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A microfluidic electrochemical cell for studying the corrosion of uranium dioxide (UO 2 )

We have developed a specialized microfluidic electrochemical cell that enables in situ investigation of the electrochemical corrosion of microgram quantities of redox active solids. The advantage of downscaling is the reduction of hazards, waste, expense, and greatly expanding data collection for hazardous materials, including radioactive samples. Cyclic voltammetry was used to monitor the oxidation–reduction cycle of minute quantities of micron-size uraninite (UO 2 ) particles, from the formation of hexavalent uranium (U(VI)), U 3 O 7 and reduction to UO 2+x . Reaction progress was also studied in situ with scanning electron microscopy. The electrochemical measurements matched those obtained at the bulk-scale and were consistent with ex situ characterization of the run products by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, scanning transmission electron microscopy, and atomic force microscopy; thus, demonstrating the utility of the microfluidic approach for studying radioactive materials.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Quartz Ampoule Loading, Sealing, and Inspection

This procedure applies to the loading of materials into quartz ampoules and flame sealing these ampoules. Flame sealed quartz ampoules are commonly used as a sealed containment for neutron irradiation. Due to the importance of maintaining containment for this application, this procedure involves a double encapsulation design wherein a sealed inner ampoule is sealed is in turn sealed within a larger diameter outer ampoule. General guidance for inspection of ampoules by destructive, non-destructive, qualitative (e.g., visual) and other methods are given. Materials to be placed inside the ampoules may consist of stable element materials or radioactive materials in either solid or liquid form. Liquids shall be dried prior to sealing the ampoule.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Effect of atmospheric conditions on operation of terahertz systems for remote detection of ionizing materials

This study was motivated by a new concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials by using a high power terahertz (THz) wave beam, which can be focused in a small spot where the wave electric field exceeds the breakdown threshold. In the presence of seed electrons in such a volume, this focusing can initiate the avalanche breakdown. Typically, an ambient density of free electrons is assumed to be at the level of one particle per cubic centimeter. So, when a breakdown-prone volume is smaller than 1 cm{sup 3}, there should be significant difference between the breakdown rates in the case of presence of additional sources of ionization versus its absence. Since the flux density of gamma rays emitted by radioactive materials rapidly falls with the distance from the source, while the intensity of THz waves also decreases with the distance due to wave attenuation in the atmosphere, it is important to find an optimal location of the breakdown to be initiated for a given distance between a radioactive material and a THz antenna. This problem is analyzed in a given paper with the account for not only atmospheric attenuation of THz waves but also the air turbulence.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Nondestructive Analysis of MET-5 Paint Can at TA35 Building 2 A-Wing Vault

In Building 2 A-wing vault MET-5 has some drums and other packages they wanted NEN-1 help identifying nondestructively. Measurements using a mechanically cooled portable high-purity germanium HPGe Ortec detective were taken of a paint can container labeled DU-2A to determine if any radioactive material was inside. The HPGe detector measures the gamma rays emitted by radioactive material and displays it as a spectrum. The spectrum is used to identify this radioactive material by using appropriate analysis software and identifying the gamma ray peaks. A paint can container, DU-2A, was analyzed with PeakEasy 4.84 and FRAM 5.2. The FRAM report is shown. The enrichment is 0.091% U235 and 99.907% U238. This material is depleted uranium. The measurement was performed in the near field, and to extract a mass a far field measurement will need to be taken.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Examining the Effect of Plume Rise on Radiological Consequences of Nuclear Accidents

