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Radionuclide Incorporation and Long Term Performance of Apatite Waste Forms

This project aims to combines state-of-the-art experimental and characterization techniques with atomistic simulations based on density functional theory (DFT) and molecular dynamics (MD) simulations. With an initial focus on long-lived I-129 and other radionuclides such as Cs, Sr in apatite structure, specific research objectives include the atomic scale understanding of: (1) incorporation behavior of the radionuclides and their effects on the crystal chemistry and phase stability; (2) stability and microstructure evolution of designed waste forms under coupled temperature and radiation environments; (3) incorporation and migration energetics of radionuclides and release behaviors as probed by DFT and molecular dynamics (MD) simulations; and (4) chemical durability as measured in dissolution experiments for long term performance evaluation and model validation.

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NNSA-IAEC Science Area V Environmental ISR: Waste Management and Subsurface Science (Final Report FY18-FY20)

In August 2017, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) launched a joint waste management program to evaluate the feasibility of siting a radioactive waste repository at intermediate depths in Israel. The bilateral collaboration involves three National Laboratories (LLNL, LANL, and Sandia), and the Nuclear Research Center, Negev, Geological Survey of Israel, and Ben Gurion University in Israel. This research is designed to assist with the evaluation of locations for an intermediate nuclear waste repository in Israel. This final report is a high-level summary of the results from the past three years by the team that worked on the WM-2: Radionuclide colloid-facilitated transport in fractured carbonate rock project for Science Area V, Environmental ISR: Subsurface Science and Waste Management. We have completed all of our tasks and met all of our milestones. MW-2 had three integrated tasks. Task 1 was laboratory experiments investigating colloid transport of radionuclides in natural fractured carbonate rocks from the Avdat formation, Israel. Task 2 was field experiments injecting radionuclide analogues pre-sorbed to clay colloids into fractured carbonate rock, and task 3 was numerical modeling of laboratory and field experimental results to assess the importance of colloids in the migration of relevant radionuclides. This task was incorporated into tasks 1 and 2. A 4 th task was initiated in FY20, to investigate the role of organics in facilitating radionuclide transport under the same conditions explored in task 1 due to the high organic content of the rocks being investigated for the immediate borehole locations. Preliminary results will be summarized here and the work will continue in FY21-23. The overall objective of this research is to evaluate the role of colloids (naturally occurring < 1 micron particles) in facilitating the transport of long-lived radionuclides from a nuclear waste repository situated in fractured carbonate rocks. Currently little data exists on radionuclide transport in carbonate rocks, but this is the main rock type available for siting a repository in Israel. Laboratory experiments were carried out in both Israel and the U.S., field experiments have taken place in Israel, and reactive transport modeling involved LLNL, LANL and Israel partner institutions. LLNL hosted a graduate student, Emily Tran, from Ben Gurion University in FY18 and FY19 and much of the work presented here was part of her PhD research.

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Assessment of Rare Earth Element Fingerprints for Distinguishing Between Site-Related Wastes and Background - 19441

