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At least 271 records · Page 15

An Aerial Radiological Survey of Selected Areas of Area 18 - Nevada Test Site

As part of the proficiency training for the Radiological Mapping mission of the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), a survey team from the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis) conducted an aerial radiological survey of selected areas of Area 18 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the purpose of mapping man-made radiation deposited as a result of the Johnnie Boy and Little Feller I tests. The survey area centered over the Johnnie Boy ground zero but also included the ground zero and deposition area of the Little Feller I test, approximately 7,000 feet (2133 meters) southeast of the Johnnie Boy site. The survey was conducted in one flight. The completed survey covered a total of 4.0 square miles. The flight lines (with the turns) over the surveyed areas are presented in Figure 1. One 2.5-hour-long flight was performed at an altitude of 100 ft above ground level (AGL) with 200 foot flight-line spacing. A test-line flight was conducted near the Desert Rock Airstrip to ensure quality control of the data. The test line is not shown in Figure 1. However, Figure 1 does include the flight lines for a ''perimeter'' flight. The path traced by the helicopter flying over distinct roads within the survey area can be used to overlay the survey data on a base map or image. The flight survey lines were flown in an east-west orientation perpendicular to the deposition patterns for both sites. This technique provides better spatial resolution when contouring the data. The data were collected by the AMS data acquisition system (REDAR V) using an array of twelve 2-inch x 4-inch x 16-inch sodium iodide (NaI) detectors flown on-board a twin-engine Bell 412 helicopter. Data, in the form of gamma energy spectra, were collected every second over the course of the survey and were geo-referenced using a differential Global Positioning System. Spectral data allows the system to distinguish between ordinary fluctuations in natural background radiation levels and the signature produced by man-made radioisotopes. Spectral data can also identify specific radioactive isotopes. Based on the results of the RSL NTS 1994 surveys, this area was chosen for a resurvey to improve the spatial resolution of the reported depositions for the Johnnie Boy and Little Feller I events. In addition, the survey was expected to confirm the absence of detectable concentrations of Americium-241 (Am-241) at the Johnnie Boy site and attempt to confirm the presence of Uranium-235 (U-235).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Security of Mobile Radiological Sources: Overview of Industry Applied Technologies

Small radiological sources used in industrial settings recurrently require transit between job sites. Securing these sources, while stationary, can be addressed with standard security approaches and equipment. Transport of these sources increases the risk and complexity of managing and maintaining control of these sources. Implementing methodologies to securely monitor and locate sources improves response and resolution of anomalous events during transit. The Mobile Source Transit Security (MSTS) system was developed to improve security and provide situational awareness of these mobile sources throughout their job cycle. The MSTS development effort focused on creating a set of systems that could be successfully implemented in industrial radiography and well-logging applications. The MSTS team worked to address source presence and location through use and storage. The MSTS system monitors radiological sources as they move from the base of operations to the job site and back. The system provides near-real-time monitoring of the mobile source location and status and early notification of source loss or theft by transmitting operational status and alerting anomalous conditions over telematic links worldwide. The MSTS system can trigger an armed response or initiation of search and recovery operations and will automatically alert management and responsible staff if a radioactive source is lost or stolen whether it is on-site, in transport, or in storage.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Enhancing Nuclear and Radiological Security in Polarized Times: Safeguarding Against Extremist Insider Threats

Domestic violent extremism has been on the rise in recent years, fueled by growing political polarization, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the spread of misinformation online. This concerning trend raises an important question: has this increase in extremist violence manifested in more incidents involving radioactive or nuclear (RN) materials and a corresponding security concern? To explore this question, we analyzed existing data on events involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials over time. Specifically, we examined the rate of RN-related incidents, the targets of these events, and the ideologies motivating the perpetrators by using the Violent Non-State Actor Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Event Database from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Our analysis aimed to determine whether the broader rise of violent extremism has translated to an elevated risk of attacks involving RN materials. Results of the analysis revealed that there was no clear increase in events involving RN material in the dataset. However, given the rarity of these events, this conclusion does not indicate that such a trend might not appear in coming years if violent extremism continues to rise. To address the potential risk presented by violent extremism, in addition to quantifying the frequency of RN events, we also reviewed traits that could make organizations more susceptible to insider threats from radicalized employees. Focusing on the literature around counterproductive workplace behavior, we identified organizational characteristics that might increase the risk of malicious acts committed by radicalized insiders. These risk factors include abusive leadership, situational constraints, and organizational injustice. Finally, using these organizational risk characteristics, we discuss interventions that organizations with RN material can take to reduce their risk of attacks stemming from violent extremism while still protecting individual rights to privacy and civil liberties. Overall, this article provides an overview of the intersections between rising domestic extremism, insider threats, and risks posed by RN materials. We present current data on trends and patterns in this space as well as practical guidance for organizational resilience.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