A nuclear accident could cause release of radioactive material outside containment. This material will eventually disperse into the surrounding environment, and could pose a serious threat to public safety, and environment. Mitigation of radiological consequences of such an accident is highly desirable, and since Fukushima accident, there has been a growing focus on nuclear utilities to develop capabilities for this purpose. Undoubtedly, suppression of radioactive material release and dispersion is the primary mean for mitigating radiological consequences nevertheless alternative methods should also be explored to broaden the spectrum of choices for actual circumstances. As we know that, dispersion of radioactive material and subsequent radiological consequences are affected by plume rise. Plume rise is an important factor in determining ground level contamination since it can increase effective release height appreciably provided that effluent discharge speed and temperature is high enough. Under most circumstances, one can expect reduction in radiological consequences due to lower levels of radiation dose and ground contamination in the presence of adequate plume rise. Nevertheless, the effect of plume rise is usually ignored in radiological consequence studies for the sake of conservatism, and lack of information. However, this particular attribute of plume rise interested us to investigate the effect of plume rise in the scope of consequence mitigation and how this advantage could be utilized during an accident progression to minimize the impact of radioactivity release to the environment. In this work, we examine the effect of plume rise on radiological consequences of a nuclear accident for plume rise contributions much larger ({approx}500 m) than usually achievable in normal circumstances. The effect of plume rise on radiological consequences is quantified in this study as decontamination credit (DCC) achievable corresponding to maximum annual dose. This analysis is performed for a number of release heights and atmospheric conditions. We discuss available results in the scope of radiological consequence mitigation, devising a strategy for utilizing plume rise phenomenon with the help of an external propelling device like a jet engine for radiological consequence management. This study is continuation of our efforts for devising systems and strategies to mitigate consequences of radioactivity release accidents like Fukushima. We have proposed several ideas for suppressing/preventing the dispersion of released radioactive material to the environment using offsite equipment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

University of Nevada, Reno Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging

This paper describes a new Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging (GCNP). Nuclear materials are currently used for large-scale production of electricity without greenhouse gas generation, advanced medical treatments, food sterilization, and sophisticated measurement technologies. In order to benefit from these uses, nuclear materials packaging must be developed, manufactured, inspected, and maintained for storage, transfer, transport, and disposal that protect the public and the environment. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP) originally offered the following ten, one-day to ten-day training courses. 1. Methods for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages and Performing Confirmatory Analysis; 2. Welding Criteria for Shipping Containers; 3. Structural Analysis and Acceptance Criteria; 4. Quality Assurance (QA) for Radioactive Material Packaging Training; 5. Application of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code to Radioactive Material Transportation Packaging; 6. ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) System for Management of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials; 7. Packaging Operations and Maintenance; 8. Packaging Leakage Test Training; 9. Management of SARP Preparation; 10. Transport Security of Radioactive Material. These courses were designed in accordance with DOE standards. They were taught at a rigorous graduate-university level by experienced technical staff who are coordinated by Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Savannah River National Laboratories. The courses were taught at these Laboratories or nearby locations. The PCP courses are attended by personnel from government agencies, national laboratories, and the nuclear industry, from both inside and outside the United States. Students in these classes have generally earned undergraduate or higher degrees. These courses are designed to assist student with specialized job duties, and may provide them a competitive advantage when seeking employment or promotion in the nuclear packaging and other related fields. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radionuclide Emission Estimation for the Center for Advanced Energy Studies (CAES)

An Radiological Safety Analysis Computer Program (RSAC)-7 model dose assessment was performed to evaluate maximum Center for Advanced Energy Studies (CAES) boundary effective dose equivalent (EDE, in mrem/yr) for potential individual releases of radionuclides from the facility. The CAES is a public/private partnership between the State of Idaho and its academic research institutions, the federal government through the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) managed by the Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA). CAES serves to advance energy security for our nation by expanding educational opportunities at Idaho universities in energy-related areas, creating new capabilities within its member institutions, and delivering technological innovations leading to technology-based economic development for the intermountain region. CAES has developed a strategic plan (INL/EXT-07-12950) based on the balanced scorecard approach. At the present time it is unknown exactly what processes will be used in the facility in support of this strategic plan. What is known is that the Idaho State University (ISU) Radioactive Materials License (Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] license 11-27380-01) is the basis for handling radioactive material in the facility. The material in this license is shared between the ISU campus and the CAES facility. There currently are no agreements in place to limit the amount of radioactive material at the CAES facility or what is done to the material in the facility. The scope of this analysis is a summary look at the basis dose for each radionuclide included under the license at a distance of 100, 500, and 1,000 m. Inhalation, ingestion and ground surface dose was evaluated using the NRC design basis guidelines. The results can be used to determine a sum of the fractions approach to facility safety. This sum of the fractions allows a facility threshold value (TV) to be established and potential activities to be evaluated against this TV.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Propagation of gamma rays and production of free electrons in air