Actinides such as uranium, thorium and radium are known to be present in sites associated with various phases of the cold war weapons research, development and production. Remediation of these sites as well as others associated with chemical plants that may have generated radioactive actinide-containing wastes have been the focus of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) for the past 20 years. The goal is to remediate a site to established cleanup standards as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. For radiologically-contaminated sites, one potential challenge is the presence of non-FUSRAP media such as naturally-occurring radioactive material (NORM) or technologically-enhanced naturally-occurring radioactive material (TENORM), from non-FUSRAP sources, at concentrations exceeding site cleanup standards. Such NORM and TENORM, and even byproduct radionuclides from other unrelated activities on or near the site, can be mistaken for project waste and thus incur significant additional excavation and waste transport and disposal costs. Past studies have provided examples of NORM and non-FUSRAP waste and described strategies to distinguish them from FUSRAP waste. This paper describes various sources of NORM, summarizes the types of project-related waste at some active FUSRAP sites, and identifies TENORM sites from which radionuclides could possibly migrate via various environmental pathways to nearby FUSRAP sites. The authors also examine two Case Studies that calculate distinctive elemental ratios and are examples of tools which may be used for distinguishing FUSRAP waste from other radionuclides present in natural or other man-made contributors to background. Case Study I examines two bodies of data and calculates distinctive elemental ratios between pairs of rare earth elements (REE) to see if significant differences may exist between such ratios in unregulated coal ash residue, common in fill in well-established towns and cities, and FUSRAP waste. The first group of data, consisting of eighteen sample results, was obtained from the FUSRAP Maywood Superfund Site's historical data while the second was obtained from a paper which provided extensive data (more than 100 samples) on the REE content in fly ash residues from three major coal-producing areas in the United States. This example illustrates statistically significant differences in five of six REE ratios and thus provides a potential tool for distinguishing FUSRAP waste from coal ash-based NORM. Case Study II examines differences in the mean REE:Actinide and REE:REE ratios in Welsbach-impacted sample results to distinguish project waste from background. While the purpose of this study was to distinguish project waste from background levels of the radionuclides of concern (ROC), it provides a good example of how one or more ratios could potentially be used to distinguish FUSRAP waste from NORM. Lastly, the authors recommend that future projects ensure robust characterization, that considers all potential radionuclide contributors from both FUSRAP activities as well as from other contributors to background for the region during the Planning Phase of the Data Life Cycle described within the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). It is expected that the incremental characterization sampling and analysis costs will be dwarfed by potential savings from efforts to better delineate and limit remediation to FUSRAP wastes rather than other potentially unregulated contributors to regional background. Other agencies or commercial entities with radiological environmental liabilities similar to FUSRAP would benefit from similar considerations of REEs and other radionuclides that could contribute to regional background. (authors)

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Cobalt-60, Barium-133, Cesium-137, and Europium-152 migration from cementitious sources through sediment under field conditions

Safe and effective storage of radioactive waste is essential to protect human and environmental health. Due to the potential for accidental releases and the severity of the associated risks, it is imperative to further understand radionuclide transport should an accident occur. This study was the second set of measurements conducted in 2022 of an ongoing experiment that has analyzed the vadose zone migration of radionuclides from cementitious wasteforms at the Savannah River Site over the last ten years. The radionuclides introduced within the sources are prominent constituents of radioactive waste or analogs for other groups or series of radionuclides. Lysimeters were first analyzed in 2016 using a collimated high-purity germanium gamma-ray spectrometer to non-destructively measure the concentration of each radionuclide in the sediment column as a function of depth. Following these measurements, the lysimeters were redeployed for another 4 years. All radionuclides in all lysimeters were observed to transport further during the redeployment period; however, the extent of migration varied with the material used for introduction. Except for 137Cs, migration through the sediment control system increased with decreasing ionic potential (ionic charge/radius); migration order: 152Eu<137Cs<60Co<133Ba. Overall, the cementitious wasteforms were observed to decrease radionuclide migration extent relative to natural vadose zone conditions. In both cementitious wasteforms, the migration extent increased in the order 152Eu<133Ba<60Co<137Cs. However, less migration was measured when the radionuclides were incorporated into a reducing grout wasteform. The novelty of this paper is the demonstration of a technique capable of creating non-destructive measurements over decade time scales. Ultimately, this work provides insight into the long-term migration of alkali, alkali earth, divalent transition metal, and trivalent (e.g., lanthanide and actinide element) isotopes.