INL@Work Radiological Search & Response Training

Dealing with radiological hazards is just part of the job for many INL scientists and engineers. Dodging bullets isn't. But some Department of Defense personnel may have to do both. INL employee Jennifer Turnage helps train soldiers in the art of detecting radiological and nuclear material. For more information about INL's research projects, visit http://www.facebook.com/idahonationallaboratory.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

INL Soil Contamination Areas - Wildland Fire Radiological Hazards

The largest wildland fire on the INL occurred in 2019 and initiated a reassessment of the hazard of wildfires burning through soil contamination areas. In 2020 during the COVID shutdown, the INL Emergency Management Group and the Radiological Control Group worked together to re-evaluate the hazards from these soil contamination areas that were last evaluated in 2001. The new soil sample data was examined, and the areas were mapped for radiation intensity. A new evaluation of the radiological hazards due to wildfire was completed and issued because of this work. This presentation will describe the work and the methodologies used to complete this re-evaluation.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiological Contingency Planning for the Mars Science Laboratory Launch

This paper describes the contingency planning for the launch of the Mars Science Laboratory scheduled for the 21-day window beginning on September 15, 2009. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), based in Las Vegas, Nevada, will support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in its role for managing the overall radiological contingency planning support effort. This paper will focus on new technologies that NSTec’s Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) is developing to enhance the overall response capability that would be required for a highly unlikely anomaly. This paper presents recent advances in collecting and collating data transmitted from deployed teams and sensors. RSL is responsible to prepare the contingency planning for a range of areas from monitoring and assessment, sample collection and control, contaminated material release criteria, data management, reporting, recording, and even communications. The tools RSL has available to support these efforts will be reported. The data platform RSL will provide shall also be compatible with integration of assets and field data acquired with other DOE, National Space and Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), state, and local resources, personnel, and equipment. This paper also outlines the organizational structure for response elements in radiological contingency planning.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Radiological Contingency Planning for the Mars Science Laboratory Launch

This paper describes the contingency planning for the launch of the Mars Science Laboratory scheduled for the 21-day window beginning on September 15, 2009. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), based in Las Vegas, Nevada, will support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in its role for managing the overall radiological contingency planning support effort. This paper will focus on new technologies that NSTec’s Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) is developing to enhance the overall response capability that would be required for a highly unlikely anomaly. This paper presents recent advances in collecting and collating data transmitted from deployed teams and sensors. RSL is responsible to prepare the contingency planning for a range of areas from monitoring and assessment, sample collection and control, contaminated material release criteria, data management, reporting, recording, and even communications. The tools RSL has available to support these efforts will be reported. The data platform RSL will provide shall also be compatible with integration of assets and field data acquired with other DOE, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, state, and local resources, personnel, and equipment. This paper also outlines the organizational structure for response elements in radiological contingency planning.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Web-based visual data exploration for improved radiological source detection

Radiation detection can provide a reliable means of detecting radiological material. Such capabilities can help to prevent nuclear and/or radiological attacks, but reliable detection in uncontrolled surroundings requires algorithms that account for environmental background radiation. The Berkeley Data Cloud (BDC) facilitates the development of such methods by providing a framework to capture, store, analyze, and share data sets. In the era of big data, both the size and variety of data make it difficult to explore and find data sets of interest and manage the data. Thus, in the context of big data, visualization is critical for checking data consistency and validity, identifying gaps in data coverage, searching for data relevant to an analyst's use cases, and choosing input parameters for analysis. Downloading the data and exploring it on an analyst's desktop using traditional tools are no longer feasible due to the size of the data. This study describes the design and implementation of a visualization system that addresses the problems associated with data exploration within the context of the BDC. Finally, the visualization system is based on a JavaScript front end communicating via REST with a back end web server.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Evaluation of the Radiological Consequences of Beyond Design Basis Accident for IRT MEPhI

The results of an analysis of the radiological consequences of a beyond design basis accident for IRT MEPhI with high-enrichment uranium fuel and conversion to IRT-3M fuel assemblies with fuel kernel based the alloy U–9% Mo in an aluminum matrix with enrichment 19.7% are presented. The beyond design basis accident is assumed to be blocking of the flow section of the coolant in FA by a foreign object. It was postulated that a single eight-tube FA will melt in this accident. The analysis is performed using approximate conservative estimates. It is shown that the effective dose for the population does not exceed the admissible level. The radiological consequences of the accident for a reactor with high- and low-enrichment fuel are almost indistinguishable.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Measuring changes in environmental radiological background from construction of an advanced nuclear reactor testing facility

We present a method to survey and track changes in the environmental radiological background during the construction and operation of advanced nuclear reactor facilities. We discuss the results of two surveys of the environmental gamma-radiation background at NEXT Lab, an advanced nuclear reactor research facility on the campus of Abilene Christian University, prior to the introduction of radioactive material. In both surveys, the observed radiation dosage rates are low, with the highest rates at 15% of the average total radiation dosage rate for the United States. We observe ≈20% changes in the radiological background of the property in locations where the environment was changed by construction and ≈20% variations within the facilities correlated with variations in building materials.