This paper is devoted to the analysis of production of free electrons in air by gamma-rays leaking from radioactive materials. A model based on the Klein-Nishina scattering theory is used to calculate scattering cross sections and approximate the electron production rate. The model includes the effects of primary gamma-quanta radiated by the source as well as that scattered in air. Comparison of the model with the mcnpx kinetic code (http://mcnpx.lanl.gov/) in a sample problem shows excellent agreement. The motivation for this research comes from the recently proposed concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials [V. L. Granatstein and G. S. Nusinovich, J. Appl. Phys. 108, 063304 (2010)]. The concept is based on the breakdown in air at the focal point of a high-power beam of electromagnetic waves produced by a THz gyrotron with a 10-20 {mu}s pulse. The presence of a radioactive material can greatly exceed the production rate of free electrons over the natural background rate. Additional electrons act as seeds to initiate the breakdown and create sufficiently dense plasma at the focal region. The dense plasma can then be remotely detected as an unambiguous effect of the concealed radioactive material.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Aspects of Assessment of Packages with Wood Filled Impact Limiters during Fire Tests - 17191

Packages for the transport of radioactive material are often equipped with impact limiters consisting of wood, encapsulated by steel sheets. These impact limiters shall ensure that the transport casks meet the mechanical and thermal IAEA regulatory test requirements. According to the accident conditions of transport it is mandatory to expose the specimens to a cumulative effect by mechanical and thermal impacts. The mechanical tests consist of a free drop from 9 m onto a flat unyielding target and a 1 m drop onto a puncture bar. After damage caused by mechanical test sequences the package has to withstand a severe fire scenario. Corresponding to the IAEA advisory material it is required that the impact attitudes for the 9 m drop test and for the puncture test have to be such as to produce maximum damage, taking into account the thermal test. Moreover, any damage, which would give rise to increased radiation or loss of containment or affect the confinement system after the thermal test, should be considered. During and following the thermal test, the specimen shall not be artificially cooled and any combustion of materials of the package shall be permitted to proceed naturally. Different works from the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and BAM show that additional energy supply from a pre-damaged impact limiter to the cask could occur. This effect should be considered within the safety assessment of the containment. Thermal effects at the closure system of the cask, which might result in an elevated activity release, have to be excluded. BAM conducted small scale tests with wood filled metal buckets showing continuing combustion processes during the cooling down phase. These test results are presented. As not much is known about smouldering processes in wood filled impact limiters, it is highly complex to define pre-damage of impact limiters, which are conservative, regarding the maximum damaging energy flow from the impact limiter to the containment system. More research has to be done to develop models to examine the effects of smouldering impact limiters on the containment of packages for the transport of radioactive material. Aspects of assessment and its difficulties are shown. BAM as a competent authority for the approval of transport casks for radioactive material in Germany operates the test facilities to examine the issue of mechanical damage, combustion and heat transfer for such kind of package systems. For this purpose, the knowledge from real drop tests with casks of a mass partly over 100 tons was transferred to a test application. A thermal test will take place with a wood filled test specimen with a diameter of about 2.3 meters. The aim is to understand the phenomena of smouldering under the consideration of relevant regulatory boundary conditions. The process of smouldering is described with regard to the requirements in the thermal assessment of safety of packages for the transport of radioactive material. Requirements concerning the pre-damage of packages for the maximum damage of impact limiters are discussed. Parameters influencing the smouldering process are identified. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decontamination and Decommissioning Program of a Radiopharmaceuticals Production Facility - 17103