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Sorption Behavior of Cationic Radionuclides on Biotite Flakes at pH 5 - 17326

Biotite contained in crystalline rock (granite) is a notable mineral because of its high sorption effects for cationic radionuclides. To date, studies on the sorption effects of rocks have focused on the powder form of minerals. However, the form of a mineral will seriously affect its sorption of radionuclides. This study examined the sorption of Cs, Sr, and Eu by biotite in the flake form. Biotite flakes (5 mm x 6 mm) were prepared for the sorption experiments. The initial concentrations of the tracer ions were set to 1 mM for Sr and Eu and 2 mM for Cs. The sorption experiments for Cs, Sr, and Eu were conducted by mixing 0.6 g of biotite flakes and 6 mL of trace solution at pH 5 for 7 days. As a result, the sorption of tracer ions gradually increased with continuous diffusion into the biotite flakes. The diffusion of the tracer ions into the layer structure of biotite was also observed by secondary ion-microprobe mass spectrometry (SIMS) analysis. The apparent diffusion coefficient of Eu into the biotite flakes was estimated to be 3.0 x 10-12 m{sup 2}/s by applying the experimental data to a theoretical model. This estimated diffusion coefficient is smaller than that for matrix diffusion in granite. Therefore, these diffusion and sorption behaviors may be important factors to consider to more reliably estimate the migration rates of radionuclides in host rock. (authors)

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Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC 1 and 2, Revision 0 with ROTCs 1,2, and 3

Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises five corrective action sites (CASs): • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 374 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at CASs 18-23-01 and 20-45-03, and a corrective action of removing potential source material (PSM) was conducted at CAS 20-45-03. The other CASs require no further action; however, best management practices of removing PSM and drums at CAS 18-22-06, and removing drums at CAS 18-22-08 were performed. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from May 4 through October 6, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigating the primary release of radionuclides and investigating other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 374 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were found to be present in the surface soil that was sampled. It is assumed that radionuclide levels present in subsurface media within the craters and ejecta fields (default contamination boundaries) at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites exceed the FAL. It is also assumed that PSM in the form of lead-acid batteries at Schooner exceeds the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of removing PSM, where present, and implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 374. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 374. • Corrective Action Unit 374 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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A Salt Repository Concept for CSNF in 21-PWR Size Canisters