Environment↗

Data fusion for a vision-aided radiological detection system: Calibration algorithm performance

In order to improve the ability to detect, locate, track and identify nuclear/radiological threats, the University of Florida nuclear detection community has teamed up with the 3D vision community to collaborate on a low cost data fusion system. The key is to develop an algorithm to fuse the data from multiple radiological and 3D vision sensors as one system. The system under development at the University of Florida is being assessed with various types of radiological detectors and widely available visual sensors. A series of experiments were devised utilizing two EJ-309 liquid organic scintillation detectors (one primary and one secondary), a Microsoft Kinect for Windows v2 sensor and a Velodyne HDL-32E High Definition LiDAR Sensor which is a highly sensitive vision sensor primarily used to generate data for self-driving cars. Each experiment consisted of 27 static measurements of a source arranged in a cube with three different distances in each dimension. The source used was Cf-252. The calibration algorithm developed is utilized to calibrate the relative 3D-location of the two different types of sensors without need to measure it by hand; thus, preventing operator manipulation and human errors. The algorithm can also account for the facility dependent deviation from ideal data fusion correlation. Use of the vision sensor to determine the location of a sensor would also limit the possible locations and it does not allow for room dependence (facility dependent deviation) to generate a detector pseudo-location to be used for data analysis later. Using manually measured source location data, our algorithm-predicted the offset detector location within an average of 20 cm calibration-difference to its actual location. Calibration-difference is the Euclidean distance from the algorithm predicted detector location to the measured detector location. The Kinect vision sensor data produced an average calibration-difference of 35 cm and the HDL-32E produced an average calibration-difference of 22 cm. Using NaI and He-3 detectors in place of the EJ-309, the calibration-difference was 52 cm for NaI and 75 cm for He-3. In conclusion, the algorithm is not detector dependent; however, from these results it was determined that detector dependent adjustments are required.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors

Here, this study analyzes the radiological dose consequences of sabotage-induced accidents at three high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors (HTPMs) with thermal power ratings of 1, 10, and 50 MWt. Each HTPM employs uranium oxycarbide tristructural isotropic fuel enriched to 19.75 wt% high-assay low-enriched uranium. Simulations were conducted to estimate reactor core inventory at the point of fuel discharge––when the effective multiplication factor reduced to less than 1––representing peak radionuclide inventory. Postulated sabotage scenarios leading to reactor shutdown were analyzed at two intervals: immediately post-shutdown (0 h) and 3 days after shutdown using the SCALE code for radionuclide inventories and the RASCAL tool for dose consequences. Results show that although HTPMs benefit from inherent safety features and robust fuel design, radiological consequences scale with reactor power because of increased source term inventories. Smaller microreactors exhibited proportionally lower dose consequences. To support the economic and regulatory feasibility of microreactor deployment, this study emphasizes the value of a risk-informed, performance-based approach, as supported by regulations like 10 CFR Parts 100 and 53 in the United States. Microreactor developers should perform site-specific assessments of potential sabotage or low-probability, high-consequence events, especially when considering minimal on-site or full off-site emergency response.

Consequence↗

Integrated soft snake robot for gamma spectroscopy of radiologically contaminated ducting

Anticipated growth in the number and complexity of nuclear facilities entering the decommissioning phase of their lifespan requires innovative methods of mitigating radiological and safety hazards for workers. Advancements in robotics provide opportunities for remote characterization of radiologically contaminated ducts and pipes, reducing worker exposure. However, the nuclear decommissioning industry has shown a hesitancy in adopting new technology due to concerns regarding capital costs and a lack of demonstration data in representative environments. This work aims to leverage novel soft robotics to develop and demonstrate a sensor-integrated characterization tool for contaminated ducting systems. Two gamma spectrometers – one scintillation-based and one solid-state – were selected and integrated into a pneumatically-actuated snake-like soft robot using stretchable electronic cabling. The robot was then demonstrated at the Idaho National Laboratory’s Critical Infrastructure Test Range Complex. The robot maneuvered through a pseudo-constrained corridor containing several sealed sources and the integrated spectrometers collected spectra at various points along the path of travel. Both spectrometers successfully collected spectra with identifiable, isotope-specific peaks. To evaluate the effect of contamination buildup on the collected spectra, the robot with the integrated scintillation detector was tested using a liquid radioactive source. The resulting spectra showed little detection interference from the liquid contamination; however, a short-lived isotope was used which may not be representative of longer-lived contamination.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Simulation of the radiological impact during selected space travel scenarios using the Monte Carlo code FLUKA