On May 2012, Best Medical Belgium (BMB) S.A., a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products located on the nuclear site of Fleurus, was declared bankrupt. According to the Belgian law, ONDRAF/NIRAS (Belgian Radioactive Waste Management Agency) was entrusted with the clean-up and the decommissioning operations of the former BMB facilities, nowadays known as 'ONDRAF/NIRAS Site Fleurus' (ONSF). In June 2015, ONSF launched a Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) program, for which Tractebel supports the definition of the clean-up and decommissioning strategies; the drafting of the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP) and License Application for decommissioning; and the follow-up of the clean-up and upcoming D and D works on site. Four nuclear buildings are part of the clean-up and D and D activities. One of them, Building 14 (B14), represents the most challenging task with the clean-up of highly contaminated areas and their further decommissioning up to greenfield. Beside its two cyclotrons successively used for the production of radioisotopes, this building features hot cells and glove boxes used for the purification of radioisotopes and the conditioning of the final pharmaceutical product. The present paper aims at presenting the development of the D and D program in terms of modifications of existing facilities to allow carrying out the clean-up and D and D activities and the management of dismantled radioactive materials in a safe, efficient and cost-effective way as well as in terms of strategic options to be developed for the FDP. To support the clean-up and D and D activities, several workshops have been designed in order to treat radioactive materials removed from the building rooms. Those workshops feature an input buffer storage area, a common output buffer storage area and installations for the treatment of radioactive materials and waste (handling devices, cutting means, decontamination means, free release measurements means, etc.). Some modifications to the existing auxiliary systems will be required in order to dispose of appropriate systems to operate those workshops in a safe way. Activated concrete structures will constitute the most important part of radioactive materials that will arise from the decommissioning activities. To limit the total decommissioning costs, and especially the costs associated to radioactive waste management, two strategies have been developed in order to manage a part of activated concrete as candidate for free release with a certain decay period or as candidate for conventional landfill. Both strategies will have to be further detailed and discussed with the competent Authorities to ensure they can actually be implemented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Neutronics Analysis for ITER Diagnostic Generic Upper Port Plug

This paper presents new results of neutronics analysis performed for the updated design of the ITER Diagnostic Generic Upper Port Plug (DGUPP). Such analysis is performed regularly during the development of the ITER Ports design. Neutronics analysis is an important step in support of the development of ITER components irradiated by 14 MeV neutrons generated in D-T fusion thermonuclear reactions. The neutrons are born in the ITER tokamak plasma chamber and then impinge on the surrounding blanket and port plugs, after that they diffuse through shielding material of vacuum vessel components or could stream through the diagnostic channels and assembly gaps far away from plasma up to the bio-shield and in a small amount beyond it. While ITER machine is in operation it is inaccessible, after the shut-down it is planned to provide personnel access to the Upper Port Inter-Space Structure (UP ISS) behind the Port Plug via the corridors. Neutrons activate the ITER materials and those radioactive materials emit decay gammas during the shut-down causing a Shut-Down Dose Rate (SDDR) field distributed all around the activated materials. Decay gammas could also stream through the void channels. That emphasizes the need for calculation of decay gamma transport in evaluations of SDDR, which is reflected in the use of transport - activation interface code described in Section of Computational Modelling. The assessment of radiation environment (fluxes and SDDR) at DGUPP was focused on the port back-side area of UP ISS, where personnel access is planned along the ISS maintenance corridors. Minimization of SDDR at the front part of the ISS maintenance corridors was the target value for optimization of the DGUPP shielding and analysis of related neutronics effects. Following the dose ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle, every possibility to reduce SDDR should be investigated, emphasizing the importance of this analysis. The challenges of such analysis are inextricably connected with the engineering complexity of the ITER machine, with integration of many diagnostics systems having channels and gaps inside the ITER ports. Those gaps result in radiation streaming and negatively affect the shielding performance of the port plugs. The computational complication is caused by the need to model precisely the ITER geometry and then to run deep penetrating radiation transport in the substantially heterogenic toroidal geometry of ITER large-size tokamak, with 30 m height and diameter of its bio-shield. The whole mass of Upper Port Plug (UPP) could be up to 25 tons and it must be very precisely positioned inside the port opening in blanket and Vacuum Vessel. Facing the engineering challenges for the assembly of DGUPP, there were proposed two Project Change Requests (PCRs) No. 439 and 709 concerning the design updates of UPP/blanket interface and its remote handling.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Book Review: Radiation protection and measurement issues related to cargo scanning with accelerator-produced high-energy X rays, NCRP Commentary No. 20

Having spent roughly the first third of his health physics career on the Norfolk, VA waterfront area, the reviewer was excited to see the NCRP Commentary 20, 'Radiation Protection and Measurements Issues Related to Cargo Scanning with Accelerator Technology'. It signals the advent of the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS). The waterfront is a border that challenges physical security programs and technology. As Commentary 20 provides in the introduction, waterfront cargo terminals and land border crossings together represent over 300 ports of entry in the USA. Every year, the USA receives over 10 million cargo containers from commercial shipping and a roughly equal amount from land border crossings. While rapidly processing containerized cargo, CAARS will be able to detect small quantities of high atomic number radioactive materials and dense shielding materials used for radioactive gamma ray sources and even illicit human cargo - important concerns for homeland security. It will also be able to detect other contraband such as explosives, weapons and drugs. Section 1 of the Commentary presents an executive summary with NCRP's radiation dose management recommendations and related operational recommendations for effective implementation of CAARS technology in the current regulatory environment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Complexation of neptunium(V) with fluoride in aqueous solutions at elevated temperatures