The most straightforward concept for disposal of large, heavy packages containing commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) in a repository in bedded salt, would be to emplace them directly on the floor in emplacement tunnels. In-tunnel axially aligned horizontal emplacement would minimize excavated volume and avoid drilling of large-diameter emplacement boreholes. A similar concept was proposed in Germany for direct disposal of POLLUX ® canisters. The repository would be constructed at a depth of 500 to 1,000 m for isolation from the surface, and for sufficient overburden stress to ensure creep reconsolidation of repository openings. It could entail modular panels of emplacement tunnels arranged on headings oriented in cardinal directions from a central core, to accommodate the estimated 140,000 MTU total U.S. CSNF inventory. To do so, the overall area of the repository layout would be approximately 20 km 2 . Many layouts are possible, but the approach should be modular, excavation should be deferred for as long as possible to avoid maintenance, and the emplacement areas should share support facilities and shafts. Vertical shafts would be used in accordance with mining practice in sedimentary basins. Large diameter shafts would be needed for ventilation exhaust and waste transport, with smaller shafts for waste salt removal, men & materials, and ventilation intake. The spacing between disposal tunnels as estimated from thermal modeling, seeks to limit the maximum average areal thermal load in the panels to 11 W/m 2 to control long-term heat buildup in the host rock. Peak salt temperature would occur within a few years and would be dominated by each waste package locally, simplifying thermal management. There would be some flexibility to decrease the package spacing or increase the emplacement thermal power limit Backfilling emplaced waste packages immediately with mine-run crushed salt would provide shielding and expedite reconsolidation. This arrangement would isolate adjacent waste packages from one another by the intervening backfill, especially after it reconsolidates and its properties approach those of intact salt. After the repository is fully loaded and the performance confirmation program is complete, activities to permanently close the repository would be initiated. During closure operations all openings in the host salt would be backfilled, then shafts would be sealed, and boreholes plugged. Plans for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) show how sealing and plugging could be done. A monitoring program could continue for 50 years or longer after repository closure. With an emplacement thermal power limit of 10 kW per waste package, nearly all the CSNF that is projected to be produced by the current fleet of reactors in the U.S. could be emplaced over a period of approximately 50 years starting in calendar 2048. No barriers to implementation in a reasonable timeframe have been identified from this generic analysis. Engineering challenges include: 1) shaft construction; 2) a very-large capacity shaft hoist; 3) overpack design; 4) a transport-emplacement-vehicle (TEV) for transporting waste packages once they are underground and emplacing them remotely; and 5) remotely operated equipment for emplacing backfill. The method of shaft construction would depend on site-specific conditions, and could involve freezing the subsurface. A shaft hoist with payload capacity of 175 MT seems technically and economically feasible based on development work in Germany, and it would be the largest hoist of its kind. The function of disposal overpacks would be to provide reliable containment during repository operations, which could be accomplished using a corrosion allowance material such as a low-carbon steel. Development effort would be needed to determine overpack thickness (e.g., 7 to 20 cm) that can resist corrosion and loading from salt creep, to rovide containment throughout the repository operational period. The transport-emplacement vehicle (TEV) would be similar to previous concepts, particularly one option proposed for a Yucca Mountain repository. It would move over a rough salt floor on independently driven and steered wheels, and carry heavy shielding in addition to a waste package. By analogy to the safety case for the WIPP in New Mexico, human intrusion is likely to be the dominant mode of radionuclide release from the repository. Treatment of human intrusion for a CSNF repository in salt could depend on promulgation of site-specific changes in the regulations. Radionuclide release and migration would be quite limited for undisturbed conditions. There may be opportunities for improved understanding of salt performance with waste heating, based on future in situ testing in an underground salt research laboratory. This report also discusses a developing area of salt rock mechanics that involves low-stress, low strain-rate creep that might cause large, heavy waste packages to slowly sink. Site-specific sampling, testing, and modeling would be used to determine if the mechanism is important enough to merit consideration in design, or inclusion in performance assessment. Part of engineering design and postclosure safety assessment for a CSNF repository in salt would be to implement a methodology to show that the probability of a criticality event in the repository, when waste packages eventually breach and are flooded, is less than the probability screening threshold for performance assessment. In the methodology, a criticality analysis would be performed for waste packages in the repository, incorporating measures that could be introduced as needed to limit reactivity, for example using fuel selection and loading rules, and crediting the absorption of thermal neutrons by natural chlorine in the environment. A similar analysis has been underway for CSNF stored in dual-purpose canisters. Ideally the strategy would be developed prior to actually loading SNF assemblies into canisters used in waste packages for disposal.

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Radionuclide inventories for the F- and H-area seepage basin groundwater plumes

Within the General Separations Areas (GSA) at the Savannah River Site (SRS), significant inventories of radionuclides exist within two major groundwater contamination plumes that are emanating from the F- and H-Area seepage basins. These radionuclides are moving slowly with groundwater migration, albeit more slowly due to interaction with the soil and aquifer matrix material. The purpose of this investigation is to quantify the activity of radionuclides associated with the pore water component of the groundwater plumes. The scope of this effort included evaluation of all groundwater sample analyses obtained from the wells that have been established by the Environmental Compliance & Area Completion Projects (EC&ACP) Department at SRS to monitor groundwater contamination emanating from the F- and H-Area Seepage Basins. Using this data, generalized groundwater plume maps for the radionuclides that occur in elevated concentrations (Am-241, Cm-243/244, Cs-137, I-129, Ni-63, Ra-226/228, Sr-90, Tc-99, U-233/234, U-235 and U-238) were generated and utilized to calculate both the volume of contaminated groundwater and the representative concentration of each radionuclide associated with different plume concentration zones.

