected in the offgas, in the condensate or in the SRAT and SME products. Based on this testing, Momentive™ Y-17112 is clearly superior to Evonik Surfynol® MD20 and Antifoam 747, especially for the nitric-formic acid flowsheet processing; it is recommended that Momentive™ Y-17112 replace Antifoam 747 in DWPF. An antifoam addition strategy is recommended for both the nitric-glycolic acid flowsheet and the nitric-formic acid flowsheet. Implementation of Momentive™ Y-17112 is expected to decrease SRAT and SME boiling times by up to 50%, eliminate the issues resulting from Antifoam 747 degradation products, and minimize foamovers. To validate the effectiveness of these defoaming agents, SRNL recommends irradiation of a SRAT or SME product simulant containing fresh antifoam. The goal of this testing is to determine whether the irradiation causes decomposition of the antifoam that would make it less effective or produce new species in the offgas or slurry. This testing began in April 2020. An evaluation should be completed to determine the thermolytic hydrogen and methane generation rate in downstream equipment, including the High-Level Waste evaporators.

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Tank 50H Mixing Pump Run Time Reassessment

Tank 50H is required to operate a single rotating standard slurry pump for 4.5 hours prior to transfers to the Salt Solution Receipt Tanks (SSRTs) in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). This mixing time is required to adequately mix miscible and immiscible liquids within Tank 50H and meet the Saltstone Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). The miscible liquids are aqueous solutions of dissolved salts, while the immiscible liquids include organic droplets such as Isopar® L. To support the accelerated salt processing rates from the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), a desire to reduce the transfer time of Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) downstream of SWPF was identified. This document describes the analysis performed to reassess the technical basis for the 4.5 hour mixing requirement for Tank 50H.

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WIPP MLU Incoming Vehicles Survey Document

The following SNL document contains requested radiological survey information, as part of the documentation for the TRU-waste shipment being performed by the LANL MLU team. The surveys were performed in TA-5, on July 20th, 2020: Incoming WIPP TRU-Pact trailers survey: 1-20200720-4, and, Incoming MLU trailer and mobile crane survey: 1-20200720-8 The first survey was of 2 WIPP trailers carrying 2 empty TRU Half-Pacts each. The second survey was for a trailer with the MLU team's equipment, and for the contracted mobile crane that be used for loading Half-Pacts. All information contained was completed, reviewed, and approved by SNL RP personnel, and is released for receipt and use by the LANL MLU Team and WIPP personnel at their discretion.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Demonstrating the Value of Human Factors for Process Design in a Controlled Experiment

A controlled between-groups experiment was conducted to demonstrate the value of human factors for process design. Most evidence to convey the benefits of human factors is derived from reactive studies of existing flawed systems designed with little or no human factors involvement. Controlled experiments conducted explicitly to demonstrate the benefits of human factors have been scarce since the 1990s. Further, most previous research focused on product or interface design as opposed to process design. The present study was designed to fill these research gaps. Toward that end, 24 Sandia National Laboratories employees completed a simple visual inspection task simulating receipt inspection. The experimental group process was designed to conform to human factors and visual inspection principles, whereas the control group process was designed without consideration of such principles. Results indicated the experimental group exhibited superior performance accuracy, lower workload, and more favorable usability ratings as compared to the control group. Given the differences observed in the simple task used in the present study, the author concluded that incorporating human factors should have even greater benefits for complex products and processes. The study provides evidence to help human factors practitioners revitalize the critical message regarding the benefits of human factors involvement for a new generation of designers.

42 ENGINEERING↗

White Paper to Justify the Use of Strip Effluent in the Defense Waste Processing Facility During Slurry Mix Evaporator Processing

At the request of Savannah River Remediation (SRR), a white paper was written to assess whether it would be acceptable to process Strip Effluent (SE) in both the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for the nitric-glycolic acid flowsheet. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) experimental data and DWPF Sludge Batch 9 (SB9) process data was reviewed, looking at batches which included Precipitate Reactor Feed Tank (PRFT) and/or Strip Effluent Feed Tank (SEFT) feeds that led to long processing times. These batches were reviewed looking for processing problems such as melter feed trips, foamovers, heating rod or steam coil fouling, missed Reduction/Oxidation (REDOX) targets, and other process anomalies.