Radiation is one of the major challenges of space exploration and can negatively impact both biological and electronic systems, particularly in the case of long-term journeys or if the spaceship features inadequate shielding. Here, in this work, the cumulative dose levels from prompt radiation in the spacecraft are quantified alongside the residual dose contributions arising from activation of vessel components. The radiological impact was assessed for various space exploration scenarios, considering the same spaceship model featuring three shielding design variants. In each scenario, the radiation environment was generated with the Monte Carlo particle transport and interaction code FLUKA. These results can be used to quantify the contribution of prompt and residual dose in spacefaring ventures and help determine optimal radiation shielding needed to mitigate the overall radiological impact on both astronauts and equipment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Uranium Chemical and Radiological Risk Assessment for Freshwater Ecosystems Receiving Ore Mining Releases: Principles, Equations and Parameters

Uranium is an element that has the solely characteristic to behave as significant hazard both from a chemical and radiological point of view. Exclusively of natural occurrence, its distribution into the environment may be influenced by human activities, such as nuclear fuel cycle, military use of depleted uranium, or coal and phosphate fertilizer use, which finally may impact freshwater ecosystems. Until now, the associated environmental impact and risk assessments were conducted separately. We propose here to apply the same methodology to evaluate the ecological risk due to potential chemotoxicity and radiotoxicity of uranium. This methodology is articulated into the classical four steps (EC, 2003: problem formulation, effect and exposure analysis, risk characterisation). The problem formulation dealt both with uranium viewed as a chemical element and as the three isotopes 234, 235 and 238 of uranium and their main daughters. Then, the exposure analysis of non-human species was led on the basis of a common conceptual model of the fluxes occurring in freshwater ecosystems. No-effect values for the ecosystem were derived using the same effect data treatment in parallel. A Species Sensitivity Distribution was fitted: (1) to the ecotoxicity data sets illustrating uranium chemotoxicity and allowing the estimation of a Predicted-No-Effect-Concentration for uranium in water expressed in {mu}g/L; (2) to radiotoxicity effect data as it was done within the ERICA project, allowing the estimation of a Predicted No-Effect-Dose-Rate (in {mu}Gy{center_dot}h{sup -1}). Two methods were then applied to characterize the risk to the ecosystem: a screening method using the risk quotient approach, involving for the radiological aspect back calculation of the water limiting concentration from the PNEDR for each isotope taken into account and a probabilistic risk assessment. A former uranium ore mining case-study will help in demonstrating the application of the whole methodology.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Online Monitoring And Determination Of Environmental Dose Rate, Using Radiological Network In Albania

From May 2004, in the Institute of Nuclear Physics is installed Albanian Radiological Monitoring Network, in the framework of emergency monitoring in the territory of Albania. In this network, this is unique monitoring on-line system in our country. are included 5(five) monitoring stations, respectively in Tirane, Shkoder, Kukes, Korce and Vlore. The last four stations are near Albanian borders The network performs measures of ambient dose rate in a range from 5 nSv/h up to 10 Sv/h. For measurements are used detector of type VACUTEC 70045 A, which are calibrated in the Centre of Applied Nuclear Physics, University of Tirana, using standard radiation source Cs-137. This monitoring help to warn in real time the relative authorities, in case of radiological accidents of 5th degree (for example accidents in nuclear power plants, near Albanian territory).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Testing for characterization of the materials from radiological point of view

The nuclear techniques and materials are now used in a large number of applications, both in medicine and industry. Due to this fact, new materials are needed in order to assure the radiological protection of the personnel involved in these activities. But, finally, all these materials have to be tested for some specific parameters, in order to prove that they are adequate for the purposed for which they were created. One of the important parameters of the materials used for the radiological protection is the attenuation coefficient. The attenuation coefficient of the ionizing radiation composed by particles without electrical charge (X,γ-ray and neutron) is the most important parameter for the materials used for the shielding of these ionizing radiation. This paper deals with the experimental methods developed for the determination of the attenuation of fast and thermal neutrons. These experimental methods, involved the use of Am-Be source and U-120 Cyclotron of IFIN-HH. For the tests which were done at the U-120 Cyclotron, a number of experiments had to be performed, in order to establish the irradiation geometry and the dose equivalent rates in front of and behind the material samples. The experimental results obtained for samples of several materials, confirmed the methods as adequate for the aim of the test.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