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Colloid-facilitated transport of 238 Pu, 233 U and 137 Cs through fractured chalk: Laboratory experiments, modelling, and implications for nuclear waste disposal

The influence of montmorillonite colloids on the mobility of 238 Pu, 233 U and 137 Cs through a chalk fracture was investigated to assess the transport potential for radioactive waste. Radioisotopes of each element, along with the conservative tracer tritium, were injected in the presence and absence of montmorillonite colloids into a naturally fractured chalk core. In parallel, batch experiments were conducted to obtain experimental sorption coefficients (K d , mL/g) for both montmorillonite colloids and the chalk fracture material. Breakthrough curves were modelled to determine diffusivity and sorption of each radionuclide to the chalk and the colloids under advective conditions. Uranium sorbed sparingly to chalk (log K d = 0.7 ± 0.2) in batch sorption experiments. 233 U(VI) breakthrough was controlled primarily by the matrix diffusion and sorption to chalk (15 and 25% recovery with and without colloids, respectively). Cesium, in contrast, sorbed strongly to both the montmorillonite colloids and chalk (batch log K d = 3.2 ± 0.01 and 3.9 ± 0.01, respectively). The high affinity to chalk and low colloid concentrations overwhelmed any colloidal Cs transport, resulting in very low 137 Cs breakthrough (1.1–5.5% mass recovery). Batch and fracture transport results, and the associated modelling revealed that Pu migrates both as Pu (IV) sorbed to montmorillonite colloids and as dissolved Pu(V) (7% recovery). Transport experiments revealed differences in Pu(IV) and Pu(V) transport behavior that could not be quantified in simple batch experiments but are critical to effectively predict transport behavior of redox-sensitive radionuclides. Finally, a brackish groundwater solution was injected after completion of the fracture flow experiments and resulted in remobilization and recovery of 2.2% of the total sorbed radionuclides which remained in the core from previous experiments. In general, our study demonstrates consistency in sorption behavior between batch and advective fracture transport. Finally, the results suggest that colloid-facilitated radionuclide transport will enhance radionuclide migration in fractured chalk for those radionuclides with exceedingly high affinity for colloids.

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Modeling glass degradation and release of radionuclides from vitrified waste for performance assessment simulations

The release of radionuclides initially encapsulated in a slowly degrading solid waste form and contained in an eventually corroding canister defines the source term for numerical simulations for the assessment of a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. While the details of waste degradation, canister corrosion, and dissolution and mobilization of the radionuclides in pore water include complex chemical reaction and transport processes that are coupled to the thermal, hydrological, microbiological, and mechanical conditions in the repository, the source-term model suitable for use in a numerical performance assessment model should be a defensible abstraction of these mechanisms. We developed a radiological source-term model and implemented it into a non-isothermal flow and transport simulator. While the proposed source-term model is applicable to various waste forms, canister systems, and disposal concepts, we specifically considered radionuclide releases from vitrified high-level waste placed in a cylindrical canister disposed in a deep vertical borehole repository. In this model, waste degradation is a function of temperature, and it can be adjusted to evaluate the influence of and propagate uncertainties in pH, passivation reactions, and chemical conditions as well as geometrical factors. The time-dependent, congruent release of safety-relevant radionuclides present in the decaying inventory is then calculated. Finally, the radionuclides are mobilized by diffusive and advective transport according to the thermo-hydraulic conditions prevailing in the near field of the repository, from where they migrate through the geosphere to the accessible environment. We examine the influence of the source-term model’s parameters on performance assessment calculations through sensitivity and uncertainty propagation analyses, identifying influential factors and confirming the upper bound of their impact. These considerations align with the overarching goal of repository design, which is to demonstrate that engineered and natural barriers can collectively delay radionuclide migration for timescales far exceeding human planning, thereby providing multiple, redundant barriers against environmental contamination.

iTOUGH2↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

Corrective Action Unit 375 comprises three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 25-23-22, Contaminated Soils Site; (2) 25-34-06, Test Cell A Bunker; and (3) 30-45-01, U-30a, b, c, d, e Craters. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 375 based on the implementation of corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls at CAS 25-23-22, no further action at CAS 25-34-06, and closure in place with administrative controls and removal of potential source material (PSM) at CAS 30-45-01. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 28, 2010, through April 4, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 375 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were assumed to be present within the default contamination boundaries at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. No contaminants were identified at CAS 25-34-06, and no corrective action is necessary. Potential source material in the form of lead plate, lead-acid batteries, and oil within an abandoned transformer were identified at CAS 30-45-01, and corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of removing the PSM. Use restrictions and warning signs were implemented for the remaining radiological contamination at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 375; (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 375; and (3) Move CAU 375 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