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Results of the Analyses of SMECT Mercury Sample Collected During Mercury Pump (MB1) Functional Check

A pump added to remove mercury from the sump of the Slurry Mix Evaporator Condensate Tank (SMECT) in DWPF was successfully tested in 2020, resulting in a sample of contaminated mercury obtained from the Mercury Purification Process (MPP) cell. The mercury in the sump of the SMECT was present as a result of steam stripping of sludge slurry in the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) at DWPF. A schematic of the MPP system provided by DWPF personnel is shown in Appendix A. DWPF personnel supplied the following detailed description of the Hg sampling: “The sample provided is the result of DWPF extraction of mercury by means of the Mercury Pump-Water Cart. The Mercury Pump extracted the sample from the SMECT mercury sump. The pump uses pressurized water to transfer a small amount of mercury to a leachate bucket located at the Lab Mercury cell. The mercury and water were allowed to be self separated, and mercury was gravity decanted from the leachate bucket.” DWPF personnel indicate that the leachate bucket is equipped with both a top stopcock/drain and a lower/bottom stopcock/drain from which the mercury was decanted or drained out, while the separated water layer remained above the mercury during draining. The DWPF customer requested SRNL to analyze the sample for the following: gross alpha/nonvolatile beta analysis and perform a Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) per the Environmental Protection Agency's Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste: Physical/Chemical Methods, SW-846. While the TCLP was preferred, a Total Metals analysis of the eight Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals was deemed acceptable.2 The analytical data collected on this mercury sample will be used in planning for sample disposition as well to start a profile for future Hg disposition of Hg collected from steam stripping.

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(U) Archive of Historic Pu-239 Jezebel Documents

The 239 Pu Jezebel experiment of 1954–1955 was reevaluated for the 2013 edition of the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. Experimental logbooks, original drawings, mass accountability statements, internal reports, and published reports were used to model four actual Jezebel assemblies with high fidelity in three dimensions. Because plutonium-alloy part masses from 1954–1955 (the time of the original experiments) were not found, assumptions were made. The most important assumption was that the assembly masses given in Los Alamos report LA-4208 (Ref. 3) in 1969 were correct. With this basic assumption, and using information found in the logbooks and mass accountability statements from 1958–1960, a distribution of the LA-4208 assembly mass among the Pu-alloy parts was postulated. Subsequently, the SF Material Transfer Receipt (November 24, 1954) was found. It lists the masses of the major parts and several minor parts as of late-November 1954. In addition, as-built drawings for the initial delivery of the major parts (October 1954, before they were remachined to reduce their reactivity) were found. These important documents, which were discovered by accident, motivated what we hope will be the final detailed Jezebel reevaluation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Radiological Handling and Containment Considerations in Support of an American Medical Isotope Producer

This work will discuss evaluation and design of new and modified facility level radiological containment, transfer, and handling systems in support of the United States’ American Medical Isotope Production Act. In the United States alone, Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) is used as a precursor to locally generate its decay product, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), for use in approximately 40,000 medical procedures every day to detect cancer and heart disease. Currently, however, Mo-99 is primarily produced overseas and typically requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is classified as weapon -usable. This poses a serious security risk to the United States and, in 2012, Congress passed the American Medical Isotope ACT which aimed to cease all Mo-99 production that requires HEU and support American based companies who have found safer production methods. Through this effort, a system was designed and developed to access irradiated material in processing hot cells for ease of material introduction and removal in the confined area. The proposed solution uses a double-door design that allows for easy access to material while also providing shielding through a mechanically manipulated carousel. A system was also designed to transport irradiated materials from target reactors to a target receipt box using a rail guide system, pneumatic motor, and lead screw drive.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Analysis of Defense Waste Processing Facility Sample: Recycle Collection Tank Sample Batch 4945

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by Savannah River Remediation (now Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC)), through a Technical Task Request, to characterization the “as-received” Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) Sample identified as sample batch 4945 [Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) batch 796)], which was delivered to SRNL Shielded Cells on January 28, 2021. The RCT characterization data will be used as input to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Recycle Diversion Project. This RCT report is the first of three sample characterization reports that will be used for this DWPF Project. The other DWPF reports will involve the characterization of the Off-Gas Condensate Tank (OGCT) and the Slurry Mix Evaporator Condensate Tank (SMECT) samples.

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Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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