Over the past several decades, the production and testing of nuclear weapons in the U.S. have created significant amounts of high-level nuclear wastes (HLW) that are currently stored in underground tanks across the U.S. DOE (Department of Energy) sites. Eventually, the HLW will be made into the waste form and disposed of in geological repositories for HLW. Among the radioactive materials, neptunium is of great concern in the post-closure chemical environment in the repository because of the long half-life of 237Np (2.14•106 years) and the high mobility of Np(V), the most stable oxidation state of neptunium. It is estimated that 237Np, together with 129I and 99Tc, will be the major contributors to the potential total annual dose from the repository beyond 10000 years [1]. Due to the high radiation energy released from the HLW, the postclosure repository is expected to remain at elevated temperatures for thousands of years [1]. If the waste package is breached and becomes in contact with groundwater, neptunium, as well as other radioactive materials will be in aqueous solutions at elevated temperatures. Interactions of radioactive materials with the chemical components in groundwater play an important role in determining their migration in the repository. To predict the migration behavior of neptunium, it is necessary to have sufficient and reliable thermodynamic data on its complexation with the ligands that are present in the groundwater of the repository (e.g., OH–, F–, SO42– ,PO43– and CO32) at elevated temperatures. However, such data are scarce and scattered for 25°C, and nearly nonexistent for elevated temperatures [2]. To provide reliable thermodynamic data, we have conducted investigations of the complexation of actinides, including thorium, uranium, neptunium and plutonium, at elevated temperatures. Thermodynamic parameters, including formation constants, enthalpy and heat capacity of complexation are experimentally determined. This paper summarizes the results of the complexation of Np(V) with fluoride in aqueous solutions at 10–70°C studied by spectrophotometry and microcalorimetry.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Potential Radionuclide Release and Transport for the Zion Nuclear Power Station Basement Fill End State: Conceptual Model Development and Sensitivity Analysis

ZionSolutions is in the process of decommissioning the Zion Nuclear Power Plant. The site contains two reactor Containment Buildings, a fuel building, an Auxiliary Building, and a Turbine Building that may be contaminated. The current decommissioning plan involves removing all above grade structures to a depth of 3 feet below grade. The remaining underground structures will be filled with clean concrete demolition debris (CCDD) that will not have detectable licensed radioactive material. However, the remaining structures will contain low amounts of residual licensed radioactive material. An important component of the decommissioning process is the demonstration that any remaining activity will not cause a hypothetical individual to receive a dose in excess of 25 mrem/y as specified in 10CFR 20 Subpart E. To demonstrate compliance with 10CFR 20 Subpart E requires modeling of the release and transport of radioactive material to a receptor. This involves characterization of the buildings on site to quantify the amount of residual radioactivity, modeling the release of radioactivity from the concrete and transport through the groundwater to a receptor well or nearby water body. At this point, exposure scenarios are postulated that have a future resident inhale, ingest, or be externally exposed to radiation resulting from the residual contamination. This typically involves using well water for drinking, irrigation, and growing crops.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Radiation detection and situation management by distributed sensor networks

Detection of radioactive materials in an urban environment usually requires large, portal-monitor-style radiation detectors. However, this may not be a practical solution in many transport scenarios. Alternatively, a distributed sensor network (DSN) could complement portal-style detection of radiological materials through the implementation of arrays of low cost, small heterogeneous sensors with the ability to detect the presence of radioactive materials in a moving vehicle over a specific region. In this paper, we report on the use of a heterogeneous, wireless, distributed sensor network for traffic monitoring in a field demonstration. Through wireless communications, the energy spectra from different radiation detectors are combined to improve the detection confidence. In addition, the DSN exploits other sensor technologies and algorithms to provide additional information about the vehicle, such as its speed, location, class (e.g. car, truck), and license plate number. The sensors are in-situ and data is processed in real-time at each node. Relevant information from each node is sent to a base station computer which is used to assess the movement of radioactive materials.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