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The Nature and State of Groundwater Contamination at the Nevada National Security Site: What Have We Learned from Decades of Groundwater Analysis? - 20337

The regulatory framework for remediating radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is based on a combination of characterization and modeling studies, monitoring, and institutional controls [1]. Currently, tritium is the largest contributor (∼90%) to the estimated 44.6 million-curie radionuclide inventory resulting from underground testing [2]. Because of its short half-life (12.32 years), its relative contribution reduces below 10% of the total radiologic inventory over the next 120 years as a result of radioactive decay. Although tritium levels are observed well above the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in groundwater, other radionuclides are well below their MCLs except within the nuclear test near-field (nuclear test cavity and chimney) environment. In fact, most device-derived radionuclides are below their MCL in groundwater even in samples collected from this near-field environment. The distribution of radionuclides following the nuclear detonation greatly influences the availability of potential contaminants for groundwater transport. Tritium is initially distributed in the gas phase, later as tritiated water in steam, and finally as liquid water, and is available to groundwater transport away from the near-field environment. Other radionuclides that are mobile in groundwater are {sup 14}C, {sup 36}Cl, {sup 99}Tc, and {sup 129}I though their radiologic inventory is small when compared to tritium. Many radionuclides (e.g. U, Pu, Am) are incorporated to a significant extent into the melt glass at the bottom of the cavity and are accessible to groundwater primarily through the slow process of glass dissolution. These radionuclides are also adsorbed to the surfaces of the crushed rock within the cavity and chimney which limits their migration in groundwater. Although colloid facilitated transport of radionuclides at the NNSS has been observed [3], radionuclide concentrations decrease with time and migration distances due to desorption and colloid filtration processes. Current studies indicate that radionuclides associated with colloids are unlikely to migrate downgradient from NNSS underground nuclear tests at concentrations above the SDWA MCL [4][5]. The results of over 50 years of sampling, along with an understanding of these post detonation processes, indicate that tritium is the only contaminant of concern downgradient of testing and that even tritium will not exceed its MCL in groundwater after ∼120 years. Although other longer-lived radionuclides may continue to be released slowly from the near-field environment they will likely never reach levels exceeding their MCLs in groundwater downgradient of the NNSS. Groundwater monitoring will continue to verify these observations. (authors)

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Investigating the Depth of Penetration of Radionuclides in Concrete - 16292

This paper focuses on some chemical and structural aspects for mature concrete structural substrate that functions as a barrier to radioactive material migration. Exposure to radioactive material may be a consequence of surface contact, such as resulting from exposure by spills or leaks. In properly-prepared waste storage areas, undamaged paint and sealant helps to protect the structural cement. However, damaged surfaces, cracks, and relatively porous slab seams can offer a preferred migration pathway for spilled contaminates, including radionuclides. The cost of remediation of concrete structures is directly related to the amount of concrete that must be removed and subsequently disposed. A carefully implemented investigative plan can be utilized to determine how much concrete must be removed and the approximate level of volumetric radiological contamination can be used to estimate disposal costs. Normal concrete pore solution is saturated with calcium hydroxide and also contains sodium and potassium hydroxide; the pH is typically 13 to 14. Contaminants (such as uranium) that hydrolyze in alkaline media that form precipitant phases and tend to deposit at the near-surface. However, more soluble contaminants, such as Cs-137 (as Cs{sup +}) and Tc-99 (as the pertechnetate anion TcO{sub 4}{sup -}) diffuse more rapidly (and deeply) into the porous substrate. Profiling the migration of the water-soluble radionuclides into a cure (hardened) cement surface is a challenge, since water-cooled saws, borers and similar implements are often used to excise and/or slice the core. Alternately, dry mechanical fracturing for excavation of cement may introduce the possibility of material cross-contamination and uncertainty for the average sampling depth for the sample collection event, potentially yielding non-representative samples, and may preclude determination of crack formation that may have been present in the native (non-fractured) substrate. Structural concrete is comprised of cement and pozzolan paste, relatively impervious aggregate (typically stone and/or sand), and rebar (iron reinforcement). Near-surface aggregate may act as a hydrolytic barrier, causing contaminants leached into the pore water to by-pass the impervious grains, causing deeper-than expected penetration, especially if there are grain boundary cracks also present to facilitate migration. (authors)

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'Radiotoxicity Index': An Inappropriate Discriminator for Advanced Fuel Cycle Technology Selection - 12276

A radiotoxicity index (RI) is often used as a figure of merit for evaluating for evaluating the attractiveness of employing an advanced fuel cycle (i.e., a fuel cycle that uses some combination of separations and other reactor technologies, such as fast reactors), rather than continued use of the current 'once-through' fuel cycle. The RI is calculated by multiplying the amount of every radionuclide found in a waste form for some unit amount of waste times the drinking water dose conversion factor, DCF, for each radionuclide, then summing these together. Some argue that if the RI for an advanced fuel cycle is lower than the RI for a once-through fuel cycle, then implementation of the particular advanced fuel cycle has merit because it reduces the radiotoxicity of the waste. Use of an RI for justifying separations technologies and other components of advanced fuel cycles is not only inappropriate, but can be misleading with respect to judging benefits of advance fuel cycle options. The disposal system, through its use of multiple engineered and natural barriers to migration, eliminates most of the radionuclides contributing to the RI such that additional separations technologies will make little difference to peak dose rates. What must also be considered is the health/dose risk caused to workers and the public by the construction and operation of the separations facility itself. Thus, use of RI may lead to selection of separations technologies that may have a negligible effect on lowering the potential health risks associated with disposal, but will increase real worker and public health risks in the near term. The use of the radiotoxicity index (RI) as a figure of merit for justifying advanced fuel cycles involving separations technologies is not only inappropriate, but can be misleading with respect to judging benefits of advance fuel cycle options. The disposal system, through its use of multiple engineered and natural barriers to migration, eliminates most of the radionuclides contributing to the RI such that additional separations technologies will make little difference to peak dose rates. What must also be considered is the health/dose risk caused to workers and the public by the construction and operation of the separations facility itself. Thus, use of RI may lead to selection of separations technologies that may have a negligible effect on lowering the potential health risks associated with disposal, but will increase real worker and public health risks in the near term. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Determination of Water Saturation in Relatively Dry Porous Media Using Gas-phase Tracer Tests

Soil desiccation (drying), involving water evaporation induced by dry air injection and extraction, is a potentially robust remediation process to slow migration of inorganic or radionuclide contaminants through the vadose zone. The application of gas-phase partitioning tracer tests has been proposed as a means to estimate initial water volumes and to monitor the progress of the desiccation process at pilot-test and field sites. In this paper, tracer tests have been conducted in porous medium columns with various water saturations using sulfur hexafluoride as the conservative tracer and tricholorofluoromethane and difluoromethane as the water-partitioning tracers. For porous media with minimal silt and/or organic matter fractions, tracer tests provided reasonable saturation estimates for saturations close to zero. However, for sediments with significant silt and/or organic matter fractions, tracer tests only provided satisfactory results when the water saturation was at least 0.1 - 0.2. For dryer conditions, the apparent tracer retardation increases due to air – soil sorption, which is not included in traditional retardation coefficients derived from advection-dispersion equations accounting only for air – water partitioning and water – soil sorption. Based on these results, gas-phase partitioning tracer tests may be used to determine initial water volumes in sediments, provided the initial water saturations are sufficiently large. However, tracer tests are not suitable for quantifying moisture content in desiccated sediments.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Impact of GSA2018 Flow Update, Alternative Dispersion Model, and Increased Grid Resolution on Tank Closure Performance Assessments

The F-Area Tank Farm (FTF) and H-Area Tank Farm (HTF) Performance Assessments (PAs) involve simulations of radionuclide and chemical waste migration through groundwater to exposure points. These solute transport simulations are based on a circa 2004 “GSA/PORFLOW” flow model [WSRC-TR-2004-00106]. The GSA/PORFLOW model was significantly updated in 2016-2017 [SRNL-STI-2017-00008 Rev. 1]. Impacts of the “GSA2016” flow model on the F- and H-Tank Farm PAs were assessed in SRNL-STI-2017-00445, Impacts of Updated GSA Groundwater Flow Models on the FTF, HTF and SDF PAs. Since then (2018-2019) further revisions resulted in a “GSA2018” flow model [SRNL-STI-2018-00643], which has been adopted for the 2019 Saltstone PA revision [SRR-CWDA-2019-00001 Revision A]. This study assesses the impacts of the GSA2018 flow model on the FTF and HTF PAs. Also assessed are the impacts of an alternative plume dispersion model and increased grid resolution that have been incorporated in the 2019 Saltstone PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of the DG-1199 methodology to the ESBWR and ABWR.

Appendix A-5 of Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1199 'Alternative Radiological Source Term for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors' provides guidance - applicable to RADTRAD MSIV leakage models - for scaling containment aerosol concentration to the expected steam dome concentration in order to preserve the simplified use of the Accident Source Term (AST) in assessing containment performance under assumed design basis accident (DBA) conditions. In this study Economic and Safe Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) and Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) RADTRAD models are developed using the DG-1199, Appendix A-5 guidance. The models were run using RADTRAD v3.03. Low Population Zone (LPZ), control room (CR), and worst-case 2-hr Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) doses were calculated and compared to the relevant accident dose criteria in 10 CFR 50.67. For the ESBWR, the dose results were all lower than the MSIV leakage doses calculated by General Electric/Hitachi (GEH) in their licensing technical report. There are no comparable ABWR MSIV leakage doses, however, it should be noted that the ABWR doses are lower than the ESBWR doses. In addition, sensitivity cases were evaluated to ascertain the influence/importance of key input parameters/features of the models.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

OVERVIEW OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CHERNOBYL CENTER'S INTERNATIONAL RADIOECOLOGY LABORATORY IN SLAVUTYCH, UKRAINE AND U.S. RESEARCH CENTERS BETWEEN 2000-2010

The International Radioecology Laboratory (IRL) located in Slavutych, Ukraine was created in 1999 under the initiative of the United States Government and the Government of Ukraine in the framework of international cooperation on evaluation and minimization of consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (ChNPP) accident. Since the time the IRL was founded, it has participated in a large number of projects, including the following: (1) study of radionuclide accumulation, distribution, and migration in components of various ecological systems of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ); (2) radiation dose assessments; (3) study of the effects of radiation influence on biological systems; (4) expert analysis of isotopic and quantitative composition of radioactive contaminants; (5) development of new methods and technologies intended for radioecological research; (6) evaluation of future developments and pathways for potential remediation of the ChEZ areas; (7) assistance in provision of physical protection systems for ionizing irradiation sources at Ukrainian enterprises; (8) reviews of open Russian language publications on issues associated with consequences of the ChNPP accident, radioactive waste management, radioecological monitoring, and ChNPP decommissioning; (9) conduct of training courses on problems of radioecology, radiation safety, radioecological characterization of test sites and environmental media, and on research methods; (10) conduct of on-site scientific conferences and workshops on the ChEZ and radioecology problems; participation in off-site scientific conferences and meetings; and (11) preparation of scientific and popular science publications, and interactions with mass media representatives. This article provides a brief overview of the major achievements resulting from this cooperation between the IRL and U.S. research centers.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